10. Communications About Legal Services
10.0 The Framework: You May Advertise; You May Not Mislead, Buy Clients, or Chase Them
Rule: Lawyers may tell the public about their services by any medium. Three limits apply to every such communication: it may not be false or misleading (MR 7.1); the lawyer may not pay others to send clients, with narrow exceptions (MR 7.2); and the lawyer may not pursue specific prospects by live person-to-person contact for money, again with narrow exceptions (MR 7.3).
The section in one table:
| What the lawyer wants to do | Governing rule | The short answer |
|---|---|---|
| Advertise — website, billboard, television, social media | 7.1, 7.2(a), 7.2(d) | Yes, if truthful and not misleading, and it identifies a responsible lawyer or firm |
| Pay someone for sending clients | 7.2(b) | No — except advertising costs, referral-service and plan charges, buying a practice, non-exclusive reciprocal referrals, and nominal thank-you gifts |
| Say what she does, or call herself a specialist | 7.2(c) | May state fields of practice; may claim certification only if actually certified by an approved body it names |
| Name the firm | 7.1 and cmts. | Anything not misleading; trade names allowed; no implying a partnership that does not exist |
| Approach a specific prospect in person or by phone | 7.3 | Not for money — unless the prospect is a lawyer, a family member or close prior relationship, or a business that routinely buys such services |
| Send a letter, email or targeted ad to a specific prospect | 7.3 | Yes, unless the prospect said no or the approach is coercive |
| Contribute to a judge's or official's campaign to get work | 7.6 | Not if that is why the contribution was made |
Two constitutional anchors, stated as rules. Truthful lawyer advertising is protected commercial speech; a state may ban only what is false or misleading, or restrict truthful advertising only to serve a substantial interest by means that directly advance it and go no further than necessary. In-person solicitation of lay prospects for profit, by contrast, may be flatly prohibited because of its inherent potential for overreaching. Targeted written solicitation stands closer to advertising and may be regulated but not banned outright — though a state may impose a short waiting period after an accident or disaster. The Model Rules track these lines. (See Verification Log for the decisions.)
⚠ Exam trap: treating "advertising" and "solicitation" as one thing. Advertising is aimed at the public; solicitation targets an identified individual whom the lawyer knows has a legal problem of her own, and offers to handle it. The rules for the two differ sharply, and the exam tests the boundary.
Cite: MR 7.1; 7.2; 7.3; 7.6; MR 7.1 cmts. [1]–[8]; MR 7.3 cmts. [1]–[9]
10.1 The Baseline: Nothing False or Misleading (MR 7.1)
10.1.1 The rule and its three ways of failing
Rule: A lawyer may not make a False or misleading communication about herself or her services. It fails that test in either of two ways: it gets a material fact or the law wrong, or it leaves out a fact without which the message, taken as a whole, gives a materially false picture.
Explanation — the three ways a truthful-looking statement fails:
- A material misstatement. "Twenty years' experience" from a lawyer admitted six years ago. Plain falsity.
- A true statement that misleads by omission. "Recovered $2 million for a client last year" — true, but misleading if the ad does not say that the client's injuries were catastrophic and the result is unrepresentative. A statement that is literally accurate can still mislead by what it leaves out or by the impression it creates. (cmt. [2])
The rule applies to every communication, in every medium — websites, social media posts, firm names, letterhead, office signs, professional listings, and what the lawyer says on a podcast. It is not confined to "advertisements." (cmt. [1])
Example: A firm's website says "We win." That is an unsubstantiated claim creating an unjustified expectation. "We have obtained verdicts for clients in over 100 trials" — if true — is a factual statement the reader can evaluate.
⚠ Exam trap: the disclaimer cure. Some misleading statements can be fixed with a disclaimer ("results depend on the facts of each case"), but a disclaimer does not rescue a statement that is false, and it does not rescue an impression the ad's design is built to create. (cmt. [3])
10.1.2 Firm names and letterhead
Rule: A firm may practice under any name that is not false or misleading — the names of current or deceased members, or a trade name — provided it does not imply a connection with a government agency, a public or charitable legal-services organization, or a lawyer not associated with the firm.
Explanation, by the questions the exam asks:
- A Trade name is permitted. "Downtown Legal Clinic" is fine if it is not misleading. A name implying a connection with government ("Municipal Law Office") or with a legal-aid organization is not. (cmt. [5])
- Deceased and retired partners' names may stay in a firm name where there has been a continuing succession in the firm's identity. (cmt. [5])
- A lawyer who holds public office may not keep her name on the firm's door, letterhead or marketing for any substantial stretch of time during which she is not actively and regularly practicing there. (cmt. [8])
- Implying a partnership that does not exist — lawyers sharing offices who call themselves "Smith & Jones" — is misleading. Holding out a joint practice is allowed only if the joint practice is real. (cmt. [7])
- Multi-office firms may use the same name in different jurisdictions, but must identify the jurisdictional limits of lawyers not licensed where an office is located. (cmt. [6])
Example: Two sole practitioners who share a suite and a receptionist put "Adler & Baird, Attorneys" on the door. Unless they are actually partners (or otherwise organized as one firm), that is a misleading communication.
Cite: MR 7.1 and cmts. [1]–[8]
10.2 Advertising, and Paying for Business (MR 7.2)
10.2.1 The permission
Rule: Subject to MR 7.1 and 7.3, a lawyer may tell the public about her services in any medium she chooses.
- This is the affirmative statement that advertising is permitted. There is no list of approved media and no ban on any medium. Television, radio, print, websites, search advertising, social media — all permitted, all subject to the truthfulness rule. (7.2(a); cmts. [1]–[3])
- State note: many jurisdictions add filing, labeling or record-keeping requirements. The Model Rule has none.
10.2.2 Every communication names someone responsible
Rule: Whatever the medium, an ad has to identify by name at least one lawyer or firm who answers for what it says, and give a way to reach that lawyer or firm.
- A "contact" is a physical address, a telephone number, an email address or a website — one is enough. (7.2(d); cmt. [12])
- The purpose is accountability: someone identifiable stands behind every ad.
10.2.3 Paying for business — who may be paid, and for what
Rule: A lawyer may not reward anyone — with money, favors or promises — for vouching for her or steering clients her way. Whether a payment is lawful turns on who receives it and what it actually buys: exposure, a seat in a vetted referral channel, a going practice, or a modest courtesy between referral sources is permitted; an endorsement is not.
The lawful payees, by who is paid and why:
| Who receives value | What the lawyer is really buying | What keeps it lawful |
|---|---|---|
| A media or marketing vendor — broadcaster, web designer, search engine, lead generator | Exposure: airtime, space, clicks, inquiries | A reasonable price, and a vendor that only advertises — it never vouches for the lawyer |
| A public-protective referral channel — a prepaid or group legal plan, a nonprofit referral program, or a referral program a regulator has vetted | A place on a panel the public can trust | The lawyer pays only the fees the channel ordinarily charges its participating lawyers |
| A lawyer selling a practice | A business — files, goodwill, the practice itself | The sale complies with MR 1.17 |
| A referral partner — another lawyer, or a nonlawyer professional such as an accountant | A two-way flow of referrals | The lawyer stays free to refer elsewhere, and each client learns that the deal exists and what it involves |
| Anyone who has already sent a matter — a colleague, a former client, a friend | Nothing: it is gratitude after the fact | The gift is modest, and neither side treats it, or could reasonably treat it, as payment for the referral |
Explanation, payee by payee:
- Marketing vendors. Paying a television station, a web designer, a search engine, or a lead-generation service a reasonable price for advertising buys exposure, not a recommendation — so long as the vendor does not itself vouch for the lawyer or steer the prospect through a "match" that implies an endorsement. A lead generator that says "we've found you the best lawyer for your case" has crossed the line. (cmt. [5])
- Referral channels. A Qualified lawyer referral service is one that a regulator has reviewed and approved as giving the public adequate safeguards; a nonprofit program (a bar association's, typically) also counts, as do prepaid and group legal plans. The lawyer may pay what the channel ordinarily charges. A for-profit referral outfit without that regulatory approval is simply someone paid to recommend — prohibited. (cmt. [6])
- Sellers of a practice. MR 1.17 permits the sale of a law practice, and the price paid is not a payment for recommendations. (S01)
- Referral partners. A Reciprocal referral agreement: "I send you my tax clients; you send me your litigation clients." Lawful only if the lawyer is not locked in (non-exclusive) and each client is told the deal exists and what it involves. The deal must not bend the lawyer's professional judgment about who is the right referral for this client, and should not run indefinitely. (cmt. [8])
- Past referrers. A Nominal gift: a bottle of wine or a holiday basket to someone who sent over a matter, as a gesture of thanks — permitted since 2018, provided it is modest and neither the giver nor the recipient means it, or could reasonably see it, as payment for the referral. A gift the referrer counts on as the price of the next referral is not nominal. (cmt. [4])
What stays prohibited: paying a Runner — a "capper" — to bring in accident victims; paying a nonlawyer a percentage of fees for each client referred (also a fee-sharing violation, MR 5.4(a)); paying a for-profit online "matching" service that recommends the lawyer; gifts that are really commissions.
Example: A lawyer pays a personal-injury lead-generation website $500 a month. The site displays the lawyer's ad to users in her area and passes on inquiries without vouching for her. That is paying the reasonable cost of advertising. If instead the site tells users "this is the lawyer we recommend for your case," the payment is for a recommendation.
⚠ Exam trap: the exception for advertising costs is not a loophole for disguised referral fees. Look at what the payee actually does: advertise (permitted) or recommend (prohibited).
10.2.4 Fields of practice and specialization
Rule: A lawyer may tell the public what fields she practices in, and may say she does or does not accept particular kinds of work. She may not state or imply that she is a Certified specialist unless she has actually been certified by an organization approved by an appropriate authority (or accredited by the ABA), and the communication plainly names that certifying body.
