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Legal Ethics Prep & Practice / Different Roles of the Lawyer FREE

Subject 8: Different Roles of the Lawyer

Free MPRE Study Material · NCBE weight: 4–10% · © 2026 PryvixLabs LLC. All rights reserved.

In this packet: Different Roles of the Lawyer Outline, 24 multiple-choice questions, 10 true/false statements, 22 flashcards, 2 scenario walkthroughs and 13 key terms.

Outlines1 outline
Multiple Choice24 questions
True/False10 statements
Flashcards22 cards
Walkthroughs2 walkthroughs
Key Terms13 terms

8. Different Roles of the Lawyer

8.0 The Framework: One Lawyer, Seven Hats

Rule: The Model Rules assume a default role — a lawyer advising and acting for one client — and then adjust the duties whenever the lawyer wears a different hat. This section collects the adjustments. In each one, ask two questions: who is the client? and which of the ordinary duties change?

The seven roles the exam tests, and the rule that governs each:

Role Rule Who is the client? What changes
Advisor MR 2.1 The client Advice must be candid and may go beyond the law
Evaluator MR 2.3 The client — the recipient is not Confidentiality and consent rules bend to let a third person rely on the work (S07)
Negotiator MR 4.1; 1.2(a); 1.4 The client Truthfulness to the other side; the client, not the lawyer, decides whether to settle (S07, S02)
Third-party neutral MR 2.4; 1.12 Nobody The neutral must say so, and later conflicts follow her
Prosecutor / government lawyer MR 3.8; 1.11; 1.13 The public, acting through the government Extra duties to the accused and to the truth
Advocate in a nonadjudicative proceeding MR 3.9 The client Some, not all, of the courtroom candor and fairness rules follow the lawyer into the hearing room
Organization's lawyer MR 1.13 The entity, not its people Duties run to the organization; a duty to escalate wrongdoing inside it

How the exam uses this section. Most questions here are "who is the client" questions in disguise. A mediator who starts giving one side legal advice, an in-house lawyer who thinks the CEO is the client, a prosecutor who treats the case as a contest to win — each has mistaken whom she serves. Identify the client first and the rest of the analysis usually falls out.

⚠ Exam trap: the Rules govern the lawyer in whatever role she occupies. A lawyer serving as a mediator is still a lawyer, still bound by MR 8.4, and still barred from misrepresenting facts (MR 4.1 where she represents someone; MR 8.4(c) always). "I wasn't acting as a lawyer" is rarely a defense.

Cite: MR 2.1; 2.3; 2.4; 3.8; 3.9; 1.13; Preamble [2]–[3]


8.1 Lawyer as Advisor (MR 2.1)

8.1.1 Independent judgment and candid advice

Rule: When advising a client, a lawyer must bring her own Independent professional judgment to bear and must give Candid advice — an honest assessment, including the parts the client does not want to hear.

Explanation:

  • Independence means the advice is the lawyer's own, not shaped by what a third party wants (a payor, a referral source, an employer) or by the lawyer's wish to keep the client happy. It is the same independence MR 1.7 and 5.4 protect from the conflicts side; here it is stated as a positive duty.
  • Candor means the lawyer says what she actually thinks the client's position is worth. Advice that is technically accurate but framed to avoid an unwelcome message falls short. (cmt. [1])
  • A lawyer may soften the delivery — tact and timing are within professional judgment — but may not soften the substance.

Example: A client wants to sue a former business partner and asks whether the case is strong. The lawyer thinks the claim is weak and the client's own conduct will look bad to a jury. Candor requires saying so, even though the client may take the matter elsewhere.

⚠ Exam trap: the answer choice that has the lawyer "supporting the client's chosen course" or "deferring to the client's assessment" describes a failure of MR 2.1, not compliance with MR 1.2(a). The client decides the objectives; the lawyer still owes an honest opinion about them.

8.1.2 Advice may go beyond the law

Rule: The lawyer's advice need not be confined to legal analysis. Where relevant to the client's situation, the lawyer may bring in moral, economic, social, political and other practical considerations — and sometimes should, because narrowly legal advice can mislead.

Explanation, organized by what the advice is for:

  1. Advice the client cannot use without the wider context. A legal answer ("you can enforce this clause") that ignores the business consequence ("and lose your largest customer") is incomplete as advice, even if complete as law. (cmt. [2])
  2. Advice that touches other disciplines. Where the matter turns on accounting, medicine, psychology or another field, the lawyer may recommend consulting a professional in that field. In a family matter, for instance, a referral to a counselor may serve the client better than a purely legal answer. (cmt. [4])
  3. Moral and ethical considerations. The lawyer may raise them. The client remains free to reject them. Raising a moral concern is permitted advice, not an attempt to take over the client's decision. (cmt. [2])

Not required: the lawyer is not obliged to volunteer moral or economic views in every matter. When the client asks for a strictly technical legal answer and is capable of evaluating the rest, a technical answer is appropriate. (cmt. [3])

Example: A client asks whether a proposed tax structure is legal. It is. The lawyer knows the structure will look aggressive to the client's lenders and may cost the client a credit line. The lawyer may — and in a full engagement ordinarily should — say so.

8.1.3 When advice must be offered without being asked

Rule: As a rule the lawyer advises when the client asks. But where the client proposes a course the lawyer knows is likely to bring substantial adverse legal consequences, the duty to keep the client reasonably informed may require the lawyer to speak up unprompted.

Explanation:

  • The trigger is the lawyer's knowledge that the client is heading for serious legal trouble. Ordinary business risk does not trigger it. (cmt. [5])
  • The source of the duty is MR 1.4 (communication), which MR 2.1 cmt. [5] invokes. The advisor rule itself does not impose a free-standing duty to volunteer.
  • A lawyer who limits the scope of the engagement under MR 1.2(c) limits this duty accordingly, but cannot use a limited scope to avoid warning about a disaster inside the scope.

⚠ Exam trap: "The client never asked" is a defense to a claim that the lawyer failed to give optional advice, not to a claim that she watched the client walk into a known legal catastrophe without a word.

8.1.4 What the advisor rule does not permit

Rule: Candid advice about a course of conduct is protected; helping the client carry out conduct the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent is not.

  • The line is MR 1.2(d), taught in S02: a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course and may help a client work out what the law allows, but may not counsel or assist conduct she knows is criminal or fraudulent.
  • Compare: MR 2.1 tells the lawyer to be honest with the client; MR 1.2(d) tells her not to become the client's instrument against others. An exam stem that has the lawyer explaining why a scheme is illegal describes MR 2.1 compliance; one that has her drafting the documents for it describes an MR 1.2(d) violation.

Cite: MR 2.1 and cmts. [1]–[5]; MR 1.2(c)–(d); MR 1.4; MR 5.4(c)


8.2 Lawyer as Evaluator (MR 2.3) — taught at S07 OUT-0009; summary only

Rule: A lawyer may prepare an Evaluation for a third person — an opinion letter, title opinion, or similar assessment meant for someone other than the client to rely on — if she reasonably believes the work is compatible with the rest of her relationship with the client.

The points this section adds to S07:

  • Who is the client: the client who asked for the evaluation. The recipient is not a client and does not become one by relying on the work (S07 TF-0020). The lawyer may still face civil liability to the recipient under other law — a separate question from discipline.
  • Consent trigger: where the lawyer knows or reasonably should know the evaluation will probably hurt the client's interests in a material way, she needs the client's informed consent before providing it. No writing is required by MR 2.3 itself.
  • Confidentiality: information relating to the evaluation stays protected by MR 1.6 except to the extent disclosure is authorized by the engagement.
  • Candor to the recipient: the evaluator owes the recipient truthfulness (MR 4.1 — no knowing misstatement of material fact or law) and, where the lawyer's examination was limited, the limits must be described so the reader is not misled about the scope of what was checked. (MR 2.3 cmt. [3]–[4])

⚠ Exam trap: confusing the evaluator (works for the client, product goes to a third person) with the third-party neutral (works for nobody, product goes to the disputing parties). The evaluator has a client and owes that client MR 1.6 and 1.7; the neutral has none.

Cite: MR 2.3 and cmts. [1]–[5]; MR 4.1; full treatment: S07 OUT-0009, TF-0019–0020


8.3 Lawyer as Negotiator (MR 4.1; 1.2(a); 1.4) — truthfulness taught at S07; summary and additions

Rule: A lawyer negotiating for a client must not knowingly misstate a material fact or the law to the other side, must keep the client informed of offers, and must leave the decision to settle to the client.

What each section carries, so nothing is taught twice:

  • Truthfulness (S07 OUT-0001): the knowing-misstatement rule and its Puffery carve-out — statements of a party's negotiating position, settlement floor, or the value it places on the subject matter are ordinarily bargaining posture, not statements of fact. Rooted in MR 4.1 cmt. [2].
  • The client decides (S02 OUT-2.2): whether to accept a settlement is the client's call under MR 1.2(a). A lawyer who settles without authority, or who lets an offer lapse without telling the client, breaches MR 1.2(a) and MR 1.4(a)(1) respectively.

What this section adds — three negotiation-specific points:

  1. Mediation is negotiation. The same truthfulness rule applies to statements a lawyer makes to a mediator in a private caucus as to statements made directly to the other side. A lawyer may keep her client's bottom line to herself; she may not invent facts. (ABA Formal Op. 06-439 (advisory))
  2. Silence and half-truths. MR 4.1 ordinarily imposes no duty to volunteer facts to the other side, but a partial statement framed to create a false impression is a misrepresentation (S07 OUT-0001 element 3), and failing to correct a misapprehension the lawyer created can be one too.
  3. Authority is a fact. A lawyer who says "my client has authorized me to accept $50,000" when the client has not has misstated a material fact. Statements about one's own authority are not puffery.

Example: In a caucus, a mediator asks whether the plaintiff has any other witnesses to the accident. The plaintiff's lawyer knows of one whose account is unhelpful and says "no." That is a knowing false statement of material fact to a third person, whatever the mediation confidentiality rules say about admissibility later.

⚠ Exam trap: "Everyone bluffs in negotiation" is true of settlement positions and false of facts. The exam separates the two by asking about a specific assertion — check whether it is a position (protected) or a fact (not).

Cite: MR 4.1 and cmt. [2]; MR 1.2(a); MR 1.4(a)(1) and cmt. [2]; MR 8.4(c); ABA Formal Op. 06-439 (2006); full treatment: S07 OUT-0001–0002; S02 OUT-2.2


8.4 Lawyer as Third-Party Neutral (MR 2.4; MR 1.12)

8.4.1 The role, and the one rule it imposes

Rule: A lawyer serves as a Third-party neutral when she helps two or more people who are not her clients resolve a dispute between them — as an arbitrator, a mediator, or in any similar capacity. She represents none of them, and MR 2.4 requires her to make sure they know it.

Explanation, organized around what the neutral must do:

  1. Tell unrepresented parties she is not their lawyer. This is an affirmative duty, owed to every party who has no counsel of their own. (MR 2.4(b))
  2. Explain the difference when someone does not get it. If it is clear to the neutral — or ought to be — that a party has the wrong idea about her role — for instance, treats her as "our lawyer" or expects her to protect his interests — she must explain how a neutral's role differs from a lawyer's. The explanation must be enough for that person to understand; a sophisticated party may need less, an unsophisticated one more. (MR 2.4(b); cmt. [3])
  3. Everything else comes from outside the Rules. The conduct of arbitrators and mediators is mainly governed by court rules, statutes and codes of conduct for neutrals. MR 2.4 does not replace those; it adds the disclosure duty because a lawyer-neutral creates a special risk of confusion. (cmt. [2])

Why the rule exists: people expect a lawyer to be on someone's side. A lawyer-mediator who lets one party believe she is looking out for him has created exactly the misunderstanding MR 4.3 addresses for unrepresented persons in ordinary matters — MR 2.4 is that idea applied to the neutral role. (cmt. [3])

Example: A lawyer mediates a dispute between a small landlord and a tenant, neither with counsel. The tenant asks, "So what should I do here?" The mediator must not give him legal advice as his lawyer would, and if the question shows he thinks she is on his side, she must explain that she is not.

⚠ Exam trap: the neutral who "answers a legal question for one party to move things along" has not merely been helpful. If the answer amounts to advice and the party thinks she is his lawyer, she has breached MR 2.4(b) — and may have created a client-lawyer relationship by conduct.

8.4.2 What the neutral does not owe

Rule: Because the parties are not clients, the neutral does not owe them the client duties — no duty of loyalty under MR 1.7, no confidentiality under MR 1.6 (confidentiality, if any, comes from the mediation rules or agreement), no duty of communication under MR 1.4.

  • She does still owe the general duties every lawyer owes everyone: no dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation (MR 8.4(c)); no conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice (MR 8.4(d)).
  • A lawyer-neutral who also happens to represent one of the parties in another matter has a conflict problem under MR 1.7 in that representation, not an MR 2.4 problem.

