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Legal Ethics Prep & Practice / Transactions and Communications with Persons Other Than Clients FREE

Subject 7: Transactions and Communications with Persons Other Than Clients

Free MPRE Study Material · NCBE weight: 2–8% · © 2026 PryvixLabs LLC. All rights reserved.

In this packet: Transactions and Communications with Persons Other Than Clients Outline, 20 multiple-choice questions, 20 true/false statements, 18 flashcards, 3 scenario walkthroughs and 11 key terms.

Outlines1 outline
Multiple Choice20 questions
True/False20 statements
Flashcards18 cards
Walkthroughs3 walkthroughs
Key Terms11 terms

Header Record

| Field | Value |

---|---| | Packet ID | A | | Section | S07 — Transactions & Communications with Persons Other than Clients | | NCBE area | VII — Transactions and Communications with Persons Other than Clients | | NCBE range / target weight | 2–8% / 5% (PRD §3) | | Part | A — Attack Sheet, Outline, Comparison Charts | | Law-as-of date | September 27, 2026 | | Outline blocks | 9 (OUT-0001 … -0009) | | Key terms marked | 11 | | Comparison charts | 2 (each with a Spoken summary) | | Case illustrations | 1 (Niesig v. Team I — citation and holding confirmed via Justia, v1.1) | | Rule-text source | Paraphrase throughout, Model Rule numbers cited (Style Guide 3.2 ¶1). No state-adopted text quoted in Part A. |

Currency check (revised at v1.1, Sept 28, 2026). The v1.0 header stated that a search for 2025–2026 ABA amendments to MR 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and MR 2.3 had found none. That was wrong, and the correction matters more than the error: the project's own k5-currency-register.md, dated Sept 24, already recorded the amendment and had earmarked it for this section. The check was run against recall instead of against the register.

The position, confirmed independently by three reviewers and by the register: the black letter of MR 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and MR 2.3 was not amended in 2025–2026. The August 2026 Annual Meeting adopted comment amendments only (Res. 100, 101A–101F), and within this section's rules exactly one landed: Res. 101F, amending MR 4.2 cmt. [9] and adding cmt. [10] on limited-scope representation and the pro se lawyer, adopting Formal Op. 502. It is taught at OUT-0005 with a testing-lag note. The February 2026 package (Res. 100) rewrote MR 1.14 and does not touch this series. Formal Ops. 525 and 523 are outside this section's scope. Formal Op. 06-442 governs metadata under MR 4.4(b) and is cited at OUT-0008.

Density note: at a 5% target weight this section is one of the lighter ones. It is written tight on purpose — nine rule blocks, two charts, one case. Do not pad it to match the length of Conflicts (S04).


Attack Sheet — Section 7

Work a Section 7 fact pattern in this order. The trigger words are what tell you which rule is live.

# Ask this first If yes, go to Trigger words in the stem
1 Is the lawyer saying something untrue to someone who is not the client? 7.1 — MR 4.1(a) "told opposing counsel", "represented that", "assured", "stated that the policy limit was"
2 Is the lawyer staying silent while the client commits a crime or fraud? 7.1 — MR 4.1(b) + MR 1.2(d), 1.6, 1.16 "the client's financials were false", "the lawyer said nothing", "continued to negotiate"
3 Does the person the lawyer contacted already have a lawyer in this matter? 7.2 — MR 4.2 "represented by counsel", "called the defendant directly", "the employee", "reached out to the officer"
4 Is the contacted person unrepresented? 7.3 — MR 4.3 "not represented", "appeared without counsel", "thought the lawyer was neutral"
5 Is the lawyer using a tactic aimed at a non-party or a third person? 7.4 — MR 4.4(a) "subpoenaed her employer", "only to embarrass", "deposed the elderly mother"
6 Did something arrive by mistake? 7.4 — MR 4.4(b) "inadvertently", "mis-addressed email", "attached the wrong file", "privileged memo"
7 Is the lawyer writing an opinion for someone other than the client to rely on? 7.5 — MR 2.3 "opinion letter to the bank", "for the buyer's use", "so the lender could rely"

Two habits that decide most Section 7 questions. First, identify whose lawyer the person has. MR 4.2 and MR 4.3 are mutually exclusive: represented goes to 4.2, unrepresented goes to 4.3, and the whole answer turns on which one the stem gave you. Second, notice who is doing the talking. These rules restrain the lawyer. They do not restrain the client, and that gap is the single most tested point in this section.


7.1 Truthfulness in Statements to Others

OUT-0001 — Knowingly false statements to a third person

Rule: While representing a client, a lawyer must not knowingly mislead a non-client about a material fact or about the law.

Elements

  1. The lawyer is acting for a client at the time.
  2. The statement goes to a third person — anyone who is not the lawyer's client.
  3. The lawyer knows it is untrue. Carelessness is not enough for this rule.
  4. The subject is a Material fact — something that could affect how the listener decides or acts. A statement about the law is treated the same way.

Exceptions and limits

  1. Ordinary negotiating talk is not a statement of material fact. What a thing is worth, how far a party will really go, what a claim is "really worth" are understood by both sides as positioning, not as fact. [MR 4.1 cmt. [2]]
  2. Silence is not a false statement under paragraph (a). A lawyer has no general duty to volunteer facts to the other side; paragraph (b), covered in the next block, is the narrow exception. [MR 4.1 cmt. [1]]
  3. Partial truths count as false. An affirmation that is literally accurate but engineered to leave a false impression is treated as a misstatement. [MR 4.1 cmt. [1]]
  4. A lawyer is also responsible for a statement made through someone else — you cannot have a paralegal or an agent say what you could not say yourself. [MR 8.4(a); MR 5.3]

Explanation The Rules let a lawyer be a hard bargainer but not a liar. The line is drawn at material fact: whether a lien exists, whether a policy has a $2 million limit, whether a signature is genuine. Those are facts, and lying about them is sanctionable even when nobody relies on the lie and nobody loses money — discipline does not require harm. What sits on the other side of the line is the language of haggling, which the profession treats as mutually understood theater. The practical test is whether a reasonable lawyer on the other side would take the statement as a report about the world or as a bargaining posture.

Example During settlement talks, Attorney Okafor tells opposing counsel two things: that her client "will not go a dollar below $90,000," and that her client's treating physician "found no pre-existing back injury." The first is a negotiating position, even if Okafor knows the client would in fact take $70,000. The second is a statement of material fact. If the physician's report does note a pre-existing injury and Okafor knows it, she has violated MR 4.1(a).

⚠ Exam trap The classic wrong answer treats bluffing about the client's bottom line as a violation. It is not — that is Puffery, and the comments say so directly. The exam builds items that put a puff and a real factual misstatement side by side in the same stem, and the credited answer turns on separating them. A second trap runs the other way: students excuse a genuine factual lie because "it was just negotiation." Negotiation is a setting, not a licence.

Compare MR 3.3 (candor to a tribunal) is stricter: before a court, a lawyer must correct even a statement innocently made, and must disclose adverse controlling authority. MR 4.1 governs statements outside a proceeding and has no comparable affirmative-correction duty in paragraph (a). MR 8.4(c) is the catch-all against dishonesty and reaches conduct even when no client representation is under way.

Cite(s): MR 4.1(a); MR 4.1 cmt. [1]–[2]; MR 8.4(a), (c); MR 5.3


OUT-0002 — When silence would make the lawyer part of a client's crime or fraud

Rule: When staying silent would help a client carry out a crime or a fraud, the lawyer must disclose the fact needed to prevent it — unless the duty of confidentiality forbids the disclosure.

Elements

  1. The client is committing, or is about to commit, a crime or fraud — not merely driving a hard or unfair bargain.
  2. The lawyer's continued silence would assist it, typically because the lawyer's ongoing participation lends the transaction credibility.
  3. Disclosure of the specific fact would prevent the assistance.
  4. Disclosure is not barred by MR 1.6.

Exceptions and limits

  1. Confidentiality wins by default. The duty in paragraph (b) is switched off wherever MR 1.6 forbids the disclosure, which is why the rule is far narrower than it first sounds. [MR 4.1(b); MR 4.1 cmt. [3]]
  2. MR 1.6(b) may switch it back on. Where the client is using the lawyer's services to commit a crime or fraud causing substantial financial injury, MR 1.6(b)(2) permits disclosure to prevent it, and MR 1.6(b)(3) permits disclosure to mitigate or rectify it. Once disclosure is permitted, paragraph (b) can require it. [MR 1.6(b)(2)–(3)]
  3. Withdrawal alone may not be enough. Pulling out under MR 1.16 stops the lawyer from further assisting, but where the lawyer's past work is still being used to mislead, a Noisy withdrawal — disaffirming the lawyer's own opinion or document — may be needed. [MR 1.2 cmt. [10]; MR 4.1 cmt. [3]]
  4. The rule never authorizes the lawyer to help in the first place. Counselling or assisting known client crime or fraud is independently prohibited. [MR 1.2(d)]

Explanation This is the one place in the Rule 4 series with an affirmative duty to disclose, and it is deliberately hemmed in. Read it as a two-step: first ask whether silence would make the lawyer a participant in a crime or fraud; then ask whether MR 1.6 allows the lawyer to say anything at all. If confidentiality bars disclosure, the lawyer's route out is withdrawal, not revelation. Most exam items that look like MR 4.1(b) resolve on the second step, so the credited answer usually names MR 1.6 as the gate.

Example Attorney Reyes represents a seller in a business sale. Mid-deal, Reyes learns the client has handed the buyer financial statements the client knows are fabricated, and the buyer is relying on Reyes's continued involvement as a sign the deal is sound. Reyes's silence now assists a fraud. Because the client is using Reyes's services to commit a fraud likely to cause substantial financial injury, MR 1.6(b)(2) permits disclosure, so MR 4.1(b) can require Reyes to disclose enough to stop it — and at minimum Reyes must withdraw.

⚠ Exam trap Students read paragraph (b) as a broad duty to correct the other side's misimpressions. It is not. Strip the fact pattern down to two questions — is this a crime or fraud, and does MR 1.6 permit disclosure — and most tempting answers fall away. The other frequent error is treating unfairness as fraud. A lopsided deal, a client who is simply a better negotiator, or a counterparty who failed to do diligence triggers nothing here.

Cite(s): MR 4.1(b); MR 4.1 cmt. [3]; MR 1.2(d); MR 1.2 cmt. [10]; MR 1.6(b)(2)–(3); MR 1.16(a)(1), (b)(2)


7.2 Communication with a Person Represented by Counsel

OUT-0003 — The no-contact rule

Rule: Where the lawyer is aware the other person already has a lawyer in the matter, she may not take that matter up with them directly. Three things open the door: the other lawyer agrees, a law allows it, or a court orders it.

Elements

  1. The lawyer is representing a client — the rule applies to the lawyer's professional conduct, not to purely personal dealings.
  2. The lawyer knows the person has counsel in this matter. Knowledge can be inferred from the circumstances; a lawyer may not shut her eyes to the obvious.
  3. The exchange touches the very matter the other lawyer is handling.
  4. No permission applies.

Exceptions and limits

  1. The other lawyer's consent. The most common route, and it must come from the lawyer, never from the represented person. [MR 4.2]
  2. Authorized by law or court order. This covers, for example, statutory rights to petition the government and certain lawful investigative activity before charges are filed. [MR 4.2 cmt. [5] (authorized by law); cmt. [6] (court order)]
  3. The represented person's own consent is irrelevant. It does not matter that the person called the lawyer, begged to talk, or said their lawyer was useless. The protection belongs to the relationship, and only counsel can waive it. [MR 4.2 cmt. [3]]
  4. Different matter, no bar. The rule is matter-specific. A lawyer may speak to a person about an unrelated subject even though that person has counsel elsewhere. [MR 4.2]
  5. A lawyer may always talk to the other lawyer — and may communicate with a represented person's counsel about anything in the matter.

Example Attorney Lindqvist represents a plaintiff. The defendant, who is represented, telephones Lindqvist directly and says, "My lawyer is hopeless, let me just tell you what happened." Lindqvist must not discuss the case. The defendant's eagerness changes nothing; Lindqvist needs defence counsel's consent. Lindqvist may tell the defendant to speak with his own lawyer and end the call.

⚠ Exam trap The most-tested trap in this section: the represented person initiates the call. Students reason that the person waived the protection. Wrong — only the person's lawyer can consent. The runner-up trap swaps in a different matter: where the contact is about something unrelated, there is no violation, and answers that treat 4.2 as a blanket ban on ever speaking to a represented person are wrong.

Compare MR 3.4(f) limits a lawyer's ability to ask a non-client to withhold information from the other side, and is generally confined to the client's relatives, employees and agents. MR 4.2 is about talking to the wrong person; MR 3.4(f) is about telling someone not to talk.

Cite(s): MR 4.2; MR 4.2 cmt. [3], [5], [7]–[8]; MR 3.4(f); MR 8.4(a)


OUT-0004 — Organizations: which people are off limits

Rule: When the represented party is an organization, the no-contact rule shields the people whose words can bind or be charged against it, not every person who works there.

Elements — treat a person inside a represented organization as covered when any of these is true. They are set out here in a different order from the comment, deliberately, and each is tied to the matter in hand rather than to rank:

  1. Their own conduct is in play. What this person did or failed to do in the matter could be charged to the organization and create its liability.
  2. They can commit the organization. They hold authority to bind it on this matter.
  3. They are the lawyer's channel. They instruct the organization's lawyer about the matter, or routinely take her advice on it. This is the branch students forget, and it captures most managers.