Explanation:
- "Practises in," "concentrates in," "limited to" — all permitted as descriptions of fields of practice, subject to being true. (7.2(c); cmt. [9])
- "Specialist," "specializes in," "certified" — the line. Under the 2018 text the prohibition is on stating or implying certification as a specialist without the qualifying certification. Whether calling oneself a "specialist" without more implies certification is a question of what the communication conveys; the safe course is to reserve the word for a real certification. (cmt. [9]) State note: many states flatly prohibit "specialist" absent certification.
- Patent and admiralty lawyers may use the traditional designations "Patent Attorney" (if registered with the USPTO) and "Proctor in Admiralty," which are recognized historical exceptions. (cmts. [10]–[11])
- The certifying body must be named. "Board-certified civil trial specialist" is incomplete; "Board-certified civil trial specialist, National Board of Trial Advocacy" is complete.
Example: A lawyer who handles mostly divorces may advertise "Practice concentrated in family law." She may not advertise "Certified Family Law Specialist" unless she holds that certification from an approved body and names it.
Cite: MR 7.2(a)–(d) and cmts. [1]–[12]; MR 1.17; MR 5.4(a)
10.3 Solicitation (MR 7.3)
10.3.1 What "solicitation" is
Rule: A Solicitation has three parts: the lawyer, or someone acting for her, starts the contact; it targets an identified individual whom the lawyer knows, or reasonably should know, has a present need for a lawyer on a specific matter; and it offers to take that matter on.
Explanation — three elements, all required:
- The lawyer starts it — personally or through someone acting for her. A prospect who calls the lawyer has not been solicited. A lawyer's employee, runner or marketing firm acting for the lawyer counts as the lawyer. (7.3(a))
- It targets an identified individual whom the lawyer knows, or reasonably should know, needs a lawyer for a specific matter. A billboard targets no one in particular. A letter to the family of a named accident victim is. (cmt. [1])
- It offers representation. General information, a newsletter, a public seminar invitation, or a communication that does not offer representation is not a solicitation. (cmt. [1])
Not solicitations: communications to the general public (advertising); responses to inquiries the prospect initiated; messages to people with no known legal problem of their own; and, as the Rule itself states, contact with people who already have ties to the lawyer — relatives, close friends, former clients, past business or professional contacts — or who regularly hire this kind of legal help for a business (10.3.3). (cmts. [1]–[2])
10.3.2 The core prohibition: no live person-to-person solicitation for money
Rule: A lawyer may not seek to be hired through Live person-to-person contact if making money is a significant motive behind the approach — unless the person contacted falls within one of three exceptions (10.3.3).
Explanation:
- What "live person-to-person" means: meeting in person; a live phone call; or a live video or audio link — situations where the prospect is confronted by a trained advocate and cannot easily walk away or take time to think. (cmt. [2])
- What it does not mean: written communications, recorded messages, email, text messages, chat-room and social-media messages — anything the recipient can disregard, delete or set aside. These are permitted, subject to 10.3.4. This was the deliberate 2018 change: the former ban on "real-time electronic contact" was narrowed to live contact, and text-based real-time exchanges fell outside it. (cmt. [2])
- Why the line is where it is: the danger the rule addresses is pressure — the trained persuader, the vulnerable prospect, no chance to reflect. Writing does not carry that danger; a phone call from a stranger after an accident does. (cmts. [2]–[3])
- The money motive. A lawyer who approaches a prospect for a political or ideological cause, or to offer free services, is outside the prohibition. The exam tests this by contrasting the accident-scene lawyer chasing a fee with the civil-rights lawyer offering pro bono representation — the latter is protected. (cmt. [3])
Example: A lawyer reads about a factory explosion, obtains the injured workers' names, and telephones each of them offering to represent them on a contingent fee. Each call is a live person-to-person solicitation for financial gain and is prohibited.
⚠ Exam trap: the lawyer who sends her paralegal or a "consultant" to the hospital. Solicitation by an agent is solicitation by the lawyer (MR 8.4(a)), and the lawyer who does it through another is disciplined as if she did it herself.
10.3.3 The three exceptions: who may be approached live
Rule: Live solicitation for a fee is allowed where the risk of overreaching is low, and the Rule recognizes two reasons it can be. Either the person can protect herself — she is another lawyer, or someone who hires this kind of legal help as a regular part of running a business — or the person already knows the lawyer: a relative, a close friend, a former client, or someone the lawyer or her firm has dealt with before in business or professional life.
Explanation, by reason:
- Can protect herself — other lawyers. Lawyers can look after themselves.
- Can protect herself — experienced business buyers — added in 2018. A general counsel, a purchasing manager who regularly retains outside counsel, an insurance claims adjuster — sophisticated repeat buyers of legal services are not the vulnerable prospects the rule protects. The exception looks at the person's experience with this type of service, not merely whether the person is a business. (cmt. [5])
- Already knows the lawyer — relatives, friends, former clients, past business or professional contacts. The risk of overreaching is low, and the contact is expected. Former clients are the clearest case of a past professional tie. (cmt. [5])
- These exceptions remove the live-contact ban only. The truthfulness rule and the limits in 10.3.4 still apply.
Example: A lawyer telephones the general counsel of a corporation, whom she has never met, to offer her firm's employment-law services. The general counsel routinely retains employment counsel for the company. The call is permitted under the routine-business-user exception.
10.3.4 Limits that apply to every solicitation, live or written
Rule: Whatever the medium, and whoever the prospect, a lawyer may not solicit someone who has let her know that solicitations are unwelcome, and may not solicit by means involving Coercion, duress or harassment.
- Telling the lawyer no: a prospect who says "don't contact me" or returns a letter marked "no" has made it known; further contact is a violation. (7.3(c)(1); cmt. [7])
- Coercion, duress, harassment: repeated contacts after no response, contact that exploits a prospect's physical or emotional state, threats, and the like. A single respectful letter is not harassment; the fifth letter in a week may be. (7.3(c)(2); cmt. [7])
- Content of written solicitations: the Model Rule since 2018 has no labeling requirement — the former "Advertising Material" legend was removed. State note: many states still require a legend, a filing, or a waiting period (commonly 30 days after an accident or disaster for personal-injury solicitations). The exam tests the Model Rule; a stem that supplies a state rule tests that rule.
Example: A lawyer mails a truthful letter offering representation to a homeowner facing foreclosure, whose name she found in the public filings. That is a permitted written solicitation under the Model Rules. If the homeowner writes back asking not to be contacted again, any further letter violates 7.3(c).
10.3.5 Group and prepaid legal services
Rule: A lawyer may take part in a Legal service plan — a prepaid or group plan run by an organization the lawyer neither owns nor controls — even though the plan's sales staff sign up members in person or by phone, as long as they are not targeting people already known to have a legal problem the plan would cover.
Explanation:
- The plan sells membership (future access to lawyers), not representation in a matter the prospect already has. That is why its live marketing is tolerated. (7.3(e); cmt. [8])
- The plan must be independent: the lawyer must neither own nor control it. A lawyer cannot launder her own solicitation through a plan she controls. (cmt. [8])
- The lawyer remains responsible for making sure the plan's marketing is truthful and not coercive, and that its structure does not interfere with her independent judgment (MR 5.4(c)) or her client's confidences. (cmt. [8])
- Class-action notices are not solicitations: a court-approved notice to a class, or a lawyer's contact with class members to notify them of the action, is a communication about a pending proceeding, not an offer of employment for financial gain. (cmt. [9])
Cite: MR 7.3(a)–(e) and cmts. [1]–[9]; MR 8.4(a); MR 5.4(c)
10.4 Political Contributions to Obtain Legal Engagements (MR 7.6)
Rule: If a lawyer or firm gives or raises campaign money in order to win, or to be in the running for, government legal work or a judicial appointment, the lawyer or firm may not then take that work or appointment. This is the rule against Pay-to-play.
Explanation:
- Two kinds of work: government legal engagements — bond counsel, outside counsel to an agency — and appointments by a judge — receiver, guardian ad litem, special master. (cmt. [1])
- The trigger is purpose. Contributions made for ordinary political reasons are fine; the rule bites where the purpose is to get or be considered for the work. Purpose is inferred from the circumstances: the size and timing of the contribution, the contributor's history, whether the contributor sought the work. (cmts. [2], [5])
- Excluded: work awarded on the lawyer's demonstrated experience and skill, through a selection process that campaign giving cannot sway; engagements required to be awarded by competitive bidding; and appointments made to serve the indigent under a court's rotation system, or made on an uncompensated basis. (cmts. [4], [6])
- Discipline runs against the lawyer who accepts the work, not against the official.
Example: A firm contributes $25,000 to a state treasurer's campaign and is then chosen as bond counsel in a process that was not competitive. If the contribution was made to obtain the engagement, accepting it violates MR 7.6.
Cite: MR 7.6 and cmts. [1]–[6]
10.5 Must-Know Checklist (Section 10)
- Any medium; nothing false or misleading. Material misstatement, misleading omission, unjustified expectation or unsubstantiated comparison — all fail.
- Every ad names a responsible lawyer or firm with contact information.
- No buying endorsements. Lawful payees: marketing vendors (a reasonable price, no vouching); plans and vetted or nonprofit referral programs (their ordinary fees); the seller of a practice; a non-exclusive, disclosed two-way referral partner; and anyone who receives a modest thank-you gift.
- Fields of practice: yes. "Certified specialist": only if certified by an approved body that the communication names. Patent Attorney and Proctor in Admiralty survive.
- Firm names: trade names allowed if not misleading; no implied government or legal-aid link; deceased partners' names may stay; no name of a public official not actively practicing; no implied partnership that does not exist.
- Solicitation = the lawyer starts it + an identified target known to need a lawyer for a specific matter + an offer to represent.
- No live person-to-person solicitation for financial gain — in person, live phone, real-time video. Writing, email, text and social-media messages are not "live."
- Three people you may approach live: another lawyer; someone the lawyer already has ties to (relative, close friend, former client, past business contact); a regular business buyer of that kind of legal work.
- For every solicitation: stop when told to stop; no coercion, duress or harassment. The Model Rule has no labeling or waiting-period requirement — states often do.
- Legal service plans may sign up members face to face or by phone if the lawyer neither owns nor controls the plan and its targets have no known legal problem the plan would cover. Class-action notices are not solicitation.
