9. Safekeeping Funds and Property
9.0 The Framework: Other People's Money
Rule: Money and property a lawyer holds for a client or a third person belong to them, not to the lawyer. MR 1.15 builds a wall between what is theirs and what is the lawyer's, requires the lawyer to account for what is theirs, and tells the lawyer what to do when two people claim the same funds.
Why this section punches above its weight. Trust-account violations are the single most common ground for disbarment in most jurisdictions, and discipline for them does not require dishonesty, loss to the client, or even that the lawyer ever intended to keep the money. A lawyer who is merely careless with client funds is subject to discipline. The exam knows this and tests the mechanics: what goes in, what comes out, when, and who gets told.
The section in four questions:
| Question | Rule | Outline |
|---|---|---|
| Where does it go? | Separate account; records; no commingling | 9.1 |
| What goes in, and when may it come out? | Advance fees and expenses; earned fees; the lawyer's own funds | 9.2–9.3 |
| What do I owe the person whose money it is? | Notice, prompt delivery, full accounting | 9.4 |
| What if two people claim it? | Hold the disputed part; pay the rest | 9.5 |
Three consequences, kept apart (as in S06 OUT-6.0): discipline under MR 1.15 needs no harm; civil liability (conversion, breach of fiduciary duty) needs the usual elements; and criminal liability for theft needs intent. A single misuse of trust funds can trigger all three. The MPRE asks about the first unless the call says otherwise.
⚠ Exam trap: "The client wasn't harmed" and "I put it back" are not defenses to discipline. Neither is "my bookkeeper did it" — the lawyer must supervise (MR 5.3) and cannot delegate the responsibility.
Cite: MR 1.15; MR 5.3; Preamble [2]
9.1 The Trust Account: Separate, Identified, Documented (MR 1.15(a))
9.1.1 Separate from the lawyer's own
Rule: When a lawyer takes charge of money or things that belong to a client or to someone else because of her legal work for the client, none of it may be mixed with what is hers. Money goes into a separate Client trust account; other property is identified as belonging to the client or third person and appropriately safeguarded.
Explanation, organized by kind of property:
- Funds. A separate bank account, held at a bank in the jurisdiction where the lawyer practices from an office (an out-of-state bank is allowed only with the owner's consent — the client's or the third person's). One trust account may hold funds of many clients; what it may not hold is the lawyer's own money, beyond the exception in 9.2.3. The account must be a trust account, so the bank and the world know the funds are held for others. (1.15(a); cmt. [1])
- Other property. Securities, jewelry, original documents, a client's passport — anything of value that is not money. The rule is identify and safeguard: label it as the client's and keep it in a safe deposit box or other secure place appropriate to its value. A client's stock certificates belong in a safe deposit box, not a desk drawer. (cmt. [1])
- What counts as "in connection with a representation." Settlement proceeds, escrow deposits, advance fees, funds received to pay a client's bills, a third party's lien claim against a recovery. Property a lawyer holds in a purely personal capacity — a friend's watch she is keeping while he travels — is outside the rule but not outside other law.
Example: A lawyer receives a $40,000 settlement check payable to her firm's trust account on behalf of a client. She must deposit it in the trust account, not the operating account, even if she intends to pay the client the next morning.
⚠ Exam trap: depositing client money "temporarily" in the operating account, or holding it in cash in the office safe, is a violation the moment it happens. There is no grace period.
9.1.2 Commingling
Rule: Mixing the lawyer's own funds with client or third-person funds is Commingling, and it is a violation in itself — whether or not any client money is lost, and whether the mixing happens in the trust account or in the lawyer's own account.
Explanation:
- The rule bites in both directions. Lawyer's funds in the trust account (beyond the bank-charges exception) is commingling. Client funds in the lawyer's operating account is commingling.
- Earned fees must come out. Once a fee is earned and the client has no dispute about it, the lawyer must withdraw it from the trust account promptly. Leaving earned fees in trust "to keep a cushion" is commingling, because those funds are now the lawyer's. (cmt. [2]; 1.15(c))
- The vice is that mixed funds cannot be protected: a lawyer's creditors can reach her operating account, and a lawyer who treats trust funds as a general pool will eventually spend someone else's money.
Example: A lawyer keeps $5,000 of her own money in the trust account "so the account never goes negative." That is commingling. The permitted amount is enough to meet the bank's own fees on the account, and no more (9.2.3).
9.1.3 Records — complete, and kept for five years
Rule: The lawyer must keep complete records of all funds and other property held for clients or third persons, and must preserve those records for five years after the representation ends.
⚠ Exam trap: a lawyer whose trust account balances to the penny but who keeps no per-client ledger has still violated 1.15(a). The rule requires records, not merely a correct balance.
9.1.4 IOLTA, and where the interest goes
Rule: Client funds that are nominal in amount or held for a short time — too small or too brief to earn net interest for the client — are held in a pooled IOLTA account whose interest goes to a fund for legal services to the poor, under the law of the jurisdiction. Larger or longer-held funds go into a separate interest-bearing account for that client, and the interest is the client's.
Explanation:
- IOLTA is state law, not a Model Rule. The Model Rule's contribution is the principle behind it: interest on a client's money belongs to the client, never to the lawyer. Where the client could earn net interest, the lawyer sets up an account for that client; where the client could not, IOLTA captures what would otherwise be lost.
- A lawyer may never keep the interest on trust funds. That is conversion of the client's property.
- State note: the thresholds and mechanics vary; every U.S. jurisdiction has an IOLTA program, most of them mandatory.
Cite: MR 1.15(a); cmts. [1]–[2]; ABA Model Rules for Client Trust Account Records (2010); MR 5.3
9.2 What Goes In and What Comes Out
9.2.1 Advance fees and expenses go in — and come out only as earned or incurred
Rule: Legal fees and expenses the client pays in advance are the client's money until the lawyer earns the fee or incurs the expense. They go into the trust account, and each dollar may move to the lawyer only once the matching work has been done or the matching cost has actually been paid out.
Explanation:
- An Advance fee is a deposit against future work. It remains the client's property, held in trust, until earned. As the lawyer performs the work she may transfer the earned portion to her operating account — and, per 9.1.2, must do so promptly once it is earned and undisputed. (1.15(c))
- Advance expenses — a deposit for filing fees, experts, court reporters — work the same way: in trust until the expense is actually incurred.
- On termination, any unearned advance must be refunded (MR 1.16(d), S02 OUT-2.9). That refund is only possible if the money was kept in trust; a lawyer who spent an advance fee before earning it has both commingled and, when she cannot refund it, converted.
Example: A client pays a $10,000 advance against hourly fees. The lawyer deposits it in trust. After a month she has billed $3,500. She may transfer $3,500 to her operating account and must leave $6,500 in trust.
⚠ Exam trap: an answer that treats an advance fee as the lawyer's on receipt — "the fee was paid, so it belongs to the lawyer" — describes the violation.
9.2.2 "Nonrefundable" fees and general retainers — ABA Formal Op. 505
Rule: A fee paid in advance for work not yet done is an advance fee, and it belongs in the trust account regardless of what the fee agreement calls it. Labeling a deposit "nonrefundable" or "earned on receipt" does not make it the lawyer's before the work is done.
Explanation — the ABA's 2023 position:
- The label does not control. Formal Op. 505 (advisory) concluded that under the Model Rules, an advance payment for services to be performed is client property until earned, whatever the agreement says; calling it "nonrefundable" is misleading to the client and does not take it out of MR 1.15 or out of the MR 1.16(d) refund duty.
- A flat fee paid in advance is still an advance. It goes into trust and is earned as the work progresses — by milestones the agreement sets, or in reasonable proportion to the work done. If the representation ends early, the unearned part is refunded.
- The one genuine exception is the General retainer — a payment made not for services but to secure the lawyer's availability over a period, so that the lawyer forgoes other work or conflicts. That is earned when paid, because what is bought (availability) is delivered at once. It is rare, must be genuinely for availability rather than a disguised advance, and must itself be reasonable under MR 1.5.
- Reasonableness always applies. Even a properly characterized fee must be reasonable in amount under MR 1.5(a); a "nonrefundable" fee that leaves the client paying for work never done is unreasonable.