Exceptions and limits

  1. Former employees are generally outside the rule. A lawyer may ordinarily interview a former employee of a represented organization without opposing counsel's consent, though the lawyer must not seek privileged material and remains bound by MR 4.3 and MR 4.4. [MR 4.2 cmt. [7]] The Model Rule position is settled and was confirmed at v1.1: the comment says flatly that the organization's lawyer's consent is not required to speak with a former constituent. State note: some jurisdictions restrict contact with former employees who were privy to privileged material.
  2. Rank is not the test. A senior title does not make someone covered if their conduct is not at issue and they cannot bind the organization; a junior employee whose act caused the injury may well be covered.
  3. Government actors. The right to petition the government and certain regulatory contacts may permit communication a private-party analysis would bar. [MR 4.2 cmt. [5]]
  4. An Organizational constituent who is personally represented in the matter is covered on that basis alone.

Explanation Organizations cannot speak for themselves, so the rule has to pick out the humans whose statements matter. The Model Rule's answer is functional rather than hierarchical: it protects the people who instruct the lawyer, the people who can commit the entity, and the people whose conduct is the case. Everyone else is, in principle, a witness the other side may interview. This matters practically because a plaintiff's lawyer investigating a company needs some lawful path to the facts, and an absolute bar would hand the company control of every witness.

Example A trucking company is represented in a collision suit. Plaintiff's counsel wants to interview: the driver involved in the crash; the safety director who has been briefing the company's lawyer weekly; and a dispatcher who was off duty that day and knows nothing about the accident. The driver is covered — his conduct is what may be charged to the company. The safety director is covered — she regularly consults with counsel about the matter. The dispatcher is not covered on these facts, and may ordinarily be interviewed, subject to MR 4.3.

⚠ Exam trap Students apply a "control group" or an "everyone who works there" test. The Model Rule does neither. Run the three functional questions instead. A second trap: assuming a former employee is still protected. Under the Model Rule the ordinary answer is that she is not — but the lawyer still may not mislead her about who he is, and may not try to extract privileged communications.

Rule cited: MR 4.2 (as adopted in New York) Rule wording: The no-contact rule protects an organization's constituents whose conduct is at issue or who can bind the entity, not all of its employees. Facts: In a construction-injury case, the plaintiff's lawyer sought to interview employees of the represented corporate defendant who had witnessed the accident, without corporate counsel's consent. The defendant argued every employee was off limits. Holding: New York's highest court rejected a blanket rule barring contact with all employees, and adopted a narrower test keyed to employees whose acts are binding on or attributable to the corporation, or who implement counsel's advice. A blanket ban would have made ordinary factual investigation impossible. Why it matters for the exam: It is the standard illustration that "employee of a represented company" is not the test — function is.

Cite(s): MR 4.2 cmt. [7]; MR 4.2 cmt. [5]; MR 4.4(a); MR 4.3


OUT-0005 — What the no-contact rule does not reach

Rule: The no-contact rule restrains lawyers, so it does not stop the parties themselves from talking, and it does not stop a lawyer from advising a client about doing so.

Elements / what remains permitted

  1. Client-to-client contact. The parties may communicate with each other directly. [MR 4.2 cmt. [4]]
  2. Advising the client about it. A lawyer may tell the client that such contact is permitted and may counsel the client about what to say. [MR 4.2 cmt. [4]]
  3. Contact about other subjects, outside the matter.
  4. Contact with the other side's lawyer, without limit.
  5. Seeking a court order authorizing the communication.

Exceptions and limits

  1. Assistance yes, overreaching no. A lawyer may advise a client about a direct approach to the other side and may help with the substance of what the client says — ABA Formal Op. 11-461 (advisory) is explicit about that. What she may not do is use the client to overreach: to extract admissions against interest, to fish for privileged material, or to close a binding agreement with someone who has counsel. That is doing through another what the Rules forbid directly. [MR 8.4(a); ABA Formal Op. 11-461 (2011) (advisory)] State note: several jurisdictions decline to follow Op. 11-461 and take a stricter line on scripting.
  2. A lawyer who is personally a party and appearing without counsel is still bound by MR 4.2 as to the other represented party. The ABA put this beyond argument in August 2026 by adding MR 4.2 cmt. [10] (Res. 101F), which treats a lawyer appearing for herself as "representing a client" for the purposes of this Rule, adopting Formal Op. 502. [MR 4.2 cmt. [10]] Update note — testing lag. The amendment was adopted in August 2026, and NCBE ordinarily does not test a change until roughly a year after adoption. A 2026 or early-2027 MPRE may still be set on the pre-amendment commentary, which did not address the pro se lawyer expressly. Cmt. [4] remains the authority for client-to-client contact and for a lawyer's advice about it; cmt. [10] is the authority for the pro se point. Fold this note in once the lag expires.

  3. The rule applies to a lawyer's agents — an investigator cannot make the call the lawyer could not. [MR 5.3; MR 8.4(a)]

Explanation This block exists because the exam tests the boundary far more than the prohibition. Once you see that MR 4.2 is a constraint on lawyers, the permitted list follows naturally, and so does its limit: advising a client that she may call the other party is proper, while feeding her the questions the lawyer wants answered converts the client into the lawyer's instrument.

Example Two neighbours are in a boundary dispute, each represented. Attorney Bhatia's client asks whether she may simply walk next door and try to settle it. Bhatia may say yes, and may discuss the client's goals and what a sensible resolution looks like. If Bhatia instead hands the client a list of admissions to extract about when the fence was built, Bhatia has used the client to do what MR 4.2 forbids.

⚠ Exam trap The tempting wrong answer says the lawyer must tell the client not to contact the other party. No rule requires that. The credited answer normally permits both the contact and the advice, and the defect — if the stem contains one — lies in the lawyer scripting the client.

Cite(s): MR 4.2 cmt. [4], [10]; MR 8.4(a); MR 5.3; ABA Formal Op. 11-461 (2011) (advisory); ABA Formal Op. 502 (2022) (advisory)


7.3 Dealing with an Unrepresented Person

OUT-0006 — Duties to an unrepresented person

Rule: Dealing with someone who has no lawyer, a lawyer must not pose as neutral, must clear up any confusion about whose side she is on, and must not counsel that person beyond telling them to get their own lawyer when their interests may clash with the client's.

Elements

  1. The person is unrepresented in the matter.
  2. Three duties follow: a. Do not state or imply neutrality. The lawyer must not present herself as disinterested. b. Correct misunderstandings. If the lawyer knows or should know the person misunderstands her role, she must make reasonable efforts to set it straight. c. Give no legal advice except "get a lawyer" — but only where the lawyer knows or reasonably should know the person's interests clash with the client's, or stand a realistic chance of doing so.

Exceptions and limits

  1. No actual or possible conflict, more latitude. Where the two sides' interests do not actually clash, the third duty relaxes and the lawyer may explain terms and negotiate. [MR 4.3 cmt. [2]]
  2. A lawyer may still negotiate and explain her client's position. MR 4.3 is not a gag order; it bars posing as neutral and advising the other side, not ordinary dealing. [MR 4.3 cmt. [1] (role clarity); cmt. [2] (negotiating and explaining terms is permitted)]
  3. Organizational constituents get a specific warning. When dealing with the constituents of a client organization whose interests diverge from it, the lawyer must explain that she represents the entity, not them. [MR 1.13(f)]
  4. Truthfulness still applies in full. MR 4.1(a) and MR 8.4(c) operate alongside this rule, so an unrepresented person may not be lied to.

Explanation The danger MR 4.3 addresses is a lay person who assumes the only lawyer in the room is there to help everybody. The rule therefore polices role confusion rather than the substance of the bargaining. In practice the safe move is a short, clear statement — whom the lawyer represents, and that the person should get their own advice — before anything else. The advice prohibition is the part students misstate: it is conditional on a conflict or a realistic possibility of one, and it always leaves room for the single permitted piece of advice, which is to obtain counsel.

Example Attorney Pratt represents a landlord. An Unrepresented person — the tenant — comes to sign a settlement and asks Pratt, "Does this waive my deposit claim? What would you do?" Pratt must not answer the second question, and must not let the tenant believe Pratt is neutral. Pratt may accurately describe what the document says and what the landlord wants, must correct the tenant if he seems to think Pratt is looking out for him, and should tell him to consult his own lawyer.

⚠ Exam trap Two mirror-image traps. First, answers claiming the lawyer may not speak to an unrepresented person at all — that confuses 4.3 with 4.2. Second, answers claiming the lawyer may helpfully explain the person's own legal options "because she was being honest." Honesty is required but insufficient; where interests conflict, the only advice permitted is to get a lawyer.

Compare MR 4.2 and MR 4.3 never apply to the same person at the same time. Decide representation status first. MR 1.13(f) is the organizational version of the MR 4.3 warning.

Cite(s): MR 4.3; MR 4.3 cmt. [1]–[2]; MR 1.13(f); MR 4.1(a); MR 8.4(c)


7.4 Respect for the Rights of Third Persons

OUT-0007 — No tactics aimed at burdening a third person

Rule: A lawyer must not use a tactic whose only real point is to harass, stall or pile burden on a third person, and must not gather evidence by means that invade a third person's legal rights.

Elements — two separate prohibitions:

  1. No-real-purpose branch. The tactic serves no genuine end beyond humiliating the third person, stalling them, or wearing them down. If a legitimate purpose genuinely exists, this branch is not violated even though the tactic is also unwelcome.
  2. Unlawful-methods branch. The lawyer obtains evidence in a way that violates the third person's legal rights — for example, unlawful recording, trespass, or inducing someone to breach a confidentiality obligation.

Exceptions and limits

  1. A real purpose saves the tactic. Aggressive, even painful, lawful discovery is permitted where it serves the client's case; the rule targets tactics with nothing else behind them. [MR 4.4(a)]
  2. The rule protects non-parties as well as parties — witnesses, custodians of records, family members.
  3. Independent limits still apply. Discovery abuse is separately reachable under MR 3.4(d), court rules and sanctions, and intimidating a witness may be a crime. [MR 3.4]
  4. A Third person here means anyone other than the lawyer's own client, including the opposing party.

Explanation This is the Rules' floor on hardball. Because the test is purpose, the analysis is nearly always about whether the stem gives the lawyer any legitimate reason for what she did. A deposition of a peripheral elderly relative is proper if she saw the accident and improper if the stem tells you she was deposed to pressure the opposing party into settling. The second branch is different in kind: it does not ask about purpose at all, only whether the method itself was unlawful. Recording a call in a jurisdiction requiring all-party consent violates it however good the reason.

Example Attorney Novak, defending a company, subpoenas the plaintiff's adult daughter's employment records. If the records bear on damages the plaintiff claims, that is a legitimate purpose. If the stem says Novak sought them so the plaintiff would "understand how unpleasant this can get," the only substantial purpose is burden, and MR 4.4(a) is violated.

⚠ Exam trap Students treat "the tactic was harsh" or "the third party was upset" as the violation. Neither is the test. Look for language in the stem revealing purpose — "solely to", "in order to pressure", "knowing it was irrelevant". Absent that, harsh but purposeful lawyering is permitted.

Cite(s): MR 4.4(a); MR 3.4(d); MR 8.4(b)


OUT-0008 — Material sent by mistake

Rule: A lawyer who receives material relating to a client's matter and realizes it was sent by mistake must promptly tell the sender.

Elements — two, not four. The Rule is easier to hold in mind as a trigger and a response than as a four-part sequence:

  1. The trigger. Something bearing on the client's matter arrives, and the lawyer realises — or in the circumstances ought to realise — that it reached her by accident rather than by choice.
  2. The response. She tells the sender, and she does it promptly. That is the whole of what the Rule asks.

Exceptions and limits

  1. Notification is the whole of the duty under the Rule. The Model Rule does not require the lawyer to return the material, to delete it, or to refrain from reading it. Whether any of that is required is a question of law outside the Rules, and a court may order it. [MR 4.4 cmt. [2]–[3]]
  2. Inadvertent, not deliberate. Material leaked on purpose by a disgruntled insider is not an Inadvertently sent document, and paragraph (b) does not apply to it — though other rules and law may. [MR 4.4 cmt. [2]] Confirmed at v1.1: the comment treats the trigger as accidental transmission, and says the Rule does not address material the sending person obtained improperly — those duties come from other law.
  3. Metadata. Embedded data the sender did not intend to transmit can fall within the rule; the ABA's position is in Formal Op. 06-442 (2006) (advisory): the receiving lawyer is not barred from looking at metadata, but where she knows or ought to know it arrived by mistake the notice duty bites. States diverge, so this is an area where a State note matters more than a single national answer. [ABA Formal Op. 06-442 (advisory)]
  4. A lawyer may choose to return it as a matter of professional judgment; the Rule leaves that to her. [MR 4.4 cmt. [3]]

Explanation Paragraph (b) was written as a narrow, administrable duty: tell the sender, promptly. The drafters deliberately declined to impose a return-or-delete obligation, leaving that to substantive law, privilege doctrine and court orders. For the exam, this asymmetry is the whole point. The credited answer is almost always "notify the sender," and the distractors overshoot into returning, deleting, or being disqualified.

Example Opposing counsel emails Attorney Sato a settlement brief and, by mistake, attaches her client's privileged strategy memo. Sato must promptly notify her. Under the Model Rule Sato is not required to return or destroy the memo, though the sender may go to court, and a court may order both return and non-use. If Sato realized the attachment was privileged only after opening it, the notification duty still attaches once she knows.

⚠ Exam trap The favourite distractor requires the lawyer to return the document unread, which sounds right and is not what the Model Rule says. A second distractor has the receiving lawyer disqualified automatically. Disqualification is a court remedy on its own standard, not an automatic consequence of receiving a stray email.

Compare MR 1.6 governs the sending lawyer, whose careless disclosure of client information may itself be a violation. Paragraph (b) governs the receiving lawyer.

Cite(s): MR 4.4(b); MR 4.4 cmt. [2]–[3]; MR 1.6(a), (c)


7.5 Evaluation for Use by Third Persons

OUT-0009 — Opinions written for someone other than the client

Rule: A lawyer may evaluate a client's affairs for an outsider to rely on when doing so fits the lawyer's other duties to that client, and must get the client's informed consent when the evaluation is likely to hurt the client materially.