- Pay-to-play: no government engagement or judicial appointment obtained by political contributions made for that purpose.
- Doing it through another is doing it — MR 8.4(a).
10.6 Common Traps
- "It was true, so it can't be misleading." Omissions and implications count.
- "Results depend on the facts" as a cure-all disclaimer. It cures some impressions, not false statements.
- "The lead-generation site just advertises." Check whether it recommends.
- Paying a nonlawyer a percentage per referral — a 7.2(b) violation and a 5.4(a) violation.
- "I texted him in real time, so it's live contact." Text is written; it is not live.
- "She's a business, so I can call her." The exception is for routine users of that type of service, not every business.
- "The letter had no 'Advertising Material' label." Not required by the Model Rule.
- "I offered free representation, so 7.3 applies." Without a significant pecuniary motive, the live-contact ban does not.
- "My paralegal did the soliciting." MR 8.4(a).
- "Specialist" without a named certifying body.
Part B: Items
Flashcards
Format: Front · Definition · Explanation · Example · Exam trap · Cite · Outline · Related. Term cards first (13), then concept cards (9).
FC-0001 (term card · OUT-10.1.1)
- Front: False or misleading communication
- Definition: A communication about a lawyer or her services that gets a material fact or the law wrong, or that leaves out a fact without which the overall message materially misleads.
- Explanation: MR 7.1 bars it in every medium — ads, websites, firm names, letterhead, casual public statements. A literally true statement can mislead by omission or implication.
- Example: "Recovered $2 million last year" without saying the case was extraordinary.
- Exam trap: "It was true" is not a defense to a misleading impression.
- Cite: MR 7.1; cmts. [1]–[3] · Outline: OUT-10.1.1 · Related: FC-0002, FC-0014
FC-0002 (term card · OUT-10.1.1)
- Front: Unsubstantiated comparison
- Definition: A claim that the lawyer outperforms or undercharges other lawyers, made without facts the reader could check to back it up.
- Explanation: Misleading under MR 7.1 cmt. [3] because it creates an expectation the reader cannot test. Verifiable factual statements — number of trials, years admitted — are permitted if true.
- Example: "The best personal-injury firm in the state."
- Exam trap: The lawyer's sincere belief in the claim does not substantiate it.
- Cite: MR 7.1 cmt. [3] · Outline: OUT-10.1.1 · Related: FC-0001
FC-0003 (term card · OUT-10.1.2)
- Front: Trade name
- Definition: A firm name that is not composed of the names of its lawyers — "Downtown Legal Clinic," "Harbor Law Group."
- Explanation: Permitted under MR 7.1 provided it is not misleading and does not imply a connection with a government agency, a public or charitable legal-services organization, or a lawyer not in the firm.
- Example: "Municipal Law Office" implies a government link and is not permitted.
- Exam trap: Assuming trade names are banned. They are not, under the Model Rules.
- Cite: MR 7.1 cmt. [5] · Outline: OUT-10.1.2 · Related: FC-0015
FC-0004 (term card · OUT-10.2.3)
- Front: Runner
- Definition: A person — also called a "capper" — paid by a lawyer to find and steer prospective clients to her, typically accident victims.
- Explanation: Paying a runner is rewarding someone for steering clients to the lawyer, prohibited by MR 7.2(b); the runner's in-person approaches are also solicitation attributed to the lawyer under MR 8.4(a).
- Example: Paying a tow-truck driver $200 for every accident victim he sends.
- Exam trap: Calling the payment a "marketing fee" changes nothing.
- Cite: MR 7.2(b); MR 7.3(b); MR 8.4(a) · Outline: OUT-10.2.3 · Related: FC-0005
FC-0005 (term card · OUT-10.2.3)
- Front: Reciprocal referral agreement
- Definition: A two-way deal: the lawyer sends clients to another lawyer or to a nonlawyer professional, and that person sends clients back.
- Explanation: Permitted by MR 7.2(b)(4) only if the lawyer stays free to refer elsewhere (non-exclusive) and each client learns that the deal exists and what it involves; it must not bend the lawyer's independent judgment about the right referral for the client, and should not run indefinitely.
- Example: A family lawyer and an accountant who refer clients to each other, non-exclusively, and tell each client so.
- Exam trap: An exclusive arrangement, or an undisclosed one, fails.
- Cite: MR 7.2(b)(4); cmt. [8] · Outline: OUT-10.2.3 · Related: FC-0006
FC-0006 (term card · OUT-10.2.3)
- Front: Nominal gift
- Definition: A modest thank-you to someone who sent the lawyer a matter, which neither side treats, or could reasonably treat, as payment for the referral.
- Explanation: Permitted since 2018 under MR 7.2(b)(5). What matters is that it is nominal and a thank-you, not the price of the next referral.
- Example: A holiday gift basket to a lawyer who sent over a client.
- Exam trap: A "gift" the referrer expects each time is compensation.
- Cite: MR 7.2(b)(5); cmt. [4] · Outline: OUT-10.2.3 · Related: FC-0005
FC-0007 (term card · OUT-10.2.3)
- Front: Qualified lawyer referral service
- Definition: A lawyer referral service that a regulator has reviewed and approved as giving the public adequate safeguards.
- Explanation: Under MR 7.2(b)(2) a lawyer may pay what it ordinarily charges participating lawyers, as she may with a nonprofit referral program or a legal plan. Paying an unapproved for-profit service that recommends the lawyer is paying for a recommendation.
- Example: A state bar's referral program.
- Exam trap: "Referral service" in the name does not make it qualified.
- Cite: MR 7.2(b)(2); cmt. [6] · Outline: OUT-10.2.3 · Related: FC-0004
FC-0008 (term card · OUT-10.2.4)
- Front: Certified specialist
- Definition: A lawyer who has been certified in a field by an organization approved by an appropriate state authority or accredited by the ABA.
- Explanation: Only such a lawyer may state or imply certification as a specialist, and the communication must clearly identify the certifying organization (MR 7.2(c)). Any lawyer may describe her fields of practice. Patent Attorney and Proctor in Admiralty are traditional designations that survive.
- Example: "Board-certified civil trial specialist — National Board of Trial Advocacy."
- Exam trap: Naming the specialty without naming the certifier.
- Cite: MR 7.2(c); cmts. [9]–[11] · Outline: OUT-10.2.4 · Related: FC-0016
FC-0009 (term card · OUT-10.3.1)
- Front: Solicitation
- Definition: A contact that the lawyer, or someone acting for her, starts; that targets an identified individual whom the lawyer knows, or reasonably should know, needs a lawyer for a specific matter; and that offers to take the matter on.
- Explanation: MR 7.3(a). All three elements are required. Advertising to the public, answering a prospect's own inquiry, and communications that do not offer services are not solicitations.
- Example: A letter to the named family of an accident victim offering representation.
- Exam trap: A billboard targets no identified individual.
- Cite: MR 7.3(a); cmt. [1] · Outline: OUT-10.3.1 · Related: FC-0010
FC-0010 (term card · OUT-10.3.2)
- Front: Live person-to-person contact
- Definition: Contact in person, by live phone call, or by live video or audio link — a setting in which the prospect faces a trained advocate and cannot easily step away.
- Explanation: MR 7.3(b) bars soliciting this way where the lawyer's financial gain is a significant motive, subject to three exceptions. Written, recorded, email, text and social-media messages are not "live" and are permitted.
- Example: Telephoning an injured worker to offer representation.
- Exam trap: A real-time text exchange is written, not live.
- Cite: MR 7.3(b); cmt. [2] · Outline: OUT-10.3.2 · Related: FC-0009, FC-0017
FC-0011 (term card · OUT-10.3.4)
- Front: Coercion, duress or harassment
- Definition: Means of solicitation that pressure the prospect — repeated contacts after no response, exploiting a prospect's physical or emotional state, threats.
- Explanation: Prohibited by MR 7.3(c)(2) for every solicitation, live or written, whatever exception otherwise applies. Paired with 7.3(c)(1): once a person has told the lawyer no, no further solicitation.
- Example: Five letters in one week to a grieving family.
- Exam trap: The routine-business-user exception does not license harassment.
- Cite: MR 7.3(c); cmt. [7] · Outline: OUT-10.3.4 · Related: FC-0010
FC-0012 (term card · OUT-10.3.5)
- Front: Legal service plan
- Definition: A prepaid or group plan, run by an organization the lawyer neither owns nor controls, that signs up members who then get access to lawyers' services.
- Explanation: MR 7.3(e) lets a lawyer take part even if the plan markets memberships face to face or by phone, as long as it is not targeting people already known to have a legal problem the plan would cover. The lawyer remains responsible for the plan's truthfulness and for her own independence.
- Example: An employer-sponsored prepaid legal plan.
- Exam trap: A plan the lawyer owns is not independent.
- Cite: MR 7.3(e); cmt. [8] · Outline: OUT-10.3.5 · Related: FC-0010
FC-0013 (term card · OUT-10.4)
- Front: Pay-to-play
- Definition: Giving or raising campaign money in order to land, or be in the running for, government legal work or a judicial appointment.
- Explanation: MR 7.6 bars accepting the engagement or appointment so obtained. Purpose is inferred from circumstances. Excluded: work awarded through a merit-based process free of contribution influence, work required to be competitively bid, and uncompensated or rotational appointments for the indigent.
- Example: A large, well-timed contribution to a treasurer's campaign followed by a non-competitive bond-counsel engagement.
- Exam trap: Ordinary political giving is not the violation; giving to get the work is.
- Cite: MR 7.6; cmts. [1]–[6] · Outline: OUT-10.4 · Related: FC-0022
FC-0014 (concept card · OUT-10.1.1)
- Front: Can a disclaimer cure a misleading advertisement?
- Definition: Sometimes. A disclaimer or qualifying statement can prevent a true statement from creating an unjustified expectation; it cannot cure a false statement or an impression the ad is designed to create.
- Explanation: MR 7.1 cmt. [3]. "Results depend on the facts of each case" may make a past-results statement acceptable; it does not fix "We win."
