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Subject 11: Lawyers' Duties to the Public and the Legal System

Free MPRE Study Material · NCBE weight: 2–4% · © 2026 PryvixLabs LLC. All rights reserved.

In this packet: Lawyers' Duties to the Public and the Legal System Outline, 11 multiple-choice questions, 4 true/false statements, 10 flashcards, 1 scenario walkthrough and 6 key terms.

Outlines1 outline
Multiple Choice11 questions
True/False4 statements
Flashcards10 cards
Walkthroughs1 walkthrough
Key Terms6 terms

11. Lawyers' Duties to the Public and the Legal System

11.0 The Framework: A Lawyer Is a Public Citizen

Rule: Beyond the duties owed to clients, courts and opponents, a lawyer owes something to the system that licenses her: to help make legal services available, to accept her share of unwanted work, to support the institutions that reform the law and serve the poor, and not to undermine the courts or the officials who staff them. This section collects those duties. Only some of them are enforceable by discipline; the exam tests which.

The section in one table:

Situation Rule Enforceable by discipline?
Doing free work for those who cannot pay MR 6.1 No — aspirational
Being appointed by a court to represent someone MR 6.2 Yes — may decline only for good cause
Sitting on the board of a legal-aid organization MR 6.3 Yes — must abstain from decisions that conflict
Working for law reform that may affect a client MR 6.4 Yes — must disclose a client's material benefit
Giving short-term limited help at a clinic or hotline MR 6.5 Yes — relaxed conflict rules apply
Criticizing a judge or judicial candidate MR 8.2 Yes — no knowing or reckless falsehood
Claiming to have improper influence MR 8.4(e) Yes
Helping a judge break the judicial code MR 8.4(f) Yes
Giving political contributions to land government legal work or a judicial appointment MR 7.6 Yes — taught in S10 at OUT-10.4

⚠ Exam trap: the section's single most tested point is the first row. MR 6.1 is the only Model Rule written as "should" rather than "shall," and a lawyer who does no pro bono work at all is not subject to discipline for that. An answer choice that disciplines a lawyer for failing to meet the 50-hour figure is wrong.

Cite: Preamble [6]; MR 6.1–6.5; MR 8.2; MR 8.4(e)–(f)


11.1 Pro Bono Service (MR 6.1)

11.1.1 The aspiration

Rule: MR 6.1 treats free legal help for people who cannot afford a lawyer as part of every lawyer's job, and sets a yearly target of at least fifty hours of Pro bono publico service. The target is phrased as "should": falling short of it carries no disciplinary sanction.

Explanation, organized by the questions a lawyer asks when she tallies her hours:

  1. "Am I working for free, for someone who could not otherwise pay a lawyer?" If the answer is yes — whether she helps a low-income person directly or helps a church, charity, civic group, school, public body or similar group whose work is mainly about serving low-income people — the hours belong to the core. Most of the fifty, by a clear margin, should come from here. The test is the absence of any fee or any expectation of one. (6.1(a))
  2. "Am I serving a public purpose, either free or at a steep discount?" Then the hours fill out the balance. Three kinds of work qualify: free or deeply discounted help for groups defending civil rights or civil liberties, or for community and nonprofit groups whose budgets cannot cover ordinary rates; discounted — not free — work for low-income individuals; and time spent making the law, the justice system or the profession work better, such as bar committees, law-reform projects and teaching. (6.1(b))
  3. "Can I write a check instead?" Donating to groups that serve low-income clients is encouraged on top of the hours, and a lawyer who cannot put in the time may give money instead — but money is not itself the personal service the aspiration describes. (cmt. [9])
  4. "Does my firm count as a team?" Yes: a firm may meet the target collectively, with some lawyers carrying more so that others carry less. (cmt. [9])
  5. "I work for the government — what then?" A public post may rule out some pro bono work; the lawyer can meet the target through the categories her position allows. (cmt. [5])

Not enforceable. The comment to MR 6.1 makes plain that bar discipline is not the tool for policing it. A jurisdiction may adopt mandatory reporting of pro bono hours, and a few require the hours themselves; those are local variations, not the Model Rule.

Example: A lawyer does no pro bono work for five years and makes no charitable contribution. She has failed to meet a professional responsibility. She is not subject to discipline.