Elements — three, grouped by the question each answers rather than by the order of the Rule:

  1. What is it, and who is it for? The lawyer assesses something touching the client's affairs, and the assessment is built for an outsider to rely on — a lender, a buyer, a regulator, an auditor.
  2. Does it sit with what she already owes the client? Taking the assignment must square with the rest of the relationship. If it cannot be squared, she declines, consent or no consent.
  3. What is the exposure, and has the client accepted it? Where the lawyer realises, or ought to realise, that the assessment is likely to set the client's own interests back — and seriously, not merely awkwardly — she needs the client's informed consent first.

Exceptions and limits

  1. Confidentiality still governs everything not in the report. Information relating to the evaluation that is not disclosed in it remains protected by MR 1.6. [MR 2.3(c)]
  2. Some evaluations are incompatible, consent or not. If the assignment cannot be squared with the lawyer's duty of loyalty or independence to the client, the lawyer must decline. [MR 2.3 cmt. [1]–[3]]
  3. The third person is not the client. No client-lawyer relationship arises with the recipient merely because it relies on the opinion — but the lawyer may still face civil liability to it, which is a different system from discipline. [MR 2.3 cmt. [3]; and see S05 on third-party liability]
  4. Truthfulness duties apply with full force: a knowingly false material statement in an opinion letter violates MR 4.1(a) as well. [MR 4.1(a)]

Explanation An Evaluation for use by third persons inverts the usual posture — the lawyer's work product is built to be relied on by someone across the table. MR 2.3 handles that by asking two questions: does this assignment sit comfortably with what the lawyer already owes the client, and does the client understand and accept the exposure. Note the trigger is doubled: the likely setback must be both serious and against the client, not merely any unwelcome effect. And MR 2.3 does not use the heightened "confirmed in writing" formula.

Example A bank will lend to Attorney Chen's long-standing client only if Chen opines that the client holds clear title to its warehouse. Chen's search turns up an unreleased lien. An accurate opinion will sink the loan — a material adverse effect — so Chen needs the client's informed consent before delivering it. Chen may not shade the opinion to save the deal; that would violate MR 4.1(a) and MR 8.4(c).

⚠ Exam trap Students assume the recipient becomes a client, or that informed consent must be confirmed in writing because so many other rules require it. Neither is right. The exam also tests the ceiling: client consent does not license a false opinion.

Compare MR 2.1 (candid advice to the client) and MR 2.4 (serving as a third-party neutral, tested in S08) are adjacent roles. MR 2.3 is the lawyer still acting for her client but producing something an outsider will rely on.

Cite(s): MR 2.3(a)–(c); MR 2.3 cmt. [1]–[3]; MR 1.6; MR 4.1(a); MR 8.4(c)


Comparison Chart 1 — Who is the person, and what may the lawyer do?

MR 4.2 — represented person MR 4.3 — unrepresented person MR 4.4 — any third person
Applies when Lawyer knows the person has counsel in this matter Person has no counsel in this matter Anyone other than the lawyer's client, party or not
Core prohibition No communication about the matter No implying neutrality; no legal advice where interests may conflict No purpose-free harassment; no unlawful evidence-gathering
Affirmative duty None Correct a known misunderstanding of the lawyer's role Notify the sender of material sent by mistake, under 4.4(b)
Who can waive or permit The person's lawyer — never the person Not a waiver question; the duties simply apply Not waivable
Other route in Authorized by law or court order — A genuine substantial purpose defeats the 4.4(a) branch
Advice the lawyer may give — Only "get your own lawyer" where interests may conflict —

Spoken summary. Three rules, sorted by who the other person is. Rule four point two covers a person who already has a lawyer: do not discuss the matter with them, and only their lawyer can give permission — their own consent is worthless. Rule four point three covers a person with no lawyer: never imply you are neutral, fix any misunderstanding about your role, and where their interests may clash with your client's, the only advice you may give is to go get counsel. Rule four point four covers any third person at all: no tactic whose only point is to harass, delay or burden, no unlawful methods of getting evidence, and if something reaches you by mistake, promptly tell whoever sent it. The two rules that sort by representation status are mutually exclusive, so always decide first whether the person has a lawyer.


Comparison Chart 2 — Truthfulness duties across the Rules

Rule To whom Standard Duty to correct?
MR 4.1(a) A third person, outside a proceeding Must not knowingly misstate a material fact, or the law No general duty under (a); the narrow duty is in (b)
MR 4.1(b) A third person Must disclose to avoid assisting client crime or fraud Yes — but only where MR 1.6 permits the disclosure
MR 3.3 A tribunal Stricter: no false statement, and adverse controlling authority must be disclosed Yes — must correct, even a statement innocently made
MR 8.4(c) Anyone No dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation Catch-all; applies with or without a representation
MR 7.1 Prospective clients and the public No false or misleading communication about the lawyer's services Governs advertising; tested in S10

Spoken summary. Four truthfulness duties, and the exam turns on which audience you are facing. To a third person outside court, Rule four point one bars knowing lies about material facts, but imposes no general duty to speak up — the one exception being where silence would help a client commit a crime or fraud, and even then only if confidentiality permits disclosure. To a court, Rule three point three is stricter: you must correct a false statement even if you made it innocently, and you must reveal controlling authority against your own client. Rule eight point four, paragraph c, is the catch-all against dishonesty and applies whether or not you are representing anyone. Rule seven point one covers what you say about your own services, and belongs to the advertising section.


Must-know checklist — Section 7

  • Under Rule 4.1, lying about a material fact to the other side is a violation; bluffing about your client's settlement range is not.
  • Rule 4.1(b) is the only affirmative duty to disclose in this section, and confidentiality under Rule 1.6 switches it off unless Rule 1.6(b) permits the disclosure.
  • Under Rule 4.2, only the other lawyer can consent to contact. It does not matter that the represented person started the conversation.
  • Rule 4.2 is matter-specific: contact about an unrelated subject is permitted.
  • Inside a represented organization, the shielded people are those who direct counsel, those who can bind the entity, and those whose conduct may be charged to it. Former employees are ordinarily fair game.
  • Rule 4.2 restrains lawyers, not clients. Parties may talk to each other, and a lawyer may say so — but may not script the client to do the lawyer's asking.
  • Under Rule 4.3, never imply you are neutral, correct a misunderstanding about your role, and give no advice beyond "get a lawyer" where interests may conflict.
  • Rule 4.4(a) turns on purpose: a tactic with a genuine substantial purpose is permitted however unwelcome.
  • Under Rule 4.4(b) the duty is to notify the sender — not to return, delete, or refrain from reading.
  • Under Rule 2.3, an evaluation for a third party needs the client's informed consent when it is likely to affect the client materially and adversely; the recipient does not become a client.

Common traps — Section 7

  1. Treating the represented person's own consent as enough under Rule 4.2. Only their lawyer can permit the contact.
  2. Reading Rule 4.2 as a total ban on speaking to anyone who has a lawyer, ignoring that it is limited to the subject of the representation.
  3. Applying a "control group" or "all employees" test to a represented organization instead of the Model Rule's three functional questions.
  4. Requiring the receiving lawyer to return or destroy material sent by mistake. The Model Rule requires notice only.
  5. Treating a hard bargaining position as a misstatement of material fact, or the reverse — excusing a genuine factual lie as "just negotiation."
  6. Letting an unrepresented person be given helpful legal advice because the lawyer was honest. Honesty is necessary, not sufficient.

— Multiple Choice Items (MC)

No answer key changed anywhere in this file at v1.1 or v1.2.


MC-0001 [Easy] — Truthfulness / puffery vs. material fact

Stem: Okafor represents a homeowner in a boundary dispute and is negotiating with the neighbour's lawyer. Okafor says two things. First, that her client "will not settle for less than the full strip of land." Second, that a survey her client commissioned "shows the fence sits three feet onto our side." Okafor knows her client would happily take half the strip, and she knows the survey actually places the fence on the neighbour's side. Is Okafor subject to discipline?

(A) Yes, because the statement about the survey concerned a material fact, although the statement about her client's settlement floor did not.

(B) Yes, because both statements were knowingly untrue and a lawyer must be truthful in all dealings with opposing counsel.

(C) No, because both sides understand settlement talk as positioning rather than as statements of fact on which the other may rely.

(D) No, because opposing counsel could have demanded a copy of the survey and chose to rely on Okafor's summary instead.

Key: A

  • (A) Why right: the survey's content is a material fact, and Okafor knew her statement about it was false — a violation of MR 4.1(a). The settlement-floor statement is ordinary puffery under MR 4.1 cmt. [2] and is not a violation.
  • (B) Why wrong: overstates the duty. MR 4.1(a) reaches knowing misstatements of material fact or law, and a bluff about the client's bottom line is not one. The conclusion is right for the wrong reason, which is why it fails.
  • (C) Why wrong: correctly states the rule for a party's negotiating position, but misapplies it. The comment treats a client's settlement range as non-factual; it does not extend that treatment to what a survey says.
  • (D) Why wrong: reliance is an element of fraud claims, not of MR 4.1(a). Discipline attaches to the knowing misstatement whether or not anyone relied or suffered loss.

Tags: S07 · 7.1 Truthfulness · material fact, puffery · Difficulty 1 · MR 4.1(a); MR 4.1 cmt. [2]


MC-0002 [Medium] — Truthfulness / silence and client fraud

Stem: Reyes represents a seller in the sale of a small manufacturing business. Two days before closing, Reyes learns that the balance sheets her client gave the buyer overstate inventory by roughly forty percent, and that the client knew this when the figures were delivered. The buyer's willingness to close rests partly on Reyes's continued involvement. Reyes says nothing and prepares to attend the closing. What is Reyes's obligation?

(A) She must withdraw, and may have to disclose, because silence would assist a client fraud and MR 1.6(b)(2) permits the disclosure.

(B) She may proceed, because the duty of confidentiality bars her from revealing anything her client told her about the figures.

(C) She must correct the figures with the buyer directly, because a lawyer may not allow a counterparty to proceed under a misapprehension.

(D) She may proceed so long as she does not personally vouch for the accuracy of the figures at the closing.

Key: A

  • (A) Why right: continued participation would assist a fraud. MR 1.6(b)(2) permits disclosure to prevent it, and once disclosure is permitted MR 4.1(b) can require it. Withdrawal under MR 1.16(a)(1) is the floor, not the ceiling.
  • (B) Why wrong: confidentiality is the right starting point and does gate MR 4.1(b), but it is not the end of the analysis. Where the client is using the lawyer's services to commit a fraud causing substantial financial injury, MR 1.6(b)(2) permits disclosure, which re-opens the 4.1(b) duty.
  • (C) Why wrong: states a duty the Rules do not impose. There is no general obligation to correct a counterparty's misapprehension; the duty arises only where silence would assist a crime or fraud, and even then it is bounded by MR 1.6.
  • (D) Why wrong: MR 1.2(d) bars assisting known client fraud, and abstaining from a personal endorsement does not cure participation. Presence and continued work are themselves the assistance.

Tags: S07 · 7.1 Truthfulness · client fraud, noisy withdrawal · Difficulty 2 · MR 4.1(b); MR 1.6(b)(2); MR 1.2(d); MR 1.16(a)(1)


MC-0003 [Easy] — No-contact rule / represented person initiates

Stem: Lindqvist represents the plaintiff in a wrongful-termination suit. The defendant company's former supervisor, who is a named co-defendant and is represented by his own counsel, telephones Lindqvist at home one evening. He says his lawyer is "doing nothing" and that he wants to explain what really happened on the day of the firing. May Lindqvist listen and discuss the case with him?

(A) No, because once someone has their own lawyer, opposing counsel may not raise any subject with them at all.

(B) Yes, because the co-defendant initiated the contact himself, and a person may generally waive a protection that exists for his own benefit.

(C) Yes, because a lawyer may always receive information a person volunteers without solicitation.

(D) No, because only the co-defendant's own lawyer can consent to a discussion of the matter, whatever the co-defendant himself wants.

Key: D

  • (A) Why wrong: overbroad. MR 4.2 is limited to the subject of the representation, so contact about an unrelated matter is permitted.
  • (B) Why wrong: waiver by the represented person is precisely what the rule does not allow. This is the single most tested misconception in this area.
  • (C) Why wrong: correctly notes that MR 4.2 addresses the lawyer's conduct, but a lawyer who listens and discusses the matter is communicating. Receiving an unsolicited letter is different from conducting a conversation.
  • (D) Why right: MR 4.2 permits the communication only with the other lawyer's consent. The protection belongs to the represented person's relationship with counsel, so his own eagerness is irrelevant — see MR 4.2 cmt. [3]. Lindqvist should refer him to his lawyer and end the call.

Tags: S07 · 7.2 No-contact · no-contact rule · Difficulty 1 · MR 4.2; MR 4.2 cmt. [3]


MC-0004 [Medium] — No-contact rule / organizational constituents

Stem: Bhatia represents a plaintiff injured when a delivery van struck her. The delivery company is represented. Bhatia wants to interview three people without company counsel's consent: the driver of the van; the operations manager who has met weekly with company counsel about the case; and a warehouse loader who was not working that day and knows nothing about the collision. Whom may Bhatia interview?

(A) None of them, because each is an employee of a represented organization and the company's consent covers them all.

(B) All three, because MR 4.2 protects only the organization itself and never its individual employees.

(C) The warehouse loader only, because the driver's conduct may be imputed and the manager takes counsel's advice on it.

(D) The operations manager only, because senior managers can speak for the organization in a way junior employees cannot.