- Example: A truthful list of past verdicts with a results-vary disclaimer.
- Exam trap: Treating the disclaimer as a formula that permits anything.
- Cite: MR 7.1 cmt. [3] · Outline: OUT-10.1.1 · Related: FC-0001
FC-0015 (concept card · OUT-10.1.2)
- Front: May a firm keep a deceased partner's name in the firm name?
- Definition: Yes, where there has been a continuing succession in the firm's identity. It may not use the name of a lawyer holding public office who is not actively and regularly practicing with the firm, and may not imply a partnership that does not exist.
- Explanation: MR 7.1 cmts. [5], [7], [8]. The test is always whether the name misleads about who is in the firm and what it is.
- Example: "Adler & Baird" for two office-sharing sole practitioners is misleading.
- Exam trap: Office-sharers using a joint name.
- Cite: MR 7.1 cmts. [5]–[8] · Outline: OUT-10.1.2 · Related: FC-0003
FC-0016 (concept card · OUT-10.2.4)
- Front: May a lawyer advertise that she "concentrates in" employment law?
- Definition: Yes. Any lawyer may communicate the fields in which she practices and whether she accepts particular kinds of work. What she may not do is state or imply certification as a specialist without a qualifying certification from a named, approved body.
- Explanation: MR 7.2(c). Field-of-practice statements are information; certification claims are credentials that must be real.
- Example: "Practice limited to immigration law" — permitted if true.
- Exam trap: "Specialist" is safest reserved for real certification; some states forbid it otherwise.
- Cite: MR 7.2(c); cmt. [9] · Outline: OUT-10.2.4 · Related: FC-0008
FC-0017 (concept card · OUT-10.3.3)
- Front: Whom may a lawyer solicit by live person-to-person contact for financial gain?
- Definition: Three low-risk groups: other lawyers; people the lawyer or her firm already has ties to — relatives, close friends, former clients, past business or professional contacts; and people who regularly hire this type of legal help for a business.
- Explanation: MR 7.3(b)(1)–(3). These remove the live-contact ban only; the truthfulness rule and the bar on coercion and on contacting those who said no still apply.
- Example: Calling a corporate general counsel who regularly retains outside employment counsel.
- Exam trap: "A business" is not the test; a routine user of that type of service is.
- Cite: MR 7.3(b); cmt. [5] · Outline: OUT-10.3.3 · Related: FC-0010
FC-0018 (concept card · OUT-10.3.2)
- Front: Does the live-contact ban apply to a lawyer offering free representation?
- Definition: No. The ban reaches only approaches in which the lawyer's own financial gain is a significant motive. A lawyer approaching a prospect to offer pro bono representation for a political or ideological cause is outside it.
- Explanation: MR 7.3(b); cmt. [3]. The truthfulness rule and MR 7.3(c) still apply.
- Example: A civil-rights lawyer offering free representation to a person whose rights she believes were violated.
- Exam trap: Assuming all in-person offers of representation are barred.
- Cite: MR 7.3(b); cmt. [3] · Outline: OUT-10.3.2 · Related: FC-0010
FC-0019 (concept card · OUT-10.3.4)
- Front: Must a written solicitation be labeled "Advertising Material"?
- Definition: Not under the Model Rules since 2018. The labeling requirement was removed. Many states still require a legend, a filing, or a waiting period.
- Explanation: The Model Rule limits on written solicitation are MR 7.1 (truthful) and MR 7.3(c) (no contact after a refusal; no coercion, duress or harassment).
- Example: A truthful letter to a homeowner in foreclosure — permitted under the Model Rules with no label.
- Exam trap: Answer choices that make the missing label the violation.
- Cite: MR 7.3(c); cmt. [7] · Outline: OUT-10.3.4 · Related: FC-0011
FC-0020 (concept card · OUT-10.2.3)
- Front: May a lawyer pay an online lead-generation service?
- Definition: Yes, the reasonable cost of the advertising — provided the service does not recommend the lawyer, vouch for her, or steer prospects in a way that implies a recommendation.
- Explanation: MR 7.2(b)(1); cmt. [5]. The line is between advertising the lawyer (permitted) and recommending her (paying for a recommendation, prohibited).
- Example: A site that displays the lawyer's ad and forwards inquiries without endorsement.
- Exam trap: "We've matched you with the best lawyer for your case."
- Cite: MR 7.2(b)(1); cmt. [5] · Outline: OUT-10.2.3 · Related: FC-0004
FC-0021 (concept card · OUT-10.3.2)
- Front: A lawyer's paralegal visits accident victims in the hospital to sign them up. Who is responsible?
- Definition: The lawyer. Solicitation through another is solicitation by the lawyer under MR 8.4(a), and the paralegal's live in-person approaches are what MR 7.3(b) prohibits.
- Explanation: A lawyer may not do through an agent what she may not do herself; MR 5.3 adds the supervisory dimension.
- Example: "Consultants" sent to a disaster scene.
- Exam trap: "I never spoke to them myself."
- Cite: MR 7.3(b); MR 8.4(a); MR 5.3 · Outline: OUT-10.3.2 · Related: FC-0004
FC-0022 (concept card · OUT-10.4)
- Front: When may a lawyer accept a government engagement after contributing to the official's campaign?
- Definition: When the contribution was not aimed at landing, or getting in the running for, the engagement — and always where the engagement was awarded on demonstrated merit through a process free of contribution influence, was required to be competitively bid, or is an uncompensated or rotational appointment.
- Explanation: MR 7.6 and cmts. [4]–[6]. Purpose is the trigger; the exclusions describe processes where contributions cannot have bought the work.
- Example: Bond counsel selected by competitive bid after a routine campaign contribution.
- Exam trap: Assuming any contribution disqualifies.
- Cite: MR 7.6; cmts. [4]–[6] · Outline: OUT-10.4 · Related: FC-0013
Multiple choice
MC-0001 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 10.1 · OUT-10.1.1)
Attorney Abbas's website states: "Over 25 years of courtroom experience." Abbas was admitted to practice nine years ago; before law school she worked sixteen years as a court reporter.
Is Abbas subject to discipline?
- A. Yes, because a communication about a lawyer's services may not be materially misleading, and the statement implies 25 years as a lawyer.
- B. No, because the statement is literally accurate — Abbas has spent over 25 years working in courtrooms, first as a reporter and then as a lawyer.
- C. No, because statements of professional experience are matters of opinion that cannot be false or misleading, and Abbas gave her own opinion.
- D. Yes, because a lawyer may not advertise her experience without a disclaimer that past performance does not guarantee results.
- Answer: A. MR 7.1 bars communications that are misleading even if literally true. "Courtroom experience" on a lawyer's website conveys experience as a lawyer; sixteen of those years were not. (MR 7.1; cmt. [2])
- B is wrong: literal accuracy does not save a statement that creates a materially misleading impression.
- C is wrong: a claim of years of experience is a statement of fact, not opinion, and is measurable.
- D is wrong: no rule requires a disclaimer on every experience claim; disclaimers address unjustified expectations about results. (MR 7.1 cmt. [3])
- Tags: 10.1 · misleading by implication · cites MR 7.1
MC-0002 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 10.1 · OUT-10.1.1)
Attorney Bauer's television advertisement shows her standing beside a client and says: "Last year we won $3.4 million for this client. Call us — we get results." The verdict was real. The client had suffered catastrophic injuries in a case with undisputed liability.
Which statement is most accurate?
- A. The advertisement is proper, because it truthfully reports an actual verdict that Bauer obtained, and a lawyer may state facts about her results.
- B. The advertisement is proper, because a lawyer may state past results if the client consents to the use of her case, and this client appeared on camera.
- C. The advertisement is misleading, because it presents an atypical result so as to create an unjustified expectation about what Bauer can get for others.
- D. The advertisement is misleading, because a lawyer may never refer to past results in a communication about her services, whatever context she adds.
- A is wrong: truth is necessary but not sufficient; the rule reaches misleading impressions.
- B is wrong: client consent addresses confidentiality, not whether the communication misleads the public.
- Answer: C. MR 7.1 cmt. [3]: reporting a real result can still mislead when it is framed so that a reasonable viewer expects the same outcome in her own case, whatever its facts. "We get results" beside an atypical verdict does exactly that. (MR 7.1; cmt. [3])
- D is wrong: past results may be referred to if the presentation is not misleading — for example, with appropriate context. (cmt. [3])
- Tags: 10.1 · unjustified expectation · cites MR 7.1 cmt. [3]
MC-0003 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 10.1 · OUT-10.1.2)
Attorneys Chen and Diaz are sole practitioners who rent adjoining offices and share a receptionist. To look more established, they put "Chen & Diaz, Attorneys at Law" on the door, their letterhead and their website. They keep separate clients, files and finances.
Are Chen and Diaz subject to discipline?
- A. No, because lawyers who share office space and staff may use a joint name for convenience, as Chen and Diaz did.
- B. Yes, because lawyers may not share office facilities without forming a partnership.
- C. No, because a firm may practice under any name it chooses so long as it does not adopt a trade name, and this is not one.
- D. Yes, because a firm name that implies a partnership between lawyers who are not partners is misleading, and these two are not.
- A is wrong: convenience does not justify a misleading name; office-sharers must not hold themselves out as a firm.
- B is wrong: office-sharing is permitted; what is forbidden is misrepresenting the arrangement.
- C is wrong: trade names are permitted if not misleading; the problem here is the implied partnership, not a trade name. (cmt. [5])
- Answer: D. MR 7.1 cmt. [7]: lawyers may present themselves as one firm only if they actually are one firm. "Chen & Diaz" tells the public they are one firm; they are not. (MR 7.1; cmt. [7])
- Tags: 10.1 · implied partnership · cites MR 7.1 cmt. [7]
MC-0004 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 10.2 · OUT-10.2.3)
Attorney Evans pays a local tow-truck operator $250 for each motorist the operator persuades to hire Evans after an accident. The operator describes Evans as "the lawyer I'd use" and hands out her card at the scene.
Is Evans subject to discipline?
