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Legal Ethics Prep & Practice / Litigation and Other Forms of Advocacy FREE

Subject 6: Litigation and Other Forms of Advocacy

Free MPRE Study Material · NCBE weight: 10–16% · © 2026 PryvixLabs LLC. All rights reserved.

In this packet: Litigation and Other Forms of Advocacy Outline, 45 multiple-choice questions, 30 true/false statements, 30 flashcards, 2 scenario walkthroughs and 20 key terms.

Outlines1 outline
Multiple Choice45 questions
True/False30 statements
Flashcards30 cards
Walkthroughs2 walkthroughs
Key Terms20 terms

6. Litigation and Other Forms of Advocacy

6.0 The Framework: An Advocate Owes Duties Beyond the Client

Rule: In litigation the lawyer presses the client's case hard, but that loyalty ends where the integrity of the proceeding begins. MR 3.1–3.7 impose duties owed to the court, to the other side and to the public. Some of them override the client's instructions, and some override even the duty of confidentiality.

Three different consequences can follow the same conduct — keep them apart:

  1. Discipline by the licensing authority under the Rules of Professional Conduct. Most MPRE questions in this section ask about discipline, but the exam also asks about civil liability, disqualification and procedural consequences, so read the call of the question.
  2. Procedural sanctions imposed by the court in the case, such as sanctions for baseless filings (e.g., FRCP 11 or a state equivalent) or discovery sanctions.
  3. Contempt or criminal liability, for example for obstruction of justice or subornation of perjury.

A single act (hiding a document, filing a baseless motion) can trigger all three. A question asking whether the lawyer is "subject to discipline" asks only about the first.

Map of the section: | Duty | Rule | Owed mainly to | |---|---|---| | Nonfrivolous claims | MR 3.1 | The court and the opponent | | Expedition | MR 3.2 | The court and the opponent | | Candor | MR 3.3 | The tribunal | | Fairness | MR 3.4 | The opposing party and counsel | | Impartiality and decorum | MR 3.5 | The tribunal and jurors | | Trial publicity | MR 3.6 | The fairness of the proceeding | | Lawyer as witness | MR 3.7 | The tribunal and the opposing party |

Tribunal: any body that decides a particular matter in an adjudicative role — a court, a binding arbitrator, or a legislature, agency or other body when a neutral official hears the evidence or argument and then issues a legally binding ruling that directly affects a party's interests in that matter. (MR 1.0(m))

Not a tribunal: a legislative committee holding a hearing on a proposed bill, or an agency taking public comment on a proposed regulation. Candor still matters there: a lawyer appearing for a client in such a nonadjudicative setting must say she appears in a representative capacity and must follow several of the candor and fairness rules. That rule is MR 3.9, taught in Section 8.

⚠ Exam trap: "The client told me to do it" is never a defense to an MR 3.x violation. The client controls the objectives (S02 OUT-2.2.1); the lawyer may not pursue them by means these Rules forbid.

Cite: MR 1.0(m); MR 3.1–3.7; MR 3.9; Preamble [2], [5]


6.1 Meritorious Claims and Contentions (MR 3.1)

6.1.1 A nonfrivolous basis in law and fact

Rule: Every claim, defense or contested issue a lawyer puts forward in a proceeding needs some legitimate footing in both the facts and the law. A position with no such footing is Frivolous, and the lawyer may not raise it.

Explanation:

  • The test is objective. A position is frivolous only if the lawyer cannot make a good-faith argument for it on the merits, and cannot support it with a good-faith argument to extend, modify or reverse existing law. Whether this lawyer expects to win is irrelevant. (cmt. [2])
  • A position is not frivolous just because the facts are not yet fully developed, or because the lawyer expects discovery to supply the evidence. The lawyer must, however, learn the relevant facts and law before filing. (cmt. [2])
  • Motive is a separate question. A client's wish to harass or burden an opponent does not by itself make a legally supported claim frivolous, and does not rescue a claim with no basis. An abusive purpose is evidence that the lawyer lacked good faith, and it can separately violate other rules, such as using means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay or burden a third person (MR 4.4(a)) or procedural sanction rules.
  • The lawyer's personal view that the client should lose, or that the claim is weak, does not make it frivolous.

Example: A tenant's lawyer files a claim that a landlord's lease clause is unconscionable. No appellate court in the state has accepted the argument, but two trial courts have, and the argument rests on a recognized doctrine. The claim is not frivolous.

⚠ Exam trap: "Likely to lose" is not "frivolous." Watch for answer choices that treat a long-shot claim as a violation.

6.1.2 Good-faith arguments to change the law

Rule: A Good-faith argument to change the law — that existing law should be extended, modified or reversed — counts as a legal basis for a claim.

Explanation:

  • The law develops through advocacy. A lawyer may ask a court to overrule its own precedent if the argument is made in good faith and is candidly presented as a request to change the law. (cmt. [1])
  • The argument must be presented honestly. Misstating what current law is, to make the argument look like an application of existing law, violates MR 3.3(a)(1) (6.3.1).

Example: Attorney Obi argues that the state supreme court should abandon its contributory-negligence rule for comparative fault, citing trends in other states. The court has reaffirmed the rule twice. The argument is proper.

6.1.3 Criminal defense: requiring the state to prove its case

Rule: Holding the other side to its full burden of proof is always a legitimate defense when the client's liberty is at stake: counsel for a criminal defendant, or for anyone facing possible incarceration in the proceeding, may make the prosecution or petitioner establish every element, even with no affirmative defense to offer.

Explanation:

  • Pleading not guilty and holding the prosecution to its burden is never frivolous. The constitutional presumption of innocence controls. (cmt. [3])
  • The same protection applies in other proceedings that can end in incarceration, such as some civil-commitment or civil-contempt proceedings. It does not extend to every proceeding that affects a liberty interest.
  • This does not permit the defense lawyer to offer false evidence (6.3) or make knowingly false statements to the court.

Example: Defense counsel knows from confidential client statements that the client committed the burglary. She may still plead not guilty, cross-examine the state's witnesses and argue that the evidence is insufficient. She may not call a witness she knows will lie.

⚠ Exam trap: Knowing the client is guilty does not, by itself, make a not-guilty defense frivolous. Other advocacy rules still apply to how the defense is run: no false evidence or false statements, no obstruction of evidence, no improper delay, no improper juror contact.

Cite: MR 3.1 and cmts. [1]–[3]; MR 4.4(a)


6.2 Expediting Litigation (MR 3.2)

6.2.1 Reasonable efforts to move the case forward

Rule: An advocate has an affirmative duty to keep the case moving and avoid needless delay, to the extent that is consistent with the client's legitimate interests.

Explanation:

  • Stalling tactics bring the administration of justice into disrepute. (cmt. [1])
  • The test: ask what the step accomplishes besides buying time. If a competent, good-faith lawyer could point to a real, substantial benefit apart from the delay, the step is proper even if it also slows the case; if stalling is its only point, it isn't. (cmt. [1])
  • Personal scheduling: a lawyer may occasionally seek a postponement for a genuine personal reason, such as a planned vacation, especially when the other side agrees and the court approves. What the rule forbids is a routine practice of delaying cases for the lawyers' own convenience. (cmt. [1])

6.2.2 Delay for the client's financial or tactical benefit

Rule: Otherwise improper delay is not justified by the client's interest in it. In particular, frustrating the opponent's effort to obtain redress or repose, or profiting from the delay itself, is not a legitimate reason to stall. Such stalling is a Dilatory tactics problem.

Explanation:

  • A client's wish to postpone paying a judgment it expects to lose, so it can keep earning interest on the money, does not justify stalling tactics that have no other substantial purpose. (cmt. [1])
  • That other lawyers commonly tolerate similar tactics is no defense. (cmt. [1])
  • Legitimate reasons for time are fine even if the client also benefits financially: needing discovery, a genuine scheduling conflict, a new lawyer getting up to speed, settlement talks.

Example: An insurer instructs defense counsel to file a string of motions for extensions solely to push entry of judgment past the insurer's fiscal year. Counsel may not do so.

⚠ Exam trap: "The client instructed the delay" is not a defense. Distinguish delay that serves a legitimate substantial purpose (proper) from delay whose only purpose is delay or profit from delay (improper).

Cite: MR 3.2 and cmt. [1]


6.3 Candor Toward the Tribunal (MR 3.3)

The big picture: MR 3.3 protects the court's ability to decide on true facts and correct law. By MR 3.3(c), the duties in paragraphs (a) and (b) apply even when compliance requires revealing information that MR 1.6 otherwise protects.

6.3.1 False statements of fact or law, and the duty to correct

Rule: Two duties protect the court from the lawyer's own falsehoods. Correction: once a lawyer learns that something material she told a tribunal was false, she must fix it. Honesty: she must never knowingly tell a tribunal anything false, about facts or about law.

Explanation:

  • "Knowingly" means actual knowledge, which may be inferred from circumstances. (MR 1.0(f))
  • The lawyer's own assertions in pleadings, affidavits and oral statements count. A lawyer may assert something as within her own knowledge only if she knows it is true or believes it true after a reasonably diligent inquiry. (cmt. [3])
  • Statements in pleadings based on the client's version of the facts are ordinarily the client's assertions, not the lawyer's, but the lawyer may not present them when she knows they are false.
  • Legal argument built on a knowingly false account of the law is dishonesty toward the tribunal. (cmt. [4])
  • The duty to correct applies to the lawyer's own earlier material statement, once the lawyer learns it was false.

Example: At a bail hearing, Attorney Ruiz tells the judge that her client has no prior convictions, believing it true. Two days later she learns of a prior felony conviction. She must correct the statement.

6.3.2 Disclosing adverse legal authority

Rule: If the lawyer knows of legal authority that is binding on the court and cuts squarely against her client's position, and the other side has not brought it to the court's attention, she must disclose it herself.

Explanation:

  • Controlling jurisdiction means authority that binds this court on this issue — for example, the state's highest court, or the appellate court over the trial court. Merely persuasive authority need not be disclosed. (cmt. [4])
  • Which law governs matters. Usually authority from another state is only persuasive. But if the forum must apply another state's substantive law (for example, under a choice-of-law clause), that state's decisions on the issue can be controlling. Ask what binds this court on this issue, not where the case was decided.
  • Directly adverse authority is authority that bears squarely against the client on the issue. The lawyer may then argue that it is distinguishable or should be overruled.
  • The duty applies only if the lawyer knows of the authority and opposing counsel has not disclosed it.
  • The duty concerns law. There is no general duty to volunteer adverse facts in an adversary proceeding. Specific duties about facts still apply: correcting the lawyer's own false statements, remedying known false evidence, remedying crime or fraud related to the proceeding, discovery obligations, the ex parte rule (6.3.6), and prosecutors' disclosure duties (Section 8).

Example: In a state trial court, Attorney Lee learns of a state supreme court decision squarely against her client. Opposing counsel's brief doesn't cite it. Lee must disclose it and may argue it is distinguishable.

⚠ Exam trap: Test binding force, not geography. A directly adverse decision the court must follow has to be disclosed, even if the lawyer thinks it was wrongly decided; a merely persuasive decision need not be.

6.3.3 False evidence

Rule: The lawyer's duties about false evidence turn on what she knows and when. Mere reasonable belief that evidence is false lets her decline to offer it (except a criminal defendant's own testimony). Actual knowledge beforehand forbids offering it. Knowledge acquired afterward — that material evidence from her, her client or a witness she called was false — requires Reasonable remedial measures, including telling the court if nothing less will fix it.

Explanation:

  • Knows (evidence is false) vs. reasonably believes:
  • If the lawyer knows evidence is false, she must not offer it.
  • If she only reasonably believes it is false, she may refuse to offer it (except a criminal defendant's testimony), but need not. (cmt. [9])
  • Doubts are resolved in the client's favor, but knowledge can't be avoided by ignoring the obvious. (cmt. [8])
  • An inconsistent document is not, alone, knowledge. The lawyer should inquire; knowledge is established when, for example, the client admits the testimony was false.
  • Partial falsity: if only part of a witness's testimony will be false, the lawyer may call the witness for the truthful part but must not elicit the false part. (cmt. [6])
  • Offering to prove falsity: the rule does not bar offering an item precisely to show that it is false. (cmt. [5])
  • Remedial measures (cmt. [10]) — the goal is to undo the effect of the false evidence:
  • Usually, first talk to the client privately: explain the duty of candor and seek her cooperation in correcting the record.
  • If that fails, the lawyer must take further reasonable steps. Withdrawal, where the tribunal permits it, is one option, but only if it would actually undo the effect of the false evidence; it usually won't, because the evidence stays in the record.
  • If nothing less will fix it, the lawyer must disclose to the tribunal as much as is reasonably necessary, even if that reveals MR 1.6 information. A futile withdrawal motion must not delay needed disclosure.
  • Withdrawal generally isn't required just to comply with this rule. It may be permitted, or required, if the relationship has deteriorated so badly that the lawyer can no longer represent the client competently. (cmt. [15])
  • The duty covers material evidence offered by the lawyer, the client, or a witness the lawyer called.

Example: A civil plaintiff testifies at trial that she was earning $90,000 a year. Her lawyer then receives tax returns showing $40,000; when he asks her about it, she admits she inflated the figure and refuses to correct it. The lawyer now knows the testimony is false and must take reasonable remedial measures, up to disclosure to the court.

6.3.4 The criminal defendant who wants to testify falsely

Rule: The candor duties bind criminal defense lawyers too: no lawyer may present testimony she knows is false, even the defendant's own. But the decision to testify belongs to the defendant, and the lawyer must respect it unless she actually knows the testimony will be false.

Explanation:

  • The client decides whether to testify (S02 OUT-2.2.1). A lawyer who merely suspects, or reasonably believes, that the testimony will be false must still let the defendant testify. (cmt. [9])
  • If the lawyer knows the defendant intends to lie: 1. Remonstrate and try to dissuade the client. 2. If the client persists, the lawyer must not elicit the false testimony; she may still elicit any truthful testimony, and may seek to withdraw where appropriate. 3. If the false testimony is given anyway and withdrawal won't cure it, take remedial measures including disclosure to the court. (cmts. [6]–[7], [10])
  • Narrative testimony: some jurisdictions have the defendant who the lawyer knows intends to lie testify in narrative form, without the lawyer's questioning. The Model Rules do not adopt that approach, but if the court or local law requires it, the lawyer follows that direction. (cmt. [7])
  • Constitutional backdrop: In Nix v. Whiteside (1986), the Supreme Court held that a defense lawyer who threatened to disclose the client's planned perjury and seek to withdraw did not deprive the client of effective assistance of counsel.

⚠ Exam trap: "Reasonably believes" the defendant will lie → the lawyer must let him testify. "Knows" → the lawyer may not elicit the lie.

6.3.5 Crime or fraud related to the proceeding, and how long the duties last

Rule: Corrective steps are mandatory — including telling the court if that is what it takes — whenever a lawyer representing a client in an adjudicative proceeding learns that anyone has committed, is committing or plans to commit a crime or fraud connected with that proceeding. These candor duties outrank MR 1.6 and last until the proceeding is over.

Explanation:

  • Conduct covered: for example, bribing, intimidating or otherwise unlawfully contacting a witness, juror or court official; unlawfully destroying or concealing evidence; failing to disclose information to the court when the law requires it. (cmt. [12])
  • The actor can be anyone: the client, a witness, a juror, a third party — even someone on the other side.
  • Remedial measures are mandatory once the lawyer knows of the conduct, whether it is planned, ongoing or completed. Disclosure is required only when it is necessary to remedy the situation.
  • Conclusion of the proceeding: the duties last until the case can go no further. That happens in one of two ways: nobody seeks review in time, so the window closes; or a reviewing court upholds the judgment. A reversal or remand does not end the proceeding. (cmt. [13])
  • Override of confidentiality: MR 3.3(c) makes the duties in 3.3(a) and (b) apply even if disclosure would otherwise be forbidden by MR 1.6. This is one of the few places where the Rules require disclosure of confidential information (compare S03 OUT-3.4: MR 1.6(b) exceptions are only permissive).

Example: During trial, a defense lawyer learns that his client paid a juror's brother to influence the juror. He must take reasonable remedial measures, including telling the court if that is necessary.

6.3.6 Ex parte proceedings

Rule: Facts that hurt the client must be disclosed too when the other side isn't there to raise them. In an Ex parte proceeding, the lawyer owes the tribunal all the material facts she knows that bear on a sound decision.

Explanation:

  • In an adversary hearing, the other side presents contrary facts. In an ex parte hearing — for example, a temporary restraining order sought without notice, where the opposing party has no opportunity to be heard — no one does that. So the lawyer must present the adverse material facts herself. (cmt. [14])
  • This is broader than the adverse-authority rule: it covers facts, not just controlling law.
  • The ex parte duty is its own requirement in MR 3.3(d). (MR 3.3(c)'s express override of MR 1.6 names paragraphs (a) and (b).)

Example: A lawyer seeking an emergency custody order without notice knows that the other parent has a court order granting visitation this weekend. She must tell the judge.

⚠ Exam trap: In an ordinary adversary proceeding, there is no general duty to volunteer adverse facts, but the specific duties listed in 6.3.2 still apply. In an ex parte proceeding, all known material facts, including adverse ones, must be disclosed.

Cite: MR 3.3 and cmts. [1]–[15]; MR 1.0(f); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986)


6.4 Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel (MR 3.4)

6.4.1 Access to evidence

Rule: Evidence must be left intact and available as the law requires. A lawyer may not — personally or by advising or helping anyone else — destroy, hide or tamper with anything that could serve as evidence, or otherwise block the other side's lawful access to it.

Explanation:

  • The key word is unlawfully: the rule takes its standard from other law, such as obstruction statutes, spoliation law and discovery rules. (cmt. [2])
  • Potential evidentiary value reaches material relevant to a pending proceeding or to one that is reasonably foreseeable.
  • Physical evidence of a crime: where applicable law permits, a lawyer may take temporary possession of an item (such as a weapon) to examine it, but the examination must not alter or destroy it, and the law may then require turning it over to the authorities. (cmt. [2])
  • Advising a client to destroy documents because litigation is expected is a classic violation where, as in most jurisdictions, preservation law forbids it.