State note: jurisdictions divide sharply here. Some follow Op. 505; others permit a flat fee to be treated as the lawyer's on receipt if the agreement says so clearly and the client is told the fee may still be refundable in part if the work is not completed. The exam tests the Model Rule position, with the reasonableness backstop.
Example: A lawyer takes a $5,000 "nonrefundable retainer" to defend a misdemeanor, deposits it in her operating account, and is discharged a week later after two hours' work. Under the Model Rules the $5,000 was an advance fee that belonged in trust, and she must refund the unearned portion. The label neither justified the deposit nor excuses the refund.
⚠ Exam trap: the word "retainer." A general retainer (availability) may be earned on receipt; a special retainer or advance (work to be done) may not. The exam uses "retainer" for both; look at what the payment is for.
9.2.3 The lawyer's own funds: the one thing that may go in
Rule: The only personal money a lawyer may put in the trust account is enough to cover the fees the bank charges for maintaining it — no more, and for no other reason.
- This is the sole exception to the no-commingling rule. (1.15(b))
- "The amount needed" is what the bank actually charges, not a round cushion. Depositing $1,000 "to be safe" when charges run $15 a month is commingling.
- Many banks waive charges on IOLTA accounts, in which case nothing of the lawyer's belongs in the account at all.
9.2.4 Funds the lawyer is entitled to: take them out promptly
Rule: When the lawyer's fee is earned and the client does not dispute it, the fee must be withdrawn from trust promptly. Funds the lawyer is entitled to may not be left in the trust account.
- The reason is 9.1.2: once earned and undisputed, the money is the lawyer's, and leaving it in trust is commingling.
- Where the client does dispute the fee, 9.5 governs: the disputed amount stays in trust until the dispute is resolved.
Cite: MR 1.15(b)–(c); cmt. [2]; MR 1.5(a); MR 1.16(d); ABA Formal Op. 505 (2023) (advisory)
9.3 Property of Third Persons (MR 1.15(a), (d), (e))
9.3.1 A third person's interest is protected the same way
Rule: The safekeeping, notice, delivery and accounting duties run not only to clients but to any Third person with a lawful interest in funds or property the lawyer holds — a medical provider with a lien, a judgment creditor, a co-owner, an insurer with a subrogation claim.
Explanation:
- The trigger is a lawful interest: a statutory or contractual lien, a court order, an assignment the lawyer knows of. A creditor's mere demand ("your client owes me money, pay me from the settlement") is not a lawful interest in the funds and gives the creditor no claim on the lawyer. (cmt. [4])
- Where a third person's lawful claim is known to the lawyer, the lawyer may not simply pay the client and leave the third person to chase him. The lawyer must protect the third person's interest — by holding the disputed amount (9.5) — and may not unilaterally decide the claim is invalid. (cmt. [4])
- The lawyer is not the third person's advocate and does not owe her the client duties. She owes her the safekeeping duties.
Example: A client's medical provider holds a valid statutory lien on personal-injury proceeds and has notified the lawyer. The lawyer receives the settlement. She must notify the provider, protect the lien amount, and pay it (or hold it if the amount is disputed) — she may not pay the whole recovery to the client because the client asks her to.
⚠ Exam trap: "The client instructed me to pay him everything." The client cannot instruct the lawyer to disregard a third person's lawful interest, and following the instruction is a 1.15 violation.
9.3.2 Escrow and the lawyer as stakeholder
Rule: A lawyer who holds funds as an Escrow agent — for example, a deposit in a real-estate transaction held under an agreement between buyer and seller — holds them for both parties under the terms of the escrow, and MR 1.15's duties apply.
- The lawyer may be the client's lawyer and the parties' escrow agent at once; the escrow duties run to both parties regardless.
- The lawyer may not release escrowed funds except as the escrow agreement provides, even on her own client's instruction. (cmt. [5])
Cite: MR 1.15(a), (d), (e); cmts. [3]–[5]
9.4 Notice, Delivery, Accounting (MR 1.15(d))
9.4.1 Three duties, triggered by receipt
Rule: The moment money or property arrives that a client or an outside claimant has a stake in, three duties switch on: (1) let each of them know without delay; (2) get each of them what is theirs without delay; and (3) if asked, promptly explain in full what came in and where it went.
Explanation, duty by duty:
- Notice. As soon as the funds arrive — a settlement check clears, a judgment is paid — the client (and any third person with a lawful interest) must be told. The purpose is that the client should never learn of her own money by accident. Delay while the lawyer "sorts out the numbers" is a violation.
- Delivery. The client's share goes to the client promptly. "Promptly" is not defined in days, but it is measured in days, not months, once the funds are available and the entitlement is clear. The lawyer may deduct her earned fee and reimbursable expenses, if undisputed, before delivering — and must then withdraw that fee from trust (9.2.4).
- Full accounting. On request, a complete statement: what came in, what went out, to whom, for what, and what remains. The client is entitled to it whether or not the lawyer thinks the client needs it. Good practice is to give it unasked with every distribution.
Example: Settlement funds arrive on the 1st. The lawyer tells the client on the 1st, prepares a settlement statement showing the recovery, her one-third fee, the reimbursed expenses, the medical lien, and the client's net, and delivers the net with the statement on the 5th. That is compliance.
⚠ Exam trap: the lawyer who holds the client's undisputed share "until the fee dispute is resolved." A dispute about the fee justifies holding the disputed fee, not the client's undisputed portion (9.5).
9.4.2 Delay is the violation
Rule: Each of the three duties is qualified by "promptly." Sitting on client funds — even with every dollar intact in the trust account — violates MR 1.15(d).
- The exam's favorite version: the lawyer receives the settlement, deposits it correctly in trust, and then does nothing for four months. No money is lost. She is subject to discipline for failing to notify and deliver promptly.
Cite: MR 1.15(d); cmt. [3]
9.5 Disputed Funds (MR 1.15(e))
9.5.1 Hold the contested part; pay the rest
Rule: If competing claims are made to money the lawyer is holding — and the lawyer herself can be one of the claimants — the contested slice is Disputed funds: it stays untouched in trust while the fight goes on. Every dollar nobody is contesting goes out promptly to its owner.
Explanation:
- The dispute may be between lawyer and client — over the fee. The disputed fee amount stays in trust. The client's undisputed share is paid. The lawyer's undisputed fee (if any part is undisputed) is withdrawn.
- Or between client and third person — over a lien or a claim. The lawyer holds the amount in dispute and pays the client the balance. The lawyer does not adjudicate the dispute: the parties resolve it by agreement, or a court does. (cmt. [4])
- "Promptly distributed" applies to the undisputed part. A dispute over $2,000 of a $50,000 recovery is not a reason to hold $50,000.
- The lawyer may seek a court's help. Where the competing claims cannot be resolved, an interpleader or similar proceeding lets the court decide and discharges the lawyer.
Example: A client's $60,000 recovery is subject to a $12,000 lien the client says is inflated and should be $8,000. The lawyer pays the client $48,000 less her own undisputed fee, pays the lienholder $8,000 if the lienholder agrees to accept that as the undisputed part, holds the disputed $4,000 in trust, and lets the client and lienholder resolve the rest.
⚠ Exam trap: two wrong answers appear regularly. (1) The lawyer "pays the client and lets the creditor sue him" — no; the lawyer holds the disputed amount. (2) The lawyer "holds everything until the dispute is over" — no; the undisputed part goes out promptly.
9.5.2 What the lawyer may not do with disputed funds
Rule: While funds are in dispute the lawyer may not pay them to herself, may not pay them to the client to end the argument, and may not use them for anything else.
- Taking a disputed fee out of trust "because I earned it" is a 1.15(e) violation and, if the lawyer turns out not to be entitled to it, conversion.
- The disputed funds are frozen, not forfeited. Once the dispute is resolved they go where the resolution directs.
Cite: MR 1.15(e); cmt. [4]
9.6 Related Duties the Exam Pairs With This Section
- Withdrawal and termination (MR 1.16(d) — S02 OUT-2.9): on ending a representation the lawyer must return the client's papers and property and refund any advance fee or expense not yet earned or incurred. That refund comes from the trust account, which is why the advance had to be there.