⚠ Exam trap: "should" versus "shall." MR 6.1 says should. Everything else in this section says shall or shall not.

Cite: MR 6.1(a)–(b) and cmts. [1]–[12]


11.2 Accepting Appointments (MR 6.2)

11.2.1 The duty, and the three grounds to decline

Rule: A lawyer may not seek to avoid a court's Appointment to represent a person, except for Good cause. Three things are good cause: (1) accepting would probably put the lawyer in breach of the Rules or other law; (2) accepting would probably saddle her with an unreasonable financial burden; or (3) her revulsion toward the client or his cause runs so deep that it would probably damage her working bond with the client or the quality of her advocacy.

Explanation, ground by ground:

  1. Violation of law or the Rules. The paradigm is a conflict of interest: the appointed lawyer has a conflict under MR 1.7 or 1.9 that consent cannot cure. Or the appointment would require the lawyer to handle a matter in which she is not competent and cannot become competent in time (MR 1.1). (cmt. [2])
  2. Unreasonable financial burden. An appointment that pays nothing or a nominal fee is not, by itself, an unreasonable burden — the Rule assumes appointed work is often uncompensated or under-compensated. The burden must be unreasonable: an appointment that would consume months of a sole practitioner's time and threaten her practice's survival, for example. (cmt. [2])
  3. Repugnance that would impair the representation. The test is not whether the lawyer dislikes the client or the cause — she may represent someone she dislikes perfectly well — but whether the feeling runs so deep that it would probably damage her working bond with the client or the quality of her advocacy. A lawyer's ordinary distaste for an accused's alleged crime is not good cause. (cmt. [2])

What is not good cause: that the client cannot pay; that the matter is unpopular; that the client's cause is one the lawyer disagrees with; that the lawyer's other clients or community may disapprove. Representing a client does not constitute an endorsement of the client's views (MR 1.2(b)), and the comment reminds the profession that lawyers have historically taken the unpopular cases. (cmt. [1])

The mechanism: a lawyer with good cause seeks leave to decline from the appointing court; she does not simply refuse. The court decides.

Example: A court appoints a lawyer to defend a man charged with a violent crime against a child. The lawyer finds the charge deeply distasteful but can represent him competently and loyally. That is not good cause. If, however, the victim were the lawyer's own niece, the lawyer's inability to represent the accused loyally would be.

⚠ Exam trap: the answer choice that lets the lawyer decline because "the client's cause is repugnant to her." The Rule requires revulsion deep enough to damage the representation. Distaste is not enough.

Cite: MR 6.2 and cmts. [1]–[3]; MR 1.2(b); MR 1.1; MR 1.7


11.3 Serving Legal-Services Organizations (MR 6.3) and Law Reform (MR 6.4)

11.3.1 Board service at a legal-aid organization

Rule: A lawyer is free to hold a board seat, an office or a membership in a Legal services organization even though the organization serves people on the other side from her own clients. What she may not do is knowingly join in an organization decision or action that would clash with her own loyalty obligations to a client under MR 1.7, or one that could significantly damage the organization's work for a person whose interests run against one of her clients.

Explanation:

  • Why the permission exists. Legal-aid boards need lawyers. If every lawyer whose firm had ever opposed a legal-aid client were disqualified from serving, the boards would be empty. So board membership is not, by itself, a representation of the organization's clients and does not create a conflict — serving the organization as a board member is different from representing any individual the organization serves. (cmt. [1])
  • The two abstention triggers: 1. Incompatibility with the lawyer's own MR 1.7 duties — for instance, a board vote to adopt a litigation policy targeting an industry the lawyer represents. 2. A decision that could significantly damage the organization's work for someone on the opposite side from the lawyer's client — for instance, a vote on whether the organization should take a particular case against the lawyer's client.
  • What to do: abstain from the decision. Resigning from the board is not required. The organization should have policies that let the lawyer step aside without disclosing the identity of the client who creates the conflict. (cmt. [2])

Example: A partner in a firm that represents a large landlord sits on the board of the city's legal-aid society. The board considers whether to bring a class action against that landlord. The partner must not participate in that decision. She may remain on the board.