Example: After a customer threatens to sue, a company's lawyer tells the operations manager to "clean up" emails about the product defect. The lawyer violated MR 3.4(a).

6.4.2 Falsifying evidence and paying witnesses

Rule: No payments the law forbids, no lies and no invented evidence: a lawyer may not offer a witness an unlawful inducement, help or encourage a witness to testify falsely, or fabricate evidence.

Explanation (paying witnesses):

  • Generally permitted, where the governing law allows: paying a witness's reasonable expenses of attending or testifying; reasonable compensation for time the witness actually loses, such as missed work; and a reasonable fee for an expert's professional services. Any payment must not depend on the content of the testimony or the outcome of the case. (cmt. [3]; ABA Formal Op. 96-402 (advisory), discussed in Formal Op. 508, also advisory)
  • Prohibited: paying any witness for the content of testimony; paying an ordinary fact witness a fee for testifying beyond expenses and lost time; and, under the common-law rule followed in most jurisdictions, paying an expert a fee contingent on the outcome. (cmt. [3])
  • Preparing a witness is proper: reviewing the facts, explaining the process, rehearsing questions, and refreshing the witness's memory with documents. What is forbidden is planting false recollections or shaping testimony the lawyer knows is untrue. (ABA Formal Op. 508)

Example: A plaintiff's lawyer offers an expert engineer 20% of any recovery instead of an hourly fee. The fee is a prohibited inducement.

⚠ Exam trap: A fact witness may be paid for lost time and expenses; an expert may be paid a reasonable fee; no witness may be paid contingent on the outcome or for favorable testimony.

6.4.3 Obeying the tribunal's rules, and discovery

Rule: Discovery and court orders both demand good faith. In discovery, a lawyer must make a reasonably diligent effort to satisfy the other side's proper requests, and may not serve requests of her own that have no legitimate basis. As for a tribunal's rules and orders, a lawyer may not knowingly disobey them — unless she refuses openly, asserting that the obligation is invalid.

Explanation:

  • Open refusal: a lawyer who believes an order is invalid may openly decline to comply in order to test it (for example, to seek appellate review). Secret noncompliance is never protected.
  • Discovery has two limbs:
  • Requests: a request with no legitimate basis (for example, sweeping demands served to burden the opponent) violates the rule.
  • Responses: stalling, partial or careless compliance with a proper request also violates it. Producing documents only after repeated motions, when they were readily available, is the classic example.

Example: A lawyer who believes a discovery order violates the attorney-client privilege tells the court she will not produce the documents and seeks an immediate appeal. That is an open refusal, not a violation.

6.4.4 Conduct at trial

Rule: At trial, the lawyer argues from the evidence, not from herself. So she may not (1) offer her personal views — whether an accused is guilty or innocent, whether a civil party is at fault, whether a witness is believable, or whether the cause is just; (2) vouch from her own knowledge of disputed facts, unless she testifies as a witness; or (3) hint at matters she has no reasonable basis to think are relevant or will be backed by admissible evidence.

Explanation:

  • Personal opinion at trial vs. argument: "The evidence shows the witness was lying" is argument based on the record. "I personally believe the witness lied" is a prohibited personal opinion.
  • Personal knowledge: "I was at that intersection myself, and the light was red" — said by counsel in closing — improperly injects the lawyer's own testimony. If the lawyer's knowledge matters, she must testify (and then MR 3.7 applies).
  • Referring in opening statement to evidence the lawyer has no reasonable belief will be admitted — for example, evidence the judge has already excluded — is a violation even if an objection is sustained.

Example: In closing, a prosecutor says, "I've been doing this for twenty years, and I know a guilty man when I see one." That is an improper personal opinion on guilt.

6.4.5 Asking others not to talk to the opposing side

Rule: The client itself may be advised not to volunteer information to the other side. Beyond the client, a lawyer may ask someone not to voluntarily give relevant information to another party only if the person is the client's relative, employee or other agent and the lawyer reasonably believes that staying silent won't hurt the person's interests. Anyone else may not be asked.

Explanation:

  • The rule concerns voluntary sharing only. It does not authorize obstructing compelled disclosure, such as a subpoena or discovery request.
  • Relatives, employees and agents of the client may be asked (not forced) to refrain, and only when the lawyer reasonably believes their interests won't be adversely affected. If an employee could face personal liability, for example, the lawyer should not make the request and the employee may need separate advice. (cmt. [4])
  • Asking an unrelated eyewitness not to talk to the opposing lawyer is a violation.

⚠ Exam trap: The exception covers the client's relatives, employees and agents, not the lawyer's, and not unrelated witnesses.

Cite: MR 3.4 and cmts. [1]–[4]; ABA Formal Ops. 96-402 and 508 (both advisory)


6.5 Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal (MR 3.5)

6.5.1 Improper influence

Rule: Improper influence is banned: a lawyer may not use any legally forbidden means to sway the people who decide or run a case — judges, jurors, members of the jury pool and other court officials.

Explanation:

  • Bribery, threats and gifts meant to influence are prohibited by criminal law and by this rule.
  • Gifts to judges are also governed by the Code of Judicial Conduct (Section 12). A lawyer who knowingly gives a judge a gift the judge may not accept violates MR 8.4(f) by knowingly assisting a judge's violation. (cmt. [1])

6.5.2 Ex parte communications

Rule: While a proceeding is pending, a lawyer may not have an Ex parte communication with the judge, a juror, a prospective juror or another official unless law or a court order permits it.

Explanation:

  • Ex parte means without the other side present or notified.
  • The ban is not limited to discussing the merits. With jurors especially, even small talk or a social-media access request is a prohibited communication.
  • Authorized examples: a scheduling call where local rules permit; an emergency application where law allows it (with the heightened candor of MR 3.3(d)).
  • Emailing the judge an argument about the merits with no copy to opposing counsel is a violation.
  • The judge's own ex parte limits are in the Code of Judicial Conduct (Section 12, CJC 2.9).

6.5.3 Jurors during and after trial

Rule: Until the jury is discharged, a lawyer may not communicate with a juror or prospective juror unless law or a court order permits it. After discharge, contact is generally allowed, but it ends the moment the juror says she doesn't want to talk; it may never deceive, pressure, coerce or harass; and a law or court order can forbid it altogether.

Explanation:

  • Social media: unless a law or court order restricts it, a lawyer may passively review a juror's or prospective juror's public social-media content. The lawyer may not send an access request (such as a "friend" request), personally or through someone else, because that is a communication. A platform's automatic notice to the juror that the lawyer viewed the page is not a communication by the lawyer. (ABA Formal Op. 466 (2014) (advisory))
  • Juror misconduct: if the lawyer learns that a juror has committed a crime or fraud connected with the case (for example, lying in voir dire or discussing the case online in violation of the court's instructions in a way that amounts to fraud), MR 3.3(b) requires reasonable remedial measures, including disclosure to the court if necessary. Other improper juror conduct may be reportable under court rules or other law. (ABA Formal Op. 466, advisory)

Example: After the jury is discharged, defense counsel calls a juror to ask why the jury ruled as it did. The juror says, "Please don't call me again." Counsel may not call or write again.

6.5.4 Disrupting a tribunal

Rule: A lawyer may not act with the intent to disrupt a tribunal.

Explanation:

  • The lawyer may stand firm against abuse by a judge but should not respond in kind; the judge's misconduct doesn't justify the lawyer's. (cmt. [4])
  • The rule reaches proceedings that are part of the tribunal's process, including depositions. (cmt. [5])

Cite: MR 3.5 and cmts. [1]–[5]; ABA Formal Op. 466 (2014) (advisory)


6.6 Trial Publicity (MR 3.6)

6.6.1 The general rule

Rule: Out-of-court publicity is limited when it threatens a fair proceeding. A statement is forbidden if it carries a Substantial likelihood of material prejudice to a proceeding in the matter, the lawyer knows or reasonably should know it will be spread publicly, and the lawyer is working on, or has worked on, the investigation or litigation of that matter.

Explanation:

  • Who is covered: lawyers who are or were participating in the matter, and (MR 3.6(d)) any lawyer in the same firm or government agency as such a lawyer.
  • The standard — a substantial likelihood of material prejudice — balances free speech and a fair trial. The Supreme Court upheld this standard in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada (1991), while holding the Nevada rule's safe-harbor language unconstitutionally vague as applied in that case.
  • Subjects that tend to be prejudicial — illustrative, not a complete or automatic list, and especially risky in a criminal jury case (cmt. [5]):
  • People: anyone's character, credibility, reputation or criminal record, whether party, suspect or witness; the identity of a witness or what a witness is expected to say.
  • The accused's own words and choices: a possible guilty plea; any confession, admission or statement by the accused, or a refusal or failure to make one.
  • Evidence: the results of an examination or test, or a refusal to take one; the identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be offered.
  • Opinions and inadmissible matter: any opinion on guilt or innocence; information the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to be inadmissible and would create a substantial risk of prejudice if disclosed.
  • The charge itself: stating that a defendant has been charged, unless the statement explains that the charge is only an accusation and the defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
  • Bench trials and non-criminal matters are generally less susceptible to prejudice. (cmt. [6])

6.6.2 The safe harbor

Rule: Even if the general rule might otherwise apply, certain basic information may always be stated. That Trial-publicity safe harbor covers four groups:

  1. Public safety and help: a warning about the danger a person involved in the matter poses, when there is reason to believe substantial harm to an individual or the public is likely; and requests for help in gathering evidence or information.
  2. Criminal-case basics: information needed to catch an accused who is at large; when and where the arrest happened; who investigated and arrested, and how long the investigation lasted; and the accused's identity, residence, occupation and family status.
  3. Procedural status: scheduling or results at any stage of the litigation; that an investigation is underway; and anything already in a public record.
  4. What the case is about: the claim, offense or defense, and (unless law forbids) who is involved.

Explanation: The safe harbor lists what may be said; it does not permit adding prejudicial commentary. "The defendant was arrested at 10 p.m." is protected; "the defendant was arrested and the evidence of guilt is overwhelming" is not. The safe harbor only answers the publicity rule: it does not override confidentiality duties, sealing orders or protective orders.

6.6.3 The right of reply

Rule: If the client is being hurt by recent publicity that neither the lawyer nor the client started, the lawyer may say what a reasonable lawyer would think is needed to protect the client from its substantial unfair prejudice — and no more than needed to blunt it. That is the Right of reply.

Explanation: The reply permission is a special allowance for statements that would otherwise be prohibited. If the lawyer's or client's own statements started the publicity, the lawyer can't invoke it; ordinary non-prejudicial or safe-harbor statements remain permitted either way.

Example: After the police chief tells reporters that the defendant has "a long history of violence," defense counsel may respond briefly that the defendant has no violent convictions and is presumed innocent.

6.6.4 Prosecutors' additional limits

Rule (MR 3.8(f), taught in Section 8): Beyond MR 3.6, a prosecutor must avoid public comments that are substantially likely to increase public condemnation of the accused, unless the comment is needed to tell the public what the prosecutor's office is doing and serves a legitimate law-enforcement purpose. The prosecutor must also use reasonable care to keep investigators, police and other staff from making statements the prosecutor could not make.

⚠ Exam trap: A prosecutor may give safe-harbor information — the charge, the arrest, facts in a public record — and a justified reply. The prosecutor may not add prejudicial commentary: calling the accused guilty, or characterizing a confession or test result that is not already public, is improper. (MR 3.8 cmt. [5])

Cite: MR 3.6 and cmts. [1]–[8]; MR 3.8(f) and cmt. [5]; Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991)


6.7 Lawyer as Witness (MR 3.7)

6.7.1 The advocate-witness bar

Rule: The same lawyer generally can't be both the advocate and a key witness at one trial. Disqualification would cause the client Substantial hardship? Then the lawyer may do both. Otherwise, a lawyer likely to be a Necessary witness may not serve as trial advocate unless the testimony concerns only the nature and value of legal services rendered in this case, or a matter nobody disputes.

Explanation:

  • Why: combining roles can confuse the factfinder — it's unclear whether a statement is evidence or argument — and can prejudice the opposing party. (cmt. [2])
  • "Necessary" is a judgment, not a mechanical test. Courts ask how important the lawyer's testimony is to a contested issue and whether the same evidence is realistically available from other sources. The availability of another witness weighs against necessity, but does not automatically defeat it: if the lawyer is the only disinterested witness to a disputed conversation, her testimony may be necessary even though the parties themselves were there.
  • "At trial": the rule bars the lawyer from acting as trial advocate. By its terms it does not bar pretrial work such as drafting motions, but a court may restrict pretrial roles in a particular case, and the conflict rules still apply.
  • Substantial hardship: the court balances the client's interests against the prejudice to the opponent. Factors include the nature of the case, the importance and probable tenor of the lawyer's testimony, and the probability that it will conflict with other witnesses' testimony — and whether either side could have foreseen that the lawyer would be a witness. (cmt. [4])

Example: Attorney Park negotiated the contract now in dispute. She is the only person other than the two parties' officers who heard a key oral promise, the officers' accounts conflict, and her account is the only neutral one. She is likely a necessary witness and may not try the case.

6.7.2 Other lawyers in the firm

Rule: The advocate-witness bar is personal. A colleague in the witness-lawyer's firm may try the case, unless the conflict-of-interest rules independently prevent it.

Explanation:

  • MR 3.7(a) is not imputed to the firm. A partner may try the case while a colleague testifies.
  • Always run an independent conflict analysis. The testifying lawyer's testimony may be adverse to the client, or the lawyer may have a personal interest (for example, exposure to liability for her own role), or a former-client duty may be involved. If a conflict exists under MR 1.7 or 1.9, the conflict rules — including whether it can be cured by informed consent, confirmed in writing, and whether it is imputed under MR 1.10 — decide whether a colleague may act. (cmts. [6]–[7])

⚠ Exam trap: MR 3.7(a) disqualifies only the witness-lawyer, and only as trial advocate. The firm is disqualified only if a separate, imputed conflict exists.

Cite: MR 3.7 and cmts. [1]–[7]; MR 1.7; MR 1.9; MR 1.10


Section 6: Must-Know Checklist

  1. Frivolous means no good-faith argument on the merits or for changing the law; long shots and good-faith arguments to change the law are proper. Criminal defendants (and respondents facing incarceration) may always make the other side prove every element. (MR 3.1)
  2. Delay for its own sake, or to profit from it, is not a legitimate client interest; an occasional agreed scheduling accommodation is fine. (MR 3.2)
  3. No knowingly false statements of fact or law to a tribunal; correct your own earlier material false statement. (MR 3.3(a)(1))
  4. Disclose known, directly adverse, controlling legal authority that opposing counsel hasn't cited. There is no general duty to volunteer adverse facts, but specific duties (false evidence, crime or fraud, discovery, ex parte) still apply. (MR 3.3(a)(2), (b), (d))
  5. False evidence: knows → must not offer; later comes to know → reasonable remedial measures, up to disclosure; reasonably believes → may refuse, except a criminal defendant's testimony. (MR 3.3(a)(3))
  6. Candor beats confidentiality until the proceeding ends (no further review possible). (MR 3.3(c))
  7. Evidence: don't unlawfully destroy, conceal or obstruct; don't pay a witness for testimony; expenses and lost time are fine where law allows; no contingent expert fees. (MR 3.4(a)–(b))
  8. At trial: no personal opinions on credibility, justness, fault or guilt; no personal-knowledge assertions unless testifying; no allusions to matters without a reasonable basis. (MR 3.4(e))
  9. Jurors: no contact before discharge unless authorized; after discharge, only if not prohibited, not unwanted and not abusive. Passive public social-media review is fine unless restricted; access requests are not. (MR 3.5)
  10. Publicity: no public statement with a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing the proceeding; know the safe harbor and the right of reply. (MR 3.6)
  11. Lawyer-witness: a necessary witness may not be trial advocate unless the testimony is uncontested, is about the value of legal services in the case, or disqualification would cause substantial hardship. Colleagues may try the case unless a conflict bars them. (MR 3.7)

Section 6: Common Traps

  • "Weak" or "novel" does not mean frivolous; a harassing motive is a separate problem.
  • Adverse law that binds the court must be disclosed; there is no general duty to volunteer adverse facts (but see the specific duties and ex parte proceedings).
  • "Reasonably believes" false: may refuse to offer, but must let a criminal defendant testify. "Knows" false: must not offer.
  • Withdrawal alone usually doesn't cure false evidence already in the record.
  • MR 3.3(a)–(b) duties override MR 1.6 until the proceeding ends; MR 1.6(b) exceptions are only permissive.
  • The client's relatives, employees and agents may be asked not to talk to the other side; unrelated witnesses may not.
  • Expert witnesses: reasonable fee yes, contingent fee no.
  • The safe harbor lists facts; it never permits opinions about guilt.
  • MR 3.7 bars the witness-lawyer from trial advocacy only; it is not imputed to the firm.

End of Part A. Part B follows.


Part B: Items

Flashcards

Format: Front · Definition · Explanation · Example · Exam trap · Cite · Outline · Related. Term cards first, then concept cards.