- A. No, because a lawyer may pay the reasonable costs of advertising her services, and the operator distributes her card to motorists.
- B. Yes, because a lawyer may not advertise through a third party who is not a licensed marketing agent.
- C. No, because the operator is not a lawyer and so is not bound by the rules on solicitation.
- D. Yes, because a lawyer may not reward anyone for steering clients to her, and the operator is paid per client to do exactly that.
- A is wrong: the exception covers the reasonable costs of advertising; a bounty for recommendations is not an advertising cost. (MR 7.2(b)(1); cmt. [5])
- B is wrong: no rule requires a licensed marketing agent; third-party advertising is permitted, paying for recommendations is not.
- C is wrong: the operator's status is irrelevant; the rule disciplines the lawyer for paying, and for soliciting through another.
- Answer: D. MR 7.2(b): rewarding a person, in any form, for vouching for the lawyer is prohibited, and a per-client payment to someone who recommends the lawyer and steers prospects is the paradigm case. The operator's in-person approaches are also live solicitation attributed to Evans under MR 8.4(a). (MR 7.2(b); MR 7.3(b); MR 8.4(a))
- Tags: 10.2 · runner · cites MR 7.2(b)
MC-0005 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 10.2 · OUT-10.2.3)
Attorney Ford, a family lawyer, and an accountant agree that each will refer clients needing the other's services to the other. The agreement is not exclusive, and Ford tells each referred client about it. No money changes hands.
Is the arrangement permitted?
- A. No, because a promise of future referrals is a reward to the accountant for steering clients to the lawyer, and Ford made that promise to him.
- B. No, because a lawyer may not enter into any agreement to exchange referrals with a nonlawyer, and an accountant is a nonlawyer.
- C. Yes, because a reciprocal referral agreement with a nonlawyer professional is permitted if it is not exclusive and clients are told of it.
- D. Yes, because the rule against paying for recommendations applies only to payments of money.
- A is wrong: a promise of referrals is something of value, which is why the Rule needed a specific exception — and the exception applies here.
- B is wrong: overstates the rule; such agreements are permitted on the stated conditions.
- Answer: C. MR 7.2(b)(4) expressly allows a two-way referral deal with a lawyer or a nonlawyer professional, so long as neither side is locked in and each client is told the deal exists and what it involves. Ford meets both conditions. (MR 7.2(b)(4); cmt. [8])
- D is wrong: the rule covers "anything of value," not only money; the arrangement is permitted because of the exception, not because no money passed. (MR 7.2(b))
- Tags: 10.2 · reciprocal referral · cites MR 7.2(b)(4)
MC-0006 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 10.2 · OUT-10.2.3)
Attorney Gill pays a for-profit website $400 a month. Users describe their legal problem; the site's algorithm selects one lawyer, displays only that lawyer's profile, and tells the user "we recommend this attorney for your matter." Gill is the only lawyer in her practice area who pays for the service in her county.
Is Gill subject to discipline?
- A. No, because a lawyer may pay the reasonable costs of advertising, including online lead generation, and $400 a month is reasonable.
- B. Yes, because the service recommends Gill to prospects, so her payment is for a recommendation rather than for advertising.
- C. No, because the payment is a flat monthly fee rather than a fee per client referred, so it is not a payment for any particular recommendation.
- D. Yes, because a lawyer may not use any online service to obtain clients.
- A is wrong: the exception is for advertising costs; a paid endorsement is not advertising.
- Answer: B. MR 7.2 cmt. [5] draws the line: a lawyer may pay for lead generation that does not recommend her, but not for a service that steers the prospect to her with an endorsement. "We recommend this attorney" is a recommendation; the payment is for it. (MR 7.2(b); cmt. [5])
- C is wrong: the form of the payment does not matter; a flat fee for endorsements is still a reward given in return for an endorsement.
- D is wrong: online advertising and non-recommending lead generation are permitted. (cmt. [5])
- Tags: 10.2 · lead generation vs. recommendation · cites MR 7.2 cmt. [5]
MC-0007 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 10.2 · OUT-10.2.4)
Attorney Hunt handles only immigration matters. Her website says: "Immigration Law Specialist — Practice Limited to Immigration." Hunt holds no certification from any organization, and her state has no approved certifying body for immigration law.
Which statement is most accurate under the Model Rules?
- A. Both statements are proper, because a lawyer may describe her fields of practice in any terms she chooses.
- B. "Practice Limited to Immigration" is proper, and "Specialist" is improper if it implies certification that Hunt does not have.
- C. Both statements are improper, because a lawyer may not limit her practice to one field without certification.
- D. "Specialist" is proper because Hunt genuinely concentrates in immigration, and "Practice Limited" is improper as it turns clients away.
- A is wrong: field descriptions are permitted; a certification claim is not "any terms she chooses."
- Answer: B. MR 7.2(c): a lawyer may communicate that she practices in, or limits her practice to, particular fields. She may not state or imply certification as a specialist without a qualifying certification from a named, approved body. "Specialist" next to a field label implies exactly that. (MR 7.2(c); cmt. [9])
- C is wrong: limiting a practice needs no certification. (cmt. [9])
- D is wrong: reverses the analysis; concentration does not make one a certified specialist, and limiting a practice is expressly permitted.
- Tags: 10.2 · specialist claim · cites MR 7.2(c)
MC-0008 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 10.2 · OUT-10.2.2)
Attorney Ibarra runs a series of radio advertisements for her firm that are truthful in every respect. The ads give a memorable slogan and a telephone number but never state the name of Ibarra, her firm, or any lawyer.
Are the advertisements proper?
- A. No, because every ad must name at least one lawyer or firm who answers for its content and say how that lawyer or firm can be reached.
- B. No, because a lawyer may not advertise using a slogan.
- C. Yes, because radio advertising is exempt from the identification requirement that applies to written communications about legal services.
- D. Yes, because the advertisements are truthful in every respect and provide a telephone number by which the firm can be reached.
- Answer: A. MR 7.2(d): every communication about a lawyer's services must identify by name at least one lawyer or firm accountable for it, together with a way to contact them. A number alone does not identify who is responsible. (MR 7.2(d); cmt. [12])
- B is wrong: slogans are permitted if not misleading. (MR 7.1)
- C is wrong: the requirement applies to communications in any medium.
- D is wrong: truthfulness and a contact number do not satisfy the requirement that a responsible lawyer or firm be named.
- Tags: 10.2 · responsible-lawyer requirement · cites MR 7.2(d)
MC-0009 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 10.3 · OUT-10.3.2)
After reading a news report about a bus crash, Attorney Jones obtains the passengers' names from a public accident report and telephones each one at home, offering to represent them on a contingent fee. None is a lawyer, none has any prior relationship with Jones, and none is a business.
Is Jones subject to discipline?
- A. No, because telephone calls are not in-person contact and so fall outside the rule against live person-to-person solicitation.
- B. No, because the passengers' names were in a public accident report, so contacting them was not solicitation of specific persons.
- C. Yes, because a lawyer may not solicit by live telephone contact where her financial gain is a significant motive, and no exception fits.
- D. Yes, because a lawyer may never contact a prospective client who has not first contacted her, and none of the passengers had called Jones.
- A is wrong: live telephone contact is expressly within the definition of live person-to-person contact. (cmt. [2])
- B is wrong: the source of the names is irrelevant; the lawyer started each call, aimed it at an identified person she knew had a claim, and offered to take the case. (MR 7.3(a))
- Answer: C. Live telephone contact is "live person-to-person contact" under MR 7.3(b) and cmt. [2]. Jones's motive is a contingent fee; the passengers are not lawyers, prior relationships, or routine business users. (MR 7.3(b); cmt. [2])
- D is wrong: overstates the rule; written solicitation of prospects the lawyer has not met is permitted subject to 7.3(c). (MR 7.3(c))
- Tags: 10.3 · live telephone solicitation · cites MR 7.3(b)
MC-0010 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 10.3 · OUT-10.3.2)
Attorney Kim learns from a court docket that a homeowner has been sued in foreclosure. Kim sends the homeowner a truthful letter describing her foreclosure-defense practice and offering a free consultation. Kim's state has adopted the Model Rules without modification.
Is the letter proper?
- A. No, because a lawyer may not offer her services to an identified person she knows needs a lawyer for a specific matter, and Kim knew of the suit.
- B. No, because a written solicitation must be labeled "Advertising Material" and Kim's was not.
- C. Yes, because a truthful written solicitation is permitted unless the recipient has said not to contact her or the approach is coercive.
- D. Yes, because a letter about a matter of public record is not a solicitation, and the foreclosure suit was on the public docket.
- A is wrong: states the definition of solicitation, not the prohibition; not every solicitation is barred.
- B is wrong: the Model Rule contains no labeling requirement since 2018; some states do, but the stem excludes that. (cmt. [7])
- Answer: C. The letter is a solicitation, but the MR 7.3(b) ban reaches only live person-to-person contact. A written solicitation is permitted subject to MR 7.1 and to 7.3(c) — no contact after a refusal, no coercion, duress or harassment. Neither is present. (MR 7.3(b)–(c); cmt. [2])
- D is wrong: the letter is a solicitation under 7.3(a); it is a permitted one.
- Tags: 10.3 · written solicitation · cites MR 7.3(c)
MC-0011 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 10.3 · OUT-10.3.3)
Attorney Lopez, who has never met him, telephones the general counsel of a regional retailer to offer her firm's services in defending employment-discrimination claims. The general counsel regularly hires outside counsel for such claims. Lopez's motive is to build her practice.
Is the call proper?
- A. No, because the call is live person-to-person solicitation for financial gain of a person with whom Lopez has no prior relationship at all.
- B. Yes, because a lawyer may solicit by live contact someone who regularly hires, for a business, the kind of legal help being offered.
- C. No, because a lawyer may solicit a business only through its chief executive officer.
- D. Yes, because solicitation of a corporation is never prohibited, since a corporation cannot be overreached.
- Answer: B. MR 7.3(b)(3), added in 2018: live solicitation is allowed where the person called regularly hires this kind of legal help in running a business. A general counsel who regularly retains employment-defense counsel is exactly that person. (MR 7.3(b)(3); cmt. [5])
- A is wrong: accurately describes the general prohibition but ignores the routine-business-user exception.