11.3.2 Law reform that may affect a client

Rule: The same freedom extends to a lawyer who joins, leads or sits on the board of a group pursuing Law reform activity, even when the change it seeks could touch a client's interests. If she actually knows that a decision she helps make could materially benefit one of her clients, she must tell the group so; the client's name can stay confidential.

Explanation:

  • The permission mirrors 6.3: lawyers should be free to work on bar committees, uniform-law commissions and advocacy groups without a conflict analysis every time a client might be affected. (cmt. [1])
  • The disclosure switches on only when the lawyer knows that a client stands to gain materially from a vote or decision she takes part in. The lawyer reveals that a client may benefit — so the organization can weigh her contribution accordingly — but the client's identity remains confidential. (6.4; cmt. [1])
  • Compare 6.3: 6.3 requires abstention when the lawyer's own duties or an organization client's interests are at stake; 6.4 requires disclosure when a client may benefit. The difference is that a lawyer advocating a reform that helps her client is not disloyal to anyone — the concern is candor to the organization, not conflict.

Example: A tax lawyer serves on a bar committee drafting proposed amendments to the state's tax code. One proposal would benefit a client she represents in a pending audit. She must tell the committee that a client of hers may benefit; she need not say who.

⚠ Exam trap: answer choices that require the 6.4 lawyer to resign, to abstain, or to name the client. None is required. The duty is to reveal that some client of hers stands to gain.

Cite: MR 6.3 and cmts. [1]–[2]; MR 6.4 and cmt. [1]; MR 1.7


11.4 Short-Term Limited Legal Services (MR 6.5)

Rule: A lawyer who gives short-term limited legal services to a client through a program sponsored by a nonprofit organization or a court — a legal-advice hotline, a courthouse help desk, a walk-in clinic — without expectation that she or her firm will continue to represent the client, is subject to the concurrent- and former-client conflict rules (MR 1.7 and 1.9(a)) only if she knows of a conflict, and is subject to the imputation rule (MR 1.10) only if she knows that another lawyer in her firm would be disqualified.

Explanation:

  • The problem the rule solves: at a walk-in clinic there is no time to run a conflicts check, and the lawyer may never learn the client's full name or the adverse party's. Applying the full conflict rules would make such programs impossible to staff. (cmt. [1])
  • The relaxation: 1.7 and 1.9(a) apply only on actual knowledge of a conflict. 1.10 imputation runs only where the lawyer knows a firm colleague is disqualified. And a lawyer's participation does not, by itself, impute the clinic client's conflicts to the firm for other matters. (cmts. [2]–[4])
  • What does not relax: competence, confidentiality (MR 1.6), the limited-scope requirements of MR 1.2(c) — the client must understand the representation is limited to the clinic encounter — and the other Rules. (cmt. [2])
  • When it ends: if the lawyer, after the short-term service, takes the client on for continuing representation, the ordinary conflict rules apply from that point. (cmt. [5])

Example: At a bar-sponsored eviction clinic a lawyer advises a tenant for twenty minutes. She does not know that her firm represents the tenant's landlord in an unrelated matter. She has not violated MR 1.7 or 1.10. If she later agrees to represent the tenant in the eviction case, the ordinary rules apply and the conflict must be addressed.

Cite: MR 6.5 and cmts. [1]–[5]; MR 1.2(c); MR 1.7; 1.9(a); 1.10


11.5 Criticizing Judges and Judicial Candidates (MR 8.2)

11.5.1 The false-statement rule

Rule: A lawyer may not make a statement about the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer, public legal officer, or a candidate for judicial or legal office that the lawyer knows is false, or makes with Reckless disregard as to whether it is true or false.