- Supervision (MR 5.3 — S01): a lawyer is responsible for trust-account misconduct by a bookkeeper or paralegal if she ordered or ratified it, or if as a supervisor she knew of it in time to prevent it and did nothing. "I trusted my bookkeeper" is not a defense to a failure to supervise the account.
- Financial assistance and business dealings (MR 1.8(a), (e) — S04): a lawyer may not lend a client money from the trust account or elsewhere except as 1.8(e) permits (court costs and litigation expenses; and, for an indigent client, modest gifts for basic living expenses under the 2020 amendment). A lawyer who "advances" a client funds from another client's trust balance has converted the other client's money.
- Fees (MR 1.5 — S02 OUT-2.7): the reasonableness standard, contingent-fee writing requirements, and the 2026 comment amendments on mid-engagement fee changes (Res. 101B).
- Dishonesty (MR 8.4(b)–(c)): taking client money is also a crime and dishonest conduct; a conversion charge under 8.4 usually accompanies the 1.15 charge.
Cite: MR 1.16(d); MR 5.3; MR 1.8(a), (e); MR 1.5; MR 8.4(b)–(c)
9.7 Must-Know Checklist (Section 9)
- Client and third-person property is kept separate; money in a trust account, other property identified and safeguarded.
- Commingling is a violation in itself — lawyer's funds in trust or client funds in operating, either way; no harm required.
- The one exception: the lawyer's own funds to cover bank charges, in that amount only.
- Advance fees and expenses are the client's until earned or incurred; they go in trust and come out as earned.
- "Nonrefundable" is a label, not a rule. Under Formal Op. 505 (advisory) an advance for work is client property until earned; only a genuine general retainer for availability is earned on receipt; reasonableness always applies.
- Earned, undisputed fees come out promptly. Leaving them in is commingling.
- Interest belongs to the client, or to the IOLTA fund where the client could earn none. Never to the lawyer.
- Third persons with a lawful interest — liens, court orders, assignments — get the same protection; a mere creditor's demand does not.
- On receipt: promptly notify, promptly deliver, and on request promptly give a full accounting.
- Disputed funds stay in trust until resolved; the undisputed part is paid out promptly; the lawyer does not decide the dispute and does not pay herself.
- Discipline needs no dishonesty and no loss. Carelessness with other people's money is enough.
9.8 Common Traps
- "I was going to pay the client the next day, so I put the check in operating." Violation on deposit.
- "The fee agreement says nonrefundable, so it went straight to my account." Under the Model Rules, an advance for work is trust money until earned.
- "I left my earned fees in trust as a cushion." Commingling.
- "I kept $500 of my own money in trust so it would never bounce." Only the amount needed for bank charges.
- "The client told me to ignore the medical lien." The client cannot waive a third person's lawful interest.
- "There's a fee dispute, so I'm holding the whole settlement." Hold only the disputed amount.
- "I paid myself the disputed fee because I earned it." Frozen until resolved.
- "Every dollar is there; I just haven't sent it yet." Delay in notice and delivery is itself the violation.
- "My bookkeeper handled the account." MR 5.3 — the lawyer answers for supervision.
- "The account balances, so the records don't matter." Records are required independently.
Part B: Items
Flashcards
Format: Front · Definition · Explanation · Example · Exam trap · Cite · Outline · Related. Term cards first (10), then concept cards (6).
FC-0001 (term card · OUT-9.1.1)
- Front: Client trust account
- Definition: A separate bank account, identified as a trust account and kept apart from the lawyer's own funds, in which money held for clients or third persons in connection with a representation is deposited.
- Explanation: Required by MR 1.15(a). Kept at a bank in the lawyer's home-office jurisdiction; banking it elsewhere needs the owner's consent. May hold many clients' funds; may hold the lawyer's own only to cover bank charges.
- Example: The firm's IOLTA account into which a settlement check is deposited.
- Exam trap: "Temporarily" depositing client money in the operating account.
- Cite: MR 1.15(a)–(b); cmt. [1] · Outline: OUT-9.1.1 · Related: FC-0002, FC-0003
FC-0002 (term card · OUT-9.1.2)
- Front: Commingling
- Definition: Mixing a lawyer's own funds with funds held for clients or third persons — in either account.
- Explanation: A violation in itself, without loss or dishonesty. Includes leaving earned, undisputed fees in the trust account, and depositing more of the lawyer's own money than bank charges require.
- Example: Keeping $5,000 of personal money in trust "as a cushion."
- Exam trap: "No client lost anything" is not a defense.
- Cite: MR 1.15(a)–(c); cmt. [2] · Outline: OUT-9.1.2 · Related: FC-0001, FC-0011
FC-0003 (term card · OUT-9.1.4)
- Front: IOLTA
- Definition: A pooled, interest-bearing trust account, created by state law or court rule, for client funds too small or too briefly held to earn net interest for the client; the interest funds legal services for the poor.
- Explanation: State law, not a Model Rule. The Model Rule principle it serves: interest on client money never belongs to the lawyer. Funds that could earn net interest for the client go into a separate account for that client.
- Example: A $500 filing-fee advance held for two weeks.
- Exam trap: A lawyer keeping trust-account interest.
- Cite: MR 1.15(a); state IOLTA rules · Outline: OUT-9.1.4 · Related: FC-0001
FC-0004 (term card · OUT-9.1.3)
- Definition: The periodic matching of the trust account's receipts-and-disbursements journal, the sum of the individual client ledgers, and the bank statement, so that all three agree.
- Explanation: The core of the "complete records" MR 1.15(a) requires, as described in the ABA Model Rules for Client Trust Account Records. Records must be kept five years after the representation ends.
- Example: Monthly, the bookkeeper confirms the journal balance, the ledger total and the bank balance are identical.
- Exam trap: A balanced account with no per-client ledgers still violates the rule.
- Cite: MR 1.15(a); ABA Model Rules for Client Trust Account Records · Outline: OUT-9.1.3 · Related: FC-0001
FC-0005 (term card · OUT-9.2.1)
- Front: Advance fee
- Definition: A payment by the client against legal services not yet performed (or expenses not yet incurred); the client's property until earned.
- Explanation: Goes into the trust account and is withdrawn only as earned or incurred (MR 1.15(c)). Any unearned balance is refunded on termination (MR 1.16(d)). Calling it "nonrefundable" does not change its character (Formal Op. 505 (advisory)).
- Example: A $10,000 deposit against hourly billing.
- Exam trap: Treating it as the lawyer's on receipt.
- Cite: MR 1.15(c); MR 1.16(d); ABA Formal Op. 505 (advisory) · Outline: OUT-9.2.1 · Related: FC-0006, FC-0012
FC-0006 (term card · OUT-9.2.2)
- Front: General retainer
- Definition: A payment made to secure a lawyer's availability over a period — not for any particular services — so that the lawyer forgoes other work; earned when paid because availability is delivered at once.
- Explanation: The one kind of advance payment that is the lawyer's on receipt under Formal Op. 505 (advisory). Must be genuinely for availability, not a disguised advance for work, and must be reasonable under MR 1.5.
- Example: A corporation pays a lawyer $2,000 a month to be on call, whether or not any work arises.
- Exam trap: A "retainer" that is really a deposit for work to be done.
- Cite: ABA Formal Op. 505; MR 1.5(a) · Outline: OUT-9.2.2 · Related: FC-0005
FC-0007 (term card · OUT-9.3.1)
- Front: Third person with a lawful interest
- Definition: Someone other than the client who holds a legally recognized claim — a statutory or contractual lien, a court order, a known assignment — to funds or property the lawyer holds.
- Explanation: Owed the same safekeeping, notice, delivery and accounting duties as a client. A mere creditor's demand is not a lawful interest. The lawyer may not disregard the interest on the client's instruction.
- Example: A medical provider with a statutory lien on personal-injury proceeds.
- Exam trap: Paying the client everything because the client said so.
- Cite: MR 1.15(d)–(e); cmt. [4] · Outline: OUT-9.3.1 · Related: FC-0009, FC-0014
FC-0008 (term card · OUT-9.3.2)
- Front: Escrow agent
- Definition: A lawyer who holds funds under an agreement between two or more parties, for release only on the agreement's terms.
- Explanation: MR 1.15 applies; the duties run to all parties to the escrow, even if one is the lawyer's client, and the lawyer may not release the funds on her client's instruction alone.