8.4.3 Afterwards: the neutral's conflict follows her (MR 1.12 — taught at S04)

Rule: A lawyer who took part personally and substantially in a matter as a neutral may not later represent anyone in connection with that same matter unless every party gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.

The three points to carry from S04:

  • Personal and substantial participation is the trigger. Presiding over the matter is enough; merely being on a panel that never reached it is not.
  • Consent must come from all parties to the earlier proceeding, in the exact formula "informed consent, confirmed in writing."
  • Screening saves the firm. If the former neutral is timely screened from the matter and gets no part of its fee, and the parties and any appropriate tribunal are given written notice, the firm may take the representation. (MR 1.12(c))
  • A party-appointed arbitrator on a multi-member panel is not treated as a neutral for this purpose and may later represent the party that appointed her. (MR 1.12(d))

⚠ Exam trap: the mediator who, after the mediation fails, agrees to represent one side in the ensuing lawsuit. That is the paradigm MR 1.12 violation, and consent from the client she now represents is not enough — the other party must consent too.

Cite: MR 2.4 and cmts. [1]–[5]; MR 1.12(a), (c), (d); MR 4.3; MR 8.4(c)–(d); full treatment of 1.12: S04


8.5 Prosecutors and Other Government Lawyers (MR 3.8; 1.11; 1.13)

8.5.1 The prosecutor is a minister of justice, not an advocate for a conviction

Rule: A Prosecutor carries every duty an advocate carries under MR 3.1–3.7, and on top of them a set of duties owed to the accused and to the accuracy of the outcome. Those extra duties exist because the prosecutor's client — the public — is served by a just result, not by a win.

Map of the extra duties, organized by when they arise:

Stage Duty Rule
Charging No charge the prosecutor knows lacks probable cause 3.8(a)
Early in the case Reasonable efforts to see the accused is told of the right to counsel and how to get one, and given a reasonable chance to do so 3.8(b)
Dealing with an accused who has no lawyer No asking him to give up significant pretrial protections 3.8(c)
Discovery and sentencing Timely disclosure of what undercuts guilt or lessens the offense; at sentencing, of unprivileged mitigating information 3.8(d)
Investigation Limits on subpoenaing a lawyer for evidence about a client 3.8(e)
Publicity No comments likely to heighten public condemnation of the accused; control over investigators' statements 3.8(f)
After conviction Duties when new evidence suggests innocence; duty to remedy a conviction known to be wrong 3.8(g)–(h)

(cmt. [1] for the "minister of justice" framing)

8.5.2 Charging and the unrepresented accused — 3.8(a)–(c)

Rule: A prosecutor may not pursue a charge she knows lacks Probable cause; must make reasonable efforts to see that an accused learns of the right to counsel and has a fair chance to obtain it; and may not press an accused who has no lawyer to surrender significant pretrial protections.

Explanation:

  • Probable cause is the same standard the criminal law uses. The rule bites on a prosecutor's knowledge — a charge that later proves weak is not a violation if the prosecutor did not know it lacked probable cause when she pursued it.
  • "Important pretrial rights" — the rule's own example is the right to a preliminary hearing. The prohibition is on the prosecutor seeking the waiver from a person with no lawyer; it is not a bar on an accused validly waiving rights.
  • Exception for the pro se accused. 3.8(c) does not reach an accused who, with the court's approval, is representing himself. Such a person may negotiate directly with the prosecutor. (cmt. [2])
  • Nothing here bars plea negotiations with a represented accused, or with an approved pro se defendant.

Example: A prosecutor tells an arrested man, who has no lawyer and has not been to court, that if he signs a form giving up his preliminary hearing she will "see what she can do" about the charges. That is asking an accused with no lawyer to give up a significant pretrial protection — a 3.8(c) violation regardless of whether the man signs.

8.5.3 The lawyer-subpoena rule — 3.8(e)

Rule: Before a prosecutor calls a lawyer before a grand jury, or into any other criminal case, to testify about someone the lawyer represents or once represented, she must be able to answer three questions the right way, on a reasonable belief. Is it protected? No privilege covers what she wants. Do I truly need it? The investigation or prosecution now under way cannot succeed without it. Can I get it somewhere else? No workable alternative source exists.

  • All three answers must come out the right way; the rule is cumulative.
  • The purpose is to protect the client-lawyer relationship from being turned into a source of evidence against the client. (cmt. [4])
  • Some jurisdictions require prior judicial approval as well; the Model Rule does not. State note: check the local version.

8.5.4 Disclosure to the defense — 3.8(d)

Rule: A prosecutor must disclose to the defense, in time for it to be useful, all evidence or information she knows of that tends to show the accused is not guilty or that lessens the offense. At sentencing, she must disclose to the defense and to the court all unprivileged information she knows of that mitigates the sentence. A court's protective order can relieve her of either duty.

Explanation — what this rule is and is not:

  1. It is a rule of professional conduct, not a restatement of constitutional law. The constitutional Brady duty asks whether withheld evidence was material — whether it would probably have changed the outcome. MR 3.8(d) contains no materiality element. It asks whether the prosecutor knows of information that tends to undercut guilt or lessen the offense. That is a broader duty, and it is the one the MPRE tests.
  2. "Timely" means early enough to be used. Disclosure on the eve of trial, or after a plea, ordinarily is not timely. (ABA Formal Op. 09-454 (advisory))
  3. Knowledge is the trigger. The rule reaches what the prosecutor knows; it is not a duty to search for exculpatory material that no one has told her about. Deliberately staying ignorant is not a way out — knowledge can be inferred from the circumstances. (MR 1.0(f))
  4. Under ABA Formal Op. 09-454 (advisory), the accused cannot be made to waive it as a condition of a plea. The Opinion reasons that the duty runs to the integrity of the process, not only to the defendant; the text of 3.8(d) itself does not address plea waivers. (Formal Op. 09-454 (advisory))
  5. The only relief is a court's protective order — for instance, to protect a witness. The prosecutor cannot relieve herself.

Update note (August 2026). The ABA amended MR 3.8 cmt. [3] (Res. 101E, adopted Aug 3–4, 2026), drawing on Formal Op. 09-454 (2009). The amended comment says the 3.8(d) duty calls for disclosure as soon as reasonably practicable, early enough for the defense to use the material, including in deciding whether to plead guilty, and that the ethics duty overlaps with, but is not the same as, the constitutional and other legal duties to disclose. The no-materiality point comes from Formal Op. 09-454, which is advisory guidance, not binding law: 3.8(d) has no after-the-fact materiality test. The black-letter text of 3.8(d) did not change. Under NCBE's testing lag the amended comment is not expected to be tested before about August 2027; the point itself — that 3.8(d) is broader than Brady — was already the ABA position and is fair game now.

Example: A prosecutor learns from a police report that a second eyewitness described the robber as much taller than the defendant. She thinks the discrepancy is minor and the case strong. She must disclose it anyway: it tends to undercut guilt, and whether it is material is not her call under 3.8(d).

⚠ Exam trap: an answer choice that has the prosecutor withholding evidence "because it would not have changed the outcome" states the Brady test and misapplies it to discipline. Under 3.8(d) that is the wrong question.

8.5.5 Publicity — 3.8(f)

Rule: Beyond the trial-publicity rule that binds every lawyer (MR 3.6, S06), a prosecutor must refrain from public comments that are substantially likely to heighten public condemnation of the accused, except for statements needed to tell the public what the prosecutor has done and why, serving a legitimate law-enforcement purpose. She must also take reasonable care to keep the investigators, police and staff working with her from saying what she could not say herself.

  • The second sentence is the part students miss: the prosecutor answers for the extrajudicial statements of the people assisting her, to the extent reasonable care could have prevented them. (cmt. [5])
  • The MR 3.6(b) safe harbor and the right of reply (S06 OUT-6.6) apply to prosecutors too; 3.8(f) narrows the space around them.

8.5.6 After conviction — 3.8(g) and (h)

Rule: After a conviction, the prosecutor's duties rise in two tiers, set by how strong the proof of innocence is. Tier 1 — innocence has become reasonably likely. When fresh evidence comes to her that is credible and material and makes it reasonably likely the convicted person is innocent, she must promptly bring it to an appropriate court or authority; and if her own jurisdiction obtained the conviction, she must also promptly tell the defendant (unless a court allows delay) and investigate, or cause an investigation. Tier 2 — innocence is shown clearly and convincingly. Once she knows the proof that someone convicted in her jurisdiction is innocent meets the clear-and-convincing standard, she must seek to remedy the conviction.

Explanation — two different thresholds, two different duties: | Threshold | Duty | |---|---| | Fresh evidence, credible and material, making innocence reasonably likely | Disclose; and if it is your jurisdiction's conviction, disclose to the defendant and investigate | | Innocence shown by clear and convincing proof; your jurisdiction | Seek to remedy the conviction |

  • Note that this rule does use "material" — unlike 3.8(d). The word appears where the ABA meant it to.
  • "Appropriate court or authority" for a conviction in another jurisdiction is typically the chief prosecutor there. (cmt. [7])
  • Good-faith judgment protects the prosecutor. A prosecutor who reasonably concludes the evidence does not meet these thresholds does not violate the rule even if she turns out to be wrong. (cmt. [9])

Example: Two years after a conviction, DNA testing ordered in an unrelated case excludes the convicted man as the source of biological material at the scene. The prosecutor in the convicting office knows this. She must disclose it to the court and to the defendant and must reopen the investigation; if the evidence rises to clear and convincing proof of innocence, she must seek to set the conviction aside.

8.5.7 Other government lawyers

Rule: A lawyer for a government body represents the body, not the officials in it, and is subject to the ordinary Rules plus the special conflict rules for movement between government and private practice.

  • Who is the client: the governmental organization, through its authorized constituents — MR 1.13 applies to government lawyers, with the added complication that the "highest authority" may be defined by statute or by the structure of government. (MR 1.13 cmt. [9])
  • Public authority to act. A government lawyer may have statutory authority to take decisions a private lawyer would leave to the client — for example, whether to settle. The Rules do not displace that authority. (Scope [18])
  • Revolving door: MR 1.11 governs a lawyer who moves from government to private practice or the reverse, and the "confidential government information" rule. Taught in full in S04.
  • Government lawyers appearing before agencies and legislatures are bound by MR 3.9 like anyone else (8.6).

Cite: MR 3.8(a)–(h) and cmts. [1]–[9]; MR 1.0(f); MR 3.6; MR 1.11; MR 1.13 cmt. [9]; Scope [18]; ABA Formal Op. 09-454 (2009) (advisory); Res. 101E (adopted Aug 2026)


8.6 Lawyer Appearing in a Nonadjudicative Proceeding (MR 3.9)

8.6.1 What the rule covers

Rule: A lawyer who represents a client before a legislature or an administrative agency in a Nonadjudicative proceeding — a hearing on a proposed bill or regulation, a rule-making, a policy inquiry — must make clear that she is there for a client, and must obey the core candor, fairness and decorum rules that govern lawyers before tribunals.

Explanation:

  • Why a separate rule: a legislative or rule-making hearing is not a "tribunal" under MR 1.0(m), because no neutral official hears evidence and issues a binding ruling on a particular party's rights (S06 OUT-6.0). So the MR 3.3–3.5 duties would not apply of their own force. MR 3.9 imports the ones that matter. (cmt. [1])
  • Which duties travel: the candor duties in MR 3.3(a)–(c) (no false statements, no false evidence, correction, disclosure of adverse controlling authority, duration), the fairness duties in MR 3.4(a)–(c) (no obstruction of evidence, no falsifying it, no knowing disobedience of the body's rules), and the whole of MR 3.5 (impartiality and decorum — no improper influence, no ex parte contact where forbidden, no disruption).
  • Which do not: MR 3.4(d)–(f) (discovery abuse, trial-stage conduct, asking third persons not to talk) and MR 3.6 and 3.7 are not imported. The rule is a targeted list, not a wholesale application.
  • The disclosure duty is the distinctive part. A lawyer testifying before a city council about a zoning change must say she appears for the developer, not as a concerned citizen. Failing to do so is the classic 3.9 violation. (cmt. [2])

8.6.2 What the rule does not cover

Rule: MR 3.9 is about appearing for a client in a proceeding. It does not apply to a lawyer negotiating or transacting with a government agency on a client's behalf, applying for a license or other privilege, or handling the client's routine compliance filings.

  • Those interactions are governed by the third-person rules — MR 4.1 (truthfulness), 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 — and by MR 8.4. (cmt. [3])
  • The exam tests this boundary directly: a lawyer filling in a client's tax return, or negotiating a permit condition with an agency official, is not "appearing in a nonadjudicative proceeding."