Explanation:

  • Who is protected: judges; other adjudicatory officers (magistrates, hearing officers, arbitrators sitting in an adjudicative role); public legal officers (a district attorney, an attorney general); and candidates for any of those offices. (8.2(a))
  • What is prohibited: false statements of fact about qualifications or integrity, made with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard — the standard borrowed from defamation law for public figures. A statement the lawyer honestly and reasonably believes, even if it turns out to be wrong, is not prohibited. (cmt. [1])
  • What is not prohibited: honest criticism of a judge's rulings, reasoning, or competence expressed as opinion; participation in the evaluation of judicial candidates; and statements the lawyer has a reasonable basis for. The comment expressly encourages lawyers to express honest and candid opinions about judges and candidates, because the public depends on the bar for that information. (cmt. [1])
  • Why the line is where it is: unfounded attacks on a judge's integrity undermine public confidence in the courts, but a rule that chilled honest criticism would undermine the courts more. (cmt. [1])

Example: A lawyer who lost a motion tells a reporter, "The judge was bought — everybody knows she takes money from the plaintiff's bar." The lawyer has no evidence. That is a statement about the judge's integrity made with reckless disregard for its truth. Saying instead, "I think the ruling was wrong and the reasoning doesn't hold up," is protected opinion.

⚠ Exam trap: the exam distinguishes criticism (permitted, even harsh) from factual accusation without basis (prohibited). Look for a statement of fact about integrity — bribery, bias for pay, dishonesty — asserted without a reasonable basis.

11.5.2 The lawyer who runs for judge

Rule: A lawyer who is a candidate for judicial office must comply with the applicable provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

  • The CJC's Canon 4 governs judicial campaign conduct — no promises about how cases will be decided, no personal solicitation of campaign funds, no misrepresentations. A lawyer-candidate who violates them is subject to lawyer discipline under MR 8.2(b), whether or not she wins. (8.2(b); cmt. [2]; S12)

Cite: MR 8.2(a)–(b) and cmts. [1]–[2]; CJC Canon 4


11.6 Improper Influence (MR 8.4(e)–(f)) and the Cross-References

11.6.1 Claiming influence one should not have

Rule: A lawyer commits professional misconduct by claiming, openly or by suggestion, that she can sway a government agency or official through improper channels, or that she can get results by methods that break the Rules or other law.

  • The vice is the claim, whether or not the influence exists. "I play golf with the commissioner — this permit is as good as issued" is misconduct even if the lawyer has never met the commissioner. (8.4(e))
  • It is equally misconduct to imply that results will be achieved by improper means: "I know how to get this in front of the right clerk."
  • Legitimate statements about experience, familiarity with a tribunal's practices, or professional relationships that are not improper are not within the rule. The line is improper influence.

11.6.2 Helping a judge break the judicial code

Rule: A lawyer commits professional misconduct by helping a judge or other judicial officer, with knowledge, to breach the Code of Judicial Conduct or other law.

  • Examples: helping a judge conceal a disqualifying interest; arranging a gift to a judge that the CJC forbids; assisting a judge's improper ex parte contact. (8.4(f); S12)
  • "Knowingly" — the lawyer must know the conduct violates the judicial code.

11.6.3 Cross-references the exam pairs with this section

  • Political contributions to obtain work (MR 7.6; NCBE XI.F): taught at S10 OUT-10.4 — study it there as part of this section. A lawyer may not accept a government engagement or judicial appointment obtained by contributions made for that purpose.
  • Assisting unauthorized practice (MR 5.5(a)) — an extra cross-reference, not NCBE XI.H: taught at S01. A lawyer may not practice where she is not licensed, or assist another in doing so.
  • Impartiality of the tribunal (MR 3.5): taught at S06. No improper influence on judges or jurors; no ex parte contact unless authorised.
  • Discrimination and harassment (MR 8.4(g)): taught at S01. Conduct the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is harassment or discrimination on a protected basis in conduct related to the practice of law.

Cite: MR 8.4(e)–(f); MR 7.6; MR 5.5(a); MR 3.5; MR 8.4(g)