- Example: Holding a buyer's deposit in a real-estate closing.
- Exam trap: Releasing escrowed funds to the client because the client asked.
- Cite: MR 1.15(a), (e); cmt. [5] · Outline: OUT-9.3.2 · Related: FC-0007
FC-0009 (term card · OUT-9.4.1)
- Front: Full accounting
- Definition: A complete statement of what the lawyer received, disbursed and retains on behalf of a client or third person, with dates, amounts, payees and purposes.
- Explanation: Owed promptly on request under MR 1.15(d), regardless of whether the lawyer thinks it is needed. Good practice delivers one unasked with every distribution.
- Example: A settlement statement showing recovery, fee, expenses, liens and net.
- Exam trap: Refusing an accounting because "the client already has the check."
- Cite: MR 1.15(d) · Outline: OUT-9.4.1 · Related: FC-0013
FC-0010 (term card · OUT-9.5.1)
- Front: Disputed funds
- Definition: Money the lawyer is holding that more than one claimant says is theirs — and the lawyer herself may be a claimant.
- Explanation: Stays in trust, untouched, while the claims are sorted out; whatever nobody contests is paid out promptly. The lawyer does not adjudicate the dispute and may not pay herself out of it.
- Example: The $4,000 difference between what a lienholder claims and what the client concedes.
- Exam trap: Holding the whole recovery because part of it is disputed.
- Cite: MR 1.15(e); cmt. [4] · Outline: OUT-9.5.1 · Related: FC-0007, FC-0016
FC-0011 (concept card · OUT-9.2.3)
- Front: May a lawyer ever put her own money in the trust account?
- Definition: Yes, but only enough to meet the bank's own fees for running the account — nothing beyond what those fees require.
- Explanation: MR 1.15(b) is the single exception to the no-commingling rule. A cushion beyond actual charges is commingling.
- Example: Depositing $20 a month to cover the bank's fee.
- Exam trap: "$1,000 so the account never goes negative."
- Cite: MR 1.15(b) · Outline: OUT-9.2.3 · Related: FC-0002
FC-0012 (concept card · OUT-9.2.2)
- Front: Does calling an advance fee "nonrefundable" make it the lawyer's on receipt?
- Definition: No. Under ABA Formal Op. 505 (advisory) an advance payment for work to be done is client property until earned, goes in trust, and is refundable to the extent unearned; only a genuine general retainer for availability is earned on receipt.
- Explanation: The label is misleading to the client and does not displace MR 1.15(c) or MR 1.16(d). Reasonableness under MR 1.5(a) applies in every case. States differ; the exam tests the Model Rule position.
- Example: A $5,000 "nonrefundable" fee for a misdemeanor defense discharged after two hours' work must be refunded in the unearned part.
- Exam trap: "The agreement said nonrefundable."
- Cite: ABA Formal Op. 505; MR 1.15(c); MR 1.16(d); MR 1.5(a) · Outline: OUT-9.2.2 · Related: FC-0005, FC-0006
FC-0013 (concept card · OUT-9.4.1)
- Front: Money arrives that a client or an outside claimant has a stake in. What three things does the lawyer owe them?
- Definition: Tell them quickly; hand over what is theirs quickly; and, if asked, promptly give a full accounting.
- Explanation: MR 1.15(d). Each duty is qualified by "promptly"; delay is a violation even if every dollar stays safely in trust. The lawyer may deduct her undisputed earned fee before delivering.
- Example: Settlement arrives on the 1st; client told the 1st, paid with a statement on the 5th.
- Exam trap: Sitting on intact funds for months.
- Cite: MR 1.15(d) · Outline: OUT-9.4.1–9.4.2 · Related: FC-0009
FC-0014 (concept card · OUT-9.3.1)
- Front: A client tells the lawyer to pay him the whole settlement and ignore a medical provider's lien. What must the lawyer do?
- Definition: Protect the lien: notify the provider, pay the undisputed lien amount or hold any disputed amount in trust, and pay the client the balance. The client cannot direct the lawyer to disregard a third person's lawful interest.
- Explanation: MR 1.15(d)–(e) and cmt. [4]. A lawful interest — statutory or contractual lien, court order, assignment — binds the lawyer; a mere unsecured creditor's demand does not.
- Example: A hospital's statutory lien on personal-injury proceeds.
- Exam trap: "The client instructed me."
- Cite: MR 1.15(d)–(e); cmt. [4] · Outline: OUT-9.3.1 · Related: FC-0007
FC-0015 (concept card · OUT-9.1.3)
- Front: How long must trust-account records be kept, and from when?
- Definition: Five years after the representation ends.
- Example: A matter closed in 2026 — records kept through 2031.
- Exam trap: Measuring from the date of the deposit.
- Cite: MR 1.15(a) · Outline: OUT-9.1.3 · Related: FC-0004
FC-0016 (concept card · OUT-9.5.1)
- Front: The client disputes the lawyer's fee. What happens to the settlement funds?
- Definition: The disputed fee amount stays in trust until the dispute is resolved; the client's undisputed share is paid promptly; any undisputed part of the fee is withdrawn.
- Explanation: MR 1.15(e). The lawyer may not pay herself the disputed amount, may not hold the client's undisputed share hostage, and does not decide the dispute — the parties or a court do.
- Example: Client disputes $3,000 of a $15,000 fee: $12,000 to the lawyer, $3,000 held, client's share paid.
- Exam trap: "I earned it, so I took it."
- Cite: MR 1.15(e) · Outline: OUT-9.5.1–9.5.2 · Related: FC-0010
Multiple choice
MC-0001 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 9.1 · OUT-9.1.1)
Attorney Ames receives a $30,000 settlement check for Client Bell on a Friday afternoon. Intending to pay Bell on Monday, Ames deposits the check in her firm's operating account so the funds will clear over the weekend. On Monday she pays Bell his full share by check from the operating account.
Is Ames subject to discipline?
- A. No, because a lawyer may hold client funds in any account so long as she keeps complete records of them.
- B. No, because Bell received his full share promptly and suffered no loss.
- C. Yes, because client funds must be held in a separate trust account, and Ames deposited them in her operating account.
- D. Yes, because a lawyer must promptly tell a client when money he has a stake in arrives, and Ames waited until Monday to tell Bell.
- A is wrong: records are required in addition to, not instead of, a separate trust account. (MR 1.15(a))
- B is wrong: discipline under MR 1.15 requires neither loss nor dishonesty; prompt payment does not cure the deposit.
- Answer: C. MR 1.15(a) requires client funds to be kept separate from the lawyer's own, in a trust account. Depositing them in the operating account is commingling at the moment of deposit; the weekend plan is irrelevant. (MR 1.15(a); cmt. [1])
- D is wrong: the notice duty is accurate, but a Friday-to-Monday interval is not the violation here; the deposit is. (MR 1.15(d))
- Tags: 9.1 · commingling on deposit · cites MR 1.15(a)
MC-0002 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 9.1 · OUT-9.1.2)
Attorney Cole bills Client Dunn $4,000 for work completed, which Dunn does not dispute. Dunn's $10,000 advance sits in the trust account. Cole leaves the earned $4,000 in the trust account for several months "so the account has a buffer," while continuing to work on the matter.
Is Cole subject to discipline?
- A. Yes, because earned, undisputed fees must be withdrawn from trust promptly, and leaving them there commingles Cole's funds with Dunn's.
- B. No, because a lawyer may deposit her own funds in the trust account to prevent it from being overdrawn, and Cole's buffer did that.
- C. No, because the funds remained in the trust account, where Dunn's money was fully protected throughout the several months in question.
- D. Yes, because a lawyer must render a full accounting to the client whenever fees are earned, and Cole gave Dunn none for months.
- Answer: A. Once earned and undisputed, the $4,000 is Cole's. Leaving the lawyer's money in the trust account is commingling; MR 1.15(c) and cmt. [2] require prompt withdrawal. (MR 1.15(a), (c); cmt. [2])
- B is wrong: personal money may go into trust only to meet the bank's fees on the account, and only to that extent; a general buffer is not permitted. (MR 1.15(b))
- C is wrong: the funds being "protected" is the point of the trust account for client money; the lawyer's money does not belong there at all.