FC-0001 (term card · OUT-6.0)

  • Front: Tribunal
  • Definition: A body deciding a particular matter in an adjudicative role — a court, a binding arbitrator, or a legislature or agency when a neutral official hears evidence or argument and issues a legally binding ruling that directly affects a party's interests.
  • Explanation: The MR 3.3–3.5 duties run to tribunals. A legislative hearing on a bill is not adjudicative; an agency hearing deciding one company's license is. Nonadjudicative appearances are governed by MR 3.9 (Section 8), which keeps many candor duties.
  • Example: An arbitrator deciding a contract dispute under a binding clause is a tribunal.
  • Exam trap: Mediators don't render binding judgments, so a mediation is not a "tribunal" proceeding for MR 3.3 (though MR 4.1 honesty still applies).
  • Cite: MR 1.0(m); MR 3.9 · Outline: OUT-6.0 · Related: Candor toward the tribunal

FC-0002 (term card · OUT-6.1.1)

  • Front: Frivolous
  • Definition: A position the lawyer cannot support with a good-faith argument on the merits or a good-faith argument to extend, modify or reverse the law — judged objectively.
  • Explanation: Weak, novel or unlikely-to-win claims are not frivolous. A harassing motive is a separate problem: it is evidence of bad faith and may violate other rules (such as MR 4.4(a)), but motive alone is not the MR 3.1 test.
  • Example: Suing a neighbor for defamation over statements that are accurate quotations of public records, with no false statement to point to, is frivolous.
  • Exam trap: Don't confuse "likely to lose" with "frivolous."
  • Cite: MR 3.1; cmt. [2]; MR 4.4(a) · Outline: OUT-6.1.1 · Related: Good-faith argument to change the law

FC-0003 (term card · OUT-6.1.2)

  • Front: Good-faith argument to change the law
  • Definition: An honest argument that existing law should be extended, modified or reversed. It supplies a nonfrivolous basis in law.
  • Explanation: The lawyer must present it candidly as an argument for change, not disguise it by misstating current law.
  • Example: Asking a state high court to overrule a century-old precedent, citing modern trends, is proper.
  • Exam trap: Misrepresenting what the law currently is turns a proper argument into an MR 3.3(a)(1) violation.
  • Cite: MR 3.1; cmt. [1] · Outline: OUT-6.1.2 · Related: Frivolous

FC-0004 (term card · OUT-6.2.2)

  • Front: Dilatory tactics
  • Definition: Litigation steps taken for no substantial purpose other than delay, such as to frustrate an opponent or profit from postponing payment.
  • Explanation: Ask what the step accomplishes besides buying time; if a competent, good-faith lawyer could name a real, substantial benefit apart from delay, it's proper.
  • Example: Serial extension motions filed only to push a judgment into the next fiscal year.
  • Exam trap: Client instructions don't make delay legitimate; an occasional agreed, court-approved scheduling accommodation is not a dilatory tactic.
  • Cite: MR 3.2; cmt. [1] · Outline: OUT-6.2 · Related: Expediting litigation

FC-0005 (term card · OUT-6.3.2)

  • Front: Controlling jurisdiction
  • Definition: The source of law that binds the court deciding the issue, such as the state's highest court or the appellate court whose decisions bind the trial court.
  • Explanation: Only known, directly adverse authority from the controlling jurisdiction must be disclosed under MR 3.3(a)(2). If the forum must apply another state's law on the issue, that state's decisions can be controlling.
  • Example: In a Texas trial court applying Texas law, a directly adverse Texas Supreme Court decision is controlling; a California decision is not.
  • Exam trap: Test binding force, not geography: merely persuasive authority need not be disclosed, however strong.
  • Cite: MR 3.3(a)(2); cmt. [4] · Outline: OUT-6.3.2 · Related: Directly adverse authority

FC-0006 (term card · OUT-6.3.2)

  • Front: Directly adverse authority
  • Definition: Legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction that bears squarely against the client's position on an issue before the court.
  • Explanation: If the lawyer knows of it and opposing counsel hasn't disclosed it, the lawyer must disclose it, and may then argue it is distinguishable or wrong.
  • Example: A binding appellate case rejecting the exact statutory reading the client relies on.
  • Exam trap: The duty covers law. There is no general duty to volunteer adverse facts in an adversary proceeding, though specific fact duties still apply.
  • Cite: MR 3.3(a)(2) · Outline: OUT-6.3.2 · Related: Controlling jurisdiction

FC-0007 (term card · OUT-6.3.3)

  • Front: Reasonable remedial measures
  • Definition: The steps a lawyer must take after coming to know that material evidence offered by her, her client or a witness she called was false (or of crime or fraud related to the proceeding): usually talk to the client first, then take further steps, disclosing to the tribunal if nothing less will fix it.
  • Explanation: Disclosure is limited to what is reasonably necessary, applies even to MR 1.6 information, and the duty lasts until the proceeding concludes.
  • Example: After a witness she called admits he lied about a date, a lawyer first seeks the client's cooperation in correcting the record, then tells the court if needed.
  • Exam trap: Withdrawal alone usually doesn't cure false evidence already in the record.
  • Cite: MR 3.3(a)(3), (b), (c); cmts. [10], [13] · Outline: OUT-6.3.3 · Related: False evidence

FC-0008 (term card · OUT-6.3.3)

  • Front: Knows (evidence is false)
  • Definition: Actual knowledge that the evidence is false, which may be inferred from the circumstances.
  • Explanation: Knowledge triggers the mandatory duty not to offer the evidence. A lawyer can't avoid knowledge by ignoring the obvious, but doubts are resolved in the client's favor.
  • Example: A client admits to the lawyer that the alibi is invented; the lawyer knows it is false.
  • Exam trap: Suspicion, an inconsistent document, or reasonable belief is not knowledge by itself.
  • Cite: MR 1.0(f); MR 3.3 cmt. [8] · Outline: OUT-6.3.3 · Related: Reasonably believes

FC-0009 (term card · OUT-6.3.4)

  • Front: Narrative testimony
  • Definition: Having a criminal defendant whom the lawyer knows intends to lie testify in a free-form narrative, without the lawyer's questions.
  • Explanation: Some jurisdictions use it; the Model Rules do not adopt it, but a lawyer must follow a court's or local law's direction to use it. Mere reasonable belief that testimony will be false is never a basis for limiting a defendant's testimony.
  • Example: A trial judge orders defense counsel to let the defendant testify in narrative form.
  • Exam trap: On the MPRE, narrative testimony is not the Model Rule solution; remonstrate, refuse to elicit known perjury, and take remedial measures.
  • Cite: MR 3.3 cmt. [7] · Outline: OUT-6.3.4 · Related: Reasonable remedial measures

FC-0010 (term card · OUT-6.3.5)

  • Front: Conclusion of the proceeding
  • Definition: The point at which the MR 3.3 duties end: the case can go no further, either because the window to seek review closed unused or because a reviewing court upheld the judgment.
  • Explanation: Until then, the lawyer must remedy known false evidence and related crime or fraud, even if it means revealing confidential information.
  • Example: A lawyer who learns during the appeal period that her client lied in material trial testimony must still act.
  • Exam trap: The duty does not last forever; after the proceeding concludes, MR 1.6 governs again. A remand does not end the proceeding.
  • Cite: MR 3.3(c); cmt. [13] · Outline: OUT-6.3.5 · Related: Reasonable remedial measures

FC-0011 (term card · OUT-6.3.6)

  • Front: Ex parte proceeding
  • Definition: A proceeding in which the opposing party has no notice or opportunity to be heard, such as an application for a temporary restraining order without notice.
  • Explanation: The lawyer must tell the tribunal all material facts she knows that it needs for an informed decision, including adverse facts.
  • Example: Seeking an emergency order without notice, a lawyer must disclose a prior order that cuts against her client.
  • Exam trap: This is broader than the adverse-authority duty, which covers adverse law, not adverse facts. A hearing the other side simply skipped after proper notice is not what this rule addresses.
  • Cite: MR 3.3(d); cmt. [14] · Outline: OUT-6.3.6 · Related: Directly adverse authority

FC-0012 (term card · OUT-6.4.1)

  • Front: Potential evidentiary value
  • Definition: Material that is relevant to a pending proceeding or one reasonably foreseeable, so that destroying or hiding it may obstruct justice.
  • Explanation: MR 3.4(a) bars unlawfully altering, destroying or concealing such material, or advising anyone to do so.
  • Example: Emails about a product defect after a customer threatens suit.
  • Exam trap: A lawsuit need not be filed yet; reasonable foreseeability is enough under the governing law.
  • Cite: MR 3.4(a); cmt. [2] · Outline: OUT-6.4.1 · Related: Obstructing access to evidence

FC-0013 (term card · OUT-6.4.3)

  • Front: Open refusal
  • Definition: Openly declining to obey an obligation of a tribunal on the stated ground that no valid obligation exists, to test the order's validity.
  • Explanation: It is the only protected form of noncompliance with a tribunal's rules or orders; secret disobedience is a violation.
  • Example: Announcing to the court that privileged documents won't be produced while seeking immediate appellate review.
  • Exam trap: "I thought the order was wrong" is no defense if the lawyer quietly ignored it.
  • Cite: MR 3.4(c) · Outline: OUT-6.4.3 · Related: Discovery obligations

FC-0014 (term card · OUT-6.4.4)

  • Front: Personal opinion at trial
  • Definition: A lawyer's own view, stated to the factfinder, about whether the cause is just, whether a witness is believable, whether a civil party is at fault, or whether an accused is guilty or innocent.
  • Explanation: Prohibited at trial. Argument tying conclusions to the evidence is allowed.
  • Example: "I believe my client is innocent" is prohibited; "the evidence shows reasonable doubt" is proper.
  • Exam trap: Prosecutors are held to this too; experience-based vouching is still opinion.
  • Cite: MR 3.4(e) · Outline: OUT-6.4.4 · Related: Alluding to inadmissible matter

FC-0015 (term card · OUT-6.5.2)

  • Front: Ex parte communication (with a judge or juror)
  • Definition: Any communication with a judge, juror, prospective juror or official during a proceeding, made without the other parties present or notified.
  • Explanation: Prohibited unless law or a court order authorizes it. The ban is not limited to talk about the merits.
  • Example: Emailing the judge an argument without copying opposing counsel; chatting with a juror in the hallway about the weather.
  • Exam trap: A social-media access request to a juror is an ex parte communication; passive viewing of public content is not (unless a law or order forbids it).
  • Cite: MR 3.5(b); ABA Formal Op. 466 (advisory) · Outline: OUT-6.5.2 · Related: Juror contact after discharge

FC-0016 (term card · OUT-6.6.1)

  • Front: Substantial likelihood of material prejudice
  • Definition: The trial-publicity standard: a lawyer who is or was participating in a matter may not make an out-of-court statement she knows or reasonably should know will be publicly disseminated and is substantially likely to materially prejudice a proceeding in the matter.
  • Explanation: Upheld in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada. It also reaches lawyers in the same firm or government agency (MR 3.6(d)), and is subject to the safe harbor and right of reply. Criminal jury cases are the most sensitive.
  • Example: Telling reporters before a jury trial that the defendant failed a polygraph.
  • Exam trap: The test is likelihood of prejudice, not actual prejudice or intent.
  • Cite: MR 3.6(a), (b), (c), (d); Gentile · Outline: OUT-6.6.1 · Related: Safe harbor

FC-0017 (term card · OUT-6.6.2)

  • Front: Trial-publicity safe harbor
  • Definition: Basic information a lawyer may always state: what the case is about and, unless law forbids naming them, who is involved; public-record facts, that an investigation is underway, and scheduling or results; requests for help; warnings about danger posed by a person involved when substantial harm is likely; and in criminal cases, basic facts about the accused, the arrest and the investigation.
  • Explanation: It permits facts, not commentary about guilt or credibility, and does not override confidentiality or sealing orders.
  • Example: "The defendant was arrested at 9 p.m. Tuesday by county detectives" is protected.
  • Exam trap: Adding "and he's clearly guilty" takes the statement outside the safe harbor.
  • Cite: MR 3.6(b) · Outline: OUT-6.6.2 · Related: Right of reply

FC-0018 (term card · OUT-6.6.3)

  • Front: Right of reply
  • Definition: Permission to say what a reasonable lawyer would think is needed to protect the client from substantial unfair prejudice caused by recent publicity that neither the lawyer nor the client started.
  • Explanation: Limited to what is needed to blunt that publicity. It is a special allowance for otherwise-prohibited speech.
  • Example: Responding briefly to a police chief's press claim that the client has a violent record.
  • Exam trap: If the lawyer or client started the publicity, the special reply permission is unavailable (ordinary non-prejudicial statements remain allowed).
  • Cite: MR 3.6(c) · Outline: OUT-6.6.3 · Related: Safe harbor

FC-0019 (term card · OUT-6.7.1)

  • Front: Necessary witness
  • Definition: A lawyer whose testimony on a contested issue is important enough, and hard enough to get from other sources, that it is likely to be needed at trial.
  • Explanation: A necessary witness may not act as trial advocate, subject to three exceptions. Necessity is a judgment: availability of other witnesses weighs against it but does not automatically defeat it.
  • Example: The lawyer who is the only neutral witness to a disputed oral modification of the contract in suit.
  • Exam trap: Don't treat "someone else was there" as automatically making the lawyer unnecessary; ask whether that person can realistically supply the same evidence.
  • Cite: MR 3.7(a); cmt. [2] · Outline: OUT-6.7.1 · Related: Substantial hardship

FC-0020 (term card · OUT-6.7.1)

  • Front: Substantial hardship (lawyer-witness)
  • Definition: The exception allowing a necessary-witness lawyer to try the case when disqualification would seriously harm the client, weighed against the prejudice to the opponent.
  • Explanation: Factors include the nature of the case, the importance and probable tenor of the lawyer's testimony, the lawyer's distinctive value to the client, and whether either side could have foreseen that the lawyer would testify.
  • Example: A complex patent case on the eve of trial, handled for years by the only lawyer who knows the technology, where the lawyer's testimony is brief and the opponent sat on the issue for years.
  • Exam trap: Mere inconvenience or the cost of new counsel is not enough, and hardship the client could have planned around carries less weight.
  • Cite: MR 3.7(a)(3); cmt. [4] · Outline: OUT-6.7.1 · Related: Necessary witness

Concept cards

FC-0021 (concept card · OUT-6.1.3)

  • Front: May a defense lawyer who knows the client is guilty go to trial?
  • Definition: Yes. A criminal defense lawyer may require the prosecution to prove every element, even with no affirmative defense.
  • Explanation: The presumption of innocence makes this nonfrivolous. The lawyer still may not offer false evidence, make knowingly false statements, or break other advocacy rules.
  • Example: Cross-examining the state's witnesses and arguing insufficiency is proper; calling a lying alibi witness is not.
  • Exam trap: Knowledge of guilt limits the evidence, not the plea.
  • Cite: MR 3.1; cmt. [3] · Outline: OUT-6.1.3 · Related: Frivolous

FC-0022 (concept card · OUT-6.3.3)

  • Front: Knows vs. reasonably believes evidence is false?
  • Definition: Knows: the lawyer must not offer it. Reasonably believes: the lawyer may refuse to offer it, except a criminal defendant's own testimony.
  • Explanation: The criminal defendant's right to testify means the lawyer must present that testimony unless she actually knows it is false.
  • Example: A lawyer who doubts a civil witness may decline to call him; one who doubts a criminal client must still let him testify.
  • Exam trap: The permissive refusal doesn't extend to a criminal defendant's testimony.
  • Cite: MR 3.3(a)(3); cmts. [8]–[9] · Outline: OUT-6.3.3, OUT-6.3.4 · Related: Knows (evidence is false)

FC-0023 (concept card · OUT-6.3.5)

  • Front: Candor vs. confidentiality: which wins?
  • Definition: Candor. The MR 3.3(a)–(b) duties apply even when compliance requires revealing information MR 1.6 otherwise protects, until the proceeding concludes.
  • Explanation: Remedial measures are mandatory; disclosure is required when it is necessary to remedy the situation. This differs from the permissive MR 1.6(b) exceptions.
  • Example: A lawyer who learns in confidence that her client bribed a juror must take reasonable remedial measures, including telling the court if nothing less will fix it.
  • Exam trap: "Confidentiality forbids disclosure" is wrong when MR 3.3 applies.
  • Cite: MR 3.3(b), (c) · Outline: OUT-6.3.5 · Related: Reasonable remedial measures

FC-0024 (concept card · OUT-6.4.2)

  • Front: What may a lawyer pay a witness?
  • Definition: Where the governing law allows: reasonable expenses of attending and testifying, reasonable compensation for time actually lost, and a reasonable professional fee for an expert. Never a fee contingent on the outcome, and never payment for the content of testimony.
  • Explanation: Payments beyond these may be prohibited inducements under MR 3.4(b).
  • Example: Paying a fact witness's airfare and a day's lost wages is proper.
  • Exam trap: A contingent expert fee is improper even if the expert is honest.
  • Cite: MR 3.4(b); cmt. [3]; ABA Formal Op. 96-402 (advisory) (discussed in Op. 508) · Outline: OUT-6.4.2 · Related: Falsifying evidence

FC-0025 (concept card · OUT-6.4.5)

  • Front: Whom may a lawyer ask not to talk to the other side?
  • Definition: The client; and the client's relatives, employees or other agents, if the lawyer reasonably believes refraining won't harm their interests.
  • Explanation: Asking anyone else, such as an unrelated eyewitness, to refrain is prohibited.
  • Example: A company lawyer may ask its employees not to volunteer information to the plaintiff's lawyer, if staying quiet won't hurt them.
  • Exam trap: The exception is for the client's people, not the lawyer's friends or neutral witnesses.
  • Cite: MR 3.4(f); cmt. [4] · Outline: OUT-6.4.5 · Related: Fairness to opposing party

FC-0026 (concept card · OUT-6.5.3)

  • Front: Contacting jurors after the jury is discharged?
  • Definition: Allowed unless a law or court order forbids it, the juror has said she doesn't want contact, or the contact deceives, pressures, coerces or harasses.
  • Explanation: Before discharge — which may come later than the verdict, for example after a penalty phase — contact is prohibited unless authorized.
  • Example: Calling a discharged juror once to ask about deliberations is proper where no local rule bars it.
  • Exam trap: Once the juror declines, further contact of any kind is prohibited.
  • Cite: MR 3.5(b), (c) · Outline: OUT-6.5.3 · Related: Ex parte communication