11.7 Must-Know Checklist (Section 11)

  1. Pro bono (6.1) is aspirational — a 50-hour yearly target, most of it free work for people who cannot afford a lawyer or for groups that serve them — and not enforceable by discipline. The only "should" rule.
  2. Appointments (6.2): may not seek to avoid one except for good cause — likely violation of law or the Rules; unreasonable financial burden; repugnance so intense it would impair the representation. Distaste, unpopularity and inability to pay are not good cause.
  3. Legal-aid boards (6.3): may serve despite adverse organization clients; must abstain from a decision that clashes with her own MR 1.7 duties or could significantly damage the organization's work for someone opposed to her client. Need not resign.
  4. Law reform (6.4): may serve despite effects on clients; when the lawyer knows a client stands to gain materially, must say so — without naming the client.
  5. Short-term limited services (6.5): at a nonprofit or court program, 1.7 and 1.9(a) apply only if the lawyer knows of the conflict; 1.10 only if she knows a colleague is disqualified. Ordinary rules resume if the representation continues.
  6. Criticizing judges (8.2(a)): no statement about qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer, public legal officer or candidate that the lawyer knows is false or makes with reckless disregard. Honest criticism and opinion are protected.
  7. Lawyer-candidates for judicial office (8.2(b)) must follow the Code of Judicial Conduct.
  8. No claiming improper influence (8.4(e)) — the claim is the violation, true or not.
  9. Never knowingly help a judge breach the judicial code (8.4(f)).
  10. Pointer — political contributions to obtain government work or judicial appointments (MR 7.6, NCBE XI.F): taught in S10 at OUT-10.4.

11.8 Common Traps

  • Disciplining a lawyer for doing no pro bono work.
  • Letting an appointed lawyer decline because the client cannot pay, or because the crime is distasteful.
  • Requiring the 6.3 board member to resign rather than abstain.
  • Requiring the 6.4 lawyer to name the client, or to abstain.
  • Treating harsh criticism of a ruling as an 8.2 violation.
  • Treating a groundless accusation of bribery as "just criticism."
  • Assuming a lawyer must actually have improper influence to violate 8.4(e).
  • Forgetting that MR 6.5's relaxed conflict rules stop when the representation continues past the clinic.

Part B: Items

Flashcards

Format: Front · Definition · Explanation · Example · Exam trap · Cite · Outline · Related. Term cards first (6), then concept cards (4).

FC-0001 (term card · OUT-11.1.1)

  • Front: Pro bono publico service
  • Definition: Legal work done for free, with no expectation of payment, mainly for people who cannot afford a lawyer or for groups that serve them; the MR 6.1 target is at least fifty hours a year.
  • Explanation: MR 6.1 is aspirational — the only Model Rule phrased as "should" — and is not enforceable by discipline. Most of the hours should go to free work for low-income people or the groups serving them; the rest may include reduced-fee work and law-improvement activities. Firms may aggregate; financial support is encouraged in addition.
  • Example: Fifty hours a year representing tenants at a legal-aid clinic.
  • Exam trap: Disciplining a lawyer for doing none.
  • Cite: MR 6.1; cmts. [1], [9], [12] · Outline: OUT-11.1.1 · Related: FC-0007

FC-0002 (term card · OUT-11.2.1)

  • Front: Appointment
  • Definition: A court's designation of a lawyer to represent a person, typically one who cannot afford counsel or whose cause is unpopular.
  • Explanation: MR 6.2: a lawyer may not seek to avoid an appointment except for good cause. Unpopularity, inability to pay, and ordinary distaste are not good cause. The lawyer seeks leave to decline; the court decides.
  • Example: Appointment to defend an indigent criminal defendant.
  • Exam trap: Simply refusing rather than seeking leave.
  • Cite: MR 6.2; cmt. [1] · Outline: OUT-11.2.1 · Related: FC-0003

FC-0003 (term card · OUT-11.2.1)

  • Front: Good cause
  • Definition: The only basis on which a lawyer may seek to avoid a court appointment: a probable breach of the Rules or other law; an unreasonable financial burden; or revulsion toward the client or cause deep enough to damage the relationship or the advocacy.
  • Explanation: MR 6.2(a)–(c). A conflict of interest is the paradigm of the first; the second requires more than uncompensated work; the third requires revulsion deep enough to do damage, not mere distaste.
  • Example: An appointment to represent the man accused of assaulting the lawyer's own sister.
  • Exam trap: "The cause is repugnant to her" without the impairment element.
  • Cite: MR 6.2(a)–(c); cmt. [2] · Outline: OUT-11.2.1 · Related: FC-0002

FC-0004 (term card · OUT-11.3.1)