Key: C

  • (A) Why wrong: applies a blanket employee rule that the Model Rule does not adopt. An absolute bar would put every witness beyond reach and is not the test under MR 4.2 cmt. [7].
  • (B) Why wrong: inverts the rule. Constituents who can bind the entity, whose conduct is at issue, or who direct its counsel are protected.
  • (C) Why right: the driver's acts in the matter may be imputed to the company, and the manager regularly consults with counsel about it, so both are covered. The loader neither binds the company nor has conduct at issue, so he may ordinarily be interviewed, subject to MR 4.3.
  • (D) Why wrong: uses seniority as the test, which the Model Rule rejects. Rank is not the question — function is. It also reaches the wrong result for the manager.

Tags: S07 · 7.2 No-contact · organizational constituent · Difficulty 2 · MR 4.2 cmt. [7]; MR 4.3


MC-0005 [Medium] — No-contact rule / lawyer scripting the client

Stem: Two business partners are dissolving their partnership and each has counsel. Pratt's client asks whether she may call her partner directly to try to work things out. Pratt tells her she may, and they discuss what a sensible resolution would look like. Pratt then hands her a list of six questions to ask, designed to get the partner to admit he withdrew funds without authorization. Pratt does not suggest that the client urge her partner to speak with his own lawyer before answering. Has Pratt acted properly?

(A) No, because the questions were built to extract admissions, which is overreaching through the client.

(B) No, because a lawyer must advise a client not to contact a represented opposing party.

(C) Yes, because the parties to a matter are always free to communicate with each other directly.

(D) Yes, because Pratt never spoke to the partner and MR 4.2 restrains only a lawyer's own communications.

Key: A

  • (A) Why right: permitting and discussing the contact was proper under MR 4.2 cmt. [4], and ABA Formal Op. 11-461 (advisory) lets a lawyer give a client substantial help with the substance of what she says. The opinion draws the line at overreaching, and it locates overreaching in the opponent's want of an opportunity to take advice: it requires the lawyer, at a minimum, to have the client encourage the other side to consult counsel. Pratt skipped that step and armed the client with a list built for concessions, so MR 8.4(a) bites. Note what does not decide the item: seeking admissions is not forbidden in itself.
  • (B) Why wrong: states a duty no rule imposes. A lawyer may tell a client that such contact is permitted and may counsel her about it.
  • (C) Why wrong: correct as far as it goes — MR 4.2 cmt. [4] permits client-to-client contact — but it ignores what Pratt added. The permission covers the contact and advice about it, not a script aimed at concessions from someone who has had no steer toward his own counsel.
  • (D) Why wrong: MR 4.2 does restrain the lawyer's own communications, but MR 8.4(a) closes the gap by reaching violations committed through another person.

Tags: S07 · 7.2 No-contact · client-to-client contact · Difficulty 2 · MR 4.2 cmt. [4]; MR 8.4(a); ABA Formal Op. 11-461 (2011)


MC-0006 [Easy] — Unrepresented person / implying neutrality

Stem: Novak represents a landlord. A tenant arrives at Novak's office without counsel to sign a move-out settlement. The tenant asks, "You're kind of the neutral one here, right? Just tell me whether signing this is a good idea for me." Novak says nothing about whom he represents and replies that the document "is pretty standard." Is Novak subject to discipline?

(A) No, because Novak's statement that the document was standard was accurate and therefore not misleading.

(B) Yes, because Novak allowed a misunderstanding about his role to stand and then commented on the wisdom of signing.

(C) No, because MR 4.3 requires a lawyer to identify his client only when the unrepresented person asks directly.

(D) Yes, because a lawyer may not communicate at all with an unrepresented person who is on the opposing side of a matter.

Key: B

  • (A) Why wrong: accuracy is necessary but not sufficient. MR 4.3 polices role confusion, and the violation lies in leaving the tenant's belief uncorrected, not in the truth of the remark.
  • (B) Why right: MR 4.3 required Novak to correct a misunderstanding he knew about and barred him from advising the tenant beyond telling him to get counsel. He did neither.
  • (C) Why wrong: the tenant effectively did ask, but the duty does not depend on a direct question. It is triggered by the lawyer's knowledge that the person misunderstands his role.
  • (D) Why wrong: confuses MR 4.3 with MR 4.2. A lawyer may deal and negotiate with an unrepresented person; what he may not do is pose as neutral or advise them.

Tags: S07 · 7.3 Unrepresented person · unrepresented person · Difficulty 1 · MR 4.3; MR 4.3 cmt. [1]


MC-0007 [Hard] — Unrepresented person / organizational constituent

Stem: Sato is retained by a company to investigate whether its chief financial officer approved improper payments. Sato interviews a mid-level accounts clerk who has no counsel. The clerk's own approval signature appears on two of the payments, and Sato recognizes that the company may later blame the clerk. The clerk assumes Sato is "the company lawyer, so basically everyone's lawyer." What must Sato do?

(A) Advise the clerk that he should consider whether his own signature exposes him personally, so that he can take steps to protect himself.

(B) Decline to interview the clerk at all until the clerk has retained independent counsel.

(C) Explain that she represents the company rather than the clerk, because the clerk's interests may diverge from the company's.

(D) Obtain the clerk's informed consent, confirmed in writing, before continuing the interview.

Key: C

  • (A) Why wrong: this is legal advice to the unrepresented person, which MR 4.3 prohibits where interests conflict. The only advice permitted is to obtain counsel.
  • (B) Why wrong: overstates the duty. MR 4.3 does not bar dealing with an unrepresented person; it requires the warning and limits advice.
  • (C) Why right: MR 1.13(f) requires a lawyer for an organization to explain the identity of her client when dealing with a constituent whose interests are or may become adverse to it, and MR 4.3 independently requires correcting the clerk's misunderstanding.
  • (D) Why wrong: imports a consent formality from the conflicts rules. Neither MR 4.3 nor MR 1.13(f) calls for informed consent from a constituent; they call for an explanation.

Tags: S07 · 7.3 Unrepresented person · organizational constituent · Difficulty 3 · MR 1.13(f); MR 4.3


MC-0008 [Medium] — Third persons / purpose test

Stem: Ware defends a company against a discrimination claim. He serves a subpoena on the plaintiff's adult sister for her employment records. The plaintiff has claimed emotional distress, and Ware's file note reads: "Sister's records irrelevant. Serve anyway — plaintiff will fold once family starts getting dragged in." Is Ware subject to discipline?

(A) Yes, because his own note establishes that the subpoena had no substantial purpose other than to burden a third person.

(B) No, because aggressive discovery is permitted and the plaintiff put her emotional condition in issue by claiming distress.

(C) Yes, because a lawyer may not serve a subpoena on a person who is not a party to the litigation.

(D) No, because a party may pursue any discovery a court has not yet quashed, and the sister may move for relief.

Key: A

  • (A) Why right: MR 4.4(a) turns on purpose, and Ware's note supplies it: the records are irrelevant and the object is pressure. Where a genuine substantial purpose exists the rule is not violated, and here there is none.
  • (B) Why wrong: correctly states that hard discovery is permitted and that a distress claim opens some inquiry — but the note removes any legitimate purpose for these particular records.
  • (C) Why wrong: invents a limit. Non-parties are routinely and properly subpoenaed; MR 4.4(a) protects them from purposeless burden, not from process.
  • (D) Why wrong: availability of a motion to quash is a real procedural point, but the ethical limit operates independently of whether the target seeks relief.

Tags: S07 · 7.4 Third persons · third person · Difficulty 2 · MR 4.4(a); MR 3.4(d)


MC-0009 [Medium] — Third persons / material sent by mistake

Stem: Opposing counsel emails Chen a settlement letter and, without intending to, attaches her own client's confidential litigation-strategy memo. Chen notices the attachment's title, realizes immediately that it was not meant for her, and opens and reads it before doing anything else. Under the Model Rules, what must Chen do?

(A) Return the memo to the sender and delete every copy, without using anything she learned from it.

(B) Nothing further, because the sender's carelessness caused the disclosure and careless disclosure waives the privilege.

(C) Notify the sender and then move to withdraw, because her continued involvement would taint the proceeding.

(D) Promptly notify the sender, though the Model Rules do not themselves require her to return the memo or refrain from reading it.

Key: D

  • (A) Why wrong: states the obligation many jurisdictions impose by other law or court order, but overstates the Model Rule. MR 4.4 cmt. [2]–[3] leave return and use to law outside the Rules.
  • (B) Why wrong: the sending lawyer's carelessness may raise her own MR 1.6(c) problem, but it does not switch off the receiving lawyer's duty under MR 4.4(b).
  • (C) Why wrong: disqualification is a court remedy on its own standard, not an automatic consequence of receiving a stray attachment, and no rule requires withdrawal here.
  • (D) Why right: MR 4.4(b) requires prompt notice to the sender and nothing more. Whether the material must be returned or may be used is a question of law the Rules deliberately leave open.

Tags: S07 · 7.4 Third persons · inadvertently sent document · Difficulty 2 · MR 4.4(b); MR 4.4 cmt. [2]–[3]; MR 1.6(c)


MC-0010 [Hard] — Third persons / deliberate leak

Stem: A disgruntled employee of an opposing party, acting entirely on his own, mails Estrada a packet of his employer's internal privileged memoranda. Estrada did not solicit the packet and had no idea it was coming. The employer's lawyer learns of it and demands its immediate return, citing MR 4.4(b). How should the demand be evaluated?

(A) MR 4.4(b) applies squarely, so Estrada owes the sender prompt word of what happened and the employer's demand is well founded.

(B) MR 4.4(b) does not apply, because the packet was sent deliberately, not by accident, though other law may govern its use.

(C) MR 4.4(b) applies, and because the memoranda are privileged Estrada must return them unread and withdraw from the matter.

(D) MR 4.4(b) does not apply, and because Estrada neither solicited nor procured the packet he may use its contents freely.

Key: B

  • (A) Why wrong: correctly states what MR 4.4(b) requires when it is triggered, but the triggering condition is that the material was inadvertently sent. A deliberate leak by a third party is not that.
  • (B) Why right: MR 4.4(b) reaches material the lawyer knows or should know was sent by mistake. A purposeful leak falls outside it, which does not leave Estrada free — privilege law, court orders and MR 4.4(a) may all bear on what she may do.
  • (C) Why wrong: compounds two errors. The rule is not triggered, and even when it is, it requires neither return unread nor disqualification.
  • (D) Why wrong: right that the rule is not triggered, wrong that the consequence is free use. Absence of a Model Rule duty is not permission; substantive law may require return or bar use.

Tags: S07 · 7.4 Third persons · inadvertently sent document · Difficulty 3 · MR 4.4(b); MR 4.4 cmt. [2]; MR 4.4(a)


MC-0011 [Easy] — Truthfulness / statements through an agent

Stem: Quintero is negotiating a commercial lease for a client. She instructs her paralegal to tell the landlord's representative that the client "has a signed offer on a comparable space two blocks away at a lower rent." No such offer exists, and Quintero knows it. The paralegal passes the statement along, believing it to be true. Is Quintero subject to discipline?

(A) No, because Quintero did not personally make the statement to the landlord's representative.

(B) Yes, because the existence of a competing signed offer is a material fact and a lawyer may not make a false statement through another person.

(C) Yes, because she failed to supervise a non-lawyer assistant whose conduct she should have monitored.

(D) No, because a claim about the availability of competing space is the kind of bargaining position that the comments treat as puffery rather than fact.

Key: B

  • (A) Why wrong: MR 8.4(a) makes it misconduct to violate the Rules through the acts of another, so routing the statement through staff changes nothing.
  • (B) Why right: the claimed offer is a material fact Quintero knew to be false, violating MR 4.1(a), and MR 8.4(a) reaches her use of the paralegal to deliver it.
  • (C) Why wrong: MR 5.3 supervision is a real duty, but it is the wrong theory. Quintero did not fail to supervise — she directed the conduct, which is a more direct violation.
  • (D) Why wrong: correctly identifies that a party's own valuation and settlement posture are non-factual, but the existence of a specific signed offer at a stated rent is a verifiable fact, not a posture.

Tags: S07 · 7.1 Truthfulness · material fact · Difficulty 1 · MR 4.1(a); MR 8.4(a); MR 5.3


MC-0012 [Medium] — Evaluation for third persons / consent trigger

Stem: A bank will lend to Chen's long-standing corporate client only if Chen delivers an opinion letter confirming the client holds clear title to its warehouse. Chen's title search turns up an unreleased lien that will likely cause the bank to refuse the loan. The client urgently needs the financing. What does MR 2.3 require of Chen?

(A) She may deliver the opinion without consent, because the bank rather than the client is the intended user of the evaluation.

(B) She must decline the engagement entirely, because no lawyer may furnish an evaluation that will damage her own client's interests.

(C) She must obtain the client's informed consent first, because the assessment stands to damage the client's position seriously.

(D) She must obtain the client's informed consent, confirmed in writing, because the evaluation will be relied upon by a third person.

Key: C

  • (A) Why wrong: correctly identifies the bank as the intended user, which is what brings MR 2.3 into play at all — but that fact triggers the rule rather than excusing consent.
  • (B) Why wrong: overstates the rule. MR 2.3 contemplates evaluations that may harm the client and manages the risk through consent; it forbids only those incompatible with the lawyer's other duties.
  • (C) Why right: MR 2.3(b) makes consent necessary once the lawyer realises, or ought to realise, that the opinion stands to set the client's own interests back substantially and to the client's detriment. A refused loan is exactly that.
  • (D) Why wrong: reaches the right result by the wrong route and adds a formality MR 2.3 does not impose. The trigger is material adverse effect, not third-party reliance, and no confirming writing is required.

Tags: S07 · 7.5 Evaluation · evaluation for use by third persons · Difficulty 2 · MR 2.3(a)–(b)


MC-0013 [Medium] — No-contact rule / unrelated matter

Stem: Aidoo represents a contractor suing a property developer over unpaid invoices; the developer is represented by counsel. At a chamber of commerce dinner Aidoo finds himself seated beside the developer. They talk for twenty minutes about a proposed municipal zoning amendment that affects both of their businesses and has nothing to do with the invoice dispute. Was the conversation proper?