FC-0027 (concept card · OUT-6.5.3)

  • Front: Researching jurors on social media?
  • Definition: Unless a law or court order restricts it, passive review of public content is proper. Sending an access request (such as a friend request) is a prohibited communication.
  • Explanation: An automatic notice from the platform that the lawyer viewed the page is not a communication by the lawyer.
  • Example: Viewing a prospective juror's public posts during jury selection is permitted where no order forbids it.
  • Exam trap: Having a paralegal send the friend request is still a violation (MR 5.3; MR 8.4(a)).
  • Cite: MR 3.5(b); ABA Formal Op. 466 (2014) (advisory) · Outline: OUT-6.5.3 · Related: Ex parte communication

FC-0028 (concept card · OUT-6.6.1)

  • Front: Subjects that tend to be prejudicial in publicity?
  • Definition: Illustrative groups: people (character, credibility, record; a witness's identity or expected testimony); the accused's words and choices (a possible plea; any statement, or refusal to make one); evidence (test results or refusals; the nature of physical evidence); opinions on guilt and information the lawyer knows or should know is likely inadmissible; and a charge announced without saying it is only an accusation.
  • Explanation: These carry a heightened risk of prejudice, especially before a criminal jury trial; they are not automatic violations.
  • Example: Announcing that the accused "failed a lie-detector test."
  • Exam trap: Bench trials and civil matters are less sensitive, but the same standard applies.
  • Cite: MR 3.6 cmts. [5]–[6] · Outline: OUT-6.6.1 · Related: Safe harbor

FC-0029 (concept card · OUT-6.7.1)

  • Front: Three exceptions to the lawyer-witness bar?
  • Definition: Disqualification would cause the client substantial hardship; the testimony concerns only the nature and value of legal services rendered in this case; or the testimony is about something nobody disputes.
  • Explanation: Otherwise a necessary-witness lawyer may not be trial advocate. The rule by its terms reaches only trial advocacy, though a court may restrict other roles.
  • Example: A lawyer may testify about her fees in a fee-shifting hearing in the same case and still argue it.
  • Exam trap: The bar is about trial advocacy, not all work on the case.
  • Cite: MR 3.7(a) · Outline: OUT-6.7.1 · Related: Necessary witness

FC-0030 (concept card · OUT-6.7.2)

  • Front: Is the lawyer-witness bar imputed to the firm?
  • Definition: No. Another lawyer in the firm may try the case unless MR 1.7 or 1.9 bars it.
  • Explanation: Run an independent conflict analysis: adverse testimony, the testifying lawyer's personal interest, or a former-client duty can create a conflict, which may be curable by consent or may be imputed under MR 1.10.
  • Example: A partner tries the case while an associate who witnessed the signing testifies, where no conflict is shown.
  • Exam trap: "The whole firm is disqualified because a lawyer will testify" is usually wrong.
  • Cite: MR 3.7(b); cmts. [6]–[7] · Outline: OUT-6.7.2 · Related: Necessary witness

Multiple choice

MC-0001 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 6.1 · OUT-6.1.1)

Attorney Vance represents a tenant suing her landlord, claiming a lease clause is unconscionable. No appellate court in the state has accepted this argument, but two trial courts have, and it rests on a recognized contract doctrine. Vance privately thinks the claim will probably fail.

Is Vance subject to discipline for filing the claim?

  • A. No, because a claim is proper if it has a nonfrivolous basis in law and fact, and Vance's argument rests on a recognized doctrine.
  • B. Yes, because a lawyer must provide competent representation, and Vance believes the claim will probably fail.
  • C. Yes, because a lawyer must make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation, and a claim Vance expects to lose will needlessly prolong the suit.
  • D. No, because the client decides the objectives of the representation, and the tenant chose to sue.
  • Answer: A. A claim is frivolous only if the lawyer can make no good-faith argument for it. A recognized doctrine accepted by two trial courts supplies one, whatever Vance expects. (MR 3.1; cmt. [2])
  • B is wrong: competence is required, but filing a colorable long-shot claim is not incompetent. (MR 1.1)
  • C is wrong: MR 3.2 bars steps whose only substantial purpose is delay; pressing a nonfrivolous claim is not a delaying tactic just because it may lose. (MR 3.2 cmt. [1])
  • D is wrong: the right result for the wrong reason. The client's choice of objectives doesn't authorize a frivolous claim; the claim is proper because it isn't frivolous. (MR 1.2(a); MR 3.1)
  • Tags: 6.1 · frivolous · cites MR 3.1

MC-0002 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 6.1 · OUT-6.1.3)

Defendant Harlow tells his public defender, Attorney Suri, in confidence that he committed the robbery he is charged with. The prosecution's only eyewitness saw the robber briefly at night. Harlow insists on pleading not guilty. Suri plans to cross-examine the eyewitness about lighting and distance and to argue reasonable doubt. She will call no defense witnesses.

May Suri proceed as planned?

  • A. Yes, because a criminal defense lawyer may require the prosecution to prove every element, and Suri will offer no false evidence.
  • B. No, because a lawyer not defending a possible-incarceration case needs a nonfrivolous factual basis for a position, and Suri knows Harlow is guilty.
  • C. Yes, because the client decides what plea to enter, and that decision also authorizes the cross-examination and argument Suri plans.
  • D. No, because a lawyer may not knowingly make a false statement of fact to a tribunal, and arguing reasonable doubt implies Harlow is innocent.
  • Answer: A. MR 3.1 lets a criminal defense lawyer defend so as to require every element to be established. Testing the evidence and arguing reasonable doubt are not false statements or false evidence. (MR 3.1; cmt. [3])
  • B is wrong: the general rule is stated accurately, with its exception — and Suri is defending someone facing incarceration, where holding the state to its burden is never frivolous.
  • C is wrong: the client does decide the plea, but that decision doesn't authorize trial tactics; what makes them proper is the MR 3.1 criminal-defense provision. (MR 1.2(a))
  • D is wrong: the rule is accurate, but arguing that the state's evidence is insufficient is not a statement that the client is innocent. (MR 3.3(a)(1))
  • Tags: 6.1 · criminal defense · cites MR 3.1 cmt. [3]

MC-0003 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 6.1 · OUT-6.1.2)

Attorney Obi represents a plaintiff injured in a crash. The state supreme court has twice reaffirmed contributory negligence as a complete bar. In her brief, Obi states that the rule applies, acknowledges that her client was slightly negligent, and asks the court to overrule its precedent and adopt comparative fault, citing trends in 46 other states.

Is Obi subject to discipline?

  • A. Yes, because a lawyer must not knowingly make a false statement of law to a tribunal, and the court's twice-reaffirmed precedent bars Obi's claim.
  • B. Yes, because a lawyer must disclose known, directly adverse controlling authority that the other side hasn't cited, and the rule was reaffirmed twice.
  • C. No, because the client decides the objectives of the representation, and Obi's client wants to recover despite the contributory-negligence bar.
  • D. No, because a basis in law includes a good-faith argument to reverse existing law, and Obi candidly asks the court to overrule its rule.
  • Answer: D. A good-faith argument for changing the law is a nonfrivolous basis, and Obi presented the current law accurately. (MR 3.1; cmt. [1])
  • A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but Obi stated the law correctly and argued for change. (MR 3.3(a)(1))
  • B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but Obi disclosed the adverse precedent herself. (MR 3.3(a)(2))
  • C is wrong: the right result for the wrong reason. The client's objectives don't authorize a frivolous argument; the argument is proper because it is made in good faith. (MR 1.2(a); MR 3.1)
  • Tags: 6.1 · good-faith argument · cites MR 3.1 cmt. [1]

MC-0004 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 6.1 · OUT-6.1.1)

A developer asks Attorney Crane to sue a neighborhood activist for defamation. The activist's statements were accurate quotations from public zoning records. The developer tells Crane, "I don't care if we win. I want her to spend her savings on lawyers so she stops opposing my projects." Crane finds no false statement to support a claim.

May Crane file the suit?

  • A. Yes, because representing a client does not mean endorsing the client's views, and the developer wants to pursue the claim.
  • B. Yes, because the client decides the objectives of the representation, and the developer wants to pursue the claim.
  • C. No, because a lawyer may not knowingly misstate a material fact to a third person, and the developer wants to silence the activist.
  • D. No, because a claim needs a nonfrivolous basis in law and fact, and Crane finds no false statement to support defamation.
  • Answer: D. Defamation requires a false statement; with none, the claim has no basis in fact and Crane can make no good-faith argument for it. That is frivolous. The developer's motive is further evidence of bad faith. (MR 3.1; cmt. [2])
  • A is wrong: representation isn't endorsement, but that principle doesn't permit filing a baseless claim, whatever the client wants. (MR 1.2(b))
  • B is wrong: the client controls objectives, but not by means the Rules forbid. (MR 1.2(a))
  • C is wrong: the rule is accurate, but nobody has made a false statement to the activist; the problem is the baseless claim. (MR 4.1(a))
  • Tags: 6.1 · frivolous · cites MR 3.1

MC-0005 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 6.1 · OUT-6.1.1)

Attorney Mendez files a products-liability complaint for a client injured by a power saw, alleging a design defect. Before filing, Mendez interviewed the client, reviewed the saw, and consulted an engineer who said the guard design was "plausibly defective" but that testing would be needed to confirm it. The testing can be done only after discovery gives access to the manufacturer's specifications.

Is Mendez subject to discipline for filing the complaint?

  • A. Yes, because a lawyer must inform herself about the facts before filing a claim, and the defect was still unconfirmed at filing.
  • B. No, because a claim is not frivolous merely because facts remain to be developed, and Mendez investigated before filing.
  • C. Yes, because a lawyer must provide the thoroughness reasonably necessary, and Mendez filed before completing testing.
  • D. No, because a criminal defendant may require the state to prove every element, and Mendez's client is similarly entitled to a trial.
  • Answer: B. A lawyer must inform herself before filing, but a claim is not frivolous just because the lawyer expects discovery to develop vital evidence. (MR 3.1 cmt. [2])
  • A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but Mendez did inform herself; MR 3.1 requires a nonfrivolous basis, not proof. (MR 3.1 cmt. [2])
  • C is wrong: competence requires reasonable preparation, which Mendez did; testing that requires discovery isn't required first. (MR 1.1)
  • D is wrong: the criminal-defense provision is accurate, but this is a civil plaintiff's claim, so it doesn't apply. (MR 3.1)
  • Tags: 6.1 · pre-filing investigation · cites MR 3.1 cmt. [2]

MC-0006 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 6.2 · OUT-6.2.2)

An insurance company expects to lose a $2 million verdict. Its general counsel instructs outside counsel, Attorney Pryor, to file successive motions for extensions so the judgment won't be entered until after the company's fiscal year ends, which will improve its reported results. The motions have no other purpose.

May Pryor file the motions?

  • A. Yes, because the client decides the objectives of the representation, and the insurer's objective is a better fiscal year.
  • B. Yes, because a lawyer may take impliedly authorized actions to carry out the representation, and the general counsel gave express instructions.
  • C. No, because a lawyer must make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation, and financial benefit from delay is not a legitimate interest.
  • D. No, because a lawyer must not unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence, and the motions delay the judgment.
  • Answer: C. Delay whose only purpose is to profit from postponing the judgment is not a legitimate client interest. (MR 3.2; cmt. [1])
  • A is wrong: clients set objectives, but not by improper means. (MR 1.2(a))
  • B is wrong: the lawyer has implied authority, but authority doesn't make an improper tactic permissible. (MR 1.2(a))
  • D is wrong: the rule is accurate, but the motions don't block access to evidence; they delay judgment. (MR 3.4(a))
  • Tags: 6.2 · delay · cites MR 3.2 cmt. [1]

MC-0007 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 6.2 · OUT-6.2.1)

Two weeks before trial, defense counsel Attorney Walsh learns that her client's key expert has had a stroke and cannot testify. She moves for a 60-day continuance to retain and prepare a new expert. The plaintiff objects that any delay prejudices her.

Is Walsh subject to discipline for seeking the continuance?

  • A. No, because a lawyer may take actions impliedly authorized to carry out the representation, and choosing a replacement expert is a tactical call.
  • B. Yes, because a lawyer must make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation, and the plaintiff objects to any delay.
  • C. Yes, because a lawyer must not engage in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, and the continuance delays trial for two months.
  • D. No, because the continuance serves a substantial purpose other than delay, and Walsh needs time to replace an unavailable expert.
  • Answer: D. MR 3.2 asks whether a competent, good-faith lawyer would see a substantial purpose other than delay. Replacing an incapacitated expert is one. (MR 3.2 cmt. [1])
  • A is wrong: the right result for the wrong reason. Implied authority lets Walsh act for the client (she should still reasonably consult about the means), but authority says nothing about whether the delay is legitimate under MR 3.2. (MR 1.2(a); MR 1.4(a)(2))
  • B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but it requires expedition only consistent with the client's legitimate interests; an opponent's objection doesn't turn a legitimate continuance into a violation.
  • C is wrong: the rule is accurate, but a legitimate continuance request doesn't prejudice the administration of justice. (MR 8.4(d))
  • Tags: 6.2 · legitimate delay · cites MR 3.2 cmt. [1]

MC-0008 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 6.2 · OUT-6.2.1)

Attorney Kerr represents a defendant in a contract case. Kerr has a vacation booked and, knowing no other reason for delay exists, asks opposing counsel to agree to move a hearing by one week. Opposing counsel agrees, and the court approves. Kerr has not sought other postponements in the case.

Is Kerr subject to discipline?

  • A. Yes, because a lawyer must make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation, and Kerr sought delay for personal reasons.
  • B. No, because an occasional agreed, court-approved postponement for a genuine personal reason is not a dilatory tactic under the rule.
  • C. Yes, because a lawyer must act with reasonable diligence and promptness, and Kerr put a vacation ahead of the case.
  • D. No, because a lawyer may refuse to offer evidence she reasonably believes false, other than a defendant's own testimony, and Kerr offered none.
  • Answer: B. Lawyers may occasionally seek a postponement for personal reasons; what MR 3.2 forbids is routinely delaying cases for the lawyers' convenience or stalling without a legitimate purpose. A single one-week, agreed, court-approved change is not that. (MR 3.2 cmt. [1])
  • A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but a single modest agreed accommodation doesn't violate it. Repeated personal postponements could.
  • C is wrong: the rule is accurate, but a one-week agreed postponement doesn't show a lack of diligence. (MR 1.3)
  • D is wrong: the rule is accurate but irrelevant; nothing here involves false evidence. (MR 3.3(a)(3))
  • Tags: 6.2 · scheduling · cites MR 3.2

MC-0009 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 6.3 · OUT-6.3.1)

At a bail hearing, Attorney Ruiz tells the judge her client has no criminal record, believing it true. The judge sets low bail. Two days later, Ruiz learns the client has a prior felony conviction in another state. The client asks Ruiz to say nothing.

What must Ruiz do?

  • A. Nothing, because a lawyer may not reveal information relating to a representation absent consent or an exception, and the client wants it.
  • B. Correct the statement, because a lawyer must correct a false statement of material fact she previously made to a tribunal.
  • C. Withdraw, because a lawyer must withdraw if continuing will result in a violation of the Rules, and the client wants Ruiz to stay silent.
  • D. Nothing, because MR 3.3(a)(1) forbids making a statement the lawyer knows is false, and Ruiz believed her statement true when she made it.
  • Answer: B. Ruiz must correct her own earlier false statement of material fact once she learns of the falsity, even over the client's objection. (MR 3.3(a)(1), (c))
  • A is wrong: the confidentiality rule is stated accurately, but MR 3.3(c) makes the candor duties apply even to information MR 1.6 protects.
  • C is wrong: the rule is accurate, but withdrawal doesn't cure the false statement already before the court; correction is required. (MR 1.16(a)(1))
  • D is wrong: the rule is accurate as to making statements, but the same paragraph separately requires correcting an earlier material statement once the lawyer learns it was false.
  • Tags: 6.3 · duty to correct · cites MR 3.3(a)(1)

MC-0010 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 6.3 · OUT-6.3.2)

Attorney Lee represents a defendant in a state trial court in Ohio, in a case governed by Ohio law. She finds an Ohio Supreme Court decision directly adverse to her client's key argument and a Michigan appellate decision also against her. Opposing counsel's brief cites neither.

What must Lee disclose?

  • A. The Ohio decision only, because a lawyer must disclose directly adverse authority from the controlling jurisdiction that opposing counsel has not disclosed.
  • B. Both decisions, because a lawyer must not knowingly make a false statement of law to a tribunal, and Lee's brief will argue for her client's reading of the law.
  • C. Neither decision, because there is no general duty to volunteer adverse facts in an adversary proceeding, and the other side's lawyers can find both cases.
  • D. Neither decision, because a lawyer may not reveal information relating to the representation unless an exception applies, and Lee found both cases in her work.
  • Answer: A. Only known, directly adverse authority in the controlling jurisdiction must be disclosed, and only if opposing counsel hasn't. The Michigan case is merely persuasive in an Ohio-law case. (MR 3.3(a)(2); cmt. [4])
  • B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but arguing for the client's position without citing persuasive out-of-state authority isn't a false statement of law.
  • C is wrong: the principle about facts is accurate, but these are legal authorities, and directly adverse controlling law must be disclosed. (MR 3.3(a)(2))
  • D is wrong: the confidentiality rule is accurate, but MR 3.3(a)(2) itself requires this disclosure, and MR 3.3(c) makes the candor duties apply notwithstanding MR 1.6. (MR 1.6(a))
  • Tags: 6.3 · adverse authority · cites MR 3.3(a)(2)

MC-0011 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 6.3 · OUT-6.3.3)

In a civil case, plaintiff Dorn testifies at trial, on direct examination by her lawyer, Attorney Hale, that she earned $90,000 the year before the accident. During a recess, Hale reviews tax returns he just received showing $40,000. When Hale asks, Dorn admits she inflated the figure. Hale explains his duty of candor and asks her to correct her testimony; she refuses.