- D is wrong: an accounting is owed on request; the violation here is commingling, not a failure to account. (MR 1.15(d))
- Tags: 9.1 · earned fees left in trust · cites MR 1.15(c)
MC-0003 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 9.1 · OUT-9.1.3)
Attorney Eng's trust account has balanced to the penny for years. She keeps the bank statements and canceled checks but maintains no ledger showing each client's individual balance, reasoning that the account total is always correct. A disciplinary auditor asks for the records.
Is Eng subject to discipline?
- A. No, because the purpose of the record-keeping rule is to ensure client funds are intact, and Eng's account has balanced to the penny for years.
- B. Yes, because a lawyer must reconcile the trust account with each client's ledger at least annually, and Eng never did so.
- C. No, because bank statements and canceled checks are the records the rule requires.
- D. Yes, because a lawyer must keep complete records of client funds, and an account total does not show what each client is owed.
- A is wrong: the rule requires records independently of whether the funds are intact; records are how intactness is proved.
- C is wrong: bank records are part of complete records, not the whole of them; individual ledgers and a journal are also needed.
- Answer: D. MR 1.15(a) requires complete records of the funds of clients and third persons. A correct total with no per-client ledger cannot show whose money is in the account, and cannot be reconciled; that is a record-keeping violation regardless of the balance. (MR 1.15(a); ABA Model Rules for Client Trust Account Records)
- Tags: 9.1 · records · cites MR 1.15(a)
MC-0004 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 9.1 · OUT-9.1.4)
Attorney Fox holds $200,000 of Client Gray's funds in the firm's pooled trust account for eight months pending a real-estate closing. The pooled account is an IOLTA account whose interest goes to the state's legal-services fund. Gray asks why he earned no interest.
Which statement is most accurate?
- A. Fox should have put the funds in a separate interest-bearing account for Gray, because funds that can earn net interest for a client are not IOLTA funds.
- B. Fox acted properly, because state law requires all client funds, whatever the amount or the duration, to be held in the lawyer's pooled IOLTA account instead.
- C. Fox acted properly, because interest on client funds belongs to the lawyer, who may direct it to the IOLTA fund as Fox's firm did.
- D. Fox should have paid Gray interest from the firm's own funds, because a lawyer holding client money for months guarantees a return on it.
- Answer: A. IOLTA captures interest only on funds that are nominal or short-term — too small or brief to earn net interest for the client. $200,000 for eight months could earn net interest for Gray; it belongs in a separate account for him, with the interest his. (MR 1.15(a); state IOLTA rules)
- B is wrong: IOLTA rules cover nominal or short-term funds, not all client funds.
- C is wrong: interest on client money never belongs to the lawyer; where the client cannot earn net interest it goes to the IOLTA fund by law, not by the lawyer's choice.
- D is wrong: no rule makes the lawyer a guarantor of a return; the duty is to place the funds where the client can earn what is available.
- Tags: 9.1 · IOLTA vs. separate account · cites MR 1.15(a)
MC-0005 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 9.2 · OUT-9.2.1)
Client Hale pays Attorney Ives a $6,000 advance against hourly fees. Ives deposits it in her operating account and uses it to pay office rent, reasoning that she will bill more than $6,000 before the matter ends.
Is Ives subject to discipline?
- A. No, because a fee paid to the lawyer becomes the lawyer's property on receipt, and Hale paid the $6,000 to Ives as her fee.
- B. Yes, because advance fees must be deposited in trust and withdrawn only as earned, and Ives had earned nothing when she spent it.
- C. No, because Ives reasonably expected to bill more than $6,000 before the matter ended, so Hale stood to suffer no loss at all.
- D. Yes, because a lawyer may not charge a fee that is paid before the work is performed, and Ives collected $6,000 before doing any work.
- A is wrong: an advance against future work is the client's property until earned. (MR 1.15(c); Formal Op. 505 (advisory))
- Answer: B. MR 1.15(c): an advance sits in trust and moves to the lawyer piece by piece as the work that earns it is done. Spending an unearned advance on rent is conversion of client property. (MR 1.15(c))
- C is wrong: neither the expectation of earning the fee nor the absence of loss is a defense; the violation is complete on misuse.
- D is wrong: advance fees are permitted; the rule governs where they are held, not whether they may be charged. (MR 1.5; 1.15(c))
- Tags: 9.2 · advance fee to operating · cites MR 1.15(c)
MC-0006 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 9.2 · OUT-9.2.2)
Attorney Judd's engagement letter for a misdemeanor defense provides for a "flat, nonrefundable fee of $5,000, earned upon receipt." Client Kerr pays it; Judd deposits it in his operating account. Ten days later, after Judd has spent three hours on the matter, Kerr discharges him and demands a refund of the unearned portion. Judd refuses, citing the agreement.
Under the Model Rules as interpreted by the ABA, which statement is most accurate?
- A. Judd acted properly, because a flat fee that the written agreement designates as earned on receipt is the lawyer's property when paid, and Kerr signed that very agreement.
- B. Judd is subject to discipline, because flat fees for criminal defense are unreasonable per se under MR 1.5, and $5,000 for a misdemeanor is excessive.
- C. Judd acted properly, because a client who discharges a lawyer without cause forfeits any right to a refund, and Kerr gave no reason for discharging Judd.
- D. Judd is subject to discipline, because an advance for services not yet performed is client property until earned, whatever its label, and the unearned part is refundable.
- A is wrong: states the position some jurisdictions take; under the Model Rules per Op. 505 the label does not control. (State note at OUT-9.2.2)
- B is wrong: flat fees are permitted and often reasonable; the issue is their handling, not their form. (MR 1.5(a))
- C is wrong: discharge without cause affects the fee for work done, not the refund of fees for work not done. (MR 1.16(d))
- Answer: D. ABA Formal Op. 505 (advisory) concludes that an advance payment for work to be done is client property until earned regardless of the label; it belongs in trust (MR 1.15(c)) and the unearned part must be refunded on termination (MR 1.16(d)). Judd both misdeposited it and wrongly refused the refund. (Formal Op. 505 (advisory); MR 1.15(c); MR 1.16(d))
- Tags: 9.2 · nonrefundable label · cites Formal Op. 505
MC-0007 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 9.2 · OUT-9.2.2)
A corporation pays Attorney Lam $3,000 a month, under a written agreement, to be available to handle its legal matters on short notice and to refrain from representing its competitors. The agreement provides that the monthly payment is earned when paid and that services actually rendered are billed separately at hourly rates.
May Lam treat the monthly payment as earned on receipt?
- A. No, because all fees paid in advance are client property until the lawyer performs the work, and Lam has performed none for the month.
- B. Yes, because a payment made to secure a lawyer's availability rather than for services is earned when the availability is provided.
- C. Yes, because any fee the client agrees in writing is earned on receipt is earned on receipt, and the corporation signed such an agreement.
- D. No, because a lawyer may not agree to refrain from representing other clients in exchange for a fee, and Lam agreed to shun competitors.
- A is wrong: accurate for advances for services; the general retainer is for availability, not services, and is the recognized exception.
- Answer: B. This is a general retainer: the payment buys availability and the forgoing of conflicting work, which is delivered as the period runs. Formal Op. 505 (advisory) recognizes it as the one advance payment earned on receipt, subject always to reasonableness under MR 1.5. (Formal Op. 505 (advisory); MR 1.5(a))
- C is wrong: the label does not control; what the payment is for does. (Formal Op. 505 (advisory))
- D is wrong: an agreement not to represent competitors during a representation is a legitimate feature of a general retainer; the rule against restricting a lawyer's right to practice (MR 5.6) concerns post-employment restrictions and settlement terms, not this. (MR 5.6)
- Tags: 9.2 · general retainer · cites Formal Op. 505
MC-0008 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 9.2 · OUT-9.2.3)
Attorney Moss keeps $2,500 of her own money in her trust account at all times "so that a bookkeeping error can never cause a client check to bounce." The bank's monthly service charge on the account is $25.
Is Moss subject to discipline?
- A. No, because a lawyer may deposit her own funds in the trust account to protect client funds from being dishonored, and that was Moss's purpose.
- B. No, because $2,500 is a nominal amount that does not affect any client's balance, and the rule is concerned with protecting client money.