(A) No, because a lawyer must avoid all social contact with a represented opposing party while litigation is pending.

(B) No, because any conversation carries a risk that the pending dispute will be mentioned inadvertently.

(C) Yes, because MR 4.2 bars communication only about the subject of the representation, and zoning was a separate subject.

(D) Yes, because the developer consented to the conversation by choosing to remain at the table and continuing to talk with Aidoo.

Key: C

  • (A) Why wrong: MR 4.2 restricts communications about the matter, not the lawyer's social proximity to the other party. No rule imposes a general avoidance duty.
  • (B) Why wrong: identifies a genuine practical risk, and prudent lawyers do steer clear — but risk of inadvertence is not itself a violation. The rule turns on what was actually discussed.
  • (C) Why right: MR 4.2 is matter-specific. A conversation confined to an unrelated subject is outside the rule even though the person is represented in the pending dispute.
  • (D) Why wrong: invokes consent, which only the developer's lawyer could give — and in any event no consent was needed, since the subject fell outside the rule.

Tags: S07 · 7.2 No-contact · no-contact rule · Difficulty 2 · MR 4.2


MC-0014 [Hard] — No-contact rule / authorized by law

Stem: Moran is an assistant prosecutor. Before any charges are filed, she directs an investigator to have a recorded conversation with a suspect who Moran knows has retained a lawyer in connection with the investigation. The investigator does not identify himself as working for the prosecution. Which of the following best describes Moran's position?

(A) She violated MR 4.2, because a lawyer may not use an investigator to reach a person she could not contact herself.

(B) Her conduct may fall within the authorized-by-law exception, which covers certain lawful pre-charge investigative activity.

(C) She violated MR 4.2, because once the suspect retained counsel no contact was permissible at any stage.

(D) Her conduct was proper, because MR 4.2 applies only after formal charges have been filed and a prosecution is pending.

Key: B

  • (A) Why wrong: states a real and important principle — MR 8.4(a) and MR 5.3 do prevent a lawyer from using an agent to do what she cannot — but it assumes the underlying contact was barred, which is the very question the exception addresses.
  • (B) Why right: MR 4.2 permits communication authorized by law or court order, and MR 4.2 cmt. [5] recognizes lawful investigative activity in this space. Whether a particular operation qualifies turns on the governing law, so the careful answer is that it may fall within the exception.
  • (C) Why wrong: treats retention of counsel as absolute. It is significant, but the rule's own text yields to law that authorizes the contact.
  • (D) Why wrong: correctly senses that the pre-charge stage matters, but draws the line in the wrong place. MR 4.2 is not limited to filed cases; the operative question is whether law authorizes the contact.

Tags: S07 · 7.2 No-contact · authorized by law · Difficulty 3 · MR 4.2; MR 4.2 cmt. [5]; MR 5.3; MR 8.4(a)


MC-0015 [Easy] — Third persons / unlawful methods

Stem: Delacroix represents a plaintiff in a trade-secrets case. To obtain evidence, she telephones a former officer of the defendant and records the call without telling him. The call takes place in a jurisdiction that requires the consent of all parties before a conversation may be recorded. The information she obtains is genuinely relevant and important to her client's case. Is Delacroix subject to discipline?

(A) No, because the recording served a legitimate purpose central to her client's claim rather than any improper one.

(B) Yes, because she obtained evidence by a method that violated the legal rights of a third person.

(C) Yes, because a lawyer may never record a conversation with a witness without that witness's express permission.

(D) No, because a former officer is not protected by the rule restricting contact with a represented organization.

Key: B

  • (A) Why wrong: purpose is the test for the first branch of MR 4.4(a), and it would protect her there. The second branch asks only whether the method was lawful, and purpose is no answer to it.
  • (B) Why right: MR 4.4(a) bars obtaining evidence by methods that violate a third person's legal rights. Recording without the consent the jurisdiction requires is such a method, and the value of the evidence does not cure it.
  • (C) Why wrong: states an absolute the Rules do not adopt. In a one-party-consent jurisdiction the recording may well be permissible; the violation here flows from the governing law, not from a blanket prohibition.
  • (D) Why wrong: accurate on MR 4.2 — a former officer is ordinarily outside it — but contacting him lawfully and recording him unlawfully are separate questions.

Tags: S07 · 7.4 Third persons · third person · Difficulty 1 · MR 4.4(a); MR 4.2 cmt. [7]


MC-0016 [Medium] — Unrepresented person / no conflict present

Stem: Hendricks represents a seller in a straightforward residential sale. The buyer has no lawyer. The buyer asks Hendricks to explain what the inspection contingency clause means and what the deadline is. Their interests on this point are not in conflict: both want a clean, timely closing. May Hendricks explain the clause?

(A) Yes, because a lawyer's duty of truthfulness to third persons obliges him to answer a direct factual question.

(B) No, because explaining a contract term to the opposing party creates an implied client-lawyer relationship with the buyer.

(C) No, because MR 4.3 forbids a lawyer from giving any legal advice to an unrepresented person in a transaction.

(D) Yes, provided he does not state or imply that he is disinterested and corrects any misunderstanding of his role.

Key: D

  • (A) Why wrong: MR 4.1(a) forbids false statements; it does not create an affirmative duty to answer questions. The answer is permitted here, not compelled.
  • (B) Why wrong: raises a real risk lawyers must manage, but explaining a term does not by itself create a representation. The governing constraint is MR 4.3's role-clarity duty.
  • (C) Why wrong: overstates the prohibition. The bar on advising an unrepresented person bites only where that person's interests clash with the client's, or stand a realistic chance of doing so — and the stem removes that condition.
  • (D) Why right: with no conflict on the point, MR 4.3 cmt. [2] leaves room to explain terms and negotiate. The two duties that always remain are not implying disinterestedness and correcting a known misunderstanding.

Tags: S07 · 7.3 Unrepresented person · unrepresented person · Difficulty 2 · MR 4.3; MR 4.3 cmt. [1]–[2]


MC-0017 [Medium] — Truthfulness / partial truth

Stem: Tanaka represents a company selling a warehouse. The buyer asks whether the roof has had any problems. Tanaka answers: "We replaced the entire roof membrane eighteen months ago." That is true. Tanaka does not add that the replacement failed inspection twice and that the roof has leaked in two places every winter since. Is Tanaka subject to discipline?

(A) No, because every word Tanaka said to the buyer was literally accurate.

(B) No, because a lawyer has no duty to volunteer facts that are adverse to her own client's position.

(C) Yes, because MR 4.1(b) required her to disclose the leaks in order to avoid assisting an ongoing fraud by her client.

(D) Yes, because a literally true statement framed to create a false impression is treated as a misrepresentation.

Key: D

  • (A) Why wrong: literal accuracy is not the standard. MR 4.1 cmt. [1] treats partially true statements that mislead as misrepresentations.
  • (B) Why wrong: states the general rule correctly — there is no duty to volunteer adverse facts — but Tanaka did not stay silent. She answered, and the answer she gave misled.
  • (C) Why wrong: identifies the wrong provision. Paragraph (b) governs disclosure needed to avoid assisting client crime or fraud and is gated by MR 1.6; the defect here is an affirmative misleading answer under paragraph (a).
  • (D) Why right: answering a direct question about roof problems by describing only the replacement creates a false impression about the roof's condition, and MR 4.1(a) reaches it as a misstatement.

Tags: S07 · 7.1 Truthfulness · material fact · Difficulty 2 · MR 4.1(a); MR 4.1 cmt. [1]


MC-0018 [Hard] — Evaluation for third persons / confidentiality

Stem: Osei prepares an evaluation of a client's environmental compliance for the client's prospective purchaser, with the client's informed consent. In the course of the work Osei learns that the client quietly settled an unrelated employee claim last year. The settlement has no bearing on environmental compliance, and Osei does not mention it in the report. The purchaser later asks Osei directly whether there is "anything else we should know about this company." How should Osei respond?

(A) She must decline to answer, because information relating to the evaluation that is not disclosed in the report remains protected by MR 1.6.

(B) She may disclose the settlement, because the client's consent to the evaluation operated as a waiver of confidentiality with respect to the purchaser.

(C) She must disclose the settlement, because failing to do so would make her report misleading by omission.

(D) She must disclose the settlement, because a lawyer providing an evaluation for a third person owes that person candour.

Key: A

  • (A) Why right: MR 2.3(c) is explicit that information relating to the evaluation but not disclosed in the report stays protected by MR 1.6. Osei may say she cannot answer beyond the report's scope.
  • (B) Why wrong: reads the consent too broadly. Consent extended to the evaluation, and MR 2.3(c) preserves MR 1.6 protection for information not disclosed in it.
  • (C) Why wrong: misleading-by-omission is a genuine concern under MR 4.1, but it operates on the report's own subject. An unrelated employment settlement does not render an environmental compliance report misleading.
  • (D) Why wrong: an evaluation must not contain knowing misstatements, but MR 2.3 does not convert the recipient into someone to whom the lawyer owes a client's duty of candour.

Tags: S07 · 7.5 Evaluation · evaluation for use by third persons · Difficulty 3 · MR 2.3(c); MR 1.6; MR 4.1(a)


MC-0019 [Easy] — No-contact rule / consent from the right person

Stem: Fontaine wishes to take a statement from the opposing party in a contract dispute. The opposing party is represented. Fontaine emails opposing counsel, who replies: "I have no objection to you speaking with my client about the delivery dates, but nothing else." Fontaine meets the party and asks about delivery dates, then also asks about the party's financial condition. Which statement is most accurate?

(A) The questions were proper in full, because the party answered voluntarily and did not object to any of them.

(B) All the questions were proper, because once counsel consents to contact the scope of the conversation is for the participants.

(C) All the questions were improper, because consent to contact a represented party can never be given by email.

(D) The questions about delivery dates were proper, and the questions about financial condition exceeded the consent given.

Key: D

  • (A) Why wrong: relies on the represented party's acquiescence, which is exactly what MR 4.2 cmt. [3] makes irrelevant. Only counsel's consent counts, and it was bounded.
  • (B) Why wrong: treats consent as a general waiver. Counsel may limit the subject matter, and a limited consent does not license a broader conversation.
  • (C) Why wrong: invents a formality. Nothing in MR 4.2 requires a particular form for the other lawyer's consent; email is ordinary practice.
  • (D) Why right: MR 4.2 permits what the other lawyer consents to. Consent here was expressly limited to delivery dates, so questioning beyond that subject fell outside it.

Tags: S07 · 7.2 No-contact · no-contact rule · Difficulty 1 · MR 4.2; MR 4.2 cmt. [3]


MC-0020 [Medium] — Truthfulness / negotiation and applicable law

Stem: Kovacs is negotiating a settlement with an unrepresented claimant. The claimant says she believes she has three years to file suit. Kovacs knows the limitation period for this claim is one year and that it expires next week. When the claimant asks whether she ought to see a lawyer, Kovacs tells her the two of them can sort this out between themselves, and never says he acts for the other side. He says nothing about the deadline and offers a low settlement, hoping she will delay. Which statement is most accurate?

(A) Kovacs violated MR 4.1(a), because knowingly allowing the claimant to proceed under a false view of the law is a misstatement of law.

(B) Kovacs violated MR 4.1(b), because disclosure of the deadline was necessary to avoid assisting his client in a fraud.

(C) Kovacs did not violate MR 4.1(a) by silence, but his conduct raises a serious problem under MR 4.3 and possibly MR 8.4(c).

(D) Kovacs acted properly, because a lawyer owes no duty whatever to an unrepresented adverse party in a negotiation.

Key: C

  • (A) Why wrong: MR 4.1(a) reaches affirmative false statements, and Kovacs made none about the limitation period. Silence is not a misstatement under paragraph (a).
  • (B) Why wrong: paragraph (b) addresses a client's crime or fraud that the lawyer's silence would assist. The client here is not perpetrating a fraud; the lawyer is exploiting an error.
  • (C) Why right: paragraph (a) is not violated by staying silent about the deadline — Kovacs asserted nothing false about the law. What he did do was steer her away from counsel while leaving her to believe he was a neutral go-between, and that is squarely MR 4.3: implying disinterestedness, failing to put right a misunderstanding of his role he plainly knows about, and giving an unrepresented person whose interests conflict with his client's the one piece of advice he may not give. Building a settlement strategy on that also implicates MR 8.4(c).
  • (D) Why wrong: overstates the absence of duty. MR 4.3 and MR 4.1 both impose obligations toward unrepresented persons, even though the lawyer owes them no loyalty.

Tags: S07 · 7.1 Truthfulness · unrepresented person · Difficulty 2 · MR 4.1(a); MR 4.3; MR 8.4(c)


— True/False Items (T/F)

Controls — measured by script, reported at the end. None asserted here.

One proposition per item. S05's TF-12 and TF-15 each bundled two propositions and both drew findings from two reviewers. TF-0011 carried a premise and a conclusion in v1.0 and was rebuilt in v1.1. Grok Bot then found at v1.1 that TF-0007 had the same premise-plus-conclusion shape, which this paragraph had claimed was absent; TF-0007 is recast at v1.2. Every statement now tests a single idea.

On absolutes. Style Guide 6.2 permits a true absolute only where the rule really is absolute. S05's TF-17 failed by making "all settlement offers" the tested word when MR 1.4 cmt. [2] qualifies it. In this set an absolute inside a FALSE statement is the intended error (0002, 0004, 0008, 0014). An absolute inside a TRUE statement appears only where the rule admits no exception (0013, 0017). TF-0019's "whenever" was an absolute in a TRUE statement that dropped MR 2.3(b)'s knowledge trigger — missed by this audit at v1.1, caught by Grok Bot, and removed at v1.2.