What should Hale do?

  • A. Withdraw immediately, because a lawyer may withdraw when a client insists on action the lawyer finds repugnant, and Dorn refuses to correct her testimony.
  • B. Continue and say nothing, because a lawyer may not reveal information relating to the representation absent an exception, and Dorn refuses consent.
  • C. Take reasonable remedial measures, including disclosure if necessary, because Hale learned that material evidence he offered was false.
  • D. Continue and say nothing, because the duty to correct covers a lawyer's own false statements of material fact, and it was Dorn, not Hale, who testified.
  • Answer: C. Hale offered material testimony and, given Dorn's admission, now knows it is false. His private effort to secure a correction failed, so he must take further remedial measures, up to disclosure to the court. (MR 3.3(a)(3), (c); cmt. [10])
  • A is wrong: the permissive-withdrawal ground is stated accurately, but withdrawal alone would leave the false testimony in the record, so it doesn't satisfy MR 3.3. (MR 1.16(b)(4))
  • B is wrong: the confidentiality rule is accurate, but MR 3.3(c) makes the candor duties apply notwithstanding MR 1.6.
  • D is wrong: the rule is accurate as to the lawyer's own statements, but a client's false testimony that the lawyer offered is covered by MR 3.3(a)(3).
  • Tags: 6.3 · false evidence, remedial measures · cites MR 3.3(a)(3)

MC-0012 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 6.3 · OUT-6.3.4)

Defendant Crowe, charged with assault, tells his lawyer, Attorney Imani, that he wants to testify that he was at his sister's house that night. Imani doubts the story because a neighbor saw Crowe near the scene, but Crowe has never told her the story is untrue, and she has no other information showing it is false.

Must Imani let Crowe testify?

  • A. No, because a lawyer may refuse to offer evidence she reasonably believes false, other than a defendant's testimony, and Imani has doubts.
  • B. No, because a lawyer must not offer evidence she knows is false, and a neighbor saw Crowe near the scene.
  • C. Yes, because a lawyer who learns her own earlier material statement was false must correct it, and Imani can fix any falsehood later.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer must honor a criminal defendant's decision to testify unless she knows the testimony will be false.
  • Answer: D. Imani has doubts, not knowledge. The option to refuse evidence reasonably believed false doesn't extend to a criminal defendant's own testimony. (MR 3.3(a)(3); cmt. [9])
  • A is wrong: the rule is stated accurately, including its exception — and Crowe is a criminal defendant, so the exception applies.
  • B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but a contrary eyewitness doesn't give Imani actual knowledge of falsity. (MR 1.0(f))
  • C is wrong: the right result for the wrong reason. The duty to correct concerns the lawyer's own statements; Crowe may testify because of his right to testify.
  • Tags: 6.3 · criminal defendant, knows vs. reasonably believes · cites MR 3.3 cmt. [9]

MC-0013 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 6.3 · OUT-6.3.4)

Defendant Price tells his lawyer, Attorney Moss, that he robbed the store and plans to testify that he was out of town. Moss explains that she cannot help him lie and urges him not to. Price insists. The trial starts tomorrow, and the court has said it will not allow a change of counsel so late. The jurisdiction follows the Model Rules and has no narrative-testimony practice.

What is Moss's proper course if Price insists on testifying to the alibi?

  • A. Let Price testify in narrative form without questioning him, because some jurisdictions allow narrative testimony for a defendant intent on lying.
  • B. Let Price testify and argue the alibi, because a criminal defendant decides whether to testify, and Price has firmly decided to take the stand.
  • C. Refuse to elicit the alibi and take remedial measures if Price testifies falsely, because a lawyer may not offer evidence she knows is false.
  • D. Tell the prosecutor now, because a lawyer may reveal what is needed to stop a client crime aided by her services that will cause serious financial harm.
  • Answer: C. The candor duties apply to criminal defense. Moss knows the alibi is false, so she may not elicit it. If Price testifies falsely anyway and withdrawal isn't possible, she must take remedial measures, including disclosure to the court if necessary. (MR 3.3(a)(3), (b), (c); cmts. [6]–[7], [10])
  • A is wrong: the description of other jurisdictions is accurate, but the Model Rules don't adopt narrative testimony and this jurisdiction has none. (cmt. [7])
  • B is wrong: the defendant does decide whether to testify, but the lawyer may not present testimony she knows is false. (MR 1.2(a))
  • D is wrong: the MR 1.6(b)(2) exception is stated accurately, but nothing here shows a crime reasonably certain to cause substantial financial injury to another. The remedy for known or intended perjury is remedial measures directed to the tribunal under MR 3.3(a)(3) and (b), which can address intended conduct — not a report to the prosecutor. (MR 1.6(b)(2))
  • Tags: 6.3 · client perjury · cites MR 3.3 cmts. [6]–[10]

MC-0014 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 6.3 · OUT-6.3.5)

A jury returns a verdict for Attorney Beck's client. Three weeks later, while the time for appeal is still running, Beck learns that his client paid a key defense witness to change her testimony. The client tells Beck this in confidence.

Must Beck take remedial action?

  • A. Yes, because a lawyer who knows of criminal conduct related to the proceeding must take remedial measures until the proceeding concludes.
  • B. No, because a lawyer's candor duties end when the proceeding concludes, and the jury has already returned a verdict in the client's favor.
  • C. No, because a lawyer may not reveal information relating to a representation without consent or an exception, and the client spoke in confidence.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer must report another lawyer's known serious misconduct unless it is confidential under MR 1.6, and bribery is a serious crime.
  • Answer: A. Bribing a witness is criminal conduct related to the proceeding. The MR 3.3(b) duty lasts until no further review is possible, and it applies notwithstanding MR 1.6. (MR 3.3(b), (c); cmt. [13])
  • B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but a proceeding concludes only when the judgment is upheld on appeal or the time for review runs out, not at the verdict. (cmt. [13])
  • C is wrong: the confidentiality rule is accurate, but MR 3.3(c) makes the candor duties apply notwithstanding it.
  • D is wrong: the reporting rule is accurate, including its confidentiality exclusion, but it concerns misconduct by lawyers, the briber is the client, and the information is confidential anyway. (MR 8.3(a), (c))
  • Tags: 6.3 · crime related to proceeding, duration · cites MR 3.3(b)–(c)

MC-0015 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 6.3 · OUT-6.3.6)

Attorney Gomez seeks an emergency order without notice barring her client's ex-husband from taking their child out of state. She knows the family court entered an order two months ago giving the ex-husband visitation this weekend, including travel. The judge asks if there is anything else she should know.

What must Gomez tell the judge?

  • A. Nothing more, because there is no general duty to volunteer adverse facts in an adversary proceeding, and the ex-husband can raise the order later.
  • B. Only legal authority, because a lawyer must disclose known, directly adverse controlling law the other side hasn't cited, and the order is a fact.
  • C. Nothing more, because a lawyer may not reveal information relating to the representation absent an exception, and Gomez learned it as counsel.
  • D. About the prior order, because in an ex parte proceeding a lawyer must disclose all material facts she knows, even adverse ones.
  • Answer: D. With no opposing party given notice, the lawyer must inform the tribunal of all material facts she knows, favorable or not. (MR 3.3(d); cmt. [14])
  • A is wrong: the principle is accurate for adversary proceedings, but this one is ex parte.
  • B is wrong: the adverse-law duty is accurate, but MR 3.3(d) adds adverse facts in ex parte proceedings.
  • C is wrong: the confidentiality rule is accurate, but MR 3.3(d) independently requires this disclosure, and a disclosure the Rules require is not one MR 1.6 forbids.
  • Tags: 6.3 · ex parte · cites MR 3.3(d)

MC-0016 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 6.3 · OUT-6.3.3)

In a civil case, Attorney Ng plans to call a neighbor who will testify that the defendant's dog was loose. Ng reasonably believes, based on inconsistencies in the neighbor's accounts, that the testimony is probably false, but she doesn't know it is. Her client insists that she call the neighbor.

Is Ng subject to discipline if she refuses to call the neighbor?

  • A. Yes, because a lawyer must abide by the client's decisions about objectives and consult about means, and the client insists on calling the neighbor.
  • B. Yes, because a lawyer must honor a criminal defendant client's decision to testify unless she knows the testimony is false, and Ng only doubts it.
  • C. No, because a lawyer must not offer evidence she knows is false, and the neighbor's accounts are inconsistent.
  • D. No, because a lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than a criminal defendant's testimony, that she reasonably believes is false.
  • Answer: D. For evidence other than a criminal defendant's testimony, a lawyer who reasonably believes it false may refuse to offer it, even over the client's wishes. (MR 3.3(a)(3); cmt. [9])
  • A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but calling a witness is a question of means, and MR 3.3(a)(3) specifically lets the lawyer decline to offer evidence she reasonably believes false. She should still consult with the client. (MR 1.2(a); MR 1.4)
  • B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but it protects a criminal defendant's own testimony; this is a civil case and a nonparty witness.
  • C is wrong: the rule is accurate, but inconsistencies support only a reasonable belief, not knowledge; the right result rests on the reasonable-belief permission.
  • Tags: 6.3 · reasonably believes · cites MR 3.3(a)(3)

MC-0017 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 6.3 · OUT-6.3.1)

In a brief, Attorney Fong writes that "no court has ever held" that a certain statute of limitations can be tolled. Fong knows of an intermediate appellate decision from a neighboring state holding that it can, but no court in her jurisdiction has addressed the issue, and her jurisdiction's law governs. Opposing counsel hasn't cited the neighboring-state case.

Is Fong subject to discipline?

  • A. Yes, because a lawyer may not knowingly make a false statement of law to a tribunal, and Fong knows a court has so held.
  • B. No, because a lawyer must disclose directly adverse authority only from the controlling jurisdiction, and the case is from another state.
  • C. Yes, because a lawyer must disclose known, directly adverse controlling authority the other side hasn't cited, and Fong knew of the case.
  • D. No, because an advocate may present the law in the light most favorable to the client, and the case isn't binding on this court.
  • Answer: A. Fong had no duty to cite the out-of-state case, but she may not affirmatively misstate the law. "No court has ever held" is knowingly false. (MR 3.3(a)(1); cmt. [4])
  • B is wrong: the disclosure rule is accurate, but the problem is Fong's false statement, not her omission.
  • C is wrong: the disclosure rule is accurate, but a neighboring state's intermediate appellate decision is not controlling here. (MR 3.3(a)(2))
  • D is wrong: favorable presentation is permitted, but not a knowingly false statement of law.
  • Tags: 6.3 · false statement of law · cites MR 3.3(a)(1)

MC-0018 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 6.3 · OUT-6.3.5)

After a two-year custody case ended in a final, unappealed judgment, Attorney Rao learns from his former client that the client lied at trial about her past drug use. More than a year has passed since the time for appeal expired. The client asks Rao to keep it quiet.

Must Rao disclose the perjury to the court?

  • A. Yes, because a lawyer who learns that material evidence was false must take remedial measures, and the client lied at trial.
  • B. No, because the candor duties continue only until the proceeding concludes, and the time for review of the judgment has passed.
  • C. Yes, because a lawyer may reveal information to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm, and children are at stake.
  • D. No, because the duty to correct false statements applies to the lawyer's own statements, and Rao himself said nothing false.
  • Answer: B. The MR 3.3 duties end when the proceeding concludes. After that, MR 1.6 governs, and no exception on these facts requires disclosure. (MR 3.3(c); cmt. [13])
  • A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but it applies only until the conclusion of the proceeding.
  • C is wrong: the MR 1.6(b)(1) exception is accurate but permissive, and lying about past drug use doesn't show reasonably certain harm to anyone. (MR 1.6(b)(1))
  • D is wrong: the rule is accurate as to MR 3.3(a)(1), but a client's false evidence is covered by MR 3.3(a)(3); the reason no duty exists here is that the proceeding has concluded.
  • Tags: 6.3 · duration · cites MR 3.3 cmt. [13]

MC-0019 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 6.3 · OUT-6.3.5)

During a civil trial, Attorney Dunn overhears her client's chief financial officer, who is not a lawyer, instruct an employee to shred documents that the court ordered produced. The shredding hasn't happened yet. Dunn urges the officer to stop, and he refuses.

What must Dunn do?

  • A. Withdraw and say nothing, because a lawyer must withdraw if continuing the representation will result in a violation of the Rules, and the officer refuses to stop.
  • B. Take reasonable remedial measures, including disclosure to the court if necessary, because a person intends criminal conduct related to the proceeding.
  • C. Nothing further, because a lawyer may not reveal information relating to the representation unless an exception applies, and Dunn learned this during the case.
  • D. Report the officer to the bar, because a lawyer must report another lawyer's known serious misconduct unless it is confidential, and the officer plans a crime.
  • Answer: B. Dunn knows a person intends criminal conduct related to the proceeding. Her effort to stop it failed, so she must take further remedial measures, including disclosure to the tribunal if necessary. (MR 3.3(b), (c); cmt. [12])
  • A is wrong: the withdrawal rule is accurate, but withdrawing silently doesn't prevent the destruction of evidence the court ordered produced, so it doesn't satisfy MR 3.3(b). (MR 1.16(a)(1))
  • C is wrong: the confidentiality rule is accurate, but MR 3.3(c) makes the candor duties apply notwithstanding it.
  • D is wrong: the reporting rule is accurate, but it concerns misconduct by lawyers, and the officer isn't one; bar reporting also wouldn't protect the proceeding. (MR 8.3(a), (c))
  • Tags: 6.3 · obstruction, remedial measures · cites MR 3.3(b)

MC-0020 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 6.3 · OUT-6.3.2)

In a federal appeal in the Ninth Circuit, Attorney Silva knows of a Ninth Circuit decision directly adverse to her client. Opposing counsel's brief cites and discusses it at length.

Must Silva also cite the decision?

  • A. No, because the duty to disclose directly adverse controlling authority applies only when opposing counsel has not disclosed it.
  • B. Yes, because a lawyer must disclose known, directly adverse controlling authority opposing counsel hasn't disclosed, and the decision is binding.
  • C. Yes, because a lawyer who learns her own earlier statement to a court was false must correct it, and Silva's brief doesn't mention the case.
  • D. No, because an advocate need not argue against the client, and the decision hurts Silva's client.
  • Answer: A. MR 3.3(a)(2) requires disclosure only of authority the other side has not disclosed. Silva may still choose to address it. (MR 3.3(a)(2))
  • B is wrong: the rule is stated accurately, but its condition isn't met: opposing counsel has already disclosed the decision.
  • C is wrong: the rule is accurate, but Silva made no false statement; omitting a case the court already has is not one.
  • D is wrong: the right result for the wrong reason; had opposing counsel not cited the case, Silva would have had to.
  • Tags: 6.3 · adverse authority · cites MR 3.3(a)(2)

Multiple choice (continued)

MC-0021 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 6.4 · OUT-6.4.1)

After a customer sends a letter threatening to sue over a defective heater, the manufacturer's in-house lawyer, Attorney Bly, tells the engineering manager to delete internal emails discussing the heater's overheating problem "before anyone asks for them." No suit has been filed yet. The jurisdiction's law requires preserving evidence once litigation is reasonably foreseeable.

Is Bly subject to discipline?

  • A. No, because the rule bars destroying evidence only when the destruction is unlawful, and no court had ordered the emails preserved.
  • B. No, because a lawyer may advise a client about the legal consequences of conduct, and Bly was advising on routine document management.
  • C. Yes, because a lawyer may not counsel another to unlawfully destroy material with potential evidentiary value, and suit was foreseeable.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer who learns her own material statement to a tribunal was false must correct it, and deleting the emails misleads the court.
  • Answer: C. Under the stated preservation law, directing the destruction of relevant material once litigation is reasonably foreseeable is unlawful, and counseling it violates MR 3.4(a). (MR 3.4(a); cmt. [2])
  • A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but the destruction is unlawful under the preservation law even without a court order.
  • B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but Bly didn't just advise; she directed destruction. (MR 1.2(d))
  • D is wrong: the rule is accurate, but Bly made no statement to a tribunal. (MR 3.3(a)(1))
  • Tags: 6.4 · evidence destruction · cites MR 3.4(a)

MC-0022 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 6.4 · OUT-6.4.2)

Attorney Rhee represents a plaintiff in a construction-defect case. She retains a structural engineer as an expert and agrees to pay the engineer 15% of any recovery instead of an hourly fee. The engineer's opinions are honest and well-supported.

Is Rhee subject to discipline?

  • A. No, because a lawyer may pay an expert a reasonable fee for professional services, and the engineer's opinions are honest and well supported.
  • B. Yes, because a lawyer may not pay a witness a fee contingent on the outcome of the case, and the engineer's fee is 15% of the recovery.
  • C. No, because a lawyer may charge a reasonable, written contingent fee in most civil cases, and the construction case is civil.
  • D. Yes, because apart from narrow exceptions a lawyer may not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, and the engineer gets a share of the recovery.
  • Answer: B. An expert may receive a reasonable fee, but not one contingent on the outcome; under the rule followed in most jurisdictions, that is a prohibited inducement. (MR 3.4(b); cmt. [3])
  • A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but a contingent fee isn't a permitted "reasonable fee," however honest the expert.
  • C is wrong: the rule is accurate, but it governs the lawyer's own fee, not payments to witnesses. (MR 1.5(c))
  • D is wrong: the rule is accurate, but the engineer shares the client's recovery, not the lawyer's fee. (MR 5.4(a))
  • Tags: 6.4 · paying witnesses · cites MR 3.4(b) cmt. [3]

MC-0023 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 6.4 · OUT-6.4.5)

Attorney Tate represents a trucking company sued after a collision. He asks (1) the company's driver and (2) a bystander who saw the crash not to talk to the plaintiff's lawyer unless subpoenaed. Tate reasonably believes the driver's interests won't be harmed by staying quiet.

Which request was proper?