- C. Yes, because the only personal money a lawyer may keep in trust is what the bank's fees on the account require, and Moss kept far more.
- D. Yes, because a lawyer may never place a single dollar of personal money in the trust account for any purpose, and Moss put $2,500 there.
- A is wrong: protecting against the lawyer's own bookkeeping errors is not a permitted purpose; the cure for errors is proper records, not a cushion.
- B is wrong: commingling is a violation regardless of amount; there is no nominal-amount exception. (MR 1.15(a))
- Answer: C. Under MR 1.15(b), personal money in trust is limited to covering the bank's fees on the account, in the amount those fees call for. $2,500 against a $25 charge is commingling. (MR 1.15(b))
- D is wrong: overstates the rule; the bank-charges exception exists. (MR 1.15(b))
- Tags: 9.2 · bank-charges exception · cites MR 1.15(b)
MC-0009 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 9.3 · OUT-9.3.1)
Attorney Nash settles Client Orr's personal-injury claim for $90,000. A hospital that treated Orr has a valid statutory lien on the proceeds for $15,000 and has sent Nash written notice of it. Orr instructs Nash to pay him the entire net recovery and says he will "deal with the hospital himself."
What must Nash do with the $15,000?
- A. Pay it to Orr, because a lawyer must abide by the client's decisions concerning the disposition of the client's own funds, and Orr has clearly decided.
- B. Protect the hospital's lien by paying it or holding any disputed sum in trust, because a third person with a lawful interest is owed the safekeeping duties.
- C. Pay it to Orr, because a lawyer's duties under the safekeeping rule run only to the client, and the hospital is not Nash's client in the personal-injury matter.
- D. Return it to the defendant's insurer, because a lawyer may not distribute funds subject to a third-party claim, and the hospital has asserted one.
- Answer: B. MR 1.15(d)–(e) and cmt. [4]: a third person with a lawful interest — here a statutory lien with notice — is protected; the lawyer may not disregard the interest on the client's say-so and must hold any disputed portion. (MR 1.15(d)–(e); cmt. [4])
- A is wrong: the client's authority over objectives does not extend to directing the lawyer to violate a third person's lawful interest. (MR 1.2(a))
- C is wrong: the rule expressly protects third persons as well as clients. (MR 1.15(a), (d))
- D is wrong: nothing requires returning the funds; the lawyer holds and distributes them according to the competing lawful interests.
- Tags: 9.3 · third-party lien · cites MR 1.15(d)–(e)
MC-0010 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 9.3 · OUT-9.3.1)
Attorney Pratt receives a $50,000 settlement for Client Quinn. Quinn's former landlord writes to Pratt claiming Quinn owes him $8,000 in back rent and demanding payment from the settlement. The landlord has no judgment, lien or assignment. Quinn denies owing the rent and tells Pratt to pay him everything.
What should Pratt do?
- A. Pay the landlord $8,000, because a lawyer may not assist a client in evading a debt, and Quinn is using the settlement to avoid paying his rent.
- B. Hold $8,000 in trust until the rent dispute is resolved, because a third person has asserted a claim to the funds and the lawyer may not decide it herself.
- C. Interplead the $8,000 into court, because a lawyer may not decide between competing claims to funds she holds, and Quinn and the landlord disagree.
- D. Pay Quinn the full net recovery, because a creditor's unsecured demand is not a lawful interest in the funds and gives the landlord no claim on them.
- A is wrong: no rule requires a lawyer to pay a client's ordinary creditors; paying Quinn is not assisting fraud. (MR 1.2(d))
- B is wrong: holding is required for a dispute over a lawful interest; the landlord has none, and holding Quinn's money on a bare demand would breach the duty of prompt delivery. (MR 1.15(d))
- C is wrong: interpleader is a tool for genuine competing lawful claims, not for a creditor with no interest in the fund.
- Answer: D. The safekeeping duties to third persons attach to a lawful interest — a lien, judgment, court order or assignment. An unsecured creditor's demand is not one, and cmt. [4] makes clear the lawyer is not obliged to hold funds against such claims. (MR 1.15(d)–(e); cmt. [4])
- Tags: 9.3 · lawful interest vs. mere creditor · cites MR 1.15 cmt. [4]
MC-0011 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 9.4 · OUT-9.4.2)
Attorney Reyes receives a $25,000 settlement for Client Soto and deposits it correctly in the trust account. Reyes then becomes absorbed in a trial and does not tell Soto the funds have arrived or send Soto's share for five months. Every dollar remains in the trust account throughout.
Is Reyes subject to discipline?
- A. No, because the funds were properly deposited and fully preserved in the trust account, and Soto lost nothing in the five months.
- B. Yes, because a lawyer must render a full accounting within thirty days of receiving client funds, and Reyes rendered none in five months.
- C. No, because a lawyer's obligation to deliver funds arises only when the client requests them, and Soto never asked Reyes for the money.
- D. Yes, because a lawyer must promptly notify the client on receiving funds and promptly deliver them, and five months is not prompt.
- A is wrong: proper deposit and preservation address the separate-account duty, not the notice and delivery duties.
- B is wrong: the accounting is owed promptly on request; the Rule sets no thirty-day clock. (MR 1.15(d))
- C is wrong: the duty to deliver is triggered by receipt and entitlement, not by a request; only the accounting is "on request." (MR 1.15(d))
- Answer: D. MR 1.15(d) requires prompt notice and prompt delivery. Preserving the funds satisfies 1.15(a) but not 1.15(d); the delay is itself the violation. (MR 1.15(d))
- Tags: 9.4 · delay in notice/delivery · cites MR 1.15(d)
MC-0012 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 9.4 · OUT-9.4.1)
After distributing Client Tan's settlement, Attorney Ubo receives a letter from Tan asking for "a full breakdown of where every dollar went." Ubo replies that Tan already received his check and the settlement statement Ubo sent to Tan's spouse, and declines to provide anything further.
Is Ubo subject to discipline?
- A. No, because a lawyer need not provide an accounting once the client has received the funds to which he is entitled.
- B. No, because Ubo had already provided a settlement statement in connection with the distribution.
- C. Yes, because a lawyer must promptly render a full accounting on request, and Tan requested one.
- D. Yes, because a lawyer must provide a written accounting to the client at least once each year.
- A is wrong: the accounting duty is independent of delivery and survives it.
- B is wrong: a statement sent to someone other than the client, and an earlier statement, do not satisfy a fresh request from the client for a full accounting.
- Answer: C. MR 1.15(d): once asked, the lawyer owes a prompt and complete explanation of the money's path. Tan asked; Ubo must provide it — to Tan. (MR 1.15(d))
- D is wrong: no annual-accounting requirement exists in the Model Rule; the duty is on request. (MR 1.15(d))
- Tags: 9.4 · accounting on request · cites MR 1.15(d)
MC-0013 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 9.5 · OUT-9.5.1)
Attorney Vega settles Client Wu's claim for $60,000 under a one-third contingent fee. Wu, believing Vega did little work, disputes the fee and says Vega deserves at most $10,000. Vega holds the entire $60,000 in trust "until the fee is sorted out."
Is Vega subject to discipline?
- A. Yes, because only the disputed portion may be held, and the undisputed portion — Wu's $40,000 and the conceded $10,000 — must go out promptly.
- B. No, because contested money stays in the trust account while the disagreement lasts, and the disagreement over Vega's fee has not yet been settled.
- C. No, because a lawyer may retain client funds as security for an unpaid fee, and Wu refuses to pay the full fee the agreement provides.
- D. Yes, because a lawyer may not hold any client funds once a fee dispute arises and must pay the entire recovery to the client at once.
- Answer: A. MR 1.15(e): the disputed $10,000 (the difference between $20,000 claimed and $10,000 conceded) stays in trust; everything not in dispute must be promptly distributed — Wu's $40,000 to Wu, the conceded $10,000 to Vega. (MR 1.15(e))
- B is wrong: accurate for the disputed portion; it does not justify holding the undisputed $50,000.
- C is wrong: MR 1.15(e) does not permit holding the client's undisputed share as leverage; a retaining lien, where one exists under state law, is a matter of other law and is not what Vega did.