TF-0001 [Easy] — Truthfulness Statement: A lawyer's assertion of the lowest amount her client would accept in settlement is ordinarily not treated as a statement of material fact under the truthfulness rule. Answer: TRUE Why: Both sides understand a party's settlement range as bargaining posture rather than a report about the world, and the comment to MR 4.1 treats it that way. Bluffing about the client's floor is therefore outside paragraph (a). The comment says ordinarily, though, and whether a given remark counts as fact can turn on the circumstances — and nothing in MR 4.1 displaces the criminal and tort law of misrepresentation. Exam trap: Students who know lying is prohibited over-apply the rule and treat any untrue statement in negotiation as a violation. Cite: MR 4.1(a); MR 4.1 cmt. [2] · Outline: OUT-0001


TF-0002 [Easy] — Truthfulness Statement: A lawyer violates the truthfulness rule only if the person who heard the false statement relied on it and suffered a loss. Answer: FALSE Why: Reliance and loss are elements of a fraud claim, not of discipline. MR 4.1(a) is violated by the knowing misstatement itself. Corrected statement: While acting for a client, a lawyer breaches MR 4.1(a) the moment she knowingly asserts something untrue that matters — whether about the facts or about the law — to somebody outside the representation. Whether that person believed it, acted on it, or lost anything by it is beside the point. Outside a representation the vehicle is MR 8.4(c) instead. Exam trap: Importing civil-fraud elements into a disciplinary rule. Discipline under MR 4.1(a) does not depend on anyone being harmed. (Some rules do build in an effect — MR 1.8(b) and MR 8.4(d) among them — so the point is about this rule, not about discipline generally.) Cite: MR 4.1(a); MR 4.1 cmt. [1]; MR 8.4(c) · Outline: OUT-0001


TF-0003 [Medium] — Truthfulness Statement: A statement that is literally accurate can still violate the truthfulness rule if it is framed to leave a false impression. Answer: TRUE Why: The comment treats partially true statements that mislead as misrepresentations. Answering a question selectively, so that the true words produce a false picture, is within MR 4.1(a). Exam trap: The fact pattern is built so that every individual word the lawyer said is verifiable. Students check the words rather than the impression. Cite: MR 4.1(a); MR 4.1 cmt. [1] · Outline: OUT-0001


TF-0004 [Medium] — Truthfulness Statement: When silence would assist a client's fraud, a lawyer must disclose the fact needed to prevent it, whatever the duty of confidentiality requires. Answer: FALSE Why: Two things narrow paragraph (b) far below what it first appears to say. Disclosure is required only where speaking up is what it takes to avoid assisting the crime or fraud — and even then, only where MR 1.6 does not forbid it. Corrected statement: Paragraph (b) bites only on what the lawyer knows: it is her knowledge that staying quiet would help along a client's crime or fraud that starts the duty running. Even then, MR 4.1(b) calls for disclosure of a material fact only where disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting the client's crime or fraud, and only where MR 1.6 does not prohibit it. Ordinarily the lawyer avoids assisting simply by getting out — withdrawing, and where that is not enough, giving notice of the withdrawal and disaffirming the work product. Disclosure is the last resort, not the first. Exam trap: Reading paragraph (b) as a free-standing duty to speak. It is narrowed at both ends: by necessity and by confidentiality. Cite: MR 4.1 (opening clause); MR 4.1(b); MR 4.1 cmt. [3]; MR 1.6(b)(2); MR 1.0(f) · Outline: OUT-0002


TF-0005 [Easy] — Truthfulness Statement: A lawyer who knows an assertion of material fact to be untrue may not put it to a third person through a paralegal or an investigator acting on her instructions. Answer: TRUE Why: MR 8.4(a) makes it misconduct to violate the Rules through the acts of another. Routing a statement through staff does not change who is responsible for it. The knowledge element still has to be met: a lawyer who passes on something false in good faith has not violated paragraph (a). Exam trap: The stem puts distance between the lawyer and the listener, inviting the conclusion that the lawyer said nothing. Cite: MR 4.1(a); MR 8.4(a); MR 5.3; MR 1.0(f) · Outline: OUT-0001


TF-0006 [Easy] — No-contact rule Statement: A represented person may give opposing counsel permission to discuss the matter with them directly, without their own lawyer's involvement. Answer: FALSE Why: The protection belongs to the person's relationship with counsel, so only counsel can waive it. The represented person's own willingness is irrelevant, however insistent they are. Corrected statement: Consent has to come from the represented person's own lawyer. The person cannot hand out that permission themselves, even if they made the first approach — and the only other ways in are authorization by law or a court order. Exam trap: The most-tested trap in this section — the represented party telephones opposing counsel and volunteers to talk. Eagerness reads like waiver and is not. Cite: MR 4.2; MR 4.2 cmt. [3], [5]–[6] · Outline: OUT-0003


TF-0007 [Medium] — No-contact rule Statement: A lawyer may talk with a represented person about a subject unrelated to the matter in which that person has counsel. Answer: TRUE Why: MR 4.2 is matter-specific by its terms, and the comment says as much: conversation about something outside the representation is not what the rule reaches. A person represented in one dispute is not placed beyond all contact on every other subject. Exam trap: Treating the rule as a blanket prohibition on ever speaking to someone who has a lawyer. Cite: MR 4.2; MR 4.2 cmt. [4] · Outline: OUT-0003 v1.2: recast. v1.1 paired a premise with a conclusion joined by "so" — the shape the header claims this set avoids. One proposition now; key unchanged (TRUE).


TF-0008 [Medium] — No-contact rule Statement: When an organization is represented, every one of its employees is off limits to opposing counsel. Answer: FALSE Why: The Model Rule uses a functional test rather than a headcount, and each branch of it is tied to the matter in hand rather than to the person's seniority in general. Corrected statement: The shield reaches three groups, and each is defined by reference to the matter at hand: constituents who instruct the organization's lawyer or routinely take advice from her about it; those with authority to commit the organization on it; and those whose own conduct in it could be charged to the organization. Everyone else on the payroll may ordinarily be interviewed — and a constituent who has their own lawyer can consent through that lawyer. Exam trap: Applying a "control group" test or an everyone-who-works-there test. Neither is the Model Rule. The branch students forget is the one about taking advice from the organization's lawyer, and it often reaches managers working on the matter. Cite: MR 4.2 cmt. [7] · Outline: OUT-0004


TF-0009 [Medium] — No-contact rule Statement: A former employee of a represented organization may ordinarily be interviewed without the organization's counsel consenting. Answer: TRUE Why: The comment places former constituents outside the rule's ordinary reach, and says so flatly: counsel's consent is not needed. The lawyer must still not mislead them about who she is, and must not go after the organization's privileged communications. Exam trap: Assuming the shield follows the person after the employment ends. State note: Some jurisdictions restrict contact with former employees who were privy to privileged material. Check the local rule. Cite: MR 4.2 cmt. [7]; MR 4.3; MR 4.4(a); ABA Formal Op. 91-359 (advisory) · Outline: OUT-0004


TF-0010 [Medium] — No-contact rule Statement: Two parties who are each represented by counsel may communicate directly with each other about the matter. Answer: TRUE Why: MR 4.2 restrains lawyers, not clients. The comment confirms the parties themselves are free to speak, and a lawyer may tell a client so. Exam trap: The tempting wrong answer has the lawyer obliged to instruct the client not to make contact. No rule requires that. Cite: MR 4.2 cmt. [4] · Outline: OUT-0005


TF-0011 [Hard] — No-contact rule Statement: A lawyer may hand a client a list of questions to put to a represented opponent, designed to extract damaging concessions, without the client being told to urge the opponent to consult counsel first. Answer: FALSE Why: Helping is allowed; overreaching is not, and what separates them is whether the opponent had a real chance to get advice. ABA Formal Op. 11-461 (advisory) lets a lawyer give her client substantial assistance with a direct approach to the other side — the topics, the issues, the strategy, and what to say. It treats the same help as overreaching where the client is equipped to pry concessions out of someone who has no opportunity to consult counsel, and it sets a floor: the lawyer must at a minimum have the client encourage the other party to speak to their own lawyer. Omitting that step is what makes this statement fail, and MR 8.4(a) bars doing through another what the lawyer could not do herself. Corrected statement: A lawyer may help a client plan what to raise with a represented opponent, down to the substance of what the client will say. She crosses into overreaching if she equips the client to pry out damaging concessions, confidential material or a signed commitment while the opponent has no real chance to take advice. At a minimum she must have the client urge the opponent to speak with counsel before conceding, disclosing or committing — and where she drafts an agreement ready for signature, the signature page should carry a conspicuous warning to consult counsel first. Exam trap: Students learn that clients may speak to each other and conclude either that the lawyer must stay silent or that any coaching at all is barred. Neither is right. The line is the counsel-consultation safeguard, not admission-seeking as such. State note: Formal Op. 11-461 is the permissive position: coaching is allowed so long as the opponent is steered toward counsel. Some jurisdictions forbid a lawyer to script a client's questions at all, and there the answer is FALSE without any qualification. Check the local rule. Cite: MR 4.2 cmt. [1], [4]; MR 8.4(a); ABA Formal Op. 11-461 (Aug. 4, 2011) (advisory) · Outline: OUT-0005 v1.1: rebuilt. v1.0 keyed a categorical bar on scripting, which is in tension with Formal Op. 11-461, and carried a premise plus a conclusion. The item now tests the overreaching line as a single proposition. Key unchanged (FALSE). v1.2: rebuilt again on Grok Bot's two Majors. The v1.1 statement left out the condition the opinion treats as decisive — no opportunity to consult counsel — so a candidate who knew 11-461 could defend TRUE. The statement now carries that condition, still as one proposition. The v1.1 corrected statement stated the opinion as a flat bar on seeking admissions or a binding agreement, softened its "must" to "should," and omitted the signature-page warning; all three are fixed. Key unchanged (FALSE).


TF-0012 [Easy] — Unrepresented person Statement: A lawyer may not communicate with an unrepresented person on the opposing side of a matter. Answer: FALSE Why: No rule bars the communication — the comment expressly contemplates negotiating with an unrepresented person. MR 4.3 governs how the lawyer conducts it, and each of its duties has a knowledge trigger rather than being absolute. Corrected statement: A lawyer may deal and negotiate with an unrepresented person. She must not state or imply that she is disinterested. Where she knows or reasonably should know that the person misunderstands her role, she must make reasonable efforts to set it right. And where she knows or reasonably should know that the person's interests are, or stand a reasonable chance of being, in conflict with her client's, the only advice she may offer is to get a lawyer. Exam trap: Confusing MR 4.3 with MR 4.2. MR 4.2 governs whether the lawyer may discuss the matter at all; MR 4.3 governs how she conducts a conversation she is already free to have. Cite: MR 4.3; MR 4.3 cmt. [1]–[2] · Outline: OUT-0006 v1.2: exam trap corrected. v1.1 said the two rules "never govern the same communication, and only one of them bars the conversation outright." MR 4.2 does not bar a conversation outright either — consent, authorization by law, a court order and unrelated subjects all get round it — and under cmt. [9] a limited-scope representation can put one conversation partly under each rule.


TF-0013 [Medium] — Unrepresented person Statement: Where an unrepresented person's interests may conflict with the client's, the only legal advice the lawyer may give that person is to obtain counsel. Answer: TRUE Why: MR 4.3 permits that single piece of advice and no other once the lawyer knows or reasonably should know of an actual or reasonably possible conflict. The comment does let her explain how she reads a document, or what she takes the underlying legal obligations to be — that is not the prohibited advice — and how far she can properly go may turn on how experienced the other person is. Exam trap: The lawyer answers a sincere question honestly and helpfully. Honesty is required but does not license advice. Cite: MR 4.3; MR 4.3 cmt. [2] · Outline: OUT-0006


TF-0014 [Medium] — Unrepresented person Statement: A lawyer must correct an unrepresented person's misunderstanding of the lawyer's role only if that person asks who the lawyer represents. Answer: FALSE Why: The duty is triggered by the lawyer's own knowledge, not by a question. Corrected statement: What sets the duty running is what the lawyer knows, not what the person asks. Where she knows, or ought in the circumstances to realize, that the person misreads her role — taking her for a neutral, or for an impartial guide to what the law requires — she must take reasonable steps to put it right, question or no question. Exam trap: The stem has the unrepresented person assume neutrality silently, so no question is ever asked. Cite: MR 4.3; MR 4.3 cmt. [1] · Outline: OUT-0006


TF-0015 [Medium] — Third persons Statement: A lawful discovery step that serves a genuine and substantial litigation purpose does not violate the rule protecting third persons merely because it also burdens the person it targets. Answer: TRUE Why: The first branch of MR 4.4(a) asks what the means was for. Where a real and substantial litigation purpose exists alongside the burden, that branch is not violated. A trivial makeweight purpose would not save it — and note that the branch reaches purposes to embarrass and to delay as well, so a step whose only other object is to embarrass still fails it. Exam trap: Treating the third person's distress, or the harshness of the tactic, as the test. The test is purpose. Cite: MR 4.4(a) · Outline: OUT-0007 v1.2: reworded. v1.1 asked whether there was "a substantial purpose beyond burdening," which left a gap: a tactic whose other purpose is to embarrass or delay has a purpose beyond burdening and still breaches MR 4.4(a). Key unchanged (TRUE).