Example: A lawyer speaks at a public hearing of a state environmental board on a proposed emissions rule, on behalf of a manufacturers' association that pays her. She must say she speaks for the association. She may not knowingly misstate the science, and she may not send the board members a private memo the other participants do not see if the board's rules forbid ex parte contact. She is not, however, required to volunteer the association's internal cost data.

⚠ Exam trap: two wrong turns. (1) Assuming that because the hearing is "not a tribunal," none of the candor rules apply. (2) Assuming that because the lawyer is dealing with a government body, MR 3.9 applies to every interaction — it applies to appearances in proceedings, not to negotiations or applications.

Cite: MR 3.9 and cmts. [1]–[3]; MR 1.0(m); MR 3.3(a)–(c); MR 3.4(a)–(c); MR 3.5; MR 4.1–4.4


8.7 Lawyer Representing an Organization (MR 1.13)

8.7.1 The entity is the client

Rule: A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the Organization as client — the entity itself, acting through the people authorized to act for it. The officers, directors, employees, shareholders and members are each a Constituent, not a client.

Explanation:

  • This is the single most tested idea in the section. An in-house lawyer's client is the corporation, not the CEO who hired her; outside counsel to a partnership represents the partnership, not the managing partner; a lawyer for an unincorporated association represents the association. (cmt. [1])
  • Constituents speak for the client when acting within their authority; the lawyer takes instructions from them in that capacity. But their personal interests are not the client's interests, and when the two diverge the lawyer's loyalty runs to the entity. (cmts. [2]–[3])
  • Consequences that follow: the privilege belongs to the organization, not the constituent (S03 OUT-3.1.2, Upjohn); the constituent is not entitled to the lawyer's confidentiality as against the organization; and the organization, through its authorized decision-makers, can waive privilege over a constituent's objection.

Example: The general counsel of a company is told by its chief financial officer, "as your client, I need you to keep this between us." The CFO is mistaken: the company is the client, and information the CFO gives the general counsel about company business may be shared with the board.

⚠ Exam trap: the constituent who has dealt with the lawyer for years and calls her "my lawyer." Familiarity does not create a client-lawyer relationship. Whether one exists is a question of what the lawyer agreed to and led the constituent reasonably to believe — which is why 1.13(f) requires the lawyer to clarify her role when interests diverge (8.7.4).

8.7.2 Wrongdoing inside the organization: the duty to escalate — 1.13(b)

Rule: An organization's lawyer who finds insider misconduct that threatens the organization must deal with it inside the organization. The duty switches on when she knows that an officer, employee or other insider — through what he is doing, plans to do, or will not do, on business her work touches — is either wronging the organization itself or breaking a law in a way that could fairly be pinned on the organization, and serious harm to the organization is the probable result. Her response must be whatever reasonably serves the organization; ordinarily that means taking the matter up the chain of authority, all the way to the top if the situation warrants it.

Explanation, organized as the three questions the lawyer must answer:

1. Is the trigger met? Four questions, and every answer must be yes:

  • Do I actually know? Actual knowledge, which may be inferred from circumstances; suspicion is not enough (MR 1.0(f)).
  • Is an insider behind it, on business my work touches? Something a constituent is doing, plans to do, or refuses to do.
  • Whom does it wrong? Either the organization itself (a fiduciary breach, a theft from it), or outsiders through a legal breach that could fairly be attributed to the organization (a regulatory violation committed in running its business).
  • Is serious harm to the organization probable? The substantial injury must be likely, and it must land on the organization. Conduct that harms only a third party, with no likely injury to the organization and no imputation to it, does not trigger 1.13(b) — though it may trigger other rules (MR 1.2(d), 1.16, 4.1). (cmt. [3])

2. What response does the organization need? Whatever reasonably serves it — and the lawyer has judgment here. She weighs the seriousness of the violation, its consequences, who is responsible and what they intend, the organization's own policies, and any other relevant consideration. Measures that minimize disruption and the risk of revealing confidences to outsiders are preferred. Asking for reconsideration, or advising that a separate legal opinion be sought, are examples. (cmt. [4])

3. Must she go up the ladder? Yes, unless she reasonably concludes that going higher would do the organization no good. The default is Up-the-ladder reporting: take the matter to someone senior to the people involved, and if warranted, to the Highest authority that can act for it — ordinarily the board of directors or an equivalent body, as applicable law determines. The "unless" clause is a narrow escape for the case where escalation would plainly serve no purpose, not a general license to stay quiet. (1.13(b); cmt. [5])

Example: In-house counsel learns that the head of sales has been paying kickbacks to a customer's purchasing manager to win contracts. That is a violation of law (commercial bribery) that would be imputed to the company and could cost it the customer, fines and reputation — substantial injury. Counsel must raise it with the sales head's superior; if the response is inadequate, with the CEO; if still inadequate, with the board.

⚠ Exam trap: the lawyer who resigns quietly instead of escalating. Withdrawal does not satisfy 1.13(b); the duty is to act in the organization's interest, and leaving without telling anyone protects no one but the lawyer. See 8.7.3 for what withdrawal requires.

8.7.3 If escalation fails, and if the lawyer is pushed out — 1.13(c)–(e)

Rule: Where the highest authority refuses to address a clear violation of law that is reasonably certain to cause substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer may reveal information outside the organization (Reporting out), but only as much as she reasonably judges is needed to head off that injury — even information MR 1.6 would otherwise protect. And a lawyer who reasonably believes she has been fired for doing her duty under (b) or (c), or who withdraws in circumstances that call for such action, must take steps to make sure the highest authority learns of the discharge or withdrawal.

What S03 already teaches (OUT-3.3.1 route 5; 3.4.3): the reporting-out permission in 1.13(c), its conditions (highest authority has failed to act; clear violation of law; reasonably certain substantial injury; disclosure limited to what is necessary), and the 1.13(d) carve-out — no reporting out of information learned while investigating an alleged violation or defending the organization or a constituent against a claim arising from one.

What this section adds — 1.13(e):

  • The trigger is the lawyer's reasonable belief that she was discharged for her (b) or (c) conduct, or her own withdrawal in circumstances that require or permit such conduct.
  • The duty is procedural: the lawyer must take whatever steps she reasonably judges will get word of the discharge or withdrawal to the organization's highest authority. It does not require the lawyer to reveal the underlying confidences to outsiders.
  • Its purpose is to stop a wrongdoing constituent from burying the problem by removing the lawyer who found it. (cmt. [8])

⚠ Exam trap: 1.13(c) is permissive ("may reveal") and 1.13(b) and (e) are mandatory ("shall proceed"). An answer that has the lawyer "required to report the violation to the authorities" under 1.13 overstates (c).

8.7.4 Dealing with constituents whose interests diverge — 1.13(f) and (g)

Rule: When a lawyer for an organization deals with a director, officer, employee or other constituent, and knows or reasonably should know that the organization's interests are adverse to that person's, she must explain that the organization — not the individual — is her client. She may represent a constituent as well as the organization, but only within MR 1.7, and any consent the organization must give comes from an appropriate official other than the person being represented, or from the shareholders.

Explanation:

  • The warning (1.13(f)). This is the Upjohn or corporate-Miranda warning in its disciplinary form (S03 OUT-3.4.3). The trigger is knowledge, actual or constructive, of adversity. When it applies, the lawyer should make clear that she cannot represent the constituent, that the conversation may not be privileged as to the constituent, and that the constituent may want his own lawyer. (cmt. [10])
  • Dual representation (1.13(g)). Representing both the entity and one of its people is permitted where MR 1.7 permits it. The extra rule is about who consents for the entity: not the constituent being represented, but a different appropriate official — or the shareholders. This prevents the represented insider from consenting on the organization's behalf to a conflict that benefits him. (cmt. [12])
  • Derivative suits. When shareholders sue derivatively on the corporation's behalf, the corporation's regular lawyer ordinarily may defend the corporation and its directors together — but where the claim is that the directors themselves committed serious wrongdoing, a conflict may exist that requires separate counsel. (cmts. [13]–[14])

Example: During an internal investigation, the company's lawyer interviews a regional manager suspected of falsifying expense reports. Before the substantive questions she must tell him that she represents the company, that the company may use what he says, and that he may wish to consult his own lawyer.

⚠ Exam trap: an answer choice that has the CEO "consenting on behalf of the corporation" to the lawyer's joint representation of the corporation and the CEO. Under 1.13(g) that consent must come from someone else.

8.7.5 The organization lawyer's other rules do not switch off

Rule: Nothing in MR 1.13 relieves the lawyer of any other Rule. In particular the lawyer may not counsel or assist the organization's own crime or fraud (MR 1.2(d)), must withdraw where MR 1.16(a) requires, and must keep the organization informed under MR 1.4 — through the constituents entitled to receive that information.

  • 1.13 and 1.6 fit together, not against each other. 1.13(b) escalation happens inside the client and involves no disclosure of client confidences at all. Only 1.13(c) reaches outside, and it is drafted as an addition to the MR 1.6(b) exceptions. (cmt. [6])
  • 1.13 and 1.16. If the organization, through its highest authority, insists on a course that requires the lawyer's assistance in a crime or fraud, the lawyer must withdraw (MR 1.16(a)(1)), and 1.13(e) then requires that the highest authority be told.

Cite: MR 1.13(a)–(g) and cmts. [1]–[14]; MR 1.0(f); MR 1.2(d); MR 1.4; MR 1.6(b); MR 1.7; MR 1.16(a); cross-references: S03 OUT-3.1.2, 3.3.1, 3.4.3 (privilege, reporting out, Upjohn)


8.8 Must-Know Checklist (Section 8)

  1. Advisor: independent judgment, candid advice; may include non-legal considerations; must warn unprompted only when the client is heading into known substantial adverse legal consequences.
  2. Evaluator: the client is the person who ordered the evaluation; the recipient is not a client and does not become one by relying (S07).
  3. Negotiator: no knowing misstatement of material fact or law; settlement positions are puffery, facts and one's own authority are not; caucused mediation is negotiation (Op. 06-439).
  4. Third-party neutral: represents nobody; must tell unrepresented parties so; must explain the difference when a party misunderstands; afterwards, MR 1.12 bars representing anyone in the same matter without every party's informed consent, confirmed in writing.
  5. Prosecutor, before trial: no charge known to lack probable cause; reasonable efforts to see the accused gets counsel; no asking an accused without counsel to give up significant pretrial protections (not the approved pro se defendant).
  6. Prosecutor, disclosure: everything she knows of that tends to undercut guilt or lessen the offense, in time to be used; no materiality test — broader than Brady; only a protective order relieves it. (No-materiality point: Formal Op. 09-454, advisory. Cmt. [3] amended Aug 2026 by Res. 101E on timing and the gap from constitutional duties; testable from about Aug 2027.)
  7. Prosecutor, lawyer subpoenas: all three of not privileged, essential, and no feasible alternative.
  8. Prosecutor, publicity: no comments likely to heighten condemnation beyond what informs the public of the prosecutor's action; responsible for restraining investigators and staff.
  9. Prosecutor, after conviction: fresh, credible, material evidence that makes innocence reasonably likely — disclose, and in your own jurisdiction disclose to the defendant and investigate; innocence in your jurisdiction shown clearly and convincingly — seek to remedy the conviction. Good-faith judgment protects.
  10. Nonadjudicative proceeding: disclose the representative capacity; MR 3.3(a)–(c), 3.4(a)–(c) and 3.5 apply; negotiations, license applications and compliance filings are not covered — MR 4.1–4.4 govern those.
  11. Organization: the entity is the client; constituents are not.
  12. Up the ladder: I know + an insider is behind it + it wrongs the entity or exposes it to blame for a legal breach + serious harm to the entity is probable → do what serves the entity, ordinarily by escalating to the highest authority. Mandatory, unless the lawyer reasonably concludes escalation would do the entity no good.
  13. Reporting out is permissive (1.13(c)), limited to what is necessary, and unavailable for information from an investigation or defense (1.13(d)). Fired for doing (b) or (c)? Make sure the highest authority knows (1.13(e)).
  14. Constituent warnings: when interests are adverse, tell the constituent who the client is. Joint representation needs 1.7 and the entity's consent from someone other than the represented insider.

8.9 Common Traps

  • Treating the CEO, the general partner, or the board chair as the client. The entity is the client — always start there.
  • Reading 1.13(c) as a duty to report out. It is a permission, and it is narrow.
  • Thinking withdrawal satisfies 1.13(b). Escalation is the duty; quitting is not a substitute.
  • Applying the Brady materiality test to MR 3.8(d). There is no materiality element in the Rule.
  • Assuming 3.8(c) bars any dealings with an unrepresented accused. It bars asking him to give up significant pretrial protections; and an approved pro se defendant is outside it.
  • Letting a lawyer-mediator "just answer a quick legal question" for one party. That is the 2.4(b) problem in miniature.
  • Assuming a legislative hearing carries no candor duties because it is not a tribunal. MR 3.9 imports the ones that matter.
  • Assuming MR 3.9 governs a permit negotiation with an agency. It does not; MR 4.1–4.4 do.
  • Forgetting that a party-appointed arbitrator on a panel is not treated as a neutral under MR 1.12(d).
  • Confusing the evaluator (has a client) with the neutral (has none).