- D is wrong: overcorrects; the disputed portion is properly held. (MR 1.15(e))
- Tags: 9.5 · holding the undisputed share · cites MR 1.15(e)
MC-0014 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 9.5 · OUT-9.5.2)
Client Xu disputes $5,000 of Attorney Yip's $20,000 fee, which Yip is holding in trust from Xu's settlement. Confident she earned every dollar, Yip transfers the full $20,000 to her operating account and tells Xu he may sue her if he disagrees.
Is Yip subject to discipline?
- A. Yes, because funds the lawyer and client both claim must stay in trust until the dispute is resolved, and Yip paid herself the disputed $5,000.
- B. No, because the client's remedy for an excessive fee is a civil action, not discipline, and Yip told Xu he may sue her if he disagrees.
- C. No, because a lawyer who has earned a fee is entitled to withdraw it from the trust account, and Yip is confident she earned every dollar of the $20,000.
- D. Yes, because a lawyer may not withdraw any part of a fee from trust while the client disputes any part of it, and Xu disputes $5,000.
- Answer: A. MR 1.15(e) applies where the lawyer is one of the claimants. The disputed $5,000 had to stay in trust; Yip could take only the undisputed $15,000. (MR 1.15(e))
- B is wrong: taking disputed funds from trust is a disciplinary violation whatever civil remedies also exist.
- C is wrong: accurate for an undisputed earned fee; the disputed portion is different precisely because entitlement is contested.
- D is wrong: overstates the rule; the undisputed $15,000 could — and should — be withdrawn. (MR 1.15(e))
- Tags: 9.5 · lawyer as claimant · cites MR 1.15(e)
MC-0015 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 9.6 · OUT-9.6)
Is Zane subject to discipline?
- A. No, because a lawyer is responsible for a nonlawyer's conduct only if she ordered it or knowingly ratified it, and Zane knew nothing of it.
- B. Yes, because a lawyer must keep complete records and make reasonable efforts to supervise the nonlawyers she employs, and Zane did neither.
- C. No, because the funds were always replaced within a week and no client was ever harmed by the bookkeeper's temporary transfers.
- D. Yes, because a lawyer is strictly liable for any misuse of trust funds by her employees, and Zane's bookkeeper misused them for two years.
- A is wrong: MR 5.3(c) is one route to responsibility; MR 5.3(b) imposes a separate supervisory duty that Zane breached without ordering or ratifying anything. (MR 5.3(b)–(c))
- C is wrong: replacement of the funds and absence of harm are not defenses to a record-keeping and supervision violation.
- D is wrong: the standard is reasonable supervision, not strict liability. (MR 5.3(b))
- Tags: 9.6 · supervision of the account · cites MR 5.3(b)
MC-0016 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 9.6 · OUT-9.6)
Client Ash, who is indigent, tells Attorney Bly she cannot pay her rent this month. Bly, holding $9,000 in trust for another client, Cruz, writes Ash a $900 check from the trust account, planning to replace it from his own funds on payday.
Which statement is most accurate?
- A. Bly acted properly, because a lawyer may provide modest gifts to an indigent client for basic living expenses, and Ash is indigent and needed money for rent.
- B. Bly is subject to discipline, because a lawyer may never provide financial assistance to a client in connection with litigation, and Bly gave Ash $900.
- C. Bly is subject to discipline, because the $900 belonged to Cruz, and using one client's trust money for another purpose is conversion even if he means to replace it.
- D. Bly acted properly, because the amount was small, he intended to restore it on payday, and Cruz's $9,000 balance would be whole again well before Cruz needed any of it.
- A is wrong: the 2020 amendment to MR 1.8(e) does permit modest gifts to an indigent client from the lawyer's own funds; it says nothing about taking them from another client. (MR 1.8(e)(3))
- B is wrong: overstates MR 1.8(e), which permits court costs and litigation expenses and, for indigent clients, modest gifts for basic living expenses. (MR 1.8(e))
- Answer: C. The $900 was Cruz's property. MR 1.15(a) requires it to be held for Cruz; paying it to Ash is misappropriation, and intent to replace is no defense. (MR 1.15(a))
- D is wrong: neither the amount nor the intent to restore matters; discipline attaches on misuse.
- Tags: 9.6 · using another client's funds · cites MR 1.15(a)
MC-0017 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 9.3 · OUT-9.3.2)
Attorney Cade represents the seller in a real-estate sale and, under the contract, holds the buyer's $20,000 deposit in trust as escrow agent, to be released at closing or returned to the buyer if the sale fails through no fault of the buyer. The sale collapses; the seller instructs Cade to release the deposit to him, asserting the buyer was at fault. The buyer disputes this.
What must Cade do?
- A. Hold the deposit until the parties agree or a court decides, because an escrow agent owes duties to both parties and may not release disputed funds on one party's word.
- B. Return the deposit to the buyer, because a lawyer must resolve doubts about disputed funds against her own client's interest, and Cade's client is the seller.
- C. Release the deposit to the seller, because Cade represents the seller and must abide by the seller's instructions about any funds that Cade holds in the matter.
- D. Split the deposit equally between them, because a lawyer holding disputed funds must distribute them fairly between the claimants without waiting for a court.
- Answer: A. As escrow agent Cade holds the funds for both parties under the escrow terms; the seller's instruction does not override them, and the competing claims make the deposit disputed funds to be held under MR 1.15(e). (MR 1.15(e); cmt. [5])
- B is wrong: no rule requires resolving the dispute against the client; the lawyer does not resolve it at all.
- C is wrong: the client's authority does not reach funds held as escrow agent for both parties. (MR 1.15 cmt. [5])
- D is wrong: the lawyer may not adjudicate or split disputed funds; she holds them. (MR 1.15(e))
- Tags: 9.3 · escrow agent · cites MR 1.15 cmt. [5]
MC-0018 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 9.1 · OUT-9.1.1)
Client Dorn gives Attorney Ely her late husband's original will and a folder of bearer bonds for safekeeping during a probate matter. Ely puts them in an unlocked filing cabinet in the reception area with the firm's general files.
Is Ely subject to discipline?
- A. No, because the safekeeping rule applies only to funds, which must be held in a trust account, and an original will and bearer bonds are not funds.
- B. Yes, because a client's property other than funds must be identified as hers and appropriately safeguarded, and an unlocked public cabinet is not.
- C. No, because Ely did not commingle the property with her own, and the rule forbids only mixing client property with the lawyer's.
- D. Yes, because a lawyer may not accept a client's valuables for safekeeping without a written agreement, and Ely and Dorn signed no such agreement.
- A is wrong: the rule reaches all property, with funds handled by trust account and other property by identification and safeguarding.
- Answer: B. MR 1.15(a) covers property other than funds: it must be identified as the client's and appropriately safeguarded. Bearer bonds and an original will belong in a safe deposit box or the equivalent. (MR 1.15(a); cmt. [1])
- C is wrong: the absence of commingling satisfies one part of the rule; safeguarding is a separate requirement.
- D is wrong: no rule requires a written agreement to hold client property; the duty is to safeguard it. (MR 1.15(a))
- Tags: 9.1 · non-monetary property · cites MR 1.15 cmt. [1]
True / False
TF-0001 (OUT-9.5.1)
- Statement: When a client disputes part of the lawyer's fee, the lawyer may hold the client's entire recovery in trust until the dispute is resolved.
- Answer: False
- Why: MR 1.15(e) requires only the disputed portion to be held; the undisputed portion must be distributed promptly.
- Corrected statement: When a client disputes part of the lawyer's fee, the lawyer must keep only the disputed amount in trust until the dispute is resolved and must promptly distribute the portion that is not in dispute.
- Cite: MR 1.15(e)
TF-0002 (OUT-9.4.1)
- Statement: A lawyer must render a full accounting of client funds only if she believes the client needs one.
- Answer: False
- Why: The accounting is owed promptly on the client's request; the lawyer's view of its necessity is irrelevant.
- Corrected statement: A lawyer must promptly render a full accounting of client funds or property whenever the client or a third person with an interest in them requests it.
- Cite: MR 1.15(d)
TF-0003 (OUT-9.2.3)
- Statement: A lawyer may keep some personal money in the client trust account if it is there only to meet the bank's fees for the account and does not exceed what those fees require.