- C is wrong: no rule specifies whom within a business may be contacted; the test is the person's routine use of the services.
- D is wrong: the exception turns on the person's routine use of the type of service, not on corporate status; a business that has never retained such counsel is not within it. (cmt. [5])
- Tags: 10.3 · routine business user · cites MR 7.3(b)(3)
MC-0012 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 10.3 · OUT-10.3.2)
Attorney Ma, active in a tenants' rights organization, learns that a building's tenants face eviction under a clause she believes is unlawful. She visits the building, knocks on doors, and offers to represent the tenants without charge in challenging the clause. She hopes the case will establish a precedent.
Is Ma subject to discipline?
- A. No, because the ban on live person-to-person solicitation applies only where the lawyer's financial gain is a significant motive, and Ma seeks none.
- B. No, because tenants facing eviction regularly hire lawyers as part of running a business.
- C. Yes, because a lawyer may not offer free services in person to persons she has never met, and Ma had never met any of the tenants.
- D. Yes, because in-person solicitation of people known to need a lawyer for a specific matter is prohibited regardless of the lawyer's motive or of any fee.
- Answer: A. MR 7.3(b) bars live solicitation only where financial gain is a significant motive. Ma's motive is ideological and the representation is free. The truthfulness rule and 7.3(c) still apply, but nothing suggests coercion. (MR 7.3(b); cmt. [3])
- B is wrong: residential tenants are not routine business users; the reason Ma is not disciplined is her motive, not the exception. (MR 7.3(b)(3))
- C is wrong: no such rule; the absence of a fee is what takes Ma outside the prohibition.
- D is wrong: the rule is expressly limited by motive.
- Tags: 10.3 · pecuniary motive · cites MR 7.3 cmt. [3]
MC-0013 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 10.3 · OUT-10.3.4)
Attorney Nair sends a truthful letter offering representation to a man whose wife died in a workplace accident. He writes back: "Do not contact me again." Nair sends a second letter two weeks later, then telephones him, "in case he's reconsidered."
Is Nair subject to discipline?
- A. Yes, because a lawyer may not solicit a bereaved person within thirty days of a death.
- B. No, because the second letter and the call were truthful and not coercive.
- C. No, because the first letter was permitted, and later contacts in the same matter are treated as part of the original solicitation.
- D. Yes, because a lawyer may not solicit a person who has already let her know that further solicitation is unwelcome.
- A is wrong: the Model Rule has no thirty-day rule; some states do, but the stem does not supply one. (cmt. [7])
- B is wrong: truthfulness and the absence of coercion do not license contact after a refusal; 7.3(c)(1) is a separate bar.
- C is wrong: each communication is a solicitation; a refusal ends the lawyer's license to send more.
- Answer: D. MR 7.3(c)(1): once the person has signaled that solicitations are unwelcome, any further one — by any means — is prohibited. The second letter and the call each violate it; the call independently violates 7.3(b). (MR 7.3(c)(1); cmt. [7])
- Tags: 10.3 · contact after refusal · cites MR 7.3(c)(1)
MC-0014 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 10.3 · OUT-10.3.2)
Attorney Oyelaran monitors a social-media group where people post about car accidents. When a member posts about a collision, Oyelaran immediately sends the member a direct message: "Sorry to hear about your accident. I handle these cases on contingency and would be glad to talk." The member is not a lawyer and has no prior relationship with Oyelaran.
Is the message a prohibited solicitation?
- A. No, because a text-based message is not live person-to-person contact, so it is a permitted solicitation subject to the truthfulness and refusal rules.
- B. Yes, because a lawyer may not use social media to communicate with prospective clients.
- C. Yes, because a direct message sent in real time to a specific accident victim is live person-to-person contact, and the member had only just posted.
- D. No, because the member's public post about the collision was an invitation that made Oyelaran's message a response rather than a solicitation.
- Answer: A. MR 7.3 cmt. [2]: messages the recipient reads and can ignore at will — chat, texts, direct messages and other written formats — fall outside live person-to-person contact. A direct message is written; it is a solicitation, but not a live one, and is permitted subject to 7.1 and 7.3(c). (MR 7.3(b); cmt. [2])
- B is wrong: no rule bars social media as a medium; the ordinary rules apply.
- C is wrong: "real time" is not the test after 2018; the test is whether the contact is live (in person, by phone, or by live video or audio) or written.
- D is wrong: a general post about an accident is not a request for legal services directed to Oyelaran; the message was initiated by the lawyer and is a solicitation. (MR 7.3(a))
- Tags: 10.3 · written vs. live · cites MR 7.3 cmt. [2]
MC-0015 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 10.3 · OUT-10.3.5)
Attorney Park participates as a panel lawyer in a prepaid legal-services plan owned and operated by an insurance company. The plan's sales agents enroll members by telephone and door-to-door, offering future access to panel lawyers for a monthly fee. Park has no ownership or management role in the plan.
Is Park's participation proper?
- A. No, because a lawyer may not participate in a plan that solicits members by live person-to-person contact, and these agents telephone and visit door-to-door.
- B. Yes, because the solicitation rules do not apply to insurance companies.
- C. No, because participation in a plan owned by a nonlawyer is prohibited fee-sharing with a nonlawyer, and an insurance company owns this plan.
- D. Yes, because a lawyer may join a prepaid plan she neither owns nor controls even if it enrolls members live, unless it targets known legal needs.
- A is wrong: states the general rule and misses the express plan exception.
- B is wrong: the rules apply to the lawyer; the exception exists because the plan sells membership, not representation in a known matter.
- C is wrong: paying what a plan ordinarily charges its lawyers is expressly permitted (MR 7.2(b)(2)); participation is not fee-sharing where the plan does not direct the lawyer's judgment. (MR 7.2(b)(2); MR 5.4(c))
- Answer: D. MR 7.3(e): a lawyer may serve on the panel of a prepaid or group plan run by an organization she neither owns nor controls, even though the plan signs up members face to face or by phone, so long as it is not aimed at people already known to need a lawyer for a matter the plan covers. Park does not own or control the plan. (MR 7.3(e); cmt. [8])
- Tags: 10.3 · prepaid plan · cites MR 7.3(e)
MC-0016 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 10.3 · OUT-10.3.2)
Attorney Quinn instructs her investigator to attend the funeral of a man killed in an industrial accident, introduce himself to the widow, express sympathy, and mention that "Attorney Quinn has handled many cases like this and would be honored to help." Quinn never speaks to the widow herself.
Is Quinn subject to discipline?
- A. No, because Quinn made no contact with the widow personally, and the solicitation rule governs only the lawyer's own communications.
- B. Yes, because a lawyer may not employ an investigator for any marketing purpose.
- C. No, because the investigator only mentioned Quinn's experience and offered condolences, and never expressly offered representation to the widow herself.
- D. Yes, because a lawyer may not solicit through another what she may not solicit herself, and the investigator's approach was live solicitation for a fee.
- A is wrong: personal contact by the lawyer is not required; contact by her agent at her direction is hers.
- B is wrong: investigators may be used for lawful purposes; the violation is the solicitation, not the employment.
- C is wrong: "would be honored to help" from a lawyer's agent is an offer of services; the substance, not the phrasing, controls.
- Answer: D. MR 8.4(a) makes it misconduct to violate the Rules through the acts of another, and MR 7.3(a) defines solicitation to include communications on the lawyer's behalf. The investigator's funeral approach is in-person solicitation of a bereaved non-lawyer for a fee. (MR 7.3(b); MR 8.4(a))
- Tags: 10.3 · solicitation through an agent · cites MR 8.4(a)
MC-0017 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 10.1 · OUT-10.1.2)
Attorney Ruiz was elected to the state senate two years ago and has not practiced law since, though she remains a partner in "Ruiz, Salas & Tran." The firm continues to use her name in the firm name and on all letterhead, reasoning that she is still a partner.
Is the firm's continued use of Ruiz's name proper?
- A. Yes, because a firm may retain the names of former partners where there has been a continuing succession in the firm's identity, and Ruiz's name is one.
- B. Yes, because a firm may use the name of any current partner in its firm name, and Ruiz remains a partner of the firm while in the senate.
- C. No, because a public official's name may not be used in the firm name during a substantial period in which she is not actively practicing with the firm.
- D. No, because a lawyer holding public office may not remain a partner in a private law firm.
- A is wrong: the succession rule applies to deceased and retired partners' names, not to a sitting official who is nominally a partner. (cmt. [5])
- B is wrong: the public-office rule overrides the general permission to use partners' names.
- Answer: C. MR 7.1 cmt. [8]: keeping an officeholder's name on the firm while, for a substantial stretch, she is not actively and regularly practicing there is misleading. Two years in the senate without practicing is such a period. (MR 7.1; cmt. [8])
- D is wrong: the Rules do not bar an officeholder from partnership; they bar the misleading use of her name.
- Tags: 10.1 · public official's name · cites MR 7.1 cmt. [8]
MC-0018 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 10.4 · OUT-10.4)
Attorney Soto's firm contributes $40,000 to the re-election campaign of the state treasurer, timed shortly before the treasurer's office selects bond counsel for a large issue, which is not competitively bid. The firm had never contributed to the treasurer before and had sought the engagement. It is selected.
May the firm accept the engagement?
- A. Yes, because political contributions are protected speech and cannot be a ground for discipline.
- B. No, because a firm may not take government legal work that it gave campaign money in order to win, and the circumstances show that purpose.
- C. Yes, because the rule against pay-to-play applies only to appointments by judges, not to engagements awarded by executive-branch officials like a treasurer.
- D. No, because a lawyer may never accept a government engagement from an official to whose campaign she has contributed, and the firm gave $40,000.