Part B: Items

Flashcards

Format: Front · Definition · Explanation · Example · Exam trap · Cite · Outline · Related. Term cards first (13), then concept cards (9).

FC-0001 (term card · OUT-8.1.1)

  • Front: Independent professional judgment
  • Definition: The lawyer's own assessment of the client's situation, formed without deference to what a third party, an employer, or the client's hopes would prefer the answer to be.
  • Explanation: MR 2.1 states it as a positive duty in advising; MR 1.7, 1.8(f) and 5.4(c) protect it from the conflicts side. Advice shaped to please a payor or to keep a client is not independent.
  • Example: An insurer that pays defense counsel's fees wants the insured to accept a settlement. Counsel's advice to the insured must reflect counsel's own judgment of the insured's interests.
  • Exam trap: "The client is happier with this advice" is never a reason to give it.
  • Cite: MR 2.1; MR 1.8(f); MR 5.4(c) · Outline: OUT-8.1.1 · Related: FC-0002

FC-0002 (term card · OUT-8.1.1)

  • Front: Candid advice
  • Definition: An honest statement of what the lawyer actually thinks the client's position, prospects or proposed course are worth, including the unwelcome parts.
  • Explanation: MR 2.1 requires candor in substance; delivery may be tactful. Technically accurate advice framed to avoid the bad news does not qualify.
  • Example: Told the client's claim is weak and his own conduct will look bad to a jury, the lawyer says so plainly rather than "there are some challenges."
  • Exam trap: Supporting the client's chosen course without an honest assessment is an MR 2.1 failure, not MR 1.2(a) deference.
  • Cite: MR 2.1; cmt. [1] · Outline: OUT-8.1.1 · Related: FC-0001, FC-0014

FC-0003 (term card · OUT-8.2)

  • Front: Evaluation for a third person
  • Definition: A lawyer's assessment of a client's affairs — an opinion letter, title opinion, or similar — prepared at the client's request for someone other than the client to rely on.
  • Explanation: Permitted where the lawyer reasonably believes it is compatible with the rest of the client relationship. The recipient is not a client. Consent is required where the lawyer knows or should know the evaluation will likely hurt the client materially.
  • Example: A borrower's lawyer gives the lender an opinion that the borrower's contracts are enforceable.
  • Exam trap: Confusing the evaluator, who has a client, with the third-party neutral, who has none.
  • Cite: MR 2.3 · Outline: OUT-8.2; S07 OUT-0009 · Related: FC-0005

FC-0004 (term card · OUT-8.3)

  • Front: Puffery
  • Definition: A statement of negotiating position — a party's settlement floor, the value it places on the deal, or its willingness to walk away — which both sides understand as posture rather than as a report of fact.
  • Explanation: MR 4.1 cmt. [2] treats such statements as ordinarily not statements of material fact. Facts, and statements about the lawyer's own authority, are outside the carve-out.
  • Example: "My client won't take a penny under $200,000" when the client would happily take $120,000.
  • Exam trap: "Our expert has confirmed the defect" is a fact, not puffery.
  • Cite: MR 4.1(a); cmt. [2] · Outline: OUT-8.3; S07 OUT-0001 · Related: FC-0015

FC-0005 (term card · OUT-8.4.1)

  • Front: Third-party neutral
  • Definition: A lawyer who helps two or more people who are not her clients resolve a dispute between them — as arbitrator, mediator, or in a similar role.
  • Explanation: She represents none of the parties. MR 2.4 requires her to tell unrepresented parties so and to explain the difference from a lawyer's role when a party misunderstands. Conduct is otherwise governed mainly by court rules and neutrals' codes.
  • Example: A lawyer mediating a landlord-tenant dispute.
  • Exam trap: Giving one party legal advice "to move things along."
  • Cite: MR 2.4(a)–(b) · Outline: OUT-8.4.1 · Related: FC-0003, FC-0016

FC-0006 (term card · OUT-8.5.1)

  • Front: Prosecutor
  • Definition: A lawyer who represents the government in a criminal matter and, on top of an advocate's duties, owes the accused and the accuracy of the outcome the special duties in MR 3.8.
  • Explanation: The framing is that of a minister of justice: the client — the public — is served by a just result, not a conviction. The extra duties run from charging through post-conviction.
  • Example: An assistant district attorney handling a robbery case.
  • Exam trap: Treating the case as a contest to be won.
  • Cite: MR 3.8; cmt. [1] · Outline: OUT-8.5.1 · Related: FC-0007, FC-0017–0019

FC-0007 (term card · OUT-8.5.2)

  • Front: Probable cause
  • Definition: The criminal-law standard for bringing a charge; a prosecutor may not pursue a charge she knows falls short of it.
  • Explanation: MR 3.8(a) is keyed to the prosecutor's knowledge at the time she pursues the charge, not to how the case later looks.
  • Example: A prosecutor who knows the only witness has recanted may not go forward on that witness alone.
  • Exam trap: A charge that later proves weak is not a violation if the prosecutor did not know it lacked probable cause.
  • Cite: MR 3.8(a) · Outline: OUT-8.5.2 · Related: FC-0006

FC-0008 (term card · OUT-8.6.1)

  • Front: Nonadjudicative proceeding
  • Definition: A legislative or agency proceeding — a hearing on a bill or a proposed rule, a policy inquiry — in which no neutral official hears evidence and issues a binding ruling on a particular party's rights.
  • Explanation: Not a "tribunal" under MR 1.0(m), so MR 3.3–3.5 do not apply of their own force. MR 3.9 imports the core candor, fairness and decorum rules and adds a duty to disclose the representative capacity.
  • Example: A city council hearing on a zoning ordinance.
  • Exam trap: A permit negotiation with an agency official is not a "proceeding" — MR 4.1–4.4 govern it.
  • Cite: MR 3.9; MR 1.0(m) · Outline: OUT-8.6.1 · Related: FC-0020

FC-0009 (term card · OUT-8.7.1)

  • Front: Organization as client
  • Definition: The principle that a lawyer employed or retained by an entity represents the entity itself, acting through its duly authorized constituents — not the people who run it, own it or work for it.
  • Explanation: Duties of loyalty, confidentiality and communication run to the entity. Privilege belongs to the entity. When a constituent's interests diverge from the entity's, the lawyer's loyalty follows the entity.
  • Example: A corporation's general counsel represents the corporation, not the CEO who hired her.
  • Exam trap: A constituent who has dealt with the lawyer for years and calls her "my lawyer."
  • Cite: MR 1.13(a); cmts. [1]–[2] · Outline: OUT-8.7.1 · Related: FC-0010, FC-0021

FC-0010 (term card · OUT-8.7.1)

  • Front: Constituent
  • Definition: A director, officer, employee, shareholder, member or other person associated with an organization, through whom the organization acts and with whom its lawyer deals.
  • Explanation: Constituents give instructions when acting within their authority, but are not clients. The lawyer must clarify her role when their interests are adverse to the entity's (1.13(f)) and may represent one only within MR 1.7 and with the entity's consent from someone else (1.13(g)).
  • Example: The chief financial officer of the client company.
  • Exam trap: Letting the represented insider consent for the corporation.
  • Cite: MR 1.13(a), (f), (g) · Outline: OUT-8.7.1, 8.7.4 · Related: FC-0009, FC-0022

FC-0011 (term card · OUT-8.7.2)

  • Front: Up-the-ladder reporting
  • Definition: The organization lawyer's default response under MR 1.13(b) to known constituent wrongdoing likely to cause the entity substantial injury: take the matter to more senior people in the organization, and if warranted to the highest authority that can act for it.
  • Explanation: Mandatory unless the lawyer reasonably concludes escalation would do the entity no good. It happens inside the client and discloses no confidences.
  • Example: Counsel who learns of kickbacks paid by the sales chief takes it to his superior, then the CEO, then the board.
  • Exam trap: Resigning quietly instead of escalating.
  • Cite: MR 1.13(b); cmts. [3]–[5] · Outline: OUT-8.7.2 · Related: FC-0012, FC-0013

FC-0012 (term card · OUT-8.7.2)

  • Front: Highest authority that can act
  • Definition: The body within an organization with ultimate power to act for it on the matter — ordinarily the board of directors or its equivalent, as applicable law determines.
  • Explanation: The endpoint of up-the-ladder reporting. Only when this body fails to act does the 1.13(c) reporting-out permission open. For a government body, statute or governmental structure may define it.
  • Example: A corporation's board; for a partnership, the partners.
  • Exam trap: Treating the CEO as the highest authority.
  • Cite: MR 1.13(b); cmt. [5]; cmt. [9] · Outline: OUT-8.7.2 · Related: FC-0011

FC-0013 (term card · OUT-8.7.3)

  • Front: Reporting out
  • Definition: The organization lawyer's permission under MR 1.13(c) to reveal information outside the entity — only as much as she reasonably judges is needed — where the highest authority has refused to address a clear violation of law reasonably certain to cause the entity substantial injury.
  • Explanation: Permissive, not mandatory. Unavailable for information from an investigation of an alleged violation or the defense of a claim arising from one (1.13(d)). Operates as an addition to MR 1.6(b).
  • Example: After the board refuses to stop an ongoing fraud, counsel discloses to the regulator what is needed to prevent the loss.
  • Exam trap: "Required to report to the authorities" overstates (c).
  • Cite: MR 1.13(c)–(d); cmts. [6]–[7] · Outline: OUT-8.7.3; S03 OUT-3.3.1 · Related: FC-0011

FC-0014 (concept card · OUT-8.1.2)

  • Front: May a lawyer's advice include non-legal considerations?
  • Definition: Yes. Where relevant, the lawyer may bring in moral, economic, social and political factors, and may recommend consulting another professional; a purely legal answer can be inadequate advice.
  • Explanation: MR 2.1 permits it; cmt. [2] warns that narrowly legal advice may mislead. The lawyer is not required to volunteer such views when the client asks for a technical answer and can evaluate the rest.
  • Example: "It's legal, and it will cost you your credit line."
  • Exam trap: Raising a moral concern is permitted advice, not an override of the client's decision.
  • Cite: MR 2.1; cmts. [2]–[4] · Outline: OUT-8.1.2 · Related: FC-0002

FC-0015 (concept card · OUT-8.3)

  • Front: Do the truthfulness rules apply to what a lawyer tells a mediator in caucus?
  • Definition: Yes. Statements to a mediator are statements to a third person under MR 4.1; the puffery carve-out still protects negotiating positions, and nothing protects false statements of fact.
  • Explanation: ABA Formal Op. 06-439 (advisory) applies MR 4.1 to caucused mediation exactly as to direct negotiation. Mediation confidentiality affects later admissibility, not the disciplinary rule.
  • Example: Telling the mediator "no other witnesses" when the lawyer knows of one.
  • Exam trap: "It was confidential" is not a defense to a knowing misrepresentation.
  • Cite: MR 4.1(a); ABA Formal Op. 06-439 · Outline: OUT-8.3 · Related: FC-0004

FC-0016 (concept card · OUT-8.4.3)

  • Front: After mediating a dispute, may the lawyer represent one of the parties in the resulting lawsuit?
  • Definition: Not without informed consent, confirmed in writing, from every party to the mediation. A former neutral may not represent anyone in connection with a matter in which she participated personally and substantially.
  • Explanation: MR 1.12(a). The firm may take the case if the former neutral is timely screened, receives no part of the fee, and written notice goes to the parties and any tribunal (1.12(c)). A party-appointed arbitrator on a panel is not treated as a neutral (1.12(d)).
  • Example: The mediator who, after the mediation fails, is retained by the plaintiff.
  • Exam trap: Consent from the new client alone is not enough.
  • Cite: MR 1.12(a), (c), (d) · Outline: OUT-8.4.3; S04 · Related: FC-0005

FC-0017 (concept card · OUT-8.5.4)

  • Front: Does a prosecutor's MR 3.8(d) disclosure duty depend on whether the evidence is material?
  • Definition: No. The prosecutor must hand over, in time for it to be used, anything she knows of that tends to undercut guilt or lessen the offense; there is no materiality element — a broader duty than the constitutional Brady rule.
  • Explanation: ABA Formal Op. 09-454 (2009), advisory guidance rather than binding law, reached this conclusion. In August 2026 the ABA amended MR 3.8 cmt. [3] (Res. 101E) to say the ethics duty is not the same as the constitutional one and must be met early enough for the defense to use the material. The amended comment is not expected to be tested before about Aug 2027, but the black-letter rule and the ABA position predate it. Only a court's protective order relieves the duty.
  • Example: A second eyewitness's description that does not fit the defendant must be disclosed even if the prosecutor thinks it immaterial.
  • Exam trap: "It would not have changed the outcome" is the Brady test, not the 3.8(d) test.
  • Cite: MR 3.8(d); cmt. [3] (as amended Aug 2026, Res. 101E); ABA Formal Op. 09-454 (advisory) · Outline: OUT-8.5.4 · Related: FC-0006