TF-0016 [Hard] — Third persons Statement: A lawyer who receives a document and realizes it was sent by mistake must return it to the sender without reading it. Answer: FALSE Why: The Model Rule requires prompt notice to the sender and nothing more. Whether the material must be returned, deleted or left unread is a question of law outside the Rules, and a court may order it. Corrected statement: The duty here is notice, and only notice. A lawyer who realizes — or who ought in the circumstances to realize — that something bearing on the matter has reached her by mistake must tell the sender, and must do it promptly. What happens after that, whether she hands it back, deletes it, or reads it at all, the Model Rule leaves to other law and to whatever a court may order. Where no law demands more, whether to return it unread is a judgment call the Model Rules leave to the lawyer; and whether the privilege survived the mistake is likewise a question for other law, not for this paragraph. Exam trap: The most attractive distractor in this section, because returning it unread sounds like the honorable answer and is not what the Rule says. Cite: MR 4.4(b); MR 4.4 cmt. [2]–[3] · Outline: OUT-0008


TF-0017 [Easy] — Third persons Statement: The rule protecting third persons from purposeless burden covers witnesses and other non-parties, not only the opposing party. Answer: TRUE Why: MR 4.4(a) speaks of third persons generally. Witnesses, record custodians and family members are within it. Exam trap: Assuming the rule tracks party status, so that a non-party has no protection. Cite: MR 4.4(a) · Outline: OUT-0007


TF-0018 [Hard] — Third persons Statement: The duty to notify the sender applies when a third party deliberately leaks an opposing party's confidential material to a lawyer. Answer: FALSE Why: Paragraph (b) is triggered by material that was inadvertently sent — the comment means an accidental transmission. A purposeful leak by someone acting on their own is not that, though other law may still govern what the receiving lawyer may do with it. Corrected statement: The notice duty in MR 4.4(b) arises only where the lawyer knows or reasonably should know the material arrived by accident. A deliberate leak falls outside the paragraph altogether. What the receiving lawyer may then do is governed by privilege and evidence law, by any court order, and by the general bars on dishonest conduct and on conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice — not by paragraph (b). Exam trap: Absence of a duty under paragraph (b) reads as permission to use the material freely. It is not. Cite: MR 4.4(b); MR 4.4 cmt. [2]; MR 8.4(c)–(d); ABA Formal Op. 06-440 (advisory) · Outline: OUT-0008


TF-0019 [Medium] — Evaluation for third persons Statement: A lawyer asked to evaluate a client's affairs for an outsider's use needs the client's informed consent where she knows, or ought to realize, that the evaluation will probably hurt the client's own interests in a material way. Answer: TRUE Why: That is MR 2.3's consent trigger, and it has two halves. The duty runs on the lawyer's knowledge or what she should reasonably appreciate; and the likely effect must be both material and against the client, not merely unwelcome. Exam trap: Students add a "confirmed in writing" requirement because so many neighboring rules carry one. MR 2.3 does not. Cite: MR 2.3(a)–(b); MR 2.3 cmt. [5] · Outline: OUT-0009 v1.2: reworded. v1.1's "whenever" was an absolute in a TRUE statement and dropped the knows/reasonably-should-know trigger; "serious setback" also set a higher bar than the rule's own threshold. Key unchanged (TRUE).


TF-0020 [Hard] — Evaluation for third persons Statement: A third person who relies on a lawyer's evaluation becomes the lawyer's client with respect to that evaluation. Answer: FALSE Why: Reliance does not create a client-lawyer relationship. The recipient remains a non-client, although the lawyer may still face civil liability to it — a separate system from discipline. Corrected statement: Relying on an evaluation does not make the reader a client. The lawyer's professional duties still run to the client, and the recipient's remedy, if it has one, lies in civil liability rather than in a client-lawyer relationship. That is not a license to mislead the reader: the lawyer may never knowingly misstate a material fact or the governing law to them, and the comments direct her to advise the client about responsibilities owed to third parties. Exam trap: Conflating reliance with representation, and then assuming the lawyer owes the recipient a client's duty of candour. Cite: MR 2.3; MR 2.3 cmt. [3]–[4]; MR 4.1(a) · Outline: OUT-0009


— Flashcards (FC)

Count rationale. Part A marks 11 key terms, and Style Guide 4.2 requires one term card per marked term and no orphan term cards. At the Part 5 mix of about 60% term cards, 11 term cards sets the file at 18. S05 carried 30 flashcards at a 9% section weight; S07 is a 5% section, so 18 is proportionate rather than a shortfall.


Term cards

FC-0001

Front: Material fact Definition: A fact that could affect how the listener decides or acts. Knowingly misstating one to a non-client violates the truthfulness rule; a statement about the law is treated the same way. Explanation: The line MR 4.1(a) draws is between reports about the world and bargaining posture. Whether a lien exists, what a policy limit is, whether a signature is genuine — all material facts. The test is whether a reasonable lawyer across the table would take the statement as a report or a posture. Example: Telling opposing counsel that a survey places a fence three feet onto your client's side, when you know it does not, is a misstatement of material fact. Exam trap: Students check whether anyone relied or lost money. Discipline requires neither. Cite: MR 4.1(a) · Outline: OUT-0001 · Related: Puffery · Third person


FC-0002

Front: Puffery Definition: Ordinary negotiating talk — a party's settlement range, estimates of value, what a claim is "really worth" — which both sides understand as positioning rather than as a statement of fact. Explanation: The comment to MR 4.1 places this outside paragraph (a), so bluffing about a client's bottom line is not a violation even when the lawyer knows the client would take far less. The profession treats it as mutually understood theater. Example: "My client will not go a dollar below $90,000" is puffery, even if the lawyer knows she would accept $70,000. Exam trap: The exam puts a puff and a genuine factual lie in the same stem. The credited answer turns on separating them. Cite: MR 4.1 cmt. [2] · Outline: OUT-0001 · Related: Material fact


FC-0003

Front: Noisy withdrawal Definition: Withdrawing and also disaffirming the lawyer's own opinion, document or work product, where quiet withdrawal would leave that work still being used to mislead someone. Explanation: Ordinary withdrawal under MR 1.16 stops the lawyer assisting further, but it does not always undo the damage. Where the lawyer's past work continues to lend a fraudulent transaction credibility, disaffirming it may be needed. Example: A lawyer who learns her opinion letter is being used to support a transaction she now knows is fraudulent may have to give notice withdrawing that letter. Exam trap: Students treat withdrawal as always sufficient. Sometimes silence after withdrawal is still assistance. Cite: MR 1.2 cmt. [10]; MR 4.1 cmt. [3] · Outline: OUT-0002 · Related: Material fact


FC-0004

Front: No-contact rule Definition: A lawyer who knows another lawyer represents someone in a matter must not communicate with that person about that matter, unless the other lawyer consents or law or a court order permits it. Explanation: The rule protects the represented person's access to their own counsel, which is why only counsel can waive it. It is matter-specific, so contact about an unrelated subject is permitted, and it bites on what the lawyer knows — though a lawyer may not shut her eyes to the obvious. Example: The defendant telephones opposing counsel to say his own lawyer is useless and he wants to explain what happened. Counsel must refer him back to his lawyer and end the call. Exam trap: The represented person starts the conversation. That feels like waiver and is not — only their lawyer can consent. Cite: MR 4.2; MR 4.2 cmt. [3] · Outline: OUT-0003 · Related: Authorized by law · Organizational constituent


FC-0005

Front: Authorized by law Definition: The exception permitting contact with a represented person where a statute, rule or court order allows it — for example the right to petition government, or certain lawful investigative activity before charges are filed. Explanation: This is the second route through MR 4.2 and it does not depend on anyone's consent. Whether a particular contact qualifies turns on the governing law rather than on the Rules alone, so the careful answer is often that it may fall within the exception. Example: A prosecutor directing lawful pre-charge investigative contact with a suspect who has retained counsel may fall within the exception. Exam trap: Treating a person's retention of counsel as an absolute bar. The rule's own text yields to law that authorizes the contact. Cite: MR 4.2; MR 4.2 cmt. [5] · Outline: OUT-0003 · Related: No-contact rule


FC-0006

Front: Organizational constituent Definition: A person inside a represented organization. Only some are shielded by the no-contact rule: those who direct its counsel, those who can bind it, and those whose acts in the matter may be charged to it. Explanation: The Model Rule's test is functional rather than hierarchical, because organizations cannot speak for themselves and a blanket bar would put every witness beyond reach. Seniority is not the question — function is. Former employees are ordinarily outside the rule. Example: In a collision case the driver and the manager who briefs counsel weekly are covered; a dispatcher who was off duty and knows nothing is not. Exam trap: Applying a "control group" test or an everyone-who-works-there test. The Model Rule does neither. Cite: MR 4.2 cmt. [7] · Outline: OUT-0004 · Related: No-contact rule · Unrepresented person


FC-0007

Front: Unrepresented person Definition: Someone with no lawyer in the matter. A lawyer may deal with them but must not imply she is neutral, must correct a known misunderstanding of her role, and may not advise them beyond telling them to get counsel where interests may conflict. Explanation: MR 4.3 polices role confusion rather than the substance of the bargaining. The danger is a lay person who assumes the only lawyer in the room is there to help everybody. A short, clear statement of whom the lawyer represents is the safe move. Example: A tenant signing a landlord's settlement asks the landlord's lawyer, "What would you do?" The lawyer must not answer that, and must correct any belief that she is neutral. Exam trap: Confusing this with the no-contact rule and concluding the lawyer may not speak to the person at all. Cite: MR 4.3; MR 4.3 cmt. [1] · Outline: OUT-0006 · Related: Organizational constituent · No-contact rule


FC-0008

Front: Third person Definition: Anyone other than the lawyer's own client, including the opposing party and non-parties such as witnesses, record custodians and family members. Explanation: MR 4.4(a) protects this whole class from tactics with no substantial purpose beyond embarrassing, delaying or burdening them, and from evidence-gathering methods that invade their legal rights. Party status is irrelevant to the protection. Example: A subpoena served on the plaintiff's sister for irrelevant records, to pressure the plaintiff into settling, targets a third person. Exam trap: Assuming the rule tracks party status, so a non-party has no protection. Cite: MR 4.4(a) · Outline: OUT-0007 · Related: Inadvertently sent document


FC-0009

Front: Inadvertently sent document Definition: Material bearing on the matter — a file, a message, anything held electronically — that reaches the lawyer by accident, in circumstances where she realises, or ought to realise, it was never meant for her. What she owes is a prompt word to the sender. Explanation: Notification is the whole of the Model Rule duty. It does not require returning the material, deleting it, or refraining from reading it — those are questions of law outside the Rules, and a court may order them. Material leaked deliberately by an insider is not covered. Example: Opposing counsel attaches her client's privileged strategy memo to a settlement email by mistake. You must tell her, promptly. Exam trap: The distractor that requires returning it unread. That sounds like the honourable answer and is not what the Rule says. Cite: MR 4.4(b); MR 4.4 cmt. [2]–[3] · Outline: OUT-0008 · Related: Metadata · Third person


FC-0010

Front: Metadata Definition: Data embedded in a file that the sender did not intend to transmit — edit history, comments, tracked changes, author details. Explanation: Embedded data the sender never meant to send can fall within the rule on material sent by mistake. The ABA's position is in Formal Op. 06-442 (advisory): the receiving lawyer is not forbidden to look at metadata, but where she knows or ought to know it arrived by mistake, the notice duty bites. States diverge from that, so a State note matters here more than a single national answer. Example: A redlined draft arrives with tracked changes intact, revealing the other side's internal reservations about a term. Exam trap: Assuming a single settled national rule on mining metadata. There is not one. Cite: MR 4.4(b); ABA Formal Op. 06-442 (2006) · Outline: OUT-0008 · Related: Inadvertently sent document


FC-0011

Front: Evaluation for use by third persons Definition: A lawyer's assessment of a matter affecting a client, prepared for someone other than the client to rely on — a lender, a buyer, a regulator, an auditor. Explanation: It inverts the usual posture: the work product is built to be relied on by someone across the table. MR 2.3 asks whether the assignment fits the lawyer's other duties to the client, and requires the client's informed consent wherever the assessment is likely to set the client's own interests back in a serious way. Example: A title opinion delivered to a bank so it will lend to the lawyer's client. Exam trap: Assuming the recipient becomes a client, or that the consent must be confirmed in writing. Neither is right. Cite: MR 2.3(a)–(c) · Outline: OUT-0009 · Related: Third person


Concept cards

FC-0012

Front: When must a lawyer speak up to avoid assisting client fraud? Definition: When silence would assist a client's crime or fraud and MR 1.6 permits the disclosure. Confidentiality is the gate, which is why the duty is far narrower than it first reads. Explanation: Read it as two steps. First, would silence make the lawyer a participant in a crime or fraud? Second, does MR 1.6 allow the lawyer to say anything at all? Where MR 1.6(b)(2) permits disclosure to prevent a client's fraud causing substantial financial injury, paragraph (b) can require it. Where confidentiality bars disclosure, the route out is withdrawal. Example: A client hands a buyer fabricated financials mid-deal and the buyer is relying on the lawyer's continued involvement. Disclosure is permitted, so it can be required. Exam trap: Reading paragraph (b) as a broad duty to correct the other side's misimpressions. Unfairness is not fraud. Cite: MR 4.1(b); MR 1.6(b)(2); MR 1.2(d) · Outline: OUT-0002


FC-0013

Front: Who can consent to contact with a represented person? Definition: Only that person's lawyer. The represented person cannot give the permission themselves, whatever they say and however the contact began. Explanation: The interest protected is the person's access to their own counsel, so the waiver belongs to counsel. Consent can also be limited in scope — if the other lawyer agrees to questions about delivery dates only, questions beyond that fall outside the consent. Example: Opposing counsel emails, "No objection to you asking about delivery dates, nothing else." Questions about the party's finances exceed the consent. Exam trap: The represented party initiates the call and volunteers to talk. That is the single most tested misconception in this area. Cite: MR 4.2; MR 4.2 cmt. [3] · Outline: OUT-0003


FC-0014

Front: Which employees of a represented organization are off limits? Definition: Three groups, each defined by reference to the matter in hand: people who instruct the organization's lawyer or routinely take her advice on it; people who can commit the organization on it; and people whose own conduct in it could be charged to the organization. Explanation: Run the three functional questions rather than looking at the org chart. Everyone else is in principle a witness the other side may interview, subject to MR 4.3 and MR 4.4. A constituent who is personally represented is covered on that basis alone. Example: The driver whose conduct caused the collision is covered; the warehouse loader who was off that day is not. Exam trap: Assuming a former employee is still protected. Under the Model Rule the ordinary answer is that she is not. Cite: MR 4.2 cmt. [7] · Outline: OUT-0004