  • A. Both, because a lawyer may advise the client not to volunteer information to the other side, and Tate represents the trucking company.
  • B. Neither, because beyond the client, only its relatives, employees or agents may be asked not to volunteer information, and neither man is the client.
  • C. Only the bystander's, because a client's employee may be asked to stay quiet only if silence won't harm him, and nothing shows it would.
  • D. Only the driver's, because the client's employee may be asked to refrain if his interests won't be harmed, and the bystander is unrelated.
  • Answer: D. The exception covers the client's relatives, employees and agents, when the lawyer reasonably believes their interests won't be harmed. Asking an unrelated witness to refrain is prohibited. (MR 3.4(f); cmt. [4])
  • A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but it covers the client itself; the bystander is neither the client nor its agent.
  • B is wrong: the rule is stated accurately (with the lawyer's reasonable belief that the person won't be harmed), but the driver is the client's employee, so he falls within it even though he isn't the client.
  • C is wrong: the rule is accurate but applies to the client's employees, like the driver — whose request Tate's reasonable belief makes proper — not to an unrelated bystander, who may not be asked at all.
  • Tags: 6.4 · requesting silence · cites MR 3.4(f)

MC-0024 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 6.4 · OUT-6.4.4)

In closing argument in a robbery trial, the prosecutor, Attorney Vale, says: "I have prosecuted cases for twenty years. I have seen hundreds of defendants. I know a guilty man when I see one, and this defendant is guilty."

Is Vale subject to discipline?

  • A. No, because a prosecutor may argue that the evidence proves guilt, and Vale was summing up the case.
  • B. No, because a lawyer testifying to the value of her services in the case may still act as advocate, and Vale described her career.
  • C. Yes, because a lawyer at trial may not state a personal opinion as to the guilt of an accused, and Vale did so.
  • D. Yes, because a prosecutor must timely disclose evidence that tends to negate guilt, and Vale argued guilt in closing.
  • Answer: C. Stating a personal opinion on guilt is prohibited at trial, and vouching based on the prosecutor's experience is such an opinion. (MR 3.4(e))
  • A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but Vale didn't tie guilt to the evidence; she offered her own opinion.
  • B is wrong: the MR 3.7(a)(2) exception is accurate, but it concerns a lawyer who testifies as a witness about her fees, not closing argument about her experience.
  • D is wrong: the disclosure duty is accurate, but arguing guilt in closing isn't a failure to disclose, and nothing suggests Vale withheld exculpatory evidence. (MR 3.8(d))
  • Tags: 6.4 · personal opinion · cites MR 3.4(e)

MC-0025 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 6.4 · OUT-6.4.3)

A trial court orders Attorney Quinn to produce her client's communications with its outside auditor. Quinn believes they are privileged. She tells the court on the record that she will not produce them and immediately seeks appellate review. The appellate court later rules against her, and she produces the documents.

Is Quinn subject to discipline for her initial refusal?

  • A. No, because a lawyer may defy a court's directive only by refusing openly on the ground that it is not valid, and Quinn did exactly that on the record.
  • B. Yes, because a lawyer may disobey a tribunal's order only by openly refusing on the ground that it is invalid, and the appellate court held the order valid.
  • C. No, because a lawyer may assert any privilege the client holds, and the auditor communications were arguably privileged.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer must make reasonably diligent efforts to comply with proper discovery requests, and Quinn refused to produce ordered documents.
  • Answer: A. MR 3.4(c) lets a lawyer refuse openly when she contends the obligation is not valid. Losing on appeal doesn't make a good-faith, open test of the order a violation.
  • B is wrong: the rule is stated accurately, but its exception turns on openly asserting invalidity, not on winning; Quinn refused openly.
  • C is wrong: the right result for the wrong reason; what protects Quinn is the open refusal, not the mere existence of a privilege claim. Secret noncompliance would violate the rule.
  • D is wrong: the rule is accurate, but an open, good-faith challenge to the order's validity is not a failure of diligent compliance. (MR 3.4(d))
  • Tags: 6.4 · open refusal · cites MR 3.4(c)

MC-0026 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 6.4 · OUT-6.4.4)

In opening statement, Attorney Lin tells the jury that the defendant "has been sued for fraud three times before." Lin knows the judge granted a motion in limine excluding the prior suits. Opposing counsel objects, and the judge instructs the jury to disregard the statement.

Is Lin subject to discipline?

  • A. No, because a lawyer may refer in opening to matters she reasonably believes admissible evidence will support, and Lin knew about the three prior fraud suits before trial.
  • B. Yes, because a lawyer at trial may not allude to matter she doesn't reasonably believe will be supported by admissible evidence, and the suits were excluded.
  • C. No, because a lawyer may publicly state information contained in a public record, and prior lawsuits against the defendant are court records.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer may not vouch for disputed facts from her own knowledge, and Lin described the defendant's history.
  • Answer: B. Referring to evidence the lawyer knows has been excluded violates MR 3.4(e), and a curative instruction doesn't undo the lawyer's violation. (MR 3.4(e))
  • A is wrong: the principle is accurate, but Lin could not reasonably believe the prior suits would be supported by admissible evidence once the judge excluded them.
  • C is wrong: the public-record provision is accurate, but it is part of the trial-publicity safe harbor for out-of-court statements, not courtroom argument. (MR 3.6(b))
  • D is wrong: the rule is accurate, but Lin didn't claim to know the facts personally; she referred to excluded evidence.
  • Tags: 6.4 · alluding to inadmissible matter · cites MR 3.4(e)

MC-0027 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 6.4 · OUT-6.4.2)

Attorney Park represents a plaintiff in a slip-and-fall case. An eyewitness who lives two states away agrees to testify. Park pays the witness's airfare and hotel and $300 for the two days of work the witness will miss, which matches the witness's regular earnings. The jurisdiction's law permits such payments. The payments do not depend on what the witness says or on the outcome.

Is Park subject to discipline for the payments to the witness?

  • A. Yes, because a lawyer may not pay a witness for the content of testimony, and Park paid the eyewitness before trial.
  • B. Yes, because a lawyer's financial help to a litigation client is limited to costs, expenses and narrow humanitarian gifts, and Park paid a witness.
  • C. No, because a lawyer may pay an expert witness a reasonable fee for professional services, and Park paid the eyewitness a reasonable amount.
  • D. No, because a lawyer may pay a witness's reasonable expenses and reasonable compensation for lost time, and Park did only that.
  • Answer: D. Under MR 3.4(b), where the law permits, paying a witness's reasonable expenses and reasonable compensation for time lost is proper, so long as the payment doesn't depend on the testimony or the outcome. (MR 3.4(b); cmt. [3]; ABA Formal Op. 96-402 (advisory))
  • A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but Park paid expenses and lost time, not for the content of testimony.
  • B is wrong: MR 1.8(e) is summarized accurately, but it governs help given to the client; paying a witness's expenses and lost time is governed by MR 3.4(b) and is proper here. (MR 1.8(e); MR 3.4(b) cmt. [3])
  • C is wrong: the rule is accurate, but the eyewitness is a fact witness, not an expert rendering professional services.
  • Tags: 6.4 · paying witnesses · cites MR 3.4(b) cmt. [3]

MC-0028 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 6.4 · OUT-6.4.1)

A client charged with homicide brings his lawyer, Attorney Hart, a knife he says he used in the killing. Hart keeps it in her office safe for a week so a defense forensic expert can examine it without altering it. The jurisdiction's law requires a lawyer who takes possession of physical evidence of a crime to turn it over to the authorities after a reasonable time for examination.

Is Hart subject to discipline if, after the examination, she returns the knife to the client?

  • A. No, because a lawyer may not reveal information relating to the representation absent an exception, and turning over the knife reveals the confession.
  • B. No, because where the law permits, a lawyer may take temporary possession of physical evidence to examine it, and Hart kept it only a week.
  • C. Yes, because the law required Hart to turn the knife over after examining it, and returning it unlawfully obstructs access to evidence.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer must disclose known, directly adverse controlling authority the other side hasn't cited, and the knife is adverse evidence.
  • Answer: C. Temporary possession for examination is permitted where law allows it, but when the law requires turning the evidence over, returning it to the client unlawfully obstructs access to evidence. (MR 3.4(a); cmt. [2])
  • A is wrong: the confidentiality rule is accurate, but it doesn't license violating the turnover law; the lawyer generally need not disclose the client's statements about the item.
  • B is wrong: the rule is accurate as to temporary possession, but it doesn't permit returning the evidence when law requires turnover.
  • D is wrong: the rule is accurate, but it concerns legal authority, not physical evidence. (MR 3.3(a)(2))
  • Tags: 6.4 · physical evidence · cites MR 3.4(a) cmt. [2]

MC-0029 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 6.5 · OUT-6.5.2)

Midway through a bench trial, Attorney Cole emails the judge a short note arguing that the other side's key exhibit is a forgery. She doesn't copy opposing counsel. No law or order authorizes the email.

Is Cole subject to discipline?

  • A. Yes, because a lawyer may not communicate ex parte with a judge during a proceeding unless authorized, and Cole excluded opposing counsel.
  • B. No, because a lawyer must disclose material facts in an ex parte proceeding, and Cole told the judge a material fact.
  • C. Yes, because a lawyer may not knowingly make a false statement of fact to a tribunal, and Cole called the exhibit a forgery without proof.
  • D. No, because a lawyer who knows of fraud related to the proceeding must take remedial measures, and Cole believes the exhibit is forged.
  • Answer: A. An unauthorized communication sent to the judge without the other side is a prohibited ex parte communication. (MR 3.5(b))
  • B is wrong: the ex parte proceeding rule is accurate, but this is an adversary trial.
  • C is wrong: the rule is accurate, but nothing shows the statement was false, let alone that Cole knew it was.
  • D is wrong: the MR 3.3(b) duty is accurate and can reach fraud by anyone, including the other side, but Cole only believes the exhibit is forged — belief isn't knowledge — and no law or order authorized her private email to the judge.
  • Tags: 6.5 · ex parte with judge · cites MR 3.5(b)

MC-0030 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 6.5 · OUT-6.5.3)

During jury selection, Attorney Ford reviews prospective jurors' public social-media profiles. No law or court order restricts such research. The platform automatically notifies one juror that Ford viewed her profile. Ford's paralegal, on Ford's instructions, also sends a "friend" request to another prospective juror whose profile is private.

Which conduct subjects Ford to discipline?

  • A. Only the notice review, because a lawyer may not communicate with a prospective juror unless authorized, and that juror got a notice.
  • B. Both, because a lawyer may not use means whose only substantial purpose is to embarrass a third person, and both jurors were researched.
  • C. Neither, because a lawyer answers for a nonlawyer assistant's misconduct only if she ordered or knowingly ratified it, and the paralegal acted.
  • D. Only the friend request, because an access request is a communication to the juror, and an automatic platform notice is not.
  • Answer: D. Passive review of public content is proper absent a restriction, and a platform's automatic notice isn't a communication by the lawyer. A friend request is an ex parte communication, and Ford is responsible for directing it. (MR 3.5(b); MR 5.3; MR 8.4(a); ABA Formal Op. 466 (advisory))
  • A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but the automatic notice is the platform's, not a communication by the lawyer.
  • B is wrong: the MR 4.4(a) rule is accurate, but juror research serves the legitimate purpose of jury selection.
  • C is wrong: the MR 5.3(c)(1) rule is accurate, but Ford ordered the friend request, so she is responsible for it. (MR 5.3(c)(1))
  • Tags: 6.5 · juror social media · cites MR 3.5(b); Op. 466

MC-0031 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 6.5 · OUT-6.5.3)

After a verdict against his client and the jury's discharge, Attorney Grant calls a juror to ask how the jury reached its decision. The juror says, "I'd rather not talk about it." No law or order bars juror contact. A week later, Grant sends the juror a polite letter asking the same questions.

Is Grant subject to discipline?

  • A. No, because after discharge a lawyer may contact a juror unless law forbids it, the juror declined, or it is abusive, and no order barred it.
  • B. Yes, because a lawyer may not contact a discharged juror who has made known a desire not to communicate, and the juror declined.
  • C. No, because the ban on ex parte contact with jurors lasts only until the jury is discharged, and Grant wrote after discharge.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer may not communicate ex parte with a juror during the proceeding unless authorized, and Grant contacted the juror twice.
  • Answer: B. Post-discharge contact is barred once the juror has made known a desire not to communicate. (MR 3.5(c)(2))
  • A is wrong: the rule is stated accurately, with all three limits, but the juror's refusal triggers the second limit.
  • C is wrong: the MR 3.5(b) timing is accurate, but after discharge MR 3.5(c) governs, and its refusal limit applies.
  • D is wrong: the MR 3.5(b) rule is accurate, but both contacts came after discharge, when MR 3.5(c) governs; the first call was proper. (MR 3.5(b))
  • Tags: 6.5 · post-verdict juror contact · cites MR 3.5(c)

MC-0032 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 6.5 · OUT-6.5.1)

The day before a hearing, Attorney Moon sends the presiding judge a bottle of expensive wine with a note: "Looking forward to your wisdom tomorrow." Moon knows the judge may not accept such a gift and hopes it will win favor at the hearing.

Is Moon subject to discipline?

  • A. No, because the Code of Judicial Conduct directly regulates judges, not lawyers, and the gift rule limits what the judge accepts.
  • B. No, because a judge may accept ordinary social hospitality unless law forbids it or it would appear to undermine impartiality, and wine is common.
  • C. Yes, because a lawyer may not seek to influence a judge by means prohibited by law, and knowingly assisting a judge's violation is misconduct.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer in a matter may not make a public statement substantially likely to materially prejudice it, and the note referred to the hearing.
  • Answer: C. A gift meant to influence a judge is barred, and knowingly assisting a judge to violate the Code of Judicial Conduct is lawyer misconduct. (MR 3.5(a); MR 8.4(f); cmt. [1])
  • A is wrong: the Code does directly regulate judges, but MR 8.4(f) makes knowingly assisting a judge's violation lawyer misconduct.
  • B is wrong: the judicial rule is accurate, but an expensive gift from a lawyer the day before the lawyer's hearing is not ordinary social hospitality. (CJC 3.13)
  • D is wrong: the rule is accurate, but a private note to the judge isn't a public statement. (MR 3.6(a))
  • Tags: 6.5 · influencing a judge · cites MR 3.5(a); MR 8.4(f)

MC-0033 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 6.5 · OUT-6.5.4)

At a deposition, opposing counsel repeatedly insults Attorney Blake. Blake responds by shouting, throwing a binder, and refusing to let the court reporter continue for twenty minutes, intending to end the deposition early.

Is Blake subject to discipline?

  • A. No, because the rule bars conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal, and no judge was present at the deposition.
  • B. No, because a lawyer may stand firm against abuse by others, and opposing counsel started the conflict.
  • C. Yes, because a lawyer at trial may not state a personal opinion on a witness's credibility, and Blake shouted at opposing counsel.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer may not engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal, and the rule reaches depositions.
  • Answer: D. The duty to refrain from disruptive conduct extends to depositions and other proceedings connected with a tribunal; the other lawyer's misconduct doesn't justify it. (MR 3.5(d); cmts. [4]–[5])
  • A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but it extends to depositions, which are part of the tribunal's process. (cmt. [5])
  • B is wrong: a lawyer may stand firm against abuse, but may not respond in kind; throwing a binder and halting the deposition is reciprocation, not firmness. (cmt. [4])
  • C is wrong: the rule is accurate, but this was a deposition, not trial, and Blake expressed no opinion on any witness's credibility. (MR 3.4(e))
  • Tags: 6.5 · decorum · cites MR 3.5(d)

MC-0034 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 6.6 · OUT-6.6.1)

Before a murder trial, the prosecutor, Attorney Dean, tells a television reporter that the defendant "failed a polygraph and confessed to his cellmate." The jury has not yet been selected. The polygraph results are likely inadmissible, and neither the polygraph nor the cellmate's account appears in any public record.

Is Dean subject to discipline?

  • A. No, because a prosecutor may comment as needed to inform the public of her action for a legitimate law-enforcement purpose, and Dean described the case.
  • B. No, because a lawyer may state information contained in a public record, and the charge against the defendant is a matter of public record.
  • C. Yes, because the statement is substantially likely to materially prejudice the trial, and it concerns test results and a confession.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer at trial may not state a personal opinion on the guilt of an accused, and Dean's remarks implied guilt.
  • Answer: C. Test results, a confession and likely inadmissible evidence are classic prejudicial subjects before a criminal jury trial. (MR 3.6(a); cmt. [5]; MR 3.8(f))
  • A is wrong: the prosecutor's allowance is accurate, but revealing nonpublic test results and a jailhouse confession isn't necessary to inform the public of the office's action.
  • B is wrong: the safe harbor is accurate, and Dean could state the charge, but the polygraph and confession are not in any public record.
  • D is wrong: the rule is accurate, but it governs statements at trial, not press statements. (MR 3.4(e))
  • Tags: 6.6 · prejudicial publicity · cites MR 3.6 cmt. [5]

MC-0035 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 6.6 · OUT-6.6.2)

After a suspect's arrest, the district attorney, Attorney Ellis, holds a press conference stating the suspect's name, age and occupation; that he was arrested at his home at 6 a.m. by state police; that the charge is arson; and that the investigation took four months. She adds that the suspect is presumed innocent.

Is Ellis subject to discipline?