FC-0018 (concept card · OUT-8.5.3)

  • Front: When may a prosecutor subpoena a lawyer to give evidence about a client?
  • Definition: Only where she reasonably believes three things: no privilege protects what she wants; the investigation or prosecution now under way cannot succeed without it; and she has no workable alternative source.
  • Explanation: MR 3.8(e). The conditions are cumulative. Some states also require prior judicial approval.
  • Example: Subpoenaing defense counsel to a grand jury about a fee arrangement the prosecutor could learn from bank records instead — fails the "no feasible alternative" condition.
  • Exam trap: Two of three is not enough.
  • Cite: MR 3.8(e); cmt. [4] · Outline: OUT-8.5.3 · Related: FC-0006

FC-0019 (concept card · OUT-8.5.6)

  • Front: What must a prosecutor do on learning that a convicted defendant may be innocent?
  • Definition: It depends on how strong the proof is. Tier 1 — fresh evidence, credible and material, that makes innocence reasonably likely: promptly bring it to an appropriate court or authority; and if her own jurisdiction obtained the conviction, tell the defendant (unless a court allows delay) and investigate. Tier 2 — innocence shown clearly and convincingly, conviction in her jurisdiction: seek to remedy the conviction.
  • Explanation: MR 3.8(g)–(h). Two thresholds, two tiers of duty. A prosecutor's good-faith judgment that a threshold is not met is not a violation even if wrong (cmt. [9]).
  • Example: DNA testing in another case excludes the convicted man.
  • Exam trap: Here "material" is an element — unlike 3.8(d).
  • Cite: MR 3.8(g)–(h); cmts. [7]–[9] · Outline: OUT-8.5.6 · Related: FC-0017

FC-0020 (concept card · OUT-8.6.1)

  • Front: Which advocacy rules follow a lawyer into a legislative hearing?
  • Definition: MR 3.3(a)–(c) (candor to the tribunal), MR 3.4(a)–(c) (no obstruction or falsification of evidence; no knowing disobedience of the body's rules) and MR 3.5 (impartiality and decorum) — plus a duty to make clear she speaks for a client.
  • Explanation: MR 3.9. It is a targeted list: 3.4(d)–(f), 3.6 and 3.7 are not imported. It does not apply to negotiations, license applications or compliance filings with an agency (cmt. [3]).
  • Example: Testifying for a developer at a zoning hearing without saying so.
  • Exam trap: "Not a tribunal, so no candor duties" is wrong.
  • Cite: MR 3.9; cmts. [1]–[3] · Outline: OUT-8.6.1–8.6.2 · Related: FC-0008

FC-0021 (concept card · OUT-8.7.2)

  • Front: What triggers the organization lawyer's duty to escalate under MR 1.13(b)?
  • Definition: Four yes answers. Does she know? (Actual knowledge, not suspicion.) Is an insider behind it, on business her work touches? (Conduct, planned conduct or a refusal to act.) Whom does it wrong? (The organization itself, or outsiders through a legal breach that could fairly be pinned on the organization.) Is serious harm to the organization probable?
  • Explanation: Then the lawyer must do what reasonably serves the entity — ordinarily by taking the matter up, to the highest authority if warranted — unless she reasonably concludes escalation would do the entity no good.
  • Example: Known commercial bribery by the sales chief.
  • Exam trap: Harm only to a third party, with no injury to or imputation against the entity, does not trigger (b).
  • Cite: MR 1.13(b); cmts. [3]–[5]; MR 1.0(f) · Outline: OUT-8.7.2 · Related: FC-0011

FC-0022 (concept card · OUT-8.7.4)

  • Front: May a lawyer represent both a corporation and its CEO in the same matter?
  • Definition: Yes, if MR 1.7 permits it — and the corporation's consent must come from an appropriate official other than the CEO, or from the shareholders.
  • Explanation: MR 1.13(g). The extra rule addresses who consents for the entity, so that the represented insider cannot approve a conflict that benefits him. Where interests are adverse, 1.13(f) first requires the lawyer to tell the CEO that the corporation is her client.
  • Example: Defending the company and its CEO in a securities suit, with the audit committee's consent.
  • Exam trap: The CEO "consenting on behalf of the corporation."
  • Cite: MR 1.13(f)–(g); cmts. [10], [12]; MR 1.7 · Outline: OUT-8.7.4 · Related: FC-0010

Multiple choice

MC-0001 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 8.1 · OUT-8.1.1)

Client Aldana asks Attorney Bright whether to sue a former partner. Bright believes the claim is weak and that Aldana's own emails will look bad to a jury, but Aldana has said he wants to hear that the case is strong. Bright tells him the case "has real potential" and files suit.

Is Bright subject to discipline?

  • A. No, because a lawyer may exercise professional judgment about how to deliver advice, and Bright chose an encouraging tone for Aldana.
  • B. Yes, because a lawyer must give candid advice, and Bright told Aldana what he wanted to hear rather than her honest assessment.
  • C. Yes, because a lawyer may not bring a claim without a nonfrivolous basis, and Bright believes the claim is weak.
  • D. No, because the client decides the objectives of the representation, and Aldana chose to sue.
  • A is wrong: judgment about delivery is real, but it covers tact and timing, not misstating the assessment itself.
  • Answer: B. MR 2.1 requires candid advice. Bright may choose her tone, but not the substance: she must tell Aldana what she actually thinks the claim is worth. (MR 2.1; cmt. [1])
  • C is wrong: a weak claim is not a frivolous one; the rule is accurate but the facts show a colorable claim. (MR 3.1)
  • D is wrong: the client's control of objectives is accurate, but it does not excuse the lawyer from an honest opinion about them. (MR 1.2(a))
  • Tags: 8.1 · candid advice · cites MR 2.1

MC-0002 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 8.1 · OUT-8.1.2)

Attorney Cho advises a family business on a proposed reorganization. The plan is lawful. Cho knows it will require laying off the founder's brother, which she believes will split the family and hurt the business more than the tax savings help. Cho says nothing about that and confirms the plan is legal.

Which statement is most accurate?

  • A. Cho violated MR 2.1, because a lawyer must include moral and economic considerations in every piece of advice.
  • B. Cho acted properly, because a lawyer's advice must be confined to the law and its application to the client's own facts.
  • C. Cho may raise the economic and family consequences, and often should, because narrowly legal advice can be inadequate.
  • D. Cho violated MR 1.4, because a lawyer must warn a client whenever a lawful plan carries any business risk.
  • Answer: C. MR 2.1 permits advice that goes beyond the law and cmt. [2] warns that purely technical advice may be inadequate. Whether Cho must raise it turns on the scope of the engagement and what the client asked for. (MR 2.1; cmts. [2]–[3])
  • A is wrong: the rule permits non-legal considerations; it does not require them in every matter, and a client who asks a technical question and can weigh the rest may get a technical answer. (cmt. [3])
  • B is wrong: states the opposite of the rule. Advice may refer to moral, economic, social and political factors.
  • D is wrong: MR 1.4 may require unprompted advice where the client faces substantial adverse legal consequences the lawyer knows of, not ordinary business risk. (MR 2.1 cmt. [5])
  • Tags: 8.1 · non-legal considerations · cites MR 2.1

MC-0003 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 8.1 · OUT-8.1.3)

Attorney Dell represents a start-up in a licensing deal. The founder mentions in passing that the company has been selling the product in a state where Dell knows it requires a license the company does not have, exposing it to heavy penalties. The founder does not ask for advice about that.

Must Dell say something?

  • A. No, because a lawyer is generally not expected to give advice until asked, and the founder asked Dell nothing about it.
  • B. No, because Dell was retained only for the licensing deal, and a limited-scope engagement excludes every matter outside that agreed scope.
  • C. Yes, because a lawyer must report a client's ongoing violation of law to the appropriate authority.
  • D. Yes, because the duty to inform may require unprompted advice when the lawyer knows the client faces substantial adverse legal consequences.
  • A is wrong: states the default accurately but misses its stated exception.
  • B is wrong: a limited scope must be reasonable and consented to, and the facts show no limitation that would silence Dell about a serious known exposure. (MR 1.2(c))
  • C is wrong: no rule requires a lawyer to report a client's violation of law to the authorities; confidentiality bars it absent an exception. (MR 1.6)
  • Answer: D. The default is advice on request. But the duty to speak here comes from MR 1.4, the communication rule, which MR 2.1 cmt. [5] invokes: a lawyer must keep the client informed enough to make informed decisions about the matter. Where the lawyer knows the client's course is likely to bring substantial adverse legal consequences, that MR 1.4 duty may require her to raise it unasked. So Dell must say something, and MR 1.4 is why. (MR 2.1 cmt. [5]; MR 1.4)
  • Tags: 8.1 · unprompted advice · cites MR 2.1 cmt. [5]

MC-0004 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 8.2 · OUT-8.2)

Attorney Enu, at Client Farro's request, prepares an opinion letter for Farro's lender stating that Farro's key contracts are enforceable. Enu reviewed only the three contracts Farro supplied and says so in the letter. The lender relies on it and later suffers a loss.

Which statement is most accurate?

  • A. The lender became Enu's client by relying on the letter, so Enu owed it the full duty of loyalty.
  • B. Enu violated MR 1.6, because an evaluation for a third person necessarily reveals information relating to the client's representation.
  • C. Enu acted properly in preparing the evaluation, and the lender is not her client, though other law may govern her liability to it.
  • D. Enu needed the lender's informed consent, confirmed in writing, before limiting her review to three contracts.
  • A is wrong: reliance does not create a client-lawyer relationship. (S07 TF-0020)
  • B is wrong: disclosure authorized by the client as part of the evaluation is not an MR 1.6 violation; the rest stays protected. (MR 2.3(c))
  • Answer: C. MR 2.3 permits an evaluation for a third person's use where compatible with the client relationship. The recipient is not a client; civil liability is governed by other law. Describing the limits of the review is what cmt. [3] contemplates. (MR 2.3(a); cmts. [1], [3])
  • D is wrong: consent for an evaluation comes from the client, not the recipient, and only where the evaluation is likely to hurt the client; MR 2.3 requires no writing. (MR 2.3(b))
  • Tags: 8.2 · evaluator · cites MR 2.3

MC-0005 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 8.3 · OUT-8.3)

In a mediation caucus, the mediator asks Attorney Gale whether her client, the plaintiff, would accept less than $300,000. Gale knows the client would take $150,000. Gale says, "She will not go below $300,000."

Is Gale subject to discipline?

  • A. Yes, because a lawyer may not knowingly misstate a material fact to a third person, and the mediator is one.
  • B. No, because a statement of a party's settlement position is ordinarily not a statement of material fact.
  • C. No, because statements in mediation are confidential and cannot support discipline.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer must abide by the client's decision whether to settle, and the client would accept less.
  • A is wrong: the rule is accurate and the mediator is a third person, but a settlement position is not a statement of material fact.
  • Answer: B. A party's bottom line is bargaining posture. MR 4.1 cmt. [2] treats it as ordinarily outside the rule, and Formal Op. 06-439 (advisory) applies the same analysis to caucused mediation. (MR 4.1 cmt. [2]; Formal Op. 06-439 (advisory))
  • C is wrong: mediation confidentiality affects admissibility in later proceedings; it does not shield a lawyer's misrepresentation from discipline, and there was none here.
  • D is wrong: the client's control of settlement is accurate, but bluffing about the floor does not usurp that decision. (MR 1.2(a))
  • Tags: 8.3 · puffery in mediation · cites MR 4.1 cmt. [2]

MC-0006 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 8.3 · OUT-8.3)

Negotiating a settlement, Attorney Hark tells opposing counsel, "I have authority to accept $80,000 today." Hark's client has told him to accept nothing under $100,000 without checking back. Opposing counsel, who had been about to offer $95,000, offers $80,000 instead.

Is Hark subject to discipline?