- A is wrong: the rule does not punish the contribution; it bars accepting an engagement obtained by it. (cmt. [1])
- Answer: B. MR 7.6. Purpose is inferred from circumstances — size, timing, lack of prior giving, pursuit of the work, and a non-competitive selection — and these show a contribution made to obtain the engagement. (MR 7.6; cmts. [2], [5])
- C is wrong: the rule covers both government legal engagements and judicial appointments. (MR 7.6)
- D is wrong: overstates the rule; contributions made without the purpose of obtaining work, or work awarded through a merit-based or competitive process, are outside it. (cmts. [4]–[6])
- Tags: 10.4 · pay-to-play · cites MR 7.6
MC-0019 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 10.2 · OUT-10.2.3)
Attorney Tran sends a $60 bottle of wine to a former law-school classmate, now a corporate lawyer, who referred a client to her last month. The classmate expected nothing and had referred the client because he thought Tran would do a good job.
Is the gift proper?
- A. No, because a lawyer may not reward a person in any form for steering a client to her, and the wine was a reward for the referral.
- B. No, because gifts between lawyers for referrals are permitted only under a written reciprocal referral agreement, and Tran and her classmate have none.
- C. Yes, because a modest thank-you gift is allowed where neither side means it, or could reasonably see it, as payment for the referral.
- D. Yes, because the rule against paying for recommendations does not apply to gifts to other lawyers.
- A is wrong: states the general rule without its nominal-gift exception.
- B is wrong: reciprocal referral agreements are a different exception with different conditions; no writing requirement attaches to a nominal gift. (MR 7.2(b)(4))
- Answer: C. MR 7.2(b)(5), added in 2018: a modest token of thanks for a referral is permitted when it is not meant as payment and could not reasonably be taken as payment. A one-off bottle of wine, unexpected, is that. (MR 7.2(b)(5); cmt. [4])
- D is wrong: the rule applies to gifts to lawyers as to anyone; what saves this gift is that it is nominal, not that the recipient is a lawyer.
- Tags: 10.2 · nominal gift · cites MR 7.2(b)(5)
MC-0020 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 10.1 · OUT-10.1.1)
Attorney Uba's billboard reads: "The lowest fees in the county. No one charges less." Uba has never compared her fees with other lawyers' and has no basis for the claim beyond a belief that her fees are reasonable.
Is Uba subject to discipline?
- A. No, because a lawyer may advertise her fees in any medium, and the billboard states nothing about Uba's fees that is false.
- B. Yes, because claiming lower fees than every other lawyer with no factual basis for the claim is a misleading comparison.
- C. No, because statements about fees are opinions of value rather than statements of fact, and Uba believes her fees are the lowest.
- D. Yes, because a lawyer may not advertise fees on a billboard.
- A is wrong: fees may be advertised truthfully; a superlative comparison with no basis is not a truthful fee advertisement.
- Answer: B. MR 7.1 cmt. [3]: a claim that the lawyer is better or cheaper than her competitors misleads when it is worded so specifically that a reasonable reader would assume it could be proved, and it cannot be. "No one charges less" is exactly that. (MR 7.1; cmt. [3])
- C is wrong: "lowest in the county" is a factual comparison capable of being true or false.
- D is wrong: any medium is permitted. (MR 7.2(a))
- Tags: 10.1 · unsubstantiated comparison · cites MR 7.1 cmt. [3]
MC-0021 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 10.3 · OUT-10.3.1)
Attorney Vance mails a newsletter about recent changes in estate-tax law to 5,000 households in affluent ZIP codes. It describes the changes, mentions that Vance's firm handles estate planning, and gives the firm's contact details. Vance has no information that any recipient needs a lawyer for a specific matter.
Is the newsletter a solicitation under MR 7.3?
- A. Yes, because it is a communication initiated by the lawyer that is sent to specific households and mentions her services.
- B. No, because newsletters are exempt from the advertising rules.
- C. Yes, because any communication that identifies the lawyer's practice area and contact details offers to provide legal services to its readers.
- D. No, because it does not target identified people whom the lawyer knows, or reasonably should know, need a lawyer for a specific matter.
- A is wrong: addressing households by name is not the same as targeting people known to need a lawyer for a specific matter.
- B is wrong: newsletters are communications about the lawyer's services and must comply with MR 7.1 and 7.2(d). (MR 7.1)
- C is wrong: the definition requires all three elements; a general practice description does not by itself offer to represent a particular person in a particular matter.
- Answer: D. MR 7.3(a) requires a target: an identified person whom the lawyer knows, or reasonably should know, needs a lawyer for a specific matter. A mass mailing to households selected by ZIP code, with no knowledge of any particular need, is advertising, governed by MR 7.1 and 7.2, not solicitation. (MR 7.3(a); cmt. [1])
- Tags: 10.3 · advertising vs. solicitation · cites MR 7.3(a)
MC-0022 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 10.2 · OUT-10.2.3)
Attorney Wu agrees with a chiropractor that Wu will refer her personal-injury clients exclusively to the chiropractor for treatment, and the chiropractor will refer all of his injured patients exclusively to Wu. Wu tells each client of the arrangement. No money changes hands.
Is the arrangement proper?
- A. No, because a reciprocal referral agreement must not be exclusive, and this one is exclusive in both directions.
- B. Yes, because no payment is made, so nothing of value is given for the referrals.
- C. Yes, because a reciprocal referral agreement with a nonlawyer professional is permitted where the client is informed of it.
- D. No, because a lawyer may never refer clients to a health-care provider.
- Answer: A. MR 7.2(b)(4) permits reciprocal referral agreements only if they are not exclusive and the client is informed. Disclosure alone does not save an exclusive arrangement, which interferes with the lawyer's independent judgment about the right referral. (MR 7.2(b)(4); cmt. [8])
- B is wrong: the promise of exclusive referrals is itself something of value; the exception, not the absence of cash, is what would permit it.
- C is wrong: disclosure is one of two conditions; non-exclusivity is the other, and it fails.
- D is wrong: referrals to providers are permitted; the rule regulates reciprocal arrangements, not referrals as such.
- Tags: 10.2 · exclusive reciprocal referral · cites MR 7.2(b)(4)
MC-0023 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 10.3 · OUT-10.3.1)
A woman injured in a store telephones Attorney Xu's office, describes her fall, and asks whether Xu would represent her. Xu returns the call, discusses the case, and offers to take it on a contingent fee.
Has Xu solicited the woman in violation of MR 7.3?
- A. Yes, because Xu's return call was live telephone contact offering services to a person known to need them in a particular matter.
- B. No, because a contact is solicitation only if the lawyer or someone acting for her starts it, and the woman started this one.
- C. Yes, because a lawyer may not discuss a contingent fee by telephone with a prospective client.
- D. No, because the woman is a prospective client, and MR 7.3 applies only to current clients.
- Answer: B. MR 7.3(a): solicitation is a contact that the lawyer, or someone acting for her, starts. Responding to a prospect's own inquiry is not solicitation, however the response is delivered. (MR 7.3(a); cmt. [1])
- A is wrong: the elements of live contact and a known matter are present, but the first element — initiation by the lawyer — is not.
- C is wrong: no such rule; fee discussions by telephone are permitted.
- D is wrong: MR 7.3 is about prospective clients; it does not apply here because the woman initiated the contact.
- Tags: 10.3 · prospect-initiated contact · cites MR 7.3(a)
MC-0024 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 10.2 · OUT-10.2.4)
Attorney Yang is registered to practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office and holds no certification from any organization. Her letterhead reads "Patent Attorney."
Is the designation proper?
- A. Yes, because a lawyer admitted to practice before the Patent and Trademark Office may use the designation "Patent Attorney" under a recognized exception.
- B. Yes, because any lawyer may call herself a patent attorney if she handles patent matters.
- C. No, because a lawyer may describe her fields of practice only in the words "practices in" or "concentrates in," and Yang used neither.
- D. No, because "Patent Attorney" implies certification as a specialist, and Yang is not certified by any organization approved by an appropriate state authority.
- Answer: A. MR 7.2 cmt. [10]: registration to practice before the USPTO entitles a lawyer to call herself a "Patent Attorney" or something close to it; it is a long-established exception to the certification rule. (MR 7.2(c); cmt. [10])
- B is wrong: the designation is tied to USPTO registration, not merely to handling patent matters.
- C is wrong: no particular words are prescribed for describing fields of practice. (cmt. [9])
- D is wrong: the designation is expressly recognized and does not depend on certification by a state-approved body.
- Tags: 10.2 · patent attorney designation · cites MR 7.2 cmt. [10]
True / False
TF-0001 (OUT-10.1.1)
- Statement: A statement in a lawyer's advertisement that is literally true cannot be a misleading communication under MR 7.1.
- Answer: False
- Why: A true statement still fails MR 7.1 when a missing fact makes the overall message materially misleading, or when it creates an unjustified expectation or an unsubstantiated comparison.
- Corrected statement: A literally true statement in a lawyer's advertisement is misleading under MR 7.1 if a material omission, an unjustified expectation or an unsubstantiated comparison makes the communication as a whole materially misleading.
- Cite: MR 7.1; cmts. [2]–[3]
TF-0002 (OUT-10.2.4)
- Statement: A lawyer may state that she is a certified specialist only if she has been certified by an organization approved by an appropriate authority and the communication clearly identifies that organization.
- Answer: True
- Why: MR 7.2(c) imposes both conditions.
- Cite: MR 7.2(c)
TF-0003 (OUT-10.4)
- Statement: A lawyer may not accept an appointment by a judge if the lawyer gave campaign money in order to win, or to be in the running for, that appointment.
- Answer: True
- Why: MR 7.6 bars accepting both government legal engagements and judicial appointments so obtained.
- Cite: MR 7.6
TF-0004 (OUT-10.2.3)
- Statement: A lawyer may pay a for-profit online service that recommends her to prospective clients, because the payment is a cost of advertising.
- Answer: False
- Why: Paying a service that recommends the lawyer is giving something of value for a recommendation, prohibited by MR 7.2(b); the advertising-cost exception covers services that advertise without recommending.
- Corrected statement: A lawyer may pay the reasonable costs of an online service that advertises her or generates leads without recommending her; she may not pay a service that recommends her to prospective clients.