  • A. No, because the statements fall within the safe harbor for basic information about the accused, the arrest and the investigation.
  • B. Yes, because a prosecutor must avoid comments likely to heighten condemnation of the accused unless needed to explain her action, and she named him.
  • C. No, because a lawyer may reply to protect a client from undue prejudicial publicity, and the arrest was news.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer in a matter may not make public statements substantially likely to materially prejudice it, and Ellis spoke before trial.
  • Answer: A. Identity, occupation, arrest details, the charge and the investigation's length are all within the MR 3.6(b) safe harbor. (MR 3.6(b))
  • B is wrong: the MR 3.8(f) rule is accurate, but it expressly does not restrict statements that comply with the MR 3.6 safe harbor, even though such basic facts can have some adverse effect on the accused. (MR 3.8 cmt. [5])
  • C is wrong: the right result for the wrong reason; the right of reply responds to others' publicity, and the prosecutor started this. (MR 3.6(c))
  • D is wrong: the rule is accurate, but the safe harbor protects these statements.
  • Tags: 6.6 · safe harbor · cites MR 3.6(b)

MC-0036 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 6.6 · OUT-6.6.3)

A police chief tells reporters that a man charged with a bank robbery "has a long history of violence." In fact the man has no violent convictions. The man's lawyer, Attorney Frost, tells reporters that the man has no criminal record of violence and is presumed innocent, and says nothing more.

Is Frost subject to discipline?

  • A. Yes, because a party's criminal record is among the subjects most likely to prejudice a trial, and Frost publicly discussed the man's record.
  • B. No, because a lawyer may reply to recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or client, limited to what is needed to mitigate it.
  • C. Yes, because the safe harbor lets a lawyer state information in a public record, and Frost's statement about convictions was not one.
  • D. No, because a defense lawyer may require the prosecution to prove every element, and Frost insisted on the presumption of innocence.
  • Answer: B. The right of reply permits a limited statement to counter recent, substantially prejudicial publicity started by others. (MR 3.6(c))
  • A is wrong: the comment accurately lists criminal record as a high-risk subject, but that is a risk factor, not a per se ban, and the reply permission covers a measured response. (cmt. [5])
  • C is wrong: the public-record category is accurate, but it is only one of several permissions; the right of reply is another.
  • D is wrong: the MR 3.1 principle is accurate, but it concerns litigation positions, not press statements.
  • Tags: 6.6 · right of reply · cites MR 3.6(c)

MC-0037 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 6.6 · OUT-6.6.1)

Attorney Hollis, a partner at a large firm, has no role in a criminal case that her partner is defending. Before trial, she posts on her public blog that the prosecution's star witness "has lied under oath before and will lie again." She knows the post will be widely read in the county where the jury will be drawn.

Is Hollis subject to discipline under the trial-publicity rule?

  • A. No, because the rule's main prohibition covers lawyers who are or were participating in the matter, and Hollis has no role in her partner's case.
  • B. No, because a lawyer may state the claim or defense involved, and the witness's credibility is part of the defense.
  • C. Yes, because the rule extends to lawyers associated in a firm with a participating lawyer, and the post is likely to prejudice the trial.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer may not state a personal opinion about a witness's credibility at trial, and Hollis publicly attacked the witness's honesty.
  • Answer: C. MR 3.6(d) extends the rule to lawyers in a firm with a lawyer subject to it. An attack on a key witness's credibility is a classic prejudicial statement. (MR 3.6(a), (d); cmt. [5])
  • A is wrong: paragraph (a) is described accurately, but paragraph (d) extends it to lawyers associated in a firm with a participating lawyer.
  • B is wrong: the safe harbor lets a lawyer state the defense, not comment on a witness's credibility.
  • D is wrong: the rule is accurate, but it governs statements at trial, not blog posts. (MR 3.4(e))
  • Tags: 6.6 · associated lawyers · cites MR 3.6(d)

MC-0038 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 6.7 · OUT-6.7.1)

Attorney Park negotiated a supply contract for her client. Other than the two companies' officers, she is the only person who heard the seller's officer orally promise a price cap. The officers' accounts now conflict, and Park's is the only account from someone without a stake in the outcome. The client sues; the price cap is the central disputed issue. Park plans to try the case and testify about the promise.

May Park serve as trial counsel?

  • A. Yes, because a lawyer may try a case in which she testifies about the value of legal services she rendered in it, and Park negotiated the contract.
  • B. Yes, because a lawyer may act as advocate when another lawyer in the firm is a witness, and Park's firm is handling the case.
  • C. No, because a lawyer likely to be a necessary witness on a contested issue may not act as trial advocate, and Park's account is likely necessary.
  • D. No, because a lawyer's personal interest may create a conflict requiring informed consent, confirmed in writing, and Park will testify at trial.
  • Answer: C. Park's testimony goes to the central contested issue, and hers is the only disinterested account, so she is likely a necessary witness and may not try the case. (MR 3.7(a); cmt. [2])
  • A is wrong: the exception is accurate, but it covers testimony about the lawyer's fees and services in the case, not the underlying negotiation facts.
  • B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but Park herself is the witness.
  • D is wrong: the conflict rule is accurate, but the facts show no personal interest or adversity that would materially limit Park's representation; testifying alone doesn't create a conflict. (MR 1.7(a)(2))
  • Tags: 6.7 · necessary witness · cites MR 3.7(a)

MC-0039 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 6.7 · OUT-6.7.2)

Associate Wu witnessed the signing of a will by a firm client who has since died. In a will contest, the estate's executor — the firm's current client — defends the will, and the contestants dispute the testator's mental capacity. Wu will testify for the executor that the testator seemed lucid. Partner Chen, from the same firm, plans to try the case. Nothing suggests Wu's testimony conflicts with the executor's position or with any duty to a former client.

May Chen serve as trial counsel?

  • A. Yes, because a lawyer may act as advocate when a firm colleague will testify, unless a conflict of interest prevents it, and no conflict is shown.
  • B. No, because a conflict that disqualifies one lawyer is generally imputed to the firm, and Wu cannot act as trial advocate.
  • C. No, because a lawyer likely to be a necessary witness may not act as trial advocate unless an exception applies, and Wu will testify at Chen's trial.
  • D. Yes, because a necessary witness may act as advocate when the testimony relates to an uncontested issue, and Wu's testimony supports the executor.
  • Answer: A. The advocate-witness bar isn't imputed. Chen may try the case unless MR 1.7 or 1.9 bars it, and on these facts no conflict is shown. (MR 3.7(b); cmts. [6]–[7])
  • B is wrong: the imputation rule is accurate for conflicts, but Wu's bar under MR 3.7(a) is not a conflict of interest, and MR 3.7(b) says it isn't imputed. (MR 1.10(a))
  • C is wrong: the rule is accurate, but it applies to Wu, not Chen.
  • D is wrong: the exception is accurate, but the testator's capacity is the disputed issue.
  • Tags: 6.7 · imputation · cites MR 3.7(b)

MC-0040 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 6.7 · OUT-6.7.1)

Six years into complex patent litigation, and two weeks before trial, the opponent amends its counterclaim to rely on a 2024 settlement conversation between Attorney Rowe and the opponent's CEO. That makes Rowe, the client's lawyer throughout, the only witness who can contradict the CEO's account. Rowe's testimony will be brief. The opponent then moves to disqualify Rowe. Replacing him, the only lawyer who has mastered the highly technical record, would delay trial for months.

Is the court likely to allow Rowe to try the case?

  • A. No, because a lawyer likely to be a necessary witness may not act as trial advocate unless an exception applies, and only Rowe can contradict the CEO.
  • B. Yes, because disqualification would work substantial hardship on the client, and the opponent's late amendment created the need for Rowe's testimony.
  • C. No, because a lawyer must provide competent representation, and Rowe will have to testify and argue in the same trial.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer may act as advocate when another firm lawyer is a witness, and Rowe's firm handles the case.
  • Answer: B. The substantial-hardship exception weighs the client's interests against the prejudice to the opponent. Rowe's testimony is brief, his distinctive knowledge of the record would be costly to replace, and his role arose only from the opponent's last-minute amendment, which weighs against the opponent on foreseeability. (MR 3.7(a)(3); cmt. [4])
  • A is wrong: the rule is stated accurately, but the substantial-hardship exception applies on these facts.
  • C is wrong: competence is required, but nothing suggests Rowe can't competently try the case; the dual-role problem is governed by MR 3.7. (MR 1.1)
  • D is wrong: the rule is accurate, but Rowe himself is the witness. (MR 3.7(b))
  • Tags: 6.7 · substantial hardship · cites MR 3.7(a)(3)

MC-0041 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 6.4 · OUT-6.4.3)

In a commercial dispute, Attorney Voss answers the other side's document requests promptly and completely. Voss also serves 400 document requests on the other side, most seeking every email the company has sent in ten years on any subject. Voss admits to a colleague that the requests aren't meant to find evidence but to run up the opponent's costs until it settles.

Is Voss subject to discipline?

  • A. No, because a lawyer must make reasonably diligent efforts to comply with proper discovery requests, and Voss answered the other side's requests completely.
  • B. Yes, because a lawyer may not make a discovery request with no legitimate basis, and Voss served requests meant only to raise the opponent's costs.
  • C. No, because the client decides the objectives of the representation, and Voss's client wants to push the opponent toward settlement.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer may not knowingly disobey a court-imposed obligation except by open refusal that none validly exists, and Voss served 400 requests.
  • Answer: B. MR 3.4(d) has two limbs, and Voss violated the one about requests: serving discovery with no legitimate purpose, only to burden the opponent, is improper even while the lawyer complies diligently with the other side's requests. (MR 3.4(d))
  • A is wrong: the compliance limb is stated accurately, and Voss satisfied it, but satisfying one limb doesn't excuse violating the other.
  • C is wrong: clients set objectives, but not by means the Rules forbid. (MR 1.2(a))
  • D is wrong: the MR 3.4(c) rule is accurate, but the facts show no court-imposed obligation that Voss disobeyed. Serving burdensome requests is the MR 3.4(d) problem, not a 3.4(c) one.
  • Tags: 6.4 · discovery abuse · cites MR 3.4(d)

MC-0042 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 6.4 · OUT-6.4.4)

Attorney Oyelaran represents a pedestrian hit at an intersection. The only disputed fact is whether the light was red. Oyelaran happened to be standing at the corner and saw the accident. Three other eyewitnesses testified at trial that the light was red. Oyelaran is not listed as a witness and will not testify. In closing, she tells the jury, "I was there myself. I saw that light, and it was red."

Is Oyelaran subject to discipline?

  • A. Yes, because a lawyer may not vouch for a disputed fact from her own knowledge unless she takes the stand, and Oyelaran did so in closing.
  • B. No, because a lawyer may argue any fact that is already in evidence, and three witnesses testified to the light.
  • C. No, because a lawyer may not knowingly make a false statement of fact to a tribunal, and Oyelaran's statement was true.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer likely to be a necessary witness may not act as trial advocate absent an exception, and Oyelaran saw the accident.
  • Answer: A. Asserting personal knowledge of a disputed fact in argument is prohibited unless the lawyer testifies as a witness; truth is no defense, and the fact that the evidence already supports the point makes no difference. (MR 3.4(e))
  • B is wrong: a lawyer may argue from the record, but Oyelaran argued from her own personal observation — not from the three witnesses' testimony. The rule bars the method, not the conclusion.
  • C is wrong: the MR 3.3(a)(1) rule is accurate, but it prohibits false statements; it does not authorize true statements made through an improper method. The violation is vouching personal knowledge, not making a false claim.
  • D is wrong: the MR 3.7 rule is stated accurately, but it bars acting as advocate only when the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness. Oyelaran will not testify, and what she saw would only repeat what three other eyewitnesses already told the jury, so her testimony is not necessary. The advocate-witness rule does not apply; her violation is asserting personal knowledge in closing (MR 3.4(e)).
  • Tags: 6.4 · personal knowledge · cites MR 3.4(e)

MC-0043 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 6.7 · OUT-6.7.1)

Attorney Pruitt represents a tenant in a fee-shifting case. If the tenant wins, the court will award reasonable attorney's fees. Pruitt plans to try the case and, if the tenant wins, testify at the fee hearing about the hours she worked and her hourly rate.

May Pruitt act as trial counsel?

  • A. Yes, because a lawyer may act as advocate when her testimony is limited to what legal work she did and what it was worth.
  • B. No, because a lawyer likely to be a necessary witness may not act as trial advocate unless an exception applies, and Pruitt will testify.
  • C. Yes, because a lawyer may act as advocate when another lawyer in the firm will testify, and Pruitt's firm handles the case.
  • D. No, because a lawyer may not charge an unreasonable fee, and Pruitt will ask the court to set her own fee.
  • Answer: A. MR 3.7(a)(2) carves out an express exception for a lawyer whose testimony will address only the work performed and its reasonable worth in the case — that is exactly what Pruitt plans to say at the fee hearing. (MR 3.7(a)(2))
  • B is wrong: the rule is stated accurately, including its exceptions — and the work-and-worth exception squarely applies here.
  • C is wrong: the MR 3.7(b) permission is real (though it still yields to MR 1.7 and 1.9), but it covers a different situation: a firm colleague as witness. Pruitt herself is the witness, so 3.7(a) governs.
  • D is wrong: the MR 1.5(a) rule is accurate, but asking a court to award a reasonable fee under a fee-shifting statute is not charging an unreasonable one.
  • Tags: 6.7 · legal-services exception · cites MR 3.7(a)(2)

MC-0044 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 6.1 · OUT-6.1.3)

Attorney Ferreira represents a respondent in a civil-contempt proceeding for unpaid child support. If the court finds willful nonpayment, it may jail the respondent until he pays. The respondent privately tells Ferreira he could have paid. The petitioner's only proof of ability to pay is a stale financial affidavit. Ferreira plans to offer no evidence and argue that the petitioner hasn't proved willfulness.

May Ferreira proceed as planned?

  • A. No, because a lawyer may not assert a position without a nonfrivolous basis in fact, and the respondent admitted he could have paid.
  • B. Yes, because counsel for a respondent facing possible jail may require proof of every element, and Ferreira offers nothing false.
  • C. No, because the burden-of-proof protection applies to criminal defense, and a contempt proceeding for child support is civil.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer may refuse to offer evidence she reasonably believes is false, and Ferreira will offer no evidence.
  • Answer: B. MR 3.1 lets counsel for a respondent in any proceeding that could result in incarceration hold the other side to its proof, even with no affirmative defense. Testing the evidence isn't a false statement. (MR 3.1)
  • A is wrong: the general rule is accurate, but MR 3.1 carves out defense of a respondent facing incarceration.
  • C is wrong: the protection is not limited to criminal cases; it reaches any proceeding that could result in incarceration, and civil contempt can.
  • D is wrong: the right result for the wrong reason. The reasonable-belief permission concerns declining to offer evidence; what makes the plan proper is MR 3.1's burden-of-proof protection.
  • Tags: 6.1 · incarceration proceedings · cites MR 3.1

MC-0045 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 6.6 · OUT-6.6.2)

Before a fraud trial, the court seals a financial report and enters a protective order barring the parties and their counsel from disclosing its contents. Defense counsel, Attorney Lindqvist, receives a copy of the order. Later, Lindqvist tells reporters the date of the next hearing and, "since it's part of the court file," summarizes the sealed report's findings.

Is Lindqvist subject to discipline?

  • A. No, because the trial-publicity safe harbor permits a lawyer to state information in a public record, and the report is in the court file.
  • B. No, because a lawyer may identify when a litigation event is scheduled to occur or report its outcome, and Lindqvist announced the hearing date.
  • C. Yes, because a lawyer may not knowingly disobey a court order except by openly asserting it is invalid, and Lindqvist revealed sealed material.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer may not state a personal opinion about the justness of a cause at trial, and Lindqvist commented on the case.
  • Answer: C. Revealing the sealed report violated the protective order. The safe harbor answers the trial-publicity rule but does not override a court order; the hearing-date statement was permissible, but summarizing the sealed report was not. (MR 3.4(c); MR 3.6(b))
  • A is wrong: the safe-harbor rule is accurate, but a sealed report subject to a protective order is not a public record, and the safe harbor cannot authorize what a court order prohibits.
  • B is wrong: the permission described covers the hearing date only — Lindqvist's announcement of that date was fine. It does not extend to disclosing sealed contents.
  • D is wrong: the MR 3.4(e) rule is accurate, but it governs in-court statements at trial; Lindqvist spoke to reporters and offered no personal opinion on the merits.
  • Tags: 6.6 · safe harbor vs. court order · cites MR 3.4(c)

True / False

TF-0001 (OUT-6.1.1)

  • Statement: A claim is frivolous under MR 3.1 whenever the lawyer believes it will probably lose.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: The test is objective. A claim is frivolous only if the lawyer can make no good-faith argument for it on the merits and no good-faith argument to extend, modify or reverse the law. A weak or unlikely claim can still meet that test.
  • Corrected statement: A claim is frivolous only if the lawyer cannot support it with a good-faith argument on the merits or for changing the law; expecting to lose doesn't make it frivolous.
  • Cite: MR 3.1; cmt. [2]

TF-0002 (OUT-6.1.3)

  • Statement: A criminal defense lawyer may plead the client not guilty and require the prosecution to prove every element, even if the client has confessed guilt to the lawyer.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: MR 3.1 lets a criminal defense lawyer defend so as to require every element to be established. The lawyer still may not offer false evidence.
  • Cite: MR 3.1; cmt. [3]

TF-0003 (OUT-6.1.2)

  • Statement: A good-faith argument that controlling precedent should be overruled supplies a nonfrivolous basis in law.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: MR 3.1 expressly includes good-faith arguments for extending, modifying or reversing existing law.
  • Cite: MR 3.1; cmt. [1]

TF-0004 (OUT-6.2.2)

  • Statement: A client's wish to delay paying an expected judgment, so it can keep earning interest on the money, is a legitimate interest that justifies delaying tactics.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: Profiting from otherwise improper delay is not a legitimate client interest.
  • Corrected statement: A client's financial benefit from postponing a judgment does not justify stalling tactics that have no other substantial purpose; steps with a legitimate purpose remain proper even if the client also benefits.
  • Cite: MR 3.2; cmt. [1]

TF-0005 (OUT-6.3.1)

  • Statement: A lawyer who made a statement of material fact to a court, believing it true, must correct it after learning it was false.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: MR 3.3(a)(1) requires correcting a false statement of material fact or law the lawyer previously made, even if made innocently.
  • Cite: MR 3.3(a)(1)