  • A. No, because statements about settlement authority are part of the negotiating posture both sides expect.
  • B. Yes, because a lawyer must promptly inform the client of a settlement offer, and Hark had not yet told the client about $80,000.
  • C. Yes, because a lawyer may not knowingly misstate a material fact to a third person, and the extent of Hark's authority is a fact.
  • D. No, because a lawyer may not reveal information relating to the representation, and the client's true instructions were confidential.
  • A is wrong: the puffery carve-out covers a party's position (what it will accept); the lawyer's authority is a fact about the world.
  • B is wrong: the duty is accurate but there was no offer to convey yet; the violation is the misstatement, not a communication failure. (MR 1.4(a)(1))
  • Answer: C. The scope of a lawyer's authority is a fact, not a position. A knowing misstatement of it is within MR 4.1(a), and here it was material — it changed what the other side offered. (MR 4.1(a); cmt. [2])
  • D is wrong: confidentiality is accurate but irrelevant; Hark could have declined to state his authority without lying about it. (MR 1.6)
  • Tags: 8.3 · authority is a fact · cites MR 4.1(a)

MC-0007 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 8.4 · OUT-8.4.1)

Attorney Ito mediates a dispute between two neighbors over a fence, neither represented. One neighbor, Mr. Kang, asks Ito privately, "You're helping me here, right? Should I take this deal?" Ito answers, "I think it's a good deal for you," and says nothing else about her role.

Is Ito subject to discipline?

  • A. Yes, because a lawyer-neutral must explain her role when she knows a party misunderstands it, and Kang plainly thought Ito was on his side.
  • B. No, because Ito represents neither neighbor, so no client duty was owed to Kang.
  • C. No, because a mediator may express views about the merits of a proposed resolution.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer may not give an unrepresented person whose interests may conflict with her client's any advice except to get a lawyer.
  • Answer: A. MR 2.4(b) requires a lawyer-neutral to tell unrepresented parties she is not representing them and, when she knows or should know a party misunderstands her role, to explain the difference. Kang's question showed the misunderstanding; Ito reinforced it. (MR 2.4(b); cmt. [3])
  • B is wrong: correct that no client duty was owed, but MR 2.4(b) imposes its own duty precisely because no one is the client.
  • C is wrong: evaluative mediation may be permitted by the applicable mediation rules, but the violation here is the unaddressed misunderstanding, not the evaluation.
  • D is wrong: MR 4.3 governs a lawyer representing a client who deals with an unrepresented person; Ito represents no one. The analogous rule for neutrals is MR 2.4(b). (MR 4.3)
  • Tags: 8.4 · neutral's disclosure · cites MR 2.4(b)

MC-0008 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 8.4 · OUT-8.4.3)

Attorney Jain served as the sole arbitrator in a contract dispute between Lee and Marsh and issued an award. Marsh now wants to hire Jain to represent him in a suit to enforce the award against Lee. Lee refuses to consent.

May Jain take the representation?

  • A. Yes, because the arbitration is over and Jain's decision has already been made.
  • B. No, because a former arbitrator may not represent anyone in the matter unless all parties give informed consent, confirmed in writing.
  • C. Yes, because a party-appointed arbitrator is not prohibited from later representing the party that selected her.
  • D. No, because a lawyer may not represent a client whose interests are directly adverse to another current client absent informed consent.
  • Answer: B. Jain participated personally and substantially as a neutral in the matter; enforcing the award is "in connection with" it. MR 1.12(a) requires every party's informed consent, confirmed in writing, and Lee refuses. (MR 1.12(a))
  • A is wrong: the rule is not limited to pending matters; it reaches later representation connected to the same matter.
  • C is wrong: the rule is stated accurately but Jain was the sole, neutral arbitrator, not a party-appointed member of a panel. (MR 1.12(d))
  • D is wrong: Lee is not Jain's client; the current-client conflict rule does not describe this situation. (MR 1.7)
  • Tags: 8.4 · former neutral · cites MR 1.12(a)

MC-0009 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 8.4 · OUT-8.4.3)

Attorney Nunes mediated a partnership dissolution between Ortiz and Pell that failed to settle. Ortiz then retains Nunes's law firm — not Nunes personally — to sue Pell. The firm screens Nunes from the case, pays her no part of the fee, and promptly sends written notice to Pell and the court.

May the firm represent Ortiz?

  • A. No, because a former neutral's disqualification is imputed to every lawyer in her firm and cannot be cured by screening.
  • B. Yes, because the former neutral is timely screened with no part of the fee, and written notice went to the parties and the tribunal.
  • C. Yes, because a mediator is not an adjudicative officer, so MR 1.12 does not apply to her or her firm.
  • D. No, because Pell has not given informed consent, confirmed in writing, to the firm's representation of Ortiz against him in this matter.
  • A is wrong: the disqualification is imputed, but 1.12(c) expressly permits a screen to cure it.
  • Answer: B. MR 1.12(c) lifts the imputed disqualification where the disqualified lawyer is timely screened, gets no part of the fee, and the parties and any appropriate tribunal are promptly told in writing. All three are present. (MR 1.12(c))
  • C is wrong: MR 1.12 applies to a lawyer who served as a mediator or other third-party neutral, not only to judges and arbitrators. (MR 1.12(a))
  • D is wrong: consent from all parties is what would let Nunes herself take the case; the firm's route is the screen, which does not require Pell's consent. (MR 1.12(a), (c))
  • Tags: 8.4 · screening former neutral · cites MR 1.12(c)

MC-0010 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 8.4 · OUT-8.4.3)

Attorney Quon was appointed by Rowe as one of three arbitrators in a construction arbitration against Sato; the panel issued an award for Rowe. Sato has moved to vacate it, and Rowe asks Quon to represent him in opposing the motion. Sato objects.

May Quon represent Rowe?

  • A. Yes, because a party-appointed arbitrator on a multi-member panel is not treated as a neutral barred from later representing that party.
  • B. No, because a lawyer who participated personally and substantially as an arbitrator may not later represent a party without every party's consent.
  • C. Yes, because the arbitration has concluded and the motion to vacate is a separate proceeding.
  • D. No, because a lawyer may not act as advocate in a proceeding in which she is likely to be a necessary witness, and Quon sat on the panel.
  • Answer: A. MR 1.12(d) carves out the arbitrator selected as a partisan of a party in a multi-member panel; she is not barred from subsequently representing that party. (MR 1.12(d))
  • B is wrong: states the general rule of 1.12(a) accurately, but 1.12(d) removes the party-appointed panel arbitrator from it.
  • C is wrong: the motion to vacate is "in connection with" the same matter; the result turns on 1.12(d), not on separateness.
  • D is wrong: nothing shows Quon's testimony is necessary; the lawyer-witness rule is accurate but the facts do not raise it. (MR 3.7)
  • Tags: 8.4 · party-appointed arbitrator · cites MR 1.12(d)

MC-0011 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 8.5 · OUT-8.5.2)

Prosecutor Tam meets with an arrested man who has no lawyer and has not yet appeared in court. Tam tells him that if he signs a waiver of his preliminary hearing, she will consider reducing the charge. He signs.

Is Tam subject to discipline?

  • A. Yes, because a prosecutor may not ask an accused who has no lawyer to give up significant pretrial protections, such as a preliminary hearing.
  • B. Yes, because a lawyer dealing with an unrepresented person may not give that person legal advice other than the advice to secure his own counsel.
  • C. No, because a prosecutor may negotiate with an accused who has chosen to proceed without counsel.
  • D. No, because the accused may validly waive a preliminary hearing, and he chose to sign.
  • Answer: A. MR 3.8(c) forbids a prosecutor to try to get an accused with no lawyer to surrender significant pretrial protections; the Rule's own example is the preliminary hearing. (MR 3.8(c))
  • B is wrong: MR 4.3 is accurate but the specific rule for prosecutors and unrepresented accused is 3.8(c), and the conduct here is seeking a waiver, not giving advice.
  • C is wrong: the pro se exception covers an accused who represents himself with the court's approval; this man has not been before a court at all. (MR 3.8 cmt. [2])
  • D is wrong: the validity of the waiver under criminal procedure is a separate question; the disciplinary violation is in seeking it. (MR 3.8(c))
  • Tags: 8.5 · waiver from unrepresented accused · cites MR 3.8(c)

MC-0012 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 8.5 · OUT-8.5.4)

Prosecutor Uda has a police report in which a second eyewitness describes the robber as about six feet tall; the defendant is five foot four. Uda believes the discrepancy is minor, the identification by the first witness strong, and that the report would not change the outcome. She does not disclose it.

Is Uda subject to discipline?

  • A. No, because a prosecutor must disclose only evidence that is material to guilt or punishment.
  • B. No, because a prosecutor may rely on her good-faith assessment of the strength of the case in deciding what evidence to disclose.
  • C. Yes, because a prosecutor must timely disclose known evidence that tends to undercut the accused's guilt, and the report does.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer must disclose to the tribunal all material facts known to her in an ex parte proceeding.
  • A is wrong: states the constitutional Brady standard, which turns on materiality; the disciplinary rule is broader.
  • B is wrong: good-faith judgment protects a prosecutor under 3.8(g)–(h) in evaluating post-conviction evidence, not in deciding whether to disclose exculpatory evidence under (d). (MR 3.8 cmt. [9])
  • Answer: C. MR 3.8(d) obliges the prosecutor to hand the defense, in time to use it, anything she knows of that tends to undercut guilt or lessen the offense. It contains no materiality element; a description that does not fit the defendant tends to negate guilt. (MR 3.8(d); cmt. [3] as amended; Formal Op. 09-454 (advisory))
  • D is wrong: the ex parte disclosure duty is accurate but this is not an ex parte proceeding. (MR 3.3(d))
  • Tags: 8.5 · 3.8(d) no materiality · cites MR 3.8(d)

MC-0013 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 8.5 · OUT-8.5.3)

Prosecutor Vance wants to prove that a defendant paid his lawyer in cash from robbery proceeds. She could subpoena the bank where the lawyer deposited the fee but instead subpoenas the lawyer to the grand jury to testify about the fee payment, reasoning that the fee arrangement is not privileged and the evidence is essential.

Is Vance subject to discipline?

  • A. No, because fee information is generally not privileged, and the evidence is essential to the prosecution.
  • B. Yes, because a lawyer may not communicate about the subject of a representation with a person she knows to be represented by counsel in that same matter.
  • C. No, because a grand jury subpoena is authorized by law, and communications authorized by law are permitted.
  • D. Yes, because a prosecutor may not subpoena a lawyer about a client unless there is no other feasible way to get the evidence, and bank records exist.
  • A is wrong: two of the three conditions; the rule is cumulative.
  • B is wrong: the no-contact rule concerns communications with a represented person about the matter; a grand jury subpoena to the lawyer is not that. (MR 4.2)
  • C is wrong: the "authorized by law" concept belongs to MR 4.2 and does not displace the specific limits of 3.8(e). (MR 4.2)
  • Answer: D. MR 3.8(e) requires all three conditions: not privileged, essential, and no feasible alternative. The bank records are a feasible alternative, so the third condition fails even if the first two are met. (MR 3.8(e))
  • Tags: 8.5 · lawyer subpoena · cites MR 3.8(e)

MC-0014 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 8.5 · OUT-8.5.6)

Two years after Prosecutor Webb's office convicted Xu of assault, a detective tells Webb that a newly discovered surveillance video appears to show Xu across town at the time. Webb views the video; it is credible and, if accurate, makes Xu's innocence reasonably likely, though not certain. Webb decides to wait until the detective finishes authenticating it before doing anything.

Which statement is most accurate?

  • A. Webb has no duty, because the conviction is final and a prosecutor's disclosure obligations end when the proceeding concludes.
  • B. Webb has no duty until the video establishes Xu's innocence by clear and convincing evidence.
  • C. Webb must promptly disclose the video to a court or authority and to Xu, unless a court permits delay, and see that it is investigated.
  • D. Webb must seek to vacate Xu's conviction immediately, because the video creates a reasonable likelihood that Xu is innocent of the assault.
  • A is wrong: the candor duties of MR 3.3 end with the proceeding; the post-conviction duties of 3.8(g)–(h) exist precisely because the proceeding is over.
  • B is wrong: clear and convincing evidence is the threshold for the duty to remedy the conviction under (h), not for the disclosure and investigation duties under (g).
  • Answer: C. Fresh evidence that is credible and material, and makes innocence reasonably likely, triggers 3.8(g): prompt disclosure to an appropriate court or authority; and because the conviction is Webb's jurisdiction's, disclosure to the defendant (unless a court authorizes delay) and an investigation. Waiting for authentication is not "prompt." (MR 3.8(g); cmts. [7]–[8])
  • D is wrong: seeking to remedy the conviction is required only on clear and convincing evidence; a reasonable likelihood requires disclosure and investigation. (MR 3.8(h))
  • Tags: 8.5 · post-conviction evidence · cites MR 3.8(g)

MC-0015 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 8.5 · OUT-8.5.5)

After an arrest, Prosecutor Yu holds a press conference. She states the defendant's name, the charge, and the time and place of the arrest. A detective standing beside her adds that the defendant "has done this before and we all know it." Yu does not react and later takes no steps regarding the detective.

Is Yu subject to discipline?