- Answer: True
- Why: MR 1.15(b) states this single exception to the no-commingling rule.
- Cite: MR 1.15(b)
TF-0004 (OUT-9.2.2)
- Statement: Under ABA Formal Opinion 505 (advisory), a genuine general retainer paid to secure a lawyer's availability, rather than for particular services, may be treated as earned when paid.
- Answer: True
- Why: Availability is delivered at once, so the payment is earned on receipt; it must still be reasonable under MR 1.5 and genuinely for availability rather than a disguised advance for work.
- Cite: ABA Formal Op. 505 (advisory); MR 1.5(a)
TF-0005 (OUT-9.2.1)
- Statement: Fees paid in advance become the lawyer's property on receipt and may be deposited directly in the operating account.
- Answer: False
- Why: An advance against future work is the client's property until earned; MR 1.15(c) requires it to be held in trust and withdrawn only as earned.
- Corrected statement: Money a client pays up front for fees or costs stays in the client trust account; the lawyer may take out a portion only after doing the work that portion pays for, or after the cost it covers has actually arisen.
- Cite: MR 1.15(c)
TF-0006 (OUT-9.3.1)
- Statement: A third person who holds a valid lien on settlement proceeds in the lawyer's possession is owed the same notice, delivery and accounting duties as the client.
- Answer: True
- Why: MR 1.15(d) protects outside claimants with a stake in the money, not only clients; a lawful lien is such a stake.
- Cite: MR 1.15(d); cmt. [4]
TF-0007 (OUT-9.1.2)
- Statement: A lawyer who deposits client funds in her operating account but pays the client in full the next day has not violated the safekeeping rule, because the client suffered no loss.
- Answer: False
- Why: Commingling is a violation in itself; discipline under MR 1.15 requires neither loss nor dishonesty.
- Corrected statement: A lawyer who deposits client funds in her operating account has commingled them and is subject to discipline even if she pays the client in full the next day and no loss results.
- Cite: MR 1.15(a); cmt. [1]
TF-0008 (OUT-9.1.3)
- Statement: A lawyer's full records of money and property held for clients must be kept until five years have passed since the representation ended.
- Answer: True
- Why: MR 1.15(a) sets the five-year period, running from the end of the representation.
- Cite: MR 1.15(a)
Scenario Walkthroughs
SW-0001 · The Settlement, the Lien and the Fee Dispute
Facts. Attorney Farrow represents Client Gault in a personal-injury case under a written one-third contingent fee. The case settles for $120,000. A hospital has a valid statutory lien for $18,000 and has notified Farrow in writing. Gault believes the hospital overbilled and says the lien should be $12,000; the hospital insists on $18,000. Gault also says Farrow's one-third fee is too much for "a case that settled in six months" and offers $30,000. Farrow believes the full $40,000 is earned under the agreement. The settlement check arrives on March 1. Farrow deposits it in the trust account the same day.
Issues.
- What must Farrow do on March 1?
- How much may Farrow distribute, to whom, and how much must be held?
- What may Farrow do about the fee dispute?
Analysis.
- March 1. MR 1.15(d): prompt notice to Gault and to the hospital — both have an interest in the funds. Farrow should also prepare a settlement statement, because a full accounting will be owed on request and good practice provides it with the distribution.
- The arithmetic. Three claims: the hospital's lien, Farrow's fee, and Gault's share. Under MR 1.15(e), disputed amounts stay in trust and undisputed amounts go out promptly.
- Hospital lien: $12,000 is conceded by everyone; $6,000 is disputed. Pay the hospital $12,000 promptly (if it will accept a partial payment without prejudice; otherwise hold the whole $18,000 as disputed, since the hospital has not agreed to the split). Hold the disputed $6,000.
- Fee: $30,000 is conceded by Gault; $10,000 is disputed. Farrow may withdraw $30,000 — and must, because an undisputed earned fee left in trust is commingling. Hold the disputed $10,000.
- Gault: $120,000 − $18,000 (maximum lien) − $40,000 (maximum fee) = $62,000 is Gault's under any outcome. Pay it promptly. If the hospital agrees to $12,000 and Gault wins the fee dispute, more follows later.
- Total held: $16,000 (or $22,000 if the hospital will not accept a partial payment).
- The fee dispute. Farrow may not pay herself the disputed $10,000 "because she earned it." She may negotiate, submit to a fee-arbitration program, or sue; until resolution the funds stay in trust. She may not hold Gault's $62,000 as leverage. MR 1.5's reasonableness standard governs the merits; the safekeeping rule governs the money meanwhile.
Conclusion. Prompt notice to both claimants; prompt payment of every undisputed dollar — $62,000 to Gault, $30,000 to Farrow, $12,000 to the hospital if it will take it; the $16,000 in genuine dispute held in trust until agreement or adjudication. Farrow decides none of the disputes herself.
Rules. MR 1.15(a), (c), (d), (e); cmts. [3]–[4] · MR 1.5(a)
SW-0002 · The "Nonrefundable" Flat Fee
Facts. Attorney Holm's standard criminal-defense engagement letter provides: "Flat fee of $7,500 for representation through trial. This fee is nonrefundable and is earned upon receipt." Client Ives signs and pays. Holm deposits the $7,500 in the firm operating account, as he does with all flat fees. Three weeks later, after Holm has reviewed the discovery and attended one hearing — roughly eight hours of work — Ives hires another lawyer and asks for a refund. Holm refuses, pointing to the letter. Separately, a disciplinary auditor reviewing Holm's accounts asks why no flat fees ever pass through the trust account.
Issues.
- Where should the $7,500 have gone on receipt?
- Is any refund owed?
- Does the engagement letter change either answer?
Analysis.
- Deposit. Under the Model Rules as read in ABA Formal Op. 505 (advisory), an advance payment for services not yet performed is the client's property until earned. A flat fee for representation "through trial" is exactly that: payment for future work. MR 1.15(c) required it to go into the trust account and to be withdrawn as earned — for a flat fee, by milestones the agreement sets or in reasonable proportion to the work done. Depositing every flat fee in the operating account was systematic commingling and, as to the unearned portions, conversion.
- Refund. MR 1.16(d) requires refund of any advance payment of fee that has not been earned. Eight hours of work against a $7,500 fee for a full trial representation leaves most of the fee unearned. Holm must refund the unearned portion, measured reasonably against the work actually done. The refund is also required by MR 1.5(a): a fee that pays for a trial defense the lawyer never provided is unreasonable if retained.
- The letter. The label "nonrefundable, earned upon receipt" does not change the analysis under the Model Rules. Op. 505 treats such terms as misleading to the client and ineffective to convert an advance for work into the lawyer's property. The only payment that is the lawyer's on receipt is a genuine general retainer for availability, and nothing here suggests Ives was paying for availability rather than for a defense. State note: some jurisdictions permit flat fees to be treated as earned on receipt with adequate disclosure; the MPRE tests the Model Rule position, and even in those jurisdictions the reasonableness backstop and a partial-refund duty on early termination usually remain.
Conclusion. The $7,500 belonged in trust; Holm violated MR 1.15(c) on deposit. Ives is owed a refund of the unearned portion under MR 1.16(d), and retaining it would make the fee unreasonable under MR 1.5(a). The engagement letter's label protects nothing.
Rules. MR 1.15(c); MR 1.16(d); MR 1.5(a); ABA Formal Op. 505 (2023)
Key terms
Each term is marked once in Part A at its definition and has a term card above.
| ID | Term | Outline | Card |
|---|---|---|---|
| KT-0001 | Client trust account | OUT-9.1.1 | FC-0001 |
| KT-0002 | Commingling | OUT-9.1.2 | FC-0002 |
| KT-0004 | IOLTA | OUT-9.1.4 | FC-0003 |
| KT-0005 | Advance fee | OUT-9.2.1 | FC-0005 |
| KT-0006 | General retainer | OUT-9.2.2 | FC-0006 |
| KT-0007 | Third person with a lawful interest | OUT-9.3.1 | FC-0007 |
| KT-0008 | Escrow agent | OUT-9.3.2 | FC-0008 |
| KT-0009 | Full accounting | OUT-9.4.1 | FC-0009 |
| KT-0010 | Disputed funds | OUT-9.5.1 | FC-0010 |