TF-0006 (OUT-6.3.2)

  • Statement: A lawyer must disclose to the court all directly adverse legal authority she knows of, from any jurisdiction, that opposing counsel has not cited.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: The duty covers only directly adverse authority in the controlling jurisdiction.
  • Corrected statement: A lawyer must disclose legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction that she knows is directly adverse to her client and that opposing counsel has not disclosed.
  • Cite: MR 3.3(a)(2); cmt. [4]

TF-0007 (OUT-6.3.2)

  • Statement: In an ordinary adversary proceeding, a lawyer has no general duty to volunteer facts adverse to the client.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: MR 3.3(a)(2) requires disclosing adverse controlling law, not adverse facts. Specific fact duties still apply (known false evidence, crime or fraud related to the proceeding, discovery), and the heightened duty to disclose adverse facts applies in ex parte proceedings.
  • Cite: MR 3.3(a)(2), (a)(3), (b), (d)

TF-0008 (OUT-6.3.3)

  • Statement: A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence in a civil case that she reasonably believes is false, even if she doesn't know it is false.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: MR 3.3(a)(3) permits refusing evidence the lawyer reasonably believes is false, except a criminal defendant's testimony.
  • Cite: MR 3.3(a)(3); cmt. [9]

TF-0009 (OUT-6.3.4)

  • Statement: A criminal defense lawyer who reasonably believes, but doesn't know, that the defendant will testify falsely may prevent the defendant from testifying.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: The defendant decides whether to testify. The lawyer must honor that decision unless she knows the testimony will be false.
  • Corrected statement: A criminal defense lawyer must let the defendant testify unless she knows the testimony will be false; even then, she may still elicit the truthful parts and must refuse only the part she knows is false — unless the court or local law requires a different procedure, such as narrative testimony, which she must follow.
  • Cite: MR 3.3(a)(3); cmts. [7], [9]; MR 1.2(a)

TF-0010 (OUT-6.3.3)

  • Statement: If a lawyer learns that her client gave material false testimony, withdrawing from the case always satisfies the lawyer's obligations.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: Withdrawal often doesn't undo the effect of false evidence already in the record. The lawyer must take reasonable remedial measures, including disclosure to the tribunal if necessary.
  • Corrected statement: A lawyer who comes to know, before the proceeding concludes, that material evidence she or her client offered was false must take reasonable remedial measures; if withdrawal won't undo the harm, that includes disclosure to the tribunal if necessary.
  • Cite: MR 3.3(a)(3), (c); cmts. [10], [13]

TF-0011 (OUT-6.3.5)

  • Statement: The duties of candor to the tribunal apply even when compliance requires disclosing information otherwise protected by MR 1.6.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: MR 3.3(c) makes the duties in MR 3.3(a) and (b) apply notwithstanding MR 1.6, until the proceeding concludes.
  • Cite: MR 3.3(c)

TF-0012 (OUT-6.3.5)

  • Statement: A lawyer's duty to remedy false evidence ends when the jury returns its verdict.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: The duty continues until the case can go no further — the window for seeking review has closed unused, or a reviewing court has upheld the judgment.
  • Corrected statement: The MR 3.3 duties continue until the conclusion of the proceeding, including the time for appeal or other review.
  • Cite: MR 3.3(c); cmt. [13]

TF-0013 (OUT-6.3.6)

  • Statement: In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer must inform the tribunal of all material facts she knows that will enable it to decide, whether or not they are adverse.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: With no opposing party given notice, MR 3.3(d) requires full disclosure of known material facts.
  • Cite: MR 3.3(d); cmt. [14]

TF-0014 (OUT-6.4.1)

  • Statement: A lawyer may advise a client to destroy relevant documents as long as no lawsuit has yet been filed.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: MR 3.4(a) bars unlawfully destroying material with potential evidentiary value, which under typical preservation law includes material relevant to reasonably foreseeable proceedings.
  • Corrected statement: A lawyer may not counsel a client to unlawfully destroy material with potential evidentiary value, even before suit is filed.
  • Cite: MR 3.4(a); cmt. [2]

TF-0015 (OUT-6.4.2)

  • Statement: A lawyer may pay an expert witness a fee contingent on the outcome of the case if the expert's opinion is honest.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: Under the rule followed in most jurisdictions, and on the MPRE, a contingent fee for an expert witness is a prohibited inducement, whatever the expert's honesty.
  • Corrected statement: A lawyer may pay an expert a reasonable fee, but under the prevailing rule not one contingent on the outcome.
  • Cite: MR 3.4(b); cmt. [3]

TF-0016 (OUT-6.4.2)

  • Statement: Where the governing law allows it, a lawyer may reimburse a fact witness's travel expenses and reasonably compensate the witness for time lost from work, so long as the payments don't depend on the content of the testimony or the outcome.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: Reasonable expenses and compensation for time actually lost are permitted payments to witnesses, if not tied to the testimony or the result.
  • Cite: MR 3.4(b); cmt. [3]; ABA Formal Op. 96-402 (advisory) (discussed in Op. 508)

TF-0017 (OUT-6.4.3)

  • Statement: A lawyer who openly refuses to comply with a court order, asserting in good faith that the order is invalid, does not violate MR 3.4(c).
  • Answer: True
  • Why: MR 3.4(c) permits disobedience only as an open refusal grounded in a claim that the obligation is invalid.
  • Cite: MR 3.4(c)

TF-0018 (OUT-6.4.4)

  • Statement: In closing argument, a lawyer may tell the jury that she personally believes her client is innocent.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: At trial a lawyer may not state a personal opinion on the guilt or innocence of an accused. She may argue that the evidence raises reasonable doubt.
  • Corrected statement: A lawyer may argue that the evidence shows innocence or reasonable doubt, but may not state a personal opinion on it.
  • Cite: MR 3.4(e)

TF-0019 (OUT-6.4.5)

  • Statement: A lawyer for a company may ask the company's employees not to voluntarily give information to the opposing party, if the lawyer reasonably believes their interests won't be harmed.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: MR 3.4(f) permits such requests to a client's relatives, employees or other agents under that condition.
  • Cite: MR 3.4(f); cmt. [4]

TF-0020 (OUT-6.5.3)

  • Statement: A lawyer may send a "friend" request to a prospective juror to see the juror's private social-media posts.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: An access request is an ex parte communication with a prospective juror.
  • Corrected statement: Unless a law or court order restricts it, a lawyer may passively review a prospective juror's public social-media content, but may not send an access request, personally or through someone else.
  • Cite: MR 3.5(b); ABA Formal Op. 466 (advisory)

TF-0021 (OUT-6.5.3)

  • Statement: After the jury is discharged, a lawyer may contact a juror who hasn't said she doesn't want to talk, unless a law or court order forbids it, provided the contact doesn't deceive, pressure, coerce or harass.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: MR 3.5(c) permits post-discharge contact subject to those limits.
  • Cite: MR 3.5(c)

TF-0022 (OUT-6.6.2)

  • Statement: Under the trial-publicity safe harbor, a prosecutor may tell reporters the accused's name, the charge, and the time and place of arrest.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: These are expressly listed in MR 3.6(b).
  • Cite: MR 3.6(b)

TF-0023 (OUT-6.6.3)

  • Statement: A lawyer may invoke the right of reply to make an otherwise prohibited statement about prejudicial publicity even if the lawyer's own press release started the publicity.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: The special reply permission covers only recent publicity that neither the lawyer nor the client started. Ordinary non-prejudicial or safe-harbor statements remain permitted either way.
  • Corrected statement: The right of reply is limited to responding to recent publicity not started by the lawyer or client, and only as needed to blunt it.
  • Cite: MR 3.6(c)

TF-0024 (OUT-6.7.2)

  • Statement: When one lawyer in a firm is likely to be a necessary witness at trial, every lawyer in the firm is barred from acting as trial advocate.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: The advocate-witness bar is not imputed. Another firm lawyer may try the case unless MR 1.7 or 1.9 bars it.
  • Corrected statement: Another lawyer in the firm may act as trial advocate unless a conflict under MR 1.7 or 1.9 precludes it.
  • Cite: MR 3.7(b)

TF-0025 (OUT-6.4.3)

  • Statement: A lawyer who serves discovery requests with no legitimate basis, simply to burden the opponent, can violate MR 3.4(d) even while responding diligently to the other side's requests.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: MR 3.4(d) has two separate limbs: no baseless discovery requests, and reasonably diligent compliance with proper requests. Satisfying one doesn't excuse violating the other.
  • Cite: MR 3.4(d)

TF-0026 (OUT-6.4.4)

  • Statement: In closing argument, a lawyer may tell the jury that she personally saw the accident happen, as long as that is true.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: A lawyer may not put her own knowledge of disputed facts before the jury unless she testifies. Truth is not a defense.
  • Corrected statement: A lawyer may not assert her own knowledge of disputed facts in argument; if her knowledge matters, she must testify, and MR 3.7 then applies.
  • Cite: MR 3.4(e); MR 3.7

TF-0027 (OUT-6.7.1)

  • Statement: A lawyer who will testify only about the nature and value of the legal services rendered in the case may still act as trial advocate.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: Testimony limited to the nature and value of legal services in the case is an express exception to the advocate-witness bar.
  • Cite: MR 3.7(a)(2)

TF-0028 (OUT-6.7.1)

  • Statement: A lawyer who is likely to be a necessary witness may never act as trial advocate, even if her testimony concerns only a fact both sides agree on.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: Testimony relating to an uncontested issue is an exception to the advocate-witness bar.
  • Corrected statement: A necessary-witness lawyer may act as trial advocate if her testimony relates only to an uncontested issue, concerns the nature and value of legal services in the case, or disqualification would cause the client substantial hardship.
  • Cite: MR 3.7(a)(1)–(3)

TF-0029 (OUT-6.1.3)

  • Statement: Counsel for a respondent in a civil-contempt proceeding that could end in jail time may require the other side to prove every element, even with no affirmative defense to offer.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: MR 3.1's burden-of-proof protection extends beyond criminal cases to a respondent in any proceeding that could result in incarceration.
  • Cite: MR 3.1

TF-0030 (OUT-6.6.2)

  • Statement: A statement that falls within the trial-publicity safe harbor may include a client's confidential information, because the safe harbor overrides MR 1.6.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: The safe harbor only answers the publicity rule. Confidentiality duties, sealing orders and protective orders still apply.
  • Corrected statement: The safe harbor permits certain statements despite MR 3.6(a), but it does not authorize revealing confidential information or violating a sealing or protective order.
  • Cite: MR 3.6(b); MR 1.6

Scenario Walkthroughs

SW-0001 · The Alibi and the Shredder

Facts. Attorney Cruz defends Nolan, a store manager charged with embezzling from his employer. Before trial, Nolan admits to Cruz that he took the money and says his cousin will testify that Nolan was at a family wedding on the key date. Cruz has seen photos showing the wedding was a week earlier. Separately, Nolan tells Cruz that last night he shredded a box of ledgers reflecting the charged transactions "so the prosecutors never see them"; the prosecution hasn't requested them yet. The jurisdiction makes destroying evidence to impede a pending prosecution a crime. During trial, the prosecutor tells the press that Nolan "has stolen from every employer he ever had." Cruz knows from the court file that Nolan has no criminal record, and from Nolan's employment file that this store is the only employer Nolan has ever had.

Prompt. Identify the issues and how Cruz should proceed.

Issues.

  1. May Cruz defend Nolan at trial, and may he call the cousin?
  2. What must Cruz do about the ledgers?
  3. May Cruz respond to the prosecutor's statement?

Rules.

  • A criminal defense lawyer may require the prosecution to prove every element. (MR 3.1; cmt. [3])
  • A lawyer may not offer evidence she knows is false and must take reasonable remedial measures if material evidence she offered turns out to be false. (MR 3.3(a)(3); cmts. [6]–[10])
  • A lawyer may not counsel or assist unlawful destruction of material with potential evidentiary value. A lawyer who knows that a person has engaged in criminal conduct related to the proceeding must take reasonable remedial measures, including disclosure to the tribunal if necessary, and these duties apply notwithstanding MR 1.6. (MR 3.4(a); MR 3.3(b)–(c))
  • A lawyer may make a statement a reasonable lawyer would believe necessary to protect a client from recent substantially prejudicial publicity not started by the lawyer or client, limited to what is needed. (MR 3.6(c))

Application.

  • Trial and the cousin. Cruz may plead not guilty and test the state's evidence. But he knows the alibi is false (Nolan's admission plus the photos), so he may not call the cousin or elicit the alibi. He should explain this to Nolan and remonstrate. If Nolan testifies falsely anyway, Cruz must take remedial measures up to disclosure.
  • The ledgers. On these facts Cruz knows Nolan deliberately destroyed records of the charged transactions to keep them from the prosecution — criminal conduct related to the proceeding, even though it is already complete. MR 3.3(b) makes reasonable remedial measures mandatory: Cruz should urge Nolan to preserve everything else and must not assist or advise further concealment. If nothing less will remedy the effect on the proceeding, Cruz must disclose to the court what is reasonably necessary, notwithstanding MR 1.6.
  • Publicity. The prosecutor's statement is prejudicial, and Cruz knows it is false (Nolan has had no other employer), and neither Cruz nor Nolan started it. Cruz may make a limited reply, for example that Nolan has no criminal record and is presumed innocent, but may not go further.

Conclusion. Cruz may defend but may not present the false alibi; he must not assist the destruction of evidence and must take reasonable remedial measures about the shredded ledgers, up to disclosure to the court; and he may make a limited reply to the prosecutor's statement.

Cites: MR 3.1; MR 3.3(a)(3), (b), (c); MR 3.4(a); MR 3.6(c) Related outline links: OUT-6.1.3 · OUT-6.3.3 · OUT-6.3.4 · OUT-6.3.5 · OUT-6.4.1 · OUT-6.6.3

SW-0002 · The Ex Parte Order and the Witness-Lawyer

Facts. Attorney Blair seeks an ex parte temporary restraining order to stop a former business partner from selling shared equipment. She knows the partner holds a written buy-out option that may let him buy the equipment, but she doesn't mention it. The judge grants the order. At the later hearing, a state appellate decision that binds the hearing court and squarely rejects Blair's legal theory is not cited by either side; Blair knows of it. Blair also personally witnessed the oral agreement at the heart of the dispute. Other than the two partners, who now give conflicting accounts, she is the only person who heard it. She plans to try the case and testify.

Prompt. Identify the issues and how Blair should proceed.

Issues.

  1. Did Blair meet her duty of candor when seeking the TRO?
  2. Must she disclose the appellate decision?
  3. May she try the case?

Rules.

  • In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer must disclose all material facts she knows that will enable an informed decision, including adverse ones. (MR 3.3(d))
  • A lawyer must disclose known, directly adverse controlling legal authority not disclosed by opposing counsel. (MR 3.3(a)(2))
  • A lawyer likely to be a necessary witness may not act as trial advocate unless an exception applies; another firm lawyer may try the case unless a conflict bars it. (MR 3.7(a)–(b))

Application.

  • The TRO. The buy-out option is a material fact bearing directly on whether the sale should be stopped. Omitting it violated MR 3.3(d). Blair should promptly correct the record.
  • The appellate decision. The decision binds the hearing court and is directly adverse, and opposing counsel hasn't cited it, so Blair must disclose it. She may argue it is distinguishable.
  • Trying the case. The oral agreement is the central contested issue, the only other witnesses are the interested partners whose accounts conflict, and Blair's is the only disinterested account. Her testimony is therefore likely necessary. None of the exceptions appears to apply: the issue is contested, it isn't about her fees, and nothing suggests substantial hardship. Another lawyer, possibly from her firm, should try the case. Before a colleague steps in, the firm must run an independent conflict analysis — for example, whether Blair's testimony could hurt the client or whether she has a personal stake (such as exposure over the TRO omission) — under MR 1.7 and, if a conflict exists, MR 1.10.

Conclusion. Blair violated the ex parte candor duty and should correct it; she must disclose the adverse controlling decision; and she should not act as trial advocate.

Cites: MR 3.3(a)(2), (d); MR 3.7(a)–(b); MR 1.7; MR 1.10 Related outline links: OUT-6.3.2 · OUT-6.3.6 · OUT-6.7.1 · OUT-6.7.2

Key terms

ID Term Outline Flashcard
KT-0001 Tribunal OUT-6.0 FC-0001
KT-0002 Frivolous OUT-6.1.1 FC-0002
KT-0003 Good-faith argument to change the law OUT-6.1.2 FC-0003
KT-0004 Dilatory tactics OUT-6.2.2 FC-0004
KT-0005 Controlling jurisdiction OUT-6.3.2 FC-0005
KT-0006 Directly adverse authority OUT-6.3.2 FC-0006
KT-0007 Reasonable remedial measures OUT-6.3.3 FC-0007
KT-0008 Knows (evidence is false) OUT-6.3.3 FC-0008
KT-0009 Narrative testimony OUT-6.3.4 FC-0009
KT-0010 Conclusion of the proceeding OUT-6.3.5 FC-0010
KT-0011 Ex parte proceeding OUT-6.3.6 FC-0011
KT-0012 Potential evidentiary value OUT-6.4.1 FC-0012
KT-0013 Open refusal OUT-6.4.3 FC-0013
KT-0014 Personal opinion at trial OUT-6.4.4 FC-0014
KT-0015 Ex parte communication OUT-6.5.2 FC-0015
KT-0016 Substantial likelihood of material prejudice OUT-6.6.1 FC-0016
KT-0017 Trial-publicity safe harbor OUT-6.6.2 FC-0017
KT-0018 Right of reply OUT-6.6.3 FC-0018
KT-0019 Necessary witness OUT-6.7.1 FC-0019
KT-0020 Substantial hardship OUT-6.7.1 FC-0020

Term markers: all 20 terms now carry {{term}} markers in the outline (v1.1).

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