  • A. Yes, because a lawyer may not make an extrajudicial statement she knows will be disseminated publicly if it is substantially likely to prejudice the proceeding.
  • B. No, because Yu's own statements fell within the safe harbor for basic information about the accused and the arrest.
  • C. No, because a lawyer is responsible for a nonlawyer's conduct only if she ordered it or ratified it, and Yu did neither.
  • D. Yes, because a prosecutor must take reasonable care to keep investigators assisting her from making statements she could not make, and Yu did nothing.
  • A is wrong: MR 3.6(a) is accurate but describes the detective's statement, which Yu did not make; her own remarks were permitted. (MR 3.6(a)–(b))
  • B is wrong: Yu's own statements were within the safe harbor, but the violation is the failure to restrain the detective.
  • C is wrong: MR 5.3 is accurate for nonlawyer assistants generally, but 3.8(f) imposes a specific reasonable care duty on prosecutors regarding investigators' statements, which does not require ordering or ratifying. (MR 5.3(c))
  • Answer: D. MR 3.8(f) requires the prosecutor to take reasonable care to prevent investigators, police and others associated with her from making extrajudicial statements she would be barred from making. A comment on prior offenses is the paradigm prejudicial statement, and Yu took no care at all. (MR 3.8(f); cmt. [5])
  • Tags: 8.5 · prosecutor's staff publicity · cites MR 3.8(f)

MC-0016 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 8.5 · OUT-8.5.4)

As part of a plea agreement, Prosecutor Zell's standard form requires the defendant to waive "any right to disclosure of evidence favorable to the defense." Defense counsel signs it for the client. Zell has in her file a witness statement that partly exculpates the defendant, which she has not disclosed.

Which statement is most accurate?

  • A. Zell acted properly, because a represented defendant may waive discovery rights through counsel as part of a plea bargain.
  • B. Zell is subject to discipline, because under Formal Op. 09-454 (advisory) the 3.8(d) duty cannot be waived as a plea condition, and only a protective order relieves it.
  • C. Zell acted properly, because the disclosure duty applies only to evidence that will be used at trial, and there will be no trial.
  • D. Zell is subject to discipline, because a lawyer may not knowingly misstate a material fact to a third person, and the form implied there was nothing to disclose.
  • Answer: B. The Rule's text does not address plea waivers; the ABA's position comes from Formal Op. 09-454 (advisory), which reads the 3.8(d) duty as running to the integrity of the process, so it may not be bargained away as a plea condition; the Rule's only stated relief is a protective order of the tribunal. Timely disclosure means before the plea is entered. (MR 3.8(d); Formal Op. 09-454 (advisory))
  • A is wrong: procedural discovery rights may be waivable; the disciplinary duty under 3.8(d) is not.
  • C is wrong: the duty is to disclose evidence that tends to undercut guilt or lessen the offense, in time to be used — including in deciding whether to plead. It is not limited to trial evidence.
  • D is wrong: MR 4.1 is accurate but the form is a waiver request, not an assertion that no evidence exists; the violation is the withholding under 3.8(d), not a misstatement.
  • Tags: 8.5 · plea waiver of 3.8(d) · cites Formal Op. 09-454

MC-0017 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 8.5 · OUT-8.5.2)

Prosecutor Abe learns from the investigating officer that the sole complaining witness has recanted entirely and that no other evidence connects the defendant to the crime. Abe nonetheless files the charge, expecting the witness to "come around" before trial.

Is Abe subject to discipline?

  • A. Yes, because a prosecutor may not pursue a charge she knows lacks probable cause, and this charge does.
  • B. No, because a prosecutor has discretion over charging decisions, and the witness may still testify.
  • C. No, because the sufficiency of the evidence is for the court to decide at a preliminary hearing.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer may not bring a proceeding lacking a nonfrivolous basis, and Abe's case is frivolous.
  • Answer: A. With the only witness recanted and nothing else, Abe knows the charge lacks probable cause. Filing anyway violates MR 3.8(a). (MR 3.8(a))
  • B is wrong: charging discretion is real, but it is bounded by 3.8(a); hoping a witness changes her mind is not probable cause.
  • C is wrong: the court's role at a preliminary hearing does not relieve the prosecutor of her own duty not to charge without probable cause.
  • D is wrong: MR 3.1 is accurate and a charge without probable cause may well be frivolous, but the specific rule for prosecutors is 3.8(a), and a criminal defense lawyer's incarceration exception has no application here.
  • Tags: 8.5 · probable cause · cites MR 3.8(a)

MC-0018 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 8.6 · OUT-8.6.1)

Attorney Bao testifies at a state legislative committee hearing on a proposed consumer-lending bill, urging its defeat. She is retained by a lenders' association for that purpose but presents herself as "a lawyer who has seen the effect of these laws on families." Asked by a legislator whether she represents anyone, she says, "I'm here on my own time."

Is Bao subject to discipline?

  • A. No, because a legislative hearing is not a tribunal, so the candor rules do not apply.
  • B. Yes, because a lawyer may not knowingly make a false statement of material fact to a third person, and the legislator is a third person.
  • C. No, because a lawyer may not reveal a client's identity without consent, and the association had not authorized disclosure.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer appearing before a legislative body for a client must make clear that she speaks for that client.
  • A is wrong: correct that the hearing is not a tribunal, but MR 3.9 exists to import the candor duties into exactly this setting.
  • B is wrong: MR 4.1 is accurate but the specific rule for appearances in nonadjudicative proceedings is 3.9, which imports 3.3(a)(1) — false statements to the body.
  • C is wrong: confidentiality is accurate in general, but a client who retains a lawyer to appear before a legislature has authorized disclosure of the representative capacity, and 3.9 requires it. (MR 1.6(a))
  • Answer: D. When a lawyer speaks for a client at a legislative or agency hearing of this kind, MR 3.9 obliges her to let the body know she is there on the client's behalf, and it imports MR 3.3(a)–(c). Bao concealed the capacity and then lied about it. (MR 3.9; cmt. [1]–[2])
  • Tags: 8.6 · representative capacity · cites MR 3.9

MC-0019 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 8.6 · OUT-8.6.2)

Attorney Cruz negotiates with a state environmental agency over the conditions of a discharge permit for her client, a manufacturer. In a meeting with the permit officer she overstates the cost of the agency's proposed monitoring requirement, knowing the true figure is a third of what she says.

Which rule has Cruz violated?

  • A. MR 4.1, because a lawyer negotiating with an agency for a client may not knowingly misstate a material fact to a third person.
  • B. MR 3.9, because a lawyer appearing before an administrative agency must conform to the candor rules that govern lawyers before tribunals.
  • C. MR 3.3, because a lawyer may not knowingly make a false statement of fact to a tribunal, and the agency is a tribunal.
  • D. None, because statements about cost in a negotiation are puffery, which the truthfulness rule does not reach.
  • Answer: A. A permit negotiation with an agency is not an appearance in a nonadjudicative proceeding; MR 3.9 cmt. [3] says such dealings are governed by MR 4.1–4.4. A knowing misstatement of the actual cost is a false statement of material fact. (MR 3.9 cmt. [3]; MR 4.1(a))
  • B is wrong: MR 3.9 is accurately stated but applies to appearances in legislative or rule-making proceedings, not to negotiating a permit. (MR 3.9 cmt. [3])
  • C is wrong: the agency acting as permit negotiator is not a tribunal under MR 1.0(m); no neutral official is hearing evidence and issuing a binding ruling. (MR 1.0(m))
  • D is wrong: the puffery carve-out covers negotiating positions, not knowingly false statements about a measurable fact. (MR 4.1 cmt. [2])
  • Tags: 8.6 · negotiation vs. proceeding · cites MR 3.9 cmt. [3]

MC-0020 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 8.6 · OUT-8.6.1)

Attorney Dahl appears for a trade group at an agency's public rule-making hearing on proposed safety standards, and discloses that she appears for the group. The agency's published procedures prohibit participants from contacting commissioners privately during the comment period. Dahl sends one commissioner a private memo summarizing the group's position.

Is Dahl subject to discipline?

  • A. Yes, because a lawyer in a nonadjudicative proceeding must obey the rule against improper ex parte contact, and the agency forbade it.
  • B. No, because a rule-making hearing is not a tribunal, and the rule against ex parte communication applies only before tribunals.
  • C. No, because Dahl disclosed her representative capacity, which is all MR 3.9 requires.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer must not make a false statement of material fact to a legislative body or agency, and the memo was one-sided advocacy.
  • Answer: A. MR 3.9 imports the whole of MR 3.5, including the bar on ex parte communication with an official during the proceeding unless authorized by law or court order. The agency's procedures forbade it. (MR 3.9; MR 3.5(b))
  • B is wrong: true of MR 3.5 on its own; false once MR 3.9 imports it into nonadjudicative proceedings.
  • C is wrong: the disclosure duty is one part of MR 3.9; the rule also imports 3.3(a)–(c), 3.4(a)–(c) and 3.5.
  • D is wrong: a one-sided advocacy memo is not a false statement; the problem is the private contact, not the content. (MR 3.3(a)(1))
  • Tags: 8.6 · ex parte in rule-making · cites MR 3.9; MR 3.5(b)

MC-0021 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 8.7 · OUT-8.7.1)

Attorney Ekwe is general counsel of a corporation. The chief executive, who hired her, tells her in confidence that he has been backdating his stock-option grants and asks her, "as my lawyer," to keep it from the board.

Whom does Ekwe represent?

  • A. The chief executive, because he hired her and communicates with her in confidence.
  • B. Both the corporation and the chief executive, because a lawyer for an organization also represents its officers.
  • C. The corporation, acting through its duly authorized constituents, and not the chief executive personally.
  • D. The board of directors, because it holds final power to act for the corporation on the matter.
  • A is wrong: the hiring decision and the CEO's belief do not make him the client; Ekwe must clarify this under 1.13(f) now that interests are adverse.
  • B is wrong: representation of a constituent as well is possible only under MR 1.7 and 1.13(g) with the entity's consent from someone else; it is not automatic. (MR 1.13(g))
  • Answer: C. MR 1.13(a): a lawyer employed by an organization represents the organization acting through its constituents. The CEO is a constituent, not the client, whoever did the hiring. (MR 1.13(a); cmts. [1]–[2])
  • D is wrong: the board is the highest authority within the client; the client is the corporation itself. (MR 1.13(b))
  • Tags: 8.7 · entity is the client · cites MR 1.13(a)

MC-0022 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 8.7 · OUT-8.7.2)

In-house counsel Fenn learns that the company's head of purchasing has been accepting kickbacks from a supplier, inflating the company's costs by several hundred thousand dollars a year. Fenn raises it with the head of purchasing, who denies it unconvincingly. Fenn, not wanting to be involved, resigns the next week without telling anyone else.

Is Fenn subject to discipline?

  • A. No, because a lawyer may withdraw from a representation when the client persists in conduct the lawyer finds repugnant.
  • B. Yes, because a lawyer must reveal information to the extent necessary to prevent a client's crime or fraud that will cause substantial financial injury to another.
  • C. No, because MR 1.13 permits, but does not require, an organization's lawyer to report internal wrongdoing.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer who knows of constituent misconduct likely to injure the organization substantially must act in its interest, ordinarily by escalating.
  • A is wrong: permissive withdrawal under MR 1.16(b) is accurate but does not discharge 1.13(b); the client is the organization, and it is the victim here, not the wrongdoer.
  • B is wrong: MR 1.6(b)(2) is a permission, not a duty, and it concerns the client's crime using the lawyer's services; the wrongdoer here is a constituent acting against the client. (MR 1.6(b)(2))
  • C is wrong: reporting out under 1.13(c) is permissive; escalation within under 1.13(b) is mandatory absent a reasonable belief it is unnecessary.
  • Answer: D. The 1.13(b) trigger is met: knowledge of a constituent's violation of a duty to the organization, likely to cause it substantial injury. The duty is to take whatever steps reasonably serve the organization — here, escalation — and resigning without doing so breaches it. (MR 1.13(b); cmts. [3]–[5])
  • Tags: 8.7 · duty to escalate · cites MR 1.13(b)

MC-0023 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 8.7 · OUT-8.7.4)

A corporation and its president are both sued for securities fraud. The president asks the corporation's regular outside counsel, Attorney Gray, to represent them both. Gray concludes the joint representation is permissible under MR 1.7 and obtains the president's informed consent, confirmed in writing, on his own behalf and "on behalf of the corporation."

Is the corporation's consent effective?