FC-0015

Front: Three duties to an unrepresented person Definition: Do not state or imply you are disinterested; correct a misunderstanding of your role that you know or should know about; and give no legal advice beyond "get a lawyer" where interests may conflict. Explanation: The third duty is conditional. Where the two sides' interests do not actually clash, the lawyer has more room, and may explain terms and negotiate. The first two duties always apply. Example: With no conflict on the point, a seller's lawyer may explain what an inspection contingency means to an unrepresented buyer — provided he does not pose as neutral. Exam trap: Answers claiming the lawyer may not speak to the person at all, or that honesty alone licenses giving advice. Cite: MR 4.3; MR 4.3 cmt. [1]–[2]; MR 1.13(f) · Outline: OUT-0006


FC-0016

Front: Two branches of the rule protecting third persons Definition: First, the lawyer may not reach for a tactic whose only real point is to humiliate a third person, stall them, or wear them down. Second, she may not gather evidence by methods that trample a third person's legal rights. Explanation: The branches ask different questions. The first turns entirely on purpose, so a genuine substantial purpose saves even a harsh tactic. The second does not ask about purpose at all — only whether the method itself was lawful. Example: Recording a call without the consent the jurisdiction requires violates the second branch no matter how relevant the evidence is. Exam trap: Treating harshness, or the third party's distress, as the test for the first branch. The test is purpose. Cite: MR 4.4(a); MR 3.4(d) · Outline: OUT-0007


FC-0017

Front: Material sent by mistake — what is required, and what is not? Definition: Required: promptly notify the sender. Not required by the Model Rule: returning it, deleting it, or refraining from reading it. Explanation: The drafters deliberately declined to impose a return-or-delete duty, leaving that to substantive law, privilege doctrine and court orders. The asymmetry is the whole point for the exam, and the distractors almost always overshoot into returning, deleting or disqualification. Example: After notifying the sender, the receiving lawyer is not automatically disqualified — that is a court remedy on its own standard. Exam trap: "Return it unread" sounds right and is not the Model Rule. Cite: MR 4.4(b); MR 4.4 cmt. [2]–[3] · Outline: OUT-0008


FC-0018

Front: Rule 4.2 or Rule 4.3 — how do you choose? Definition: By whether the person has a lawyer in the matter. Represented goes to MR 4.2; unrepresented goes to MR 4.3. They never apply to the same person at the same time. Explanation: Decide representation status first, because the whole answer turns on it. MR 4.2 bars the conversation about the matter; MR 4.3 permits the conversation but governs how it is conducted. A great many wrong answers come from applying the bar of one rule to the situation of the other. Example: A stem that says a party "appeared without counsel" is steering you to MR 4.3, not MR 4.2. Exam trap: Answering that a lawyer may never speak to an unrepresented opposing party. That is MR 4.2's rule applied to MR 4.3's facts. Cite: MR 4.2; MR 4.3 · Outline: OUT-0003, OUT-0006


— Scenario Walkthroughs (WT)

Count rationale. S05 carried 4 walkthroughs at a 9% section weight; S07 is a 5% section, so 3 is proportionate. Each combines two or three issues, which is what distinguishes a walkthrough from a single MC item.

WT-0001 — The claimant who has no lawyer

Facts. Kovacs represents a regional courier company. A former contract driver, Mensah, was injured unloading a van and has written directly to the company demanding compensation. Mensah has no lawyer. Kovacs agrees to meet him.

At the meeting Mensah says he assumes Kovacs is "the company's lawyer, but also sort of handling this fairly for both of us." Kovacs does not respond to that. Mensah then says he has read online that he has three years to sue. Kovacs knows the limitation period for this claim is one year and that it expires in eleven days. He says nothing about it.

Mensah asks whether the release Kovacs has drafted covers future medical treatment. Kovacs says the release is "the standard form we always use," which is true. He does not mention that the form was revised last month to add a broad waiver of future claims. Kovacs offers $4,000 and encourages Mensah to sign today.

Prompt. Identify the issues and how the lawyer should proceed.

Issues.

Whether Kovacs may leave Mensah's belief about his role uncorrected.

Whether Kovacs's silence about the limitation period violates the truthfulness rule.

Whether the description of the release was a misrepresentation.

Rules.

MR 4.3 bars a lawyer from stating or implying that she is disinterested, requires reasonable efforts to correct a misunderstanding the lawyer knows or should know about, and permits no legal advice to an unrepresented person beyond securing counsel where interests may conflict.

MR 4.1(a) bars a lawyer from asserting, to someone outside the representation, something she knows to be untrue and that matters — whether the untruth is about the facts or about the law. A literally accurate statement framed to leave a false impression is treated as a misstatement.

MR 8.4(c) reaches dishonesty, fraud, deceit and misrepresentation generally.

Application.

Issue 1 — role confusion. Mensah stated his misunderstanding out loud, so Kovacs knew of it. MR 4.3 required reasonable efforts to correct it, and silence was not that. This is the clearest violation on these facts, and it is independent of anything Kovacs said about the claim.

Issue 2 — the limitation period. Kovacs made no statement about the deadline, and MR 4.1(a) reaches affirmative false statements rather than silence. So paragraph (a) is not violated by the omission standing alone. Nor does MR 4.1(b) apply: that paragraph addresses a client's crime or fraud that the lawyer's silence would assist, and the company is not perpetrating a fraud — Kovacs is exploiting Mensah's own legal error.

But the silence is not costless. Kovacs is running out the clock on an unrepresented person who has told him he misunderstands the law, while posing as something close to neutral. That combination is where MR 8.4(c) does real work, and it compounds the MR 4.3 violation rather than sitting apart from it.

Issue 3 — the release. "The standard form we always use" is literally true and is framed to suggest nothing has changed. Asked a direct question about future medical treatment, Kovacs answered in a way that produced a false picture of the document's scope. Under MR 4.1 cmt. [1] a partially true statement that misleads is a misrepresentation, so this is a violation of paragraph (a) even though no individual word was false.

Conclusion. Kovacs is subject to discipline under MR 4.3 for leaving the role misunderstanding uncorrected, and under MR 4.1(a) for the misleading answer about the release, with MR 8.4(c) available on the overall course of conduct. He should have opened by stating plainly that he represents the company and that Mensah should get his own lawyer; he must correct the description of the release; and he may not give Mensah advice about the limitation period, because the only advice permitted here is to secure counsel.

Cites. MR 4.3; MR 4.1(a); MR 4.1 cmt. [1]; MR 4.1(b); MR 8.4(c) Outline links. OUT-0001, OUT-0002, OUT-0006

WT-0002 — Investigating a represented company

Facts. Adeyemi represents a plaintiff suing Harborview Logistics over a warehouse fire. Harborview is represented by counsel. Adeyemi wants facts and does not want to wait for discovery.

He instructs his investigator to make four approaches. First, the shift supervisor who was on duty the night of the fire and whose decision to override an alarm is central to the claim. Second, the operations director, who meets Harborview's lawyers every week about this case. Third, a maintenance technician who left Harborview eight months ago and now works elsewhere. Fourth, a payroll clerk with no knowledge of the fire, whom the investigator plans to approach socially without saying who he works for.

The investigator also proposes recording each conversation. The state requires all parties to consent before a call is recorded.

Prompt. Identify the issues and how the lawyer should proceed.

Issues.

Which of the four people the no-contact rule shields.

Whether using an investigator changes the analysis.

Whether the proposed recording and the social approach are permissible methods.

Rules.

MR 4.2 stops a lawyer taking the matter up directly with someone she is aware already has counsel, unless that counsel agrees or the law allows it.

For an organization, the comment shields three kinds of constituent, each tied to the matter in hand: those who instruct the organization's lawyer or routinely take her advice on it; those who can commit the organization on it; and those whose own conduct in it could be charged to the organization. Former constituents are ordinarily outside the rule.

MR 8.4(a) makes it misconduct to violate a Rule through the acts of another; MR 5.3 imposes responsibility for non-lawyer assistants.

MR 4.4(a) bars obtaining evidence by methods that violate a third person's legal rights, and MR 4.3 bars implying disinterestedness to an unrepresented person.

Application.

Issue 1 — who is shielded. The shift supervisor is covered: his override is the conduct that may be charged to Harborview. The operations director is covered on a different ground — she regularly consults with company counsel about this matter. The former technician is ordinarily outside the rule, so Adeyemi may interview him, though he must not seek Harborview's privileged communications. The payroll clerk neither binds the company nor has conduct at issue and knows nothing about the fire; she is not shielded by MR 4.2.

Note what does the work here. Seniority does not decide it — the supervisor is junior to the director and both are covered, for different reasons, while the clerk is not covered despite being a current employee.

Issue 2 — the investigator. It changes nothing. MR 8.4(a) prohibits doing through another person what the Rules forbid directly, and MR 5.3 makes Adeyemi responsible for his investigator's conduct. The two approaches that MR 4.2 bars are barred whoever makes them.

Issue 3 — methods. Recording without the consent the state requires violates the legal rights of the person recorded, and MR 4.4(a)'s second branch asks only whether the method was lawful. The value of the evidence is no answer, and that branch applies to the former technician and the payroll clerk as much as to anyone else.

The social approach to the clerk raises MR 4.3. She is unrepresented, and an investigator who conceals whom he works for is implying disinterestedness through Adeyemi's agent.

Conclusion. Adeyemi may approach the former technician and the payroll clerk, but not the shift supervisor or the operations director without Harborview counsel's consent. He must not record any of the conversations without the consent the state requires. And the investigator must identify whose interests he serves when approaching the clerk. The permissible plan is narrower than the one proposed, but it is not empty — informal access to non-shielded witnesses is exactly what the functional test preserves.

Cites. MR 4.2; MR 4.2 cmt. [7]; MR 8.4(a); MR 5.3; MR 4.4(a); MR 4.3 Outline links. OUT-0003, OUT-0004, OUT-0006, OUT-0007

WT-0003 — The misdirected attachment and the opinion letter

Facts. Ibarra represents Calder Foods, which is selling a processing plant. A bank will finance the buyer only if Ibarra delivers an opinion letter confirming Calder holds clear title. Calder has given informed consent to the evaluation.

Two things happen on the same morning. First, the buyer's lawyer emails Ibarra a revised schedule and, without intending to, attaches her own client's internal memo setting out the highest price the buyer will pay. Ibarra sees the file name, understands immediately what it is, and reads it.

Second, Ibarra's title search turns up an unreleased contractor's lien on part of the plant. Calder's chief executive tells Ibarra to describe the title as clear, saying the lien is "stale and nobody will ever chase it."

Prompt. Identify the issues and how the lawyer should proceed.

Issues.

What Ibarra must do about the misdirected memo.

Whether Ibarra may describe the title as clear.

What the discovery of the lien means for the client's consent.

Rules.

MR 4.4(b) requires a lawyer who knows or reasonably should know that material was inadvertently sent to notify the sender promptly.

MR 2.3 permits an evaluation for a third person's use where it is compatible with the lawyer's other duties to the client, and requires the client's informed consent wherever the opinion stands to set the client's own interests back substantially, and to the client's detriment.

MR 4.1(a) bars knowingly false statements of material fact, and MR 8.4(c) bars dishonesty. MR 1.2(d) bars assisting a client's crime or fraud.

Application.

Issue 1 — the memo. Ibarra knew the attachment was sent by mistake, so MR 4.4(b) required him to notify the buyer's lawyer promptly. That is the entire duty the Model Rule imposes: it does not require him to return the memo, delete it, or refrain from having read it, and he is not disqualified by having received it. Whether he may use what he learned is a question of law outside the Rules, and the buyer's lawyer may seek a court order. The fact that he read it before acting does not excuse the notification, which he still owes.

Issue 2 — the opinion. This is the firm limit in the scenario. An opinion letter stating that title is clear, written for a bank to rely on when Ibarra knows of an unreleased lien, is a knowingly false statement of material fact to a third person under MR 4.1(a) and dishonesty under MR 8.4(c). The client's instruction does not change that, and following it would also mean assisting the client in a fraud on the lender, contrary to MR 1.2(d). The chief executive's view that nobody will chase the lien is a prediction, not a fact about title.

Issue 3 — consent. Calder consented to an evaluation, but it consented before anyone knew about the lien. An accurate opinion will now probably cost Calder the financing, which is a material and adverse effect on the client's interests — precisely the MR 2.3 consent trigger. Ibarra must go back to Calder, explain what the search found and what an accurate opinion will say, and obtain informed consent to deliver it. Note the consent is to delivery of an accurate opinion. No consent can authorize a false one.

If Calder refuses, Ibarra does not deliver the letter. Information he learned in the evaluation that is not disclosed in it stays protected by MR 1.6.

Conclusion. Ibarra must promptly notify the buyer's lawyer about the memo. He must refuse to describe the title as clear. He must return to his client for fresh informed consent now that the lien has changed what the opinion will say, and if consent is withheld he withholds the opinion rather than softening it.

Cites. MR 4.4(b); MR 4.4 cmt. [2]–[3]; MR 2.3(a)–(c); MR 4.1(a); MR 8.4(c); MR 1.2(d); MR 1.6 Outline links. OUT-0001, OUT-0008, OUT-0009

— Key Terms (KT)

Every term below is marked … at its point of definition in the Part A outline, and every one has exactly one flashcard. The app uses this file to drive the tap-a-term behaviour: tapping a term opens the outline block where it is defined.

Terms deliberately not marked in this section

Recorded so a reviewer can see the choice was made rather than missed. Each is defined elsewhere in the pipeline, and Style Guide Part 1 ¶7 requires one source of truth — a term defined twice is a point taught two ways.

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