- Cite: MR 7.2(b)(1); cmt. [5]
TF-0005 (OUT-10.2.2)
- Statement: Every communication about a lawyer's services must identify by name at least one lawyer or firm that answers for what it says, along with a way to contact that lawyer or firm.
- Answer: True
- Why: MR 7.2(d) so requires, in any medium.
- Cite: MR 7.2(d)
TF-0006 (OUT-10.3.3)
- Statement: A lawyer may solicit by live telephone call a person who regularly hires, for a business, the same type of legal help the lawyer offers.
- Answer: True
- Why: MR 7.3(b)(3) excepts such persons from the live-contact prohibition.
- Cite: MR 7.3(b)(3); cmt. [5]
TF-0007 (OUT-10.3.2)
- Statement: A lawyer may not solicit a specific prospective client by any means if the lawyer's financial gain is a significant motive.
- Answer: False
- Why: The MR 7.3(b) prohibition reaches only live person-to-person contact; written, recorded and electronic solicitations are permitted subject to MR 7.1 and 7.3(c).
- Corrected statement: A lawyer may not solicit a specific prospective client by live person-to-person contact if the lawyer's financial gain is a significant motive, unless an exception applies; solicitation by written or electronic means is permitted subject to the truthfulness rule and the bars on contact after refusal and on coercion.
- Cite: MR 7.3(b)–(c); cmt. [2]
TF-0008 (OUT-10.3.4)
- Statement: Under the Model Rules, a written solicitation to a prospective client must be labeled "Advertising Material."
- Answer: False
- Why: The labeling requirement was removed from MR 7.3 in 2018; some states retain one, but the Model Rule does not.
- Corrected statement: Under the Model Rules a written solicitation need not carry an "Advertising Material" label; it must be truthful and must not be sent to a person who has asked not to be solicited or by means involving coercion, duress or harassment.
- Cite: MR 7.3(c); cmt. [7]
Scenario Walkthroughs
SW-0001 · The Bus Crash
Facts. A charter bus overturns on an interstate, injuring thirty passengers. Attorney Adeyemi, a personal-injury lawyer, takes four steps within 48 hours. (1) She buys a search-engine advertisement keyed to "bus crash lawyer" that displays her firm's name, number and website. (2) She obtains the passenger list from the police report and mails each passenger a truthful letter describing her experience with transportation cases and offering a free consultation. (3) She telephones one passenger, the general counsel of a trucking company, whom she has never met, and offers to represent him. (4) She sends her paralegal to the hospital to visit three passengers, hand out her card, and say she "would be glad to help." One of the mailed passengers writes back "please do not contact me"; Adeyemi's office sends him a follow-up letter a week later. Adeyemi's state has adopted the Model Rules without modification.
Issues. Which of the five communications are permitted, which are prohibited, and why?
Analysis.
- The search advertisement. Directed to the public, not to specific persons; not a solicitation at all. Governed by MR 7.1 (truthful) and 7.2 (any medium; responsible lawyer identified; reasonable advertising cost paid to the search engine, which does not recommend her). Permitted.
- The letters. Each is a solicitation under 7.3(a): started by the lawyer, aimed at an identified person she knows needs a lawyer for a specific matter, offering to take it. But 7.3(b) bars only live person-to-person contact. A letter is written; it is permitted subject to 7.1 and 7.3(c). Under the Model Rules no label or waiting period is required. Permitted — as to every recipient except one (see 5).
- The call to the general counsel. Live telephone contact for financial gain — prohibited unless an exception applies. Two exceptions must be checked separately. The routine-business-user exception (7.3(b)(3)) does not fit: it asks whether this person regularly hires this type of legal help for a business — personal-injury representation of himself — and a general counsel who retains outside counsel for his company does not routinely buy that. But the first exception (7.3(b)(1)) does fit: he is a lawyer. On that ground alone the call is permitted. The stem is built to tempt the "he's a business person" answer; the correct route is the simpler one.
- The paralegal's hospital visits. In-person contact with injured non-lawyers, for the lawyer's financial gain, on the lawyer's instructions. MR 8.4(a) attributes it to Adeyemi; 7.3(b) prohibits it. The card and "glad to help" are an offer of services. Prohibited. The setting — a hospital, within 48 hours — also raises 7.3(c)(2) (exploiting the prospects' condition) and would violate most states' waiting-period rules.
- The follow-up letter. The recipient told Adeyemi to stop. MR 7.3(c)(1) bars any further solicitation. Prohibited — and "my office sent it" is no defense (MR 5.3; 8.4(a)).
Conclusion. Advertisement: proper. Letters: proper, except the follow-up to the passenger who said no. Call to the general counsel: permitted, because he is a lawyer — not because he is a business user. Hospital visits: prohibited solicitation through an agent. The pattern to carry: the medium (live vs. written) and the person (lawyer, prior relationship, routine business user) decide the live-contact question; refusal and coercion are checked for every solicitation regardless.
Rules. MR 7.1 · MR 7.2(a), (b)(1), (d) · MR 7.3(a), (b)(1)–(3), (c)(1)–(2); cmts. [1]–[5], [7] · MR 8.4(a) · MR 5.3
SW-0002 · Building the Practice
Facts. Attorney Brandt, three years into solo practice in elder law, wants more clients. She (1) renames her practice "Senior Legal Services Center"; (2) adds to her website "Certified Elder Law Specialist" on the strength of a weekend course that issued a certificate, in a state that has approved one certifying organization for elder law, of which Brandt is not a member; (3) agrees with a financial planner that each will refer clients to the other, non-exclusively, and discloses the arrangement to clients; (4) pays a for-profit "Find-a-Lawyer" website $300 a month to list her as its "recommended elder-law attorney" for her city; (5) sends a $40 fruit basket to a former client who referred her sister; and (6) contributes $500 to the campaign of a probate judge, hoping to be appointed guardian ad litem in the judge's cases, which the judge assigns at her discretion.
Issues. Which of the six steps are proper under the Model Rules?
Analysis.
- The trade name. Trade names are permitted if not misleading (MR 7.1 cmt. [5]). "Senior Legal Services Center" describes the practice; the risk is that "Legal Services" implies a public or charitable legal-aid organization. Whether it misleads depends on the presentation; the safer course is a name that does not echo the legal-aid vocabulary. Permitted if not presented so as to imply a charitable or governmental connection; a reviewer would flag the phrasing.
- "Certified Elder Law Specialist." MR 7.2(c): certification may be claimed only if the lawyer is certified by an organization approved by an appropriate authority (or ABA-accredited) and the communication names it. A weekend-course certificate from an unapproved body is not that, and the state has an approved body Brandt does not belong to. Prohibited — and misleading under 7.1 as well.
- The reciprocal referral agreement. MR 7.2(b)(4): with a nonlawyer professional, non-exclusive, disclosed to clients. Permitted, provided it does not interfere with Brandt's judgment about whom to refer and is not of indefinite duration.
- The "recommended attorney" listing. The site recommends her for a monthly payment. That is giving something of value for a recommendation, not paying the reasonable cost of advertising (MR 7.2 cmt. [5]). Prohibited.
- The fruit basket. A modest thank-you that no one treats as payment for the referral. MR 7.2(b)(5). Permitted.
- The judicial campaign contribution. MR 7.6 bars taking a judicial appointment when the lawyer contributed in order to win it or to be in the running for it. Brandt's stated hope is exactly that purpose. The contribution itself is not the violation; accepting a guardian-ad-litem appointment from that judge would be — unless the appointment falls within an exclusion (uncompensated, or made under a rotation system for the indigent), which the facts do not show.
Conclusion. Proper: the reciprocal referral (3) and the gift (5); the trade name (1) if presented carefully. Improper: the specialist claim (2), the paid recommendation (4), and any appointment accepted after the purposeful contribution (6). The recurring test is the same one throughout the section — does the communication mislead, and is anyone being paid, in cash or kind, to recommend the lawyer?
Rules. MR 7.1; cmt. [5] · MR 7.2(b)(4)–(5), (c); cmts. [4]–[5], [8]–[9] · MR 7.6; cmts. [2], [4]–[6]
Key terms
Each term is marked once in Part A at its definition and has a term card above.
| ID | Term | Outline | Card |
|---|---|---|---|
| KT-0001 | False or misleading communication | OUT-10.1.1 | FC-0001 |
| KT-0002 | Unsubstantiated comparison | OUT-10.1.1 | FC-0002 |
| KT-0003 | Trade name | OUT-10.1.2 | FC-0003 |
| KT-0004 | Runner | OUT-10.2.3 | FC-0004 |
| KT-0005 | Reciprocal referral agreement | OUT-10.2.3 | FC-0005 |
| KT-0006 | Nominal gift | OUT-10.2.3 | FC-0006 |
| KT-0007 | Qualified lawyer referral service | OUT-10.2.3 | FC-0007 |
| KT-0008 | Certified specialist | OUT-10.2.4 | FC-0008 |
| KT-0009 | Solicitation | OUT-10.3.1 | FC-0009 |
| KT-0010 | Live person-to-person contact | OUT-10.3.2 | FC-0010 |
| KT-0011 | Coercion, duress or harassment | OUT-10.3.4 | FC-0011 |
| KT-0012 | Legal service plan | OUT-10.3.5 | FC-0012 |
| KT-0013 | Pay-to-play | OUT-10.4 | FC-0013 |
| Proposition taught at OUT-10.0 | Decision to confirm |
|---|---|
| Truthful lawyer advertising is protected commercial speech; a blanket ban is unconstitutional | Bates v. State Bar of Arizona (U.S. 1977) |
| In-person solicitation of lay prospects for pecuniary gain may be flatly prohibited | Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association (U.S. 1978) |
| Solicitation for political or ideological ends, without pecuniary motive, is protected association | In re Primus (U.S. 1978) |
| Truthful, non-deceptive advertising of specific legal services, including illustrations, may not be banned; disclosure requirements may be imposed | Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel (U.S. 1985) |
| Targeted direct-mail solicitation may be regulated but not banned outright | Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association (U.S. 1988) |
| A short waiting period on targeted mail to accident victims and their families is constitutional | Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. (U.S. 1995) |