  • A. Yes, because the president is the corporation's chief executive and may bind it in the ordinary course.
  • B. No, because the organization's consent must come from an appropriate official other than the represented constituent, or from the shareholders.
  • C. Yes, because informed consent, confirmed in writing, satisfies MR 1.7 no matter which officer signs on the organization's behalf, and the president did.
  • D. No, because a lawyer may never represent both an organization and one of its constituents as co-defendants in the same litigation.
  • A is wrong: ordinary authority to bind the corporation does not extend to this consent; 1.13(g) overrides it.
  • Answer: B. MR 1.13(g): the organization's consent to dual representation must come from an appropriate official other than the individual being represented, or from the shareholders. The president cannot consent for the corporation to a conflict that benefits him. (MR 1.13(g); cmt. [12])
  • C is wrong: the consent formula is accurate, but who gives it matters; consent from the wrong person is no consent.
  • D is wrong: dual representation is permitted where MR 1.7 allows it and 1.13(g) is followed. (MR 1.13(g))
  • Tags: 8.7 · consent for dual representation · cites MR 1.13(g)

MC-0024 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 8.7 · OUT-8.7.3)

Counsel Hale, employed by a company, discovers that its finance director is hiding losses in the accounts, likely to cause the company substantial injury. Hale takes the matter to the CEO, then the audit committee, then the full board; each declines to act. The board then fires Hale, telling her it is "restructuring the legal department."

Which statement is most accurate?

  • A. Hale must report the accounting fraud to the securities regulator, because the highest authority has refused to act on a clear violation of law.
  • B. Hale must keep the information confidential, because MR 1.6 permits disclosure only to prevent a crime committed by using the lawyer's own services.
  • C. Hale may do nothing further, because her employment has ended and with it her duties to the company.
  • D. Hale may disclose what she reasonably thinks is needed to avert substantial injury to the company, and must see the board learns of her discharge.
  • A is wrong: 1.13(c) is permissive; no rule requires Hale to report out.
  • B is wrong: 1.13(c) is an additional exception beyond MR 1.6(b), and 1.6(b)(2)–(3) are not limited to the way this option states them. (MR 1.13 cmt. [6])
  • C is wrong: 1.13(e) applies precisely when the lawyer has been discharged; the duties do not end with the employment.
  • Answer: D. After the highest authority fails to act on a clear violation of law reasonably certain to cause substantial injury, 1.13(c) permits disclosure limited to what is necessary. And under 1.13(e), a lawyer who reasonably believes she was fired for her (b) conduct must take the steps needed to get word of the firing to the highest authority. (MR 1.13(c), (e); cmts. [6], [8])
  • Tags: 8.7 · reporting out; discharge · cites MR 1.13(c), (e)

True / False

TF-0001 (OUT-8.7.2)

  • Statement: When an organization's lawyer knows that an officer is violating a legal duty to the organization in a way likely to cause it substantial injury, the lawyer must ordinarily take the matter to more senior levels of the organization.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: MR 1.13(b). Escalation, up to the highest authority that can act if warranted, is the default, unless the lawyer reasonably concludes that going higher would do the organization no good.
  • Cite: MR 1.13(b); cmt. [5]

TF-0002 (OUT-8.5.4)

  • Statement: A prosecutor's duty under MR 3.8(d) is limited to evidence that would probably change the outcome of the case.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: That is the constitutional Brady materiality test. MR 3.8(d) reaches anything the prosecutor knows of that tends to undercut guilt or lessen the offense, without a materiality element.
  • Corrected statement: A prosecutor's ethics duty under MR 3.8(d) is broader than the constitutional Brady duty: she must give the defense, in time to use it, anything she knows of that tends to cast doubt on the accused's guilt or to lessen the offense, whether or not it would change the outcome, unless a court's protective order relieves her of it.
  • Cite: MR 3.8(d); cmt. [3] (as amended Aug 2026, Res. 101E); ABA Formal Op. 09-454 (advisory)

TF-0003 (OUT-8.7.3)

  • Statement: MR 1.13 requires an organization's lawyer to report to the authorities a clear violation of law that the highest authority has refused to address.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: MR 1.13(c) permits disclosure outside the organization in those circumstances, limited to what the lawyer reasonably judges is needed to spare it substantial injury. It imposes no duty to report.
  • Corrected statement: Where the highest authority refuses to address a clear violation of law reasonably certain to cause the organization substantial injury, MR 1.13(c) permits — but does not require — the lawyer to reveal information outside the organization, limited to what she reasonably judges is needed to avert the injury.
  • Cite: MR 1.13(c); cmt. [6]

TF-0004 (OUT-8.4.3)

  • Statement: A lawyer who served as the mediator in a dispute may later represent one of the parties in that matter if all parties give informed consent, confirmed in writing.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: MR 1.12(a) bars the representation unless all parties to the proceeding give informed consent, confirmed in writing. With that consent it is permitted.
  • Cite: MR 1.12(a)

TF-0005 (OUT-8.1.1)

  • Statement: A lawyer complies with the duty of candid advice by giving accurate legal information, even if it is framed to avoid the client's likely displeasure.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: Candor goes to substance. Advice framed to avoid an unwelcome message falls short of MR 2.1 even if every sentence is accurate.
  • Corrected statement: Candid advice means an honest assessment, including what the client does not want to hear; the lawyer may choose a tactful delivery but not soften the substance.
  • Cite: MR 2.1; cmt. [1]

TF-0006 (OUT-8.1.2)

  • Statement: In advising a client, a lawyer may refer to moral and economic considerations as well as to the law.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: MR 2.1 expressly permits it, and cmt. [2] notes that purely technical legal advice may be inadequate.
  • Cite: MR 2.1; cmt. [2]

TF-0007 (OUT-8.6.2)

  • Statement: A lawyer who negotiates a license condition with an agency official on a client's behalf is appearing in a nonadjudicative proceeding governed by MR 3.9.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: MR 3.9 covers appearances in legislative and rule-making proceedings. Negotiations, license applications and compliance filings with an agency are governed by MR 4.1–4.4 instead.
  • Corrected statement: A lawyer negotiating a license condition with an agency is not appearing in a nonadjudicative proceeding; her dealings with the official are governed by the third-person rules, MR 4.1 through 4.4.
  • Cite: MR 3.9 cmt. [3]

TF-0008 (OUT-8.4.1)

  • Statement: A lawyer serving as a mediator between two unrepresented parties represents both of them for the limited purpose of the mediation.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: A third-party neutral represents none of the parties. That is why MR 2.4(b) requires her to tell unrepresented parties so.
  • Corrected statement: A lawyer serving as a mediator represents no party to the mediation and must inform unrepresented parties that she is not representing them.
  • Cite: MR 2.4(a)–(b)

TF-0009 (OUT-8.5.6)

  • Statement: A prosecutor who knows that clear and convincing proof shows a person convicted in her jurisdiction to be innocent must seek to remedy the conviction.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: That is MR 3.8(h). The lower threshold — fresh, credible, material evidence that makes innocence reasonably likely — triggers disclosure and investigation under (g).
  • Cite: MR 3.8(h)

TF-0010 (OUT-8.5.2)

  • Statement: A prosecutor may negotiate directly with an accused who, after being advised of the right to counsel, has chosen with the court's approval to represent himself.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: MR 3.8(c)'s bar on seeking waivers from an unrepresented accused does not apply to an accused who, with the court's approval, represents himself.
  • Cite: MR 3.8(c); cmt. [2]

Scenario Walkthroughs

SW-0001 · The Mediator Who Took Sides

Facts. Attorney Ines is a lawyer who also works as a mediator. She mediates a dispute between a small contractor, Mr. Otero, and a homeowner, Ms. Park, over a kitchen renovation. Neither party has a lawyer. During a private session Otero asks Ines, "I don't really understand how this works — you're kind of my lawyer in here, right? Should I take her offer?" Ines says, "Between us, I'd take it," and moves on. The mediation settles. Two months later Park sues Otero alleging the settlement was procured by fraud, and Otero asks Ines to represent him. Park objects.

Issues.

  1. Did Ines breach MR 2.4 in the private session?
  2. May Ines represent Otero in the fraud suit?

Analysis.

  • The private session. Ines is a third-party neutral; she represents neither party. MR 2.4(b) required her, first, to tell the unrepresented parties she was not representing them — nothing in the facts shows she did — and second, on learning that Otero misunderstood her role, to explain the difference between a neutral's role and a lawyer's. Otero's question was an explicit statement of the misunderstanding. Ines answered as though she were his lawyer and said nothing about her role. That is a 2.4(b) violation on both limbs. If her answer amounted to legal advice on which Otero relied, she may also have created a client-lawyer relationship by conduct, with all the duties that follow — which would raise an MR 1.7 problem toward Park as well.
  • The fraud suit. Ines participated personally and substantially as a mediator in the matter. The fraud suit concerns the settlement reached in that mediation and is "in connection with" it. Under MR 1.12(a) she may not represent Otero unless all parties to the mediation give informed consent, confirmed in writing. Park objects, so the consent cannot be obtained. Otero's consent alone is not enough. Ines's firm could take the case only under a 1.12(c) screen with written notice to Park and the court.

Conclusion. Ines violated MR 2.4(b) in the mediation and may not represent Otero in the fraud suit. Both errors flow from the same mistake: acting as though she had a client when the role gave her none.

Rules. MR 2.4(a)–(b); cmt. [3] · MR 1.12(a), (c) · MR 1.7 (if a relationship arose)

SW-0002 · The General Counsel and the Backdated Grants

Facts. Attorney Ruiz is general counsel of Tellus Corp. The CEO, who hired her and to whom she reports, tells her that for three years he has been backdating his own stock-option grants to dates when the stock price was lower, and that the board does not know. He says: "You're my lawyer. This stays between us." Ruiz believes the backdating breaches the CEO's fiduciary duties, violates securities law in a way that will be attributed to Tellus, and exposes the company to regulatory penalties and shareholder suits. She tells the CEO she cannot keep it from the board. He replies that if she raises it she will be fired. She raises it with the audit committee chair, who says the committee will "look into it." Two weeks later the board terminates Ruiz, citing "a change in direction." Ruiz has heard nothing further from the committee.

Issues.

  1. Whom does Ruiz represent, and what did she owe the CEO when he confided in her?
  2. What did MR 1.13(b) require of her, and did she do it?
  3. What may and must she do now that she has been fired?

Analysis.

  • Who is the client. Tellus, acting through its authorized constituents (MR 1.13(a)). The CEO is a constituent. Hiring Ruiz and reporting lines do not make him her client. When he said "you're my lawyer," his interests were already adverse to the company's, so 1.13(f) required Ruiz to make clear that Tellus is her client and that she could not keep his disclosure from it. She did so ("I cannot keep it from the board"), which was correct. She should also have made clear that he might want his own counsel.
  • The duty to escalate. The 1.13(b) trigger is fully met: Ruiz knows (the CEO told her) that an officer, on business her work touches, is both wronging Tellus and breaking a law in a way that could fairly be pinned on Tellus, with serious harm to Tellus the probable result. She was therefore required to do what reasonably serves Tellus — ordinarily by taking the matter to more senior people, and if warranted to the highest authority that can act, the board. Going to the audit committee chair was a proper first step; the committee's non-response, followed by her termination, would ordinarily warrant taking it to the full board. Her termination interrupted that.
  • After the discharge. Two rules operate. First, 1.13(e): Ruiz reasonably believes she was fired because of her 1.13(b) conduct, so she must take the steps she reasonably judges will get word of her discharge to the board — the highest authority. In practice that means communicating with the board (not only the committee chair) that she was terminated after raising the backdating. Second, 1.13(c): if the highest authority, once informed, fails to act on what is a clear violation of law reasonably certain to cause substantial injury, Ruiz may reveal information outside Tellus, but only as much as she reasonably judges is needed to head off the injury — for example, to the securities regulator. That permission is not a duty, and it does not open until the board has failed to act. Her MR 1.6 obligations otherwise continue after termination (MR 1.9(c)).

Conclusion. Ruiz correctly identified her client and correctly began escalating. Discharge did not end her duties: she must see that the board learns of her termination and why, and if the board then fails to act she may — but need not — report out, limited to what is necessary.

Rules. MR 1.13(a), (b), (c), (e), (f); cmts. [1]–[6], [8], [10] · MR 1.0(f) · MR 1.6; MR 1.9(c)


Key terms

Each term is marked once in Part A at its definition and has a term card above.

ID Term Outline Card
KT-0001 Independent professional judgment OUT-8.1.1 FC-0001
KT-0002 Candid advice OUT-8.1.1 FC-0002
KT-0003 Evaluation for a third person OUT-8.2 FC-0003
KT-0004 Puffery OUT-8.3 FC-0004
KT-0005 Third-party neutral OUT-8.4.1 FC-0005
KT-0006 Prosecutor OUT-8.5.1 FC-0006
KT-0007 Probable cause OUT-8.5.2 FC-0007
KT-0008 Nonadjudicative proceeding OUT-8.6.1 FC-0008
KT-0009 Organization as client OUT-8.7.1 FC-0009
KT-0010 Constituent OUT-8.7.1 FC-0010
KT-0011 Up-the-ladder reporting OUT-8.7.2 FC-0011
KT-0012 Highest authority that can act OUT-8.7.2 FC-0012
KT-0013 Reporting out OUT-8.7.3 FC-0013

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