  • Front: Legal services organization
  • Definition: An organization — a legal-aid society, a public-interest law office — that provides legal services to persons who cannot otherwise obtain them.
  • Explanation: MR 6.3 lets a lawyer sit on its board, hold office in it or belong to it even though it serves people on the other side from her clients. She must sit out any decision that clashes with her own MR 1.7 duties or could significantly damage its work for someone opposed to her client; she need not resign.
  • Example: The city legal-aid society's board.
  • Exam trap: Treating board service as representation of the organization's clients.
  • Cite: MR 6.3; cmts. [1]–[2] · Outline: OUT-11.3.1 · Related: FC-0005

FC-0005 (term card · OUT-11.3.2)

  • Front: Law reform activity
  • Definition: Work — through a bar committee, a law-revision commission, an advocacy organization — aimed at changing the law or improving the legal system.
  • Explanation: MR 6.4 permits a lawyer to take part even though the reform may affect a client. If she knows a client stands to gain materially from a decision she helps make, she must tell the group so, and may keep the client's name confidential. No abstention or resignation is required.
  • Example: Drafting proposed tax-code amendments on a bar committee while representing a client the amendments would help.
  • Exam trap: Requiring the lawyer to name the client.
  • Cite: MR 6.4; cmt. [1] · Outline: OUT-11.3.2 · Related: FC-0004

FC-0006 (term card · OUT-11.5.1)

  • Front: Reckless disregard
  • Definition: Making a statement of fact without caring whether it is true or false — the state of mind that, along with actual knowledge of falsity, makes a lawyer's statement about a judge's qualifications or integrity a violation of MR 8.2(a).
  • Explanation: The standard is borrowed from defamation law. Honest opinion, harsh criticism of rulings, and statements with a reasonable basis are protected; groundless factual accusations of corruption or bias are not.
  • Example: "The judge takes money from the plaintiffs' bar," said with no evidence.
  • Exam trap: Treating any harsh criticism of a judge as a violation.
  • Cite: MR 8.2(a); cmt. [1] · Outline: OUT-11.5.1 · Related: FC-0009

FC-0007 (concept card · OUT-11.1.1)

  • Front: Is a lawyer subject to discipline for doing no pro bono work?
  • Definition: No. MR 6.1 describes a professional responsibility and a fifty-hour yearly target, and its comment makes clear that bar discipline does not police it.
  • Explanation: Some jurisdictions require reporting of hours, and a very few mandate hours; those are local rules, not the Model Rule.
  • Example: A lawyer who does no free work for years has failed an aspiration, not a rule.
  • Exam trap: "Shall" versus "should."
  • Cite: MR 6.1; cmt. [12] · Outline: OUT-11.1.1 · Related: FC-0001

FC-0008 (concept card · OUT-11.4)

  • Front: Do the usual conflict rules apply to a lawyer volunteering at a walk-in legal clinic?
  • Definition: Only in part. Under MR 6.5, in short-term limited services through a nonprofit or court program, MR 1.7 and 1.9(a) apply only if the lawyer knows of a conflict, and MR 1.10 only if she knows a firm colleague is disqualified.
  • Explanation: There is no time for a conflicts check at a clinic. The other Rules — competence, confidentiality, the limited-scope requirements — apply in full. If the representation continues past the clinic, the ordinary conflict rules resume.
  • Example: Twenty minutes of advice to a tenant whose landlord the lawyer's firm unknowingly represents elsewhere.
  • Exam trap: Assuming the relaxation survives an ongoing engagement.
  • Cite: MR 6.5; cmts. [1]–[5] · Outline: OUT-11.4 · Related: FC-0004

FC-0009 (concept card · OUT-11.5.1)

  • Front: Who is protected by the rule against false statements about judicial officers?
  • Definition: Judges; other adjudicatory officers; public legal officers such as a district attorney or attorney general; and candidates for any judicial or legal office.
  • Explanation: MR 8.2(a). The protected subject is their qualifications or integrity; the prohibited state of mind is knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard. A lawyer who runs for judicial office must also comply with the Code of Judicial Conduct (8.2(b)).
  • Example: A false accusation that a candidate for district attorney fabricated evidence.
  • Exam trap: Assuming only sitting judges are covered.
  • Cite: MR 8.2(a)–(b) · Outline: OUT-11.5.1–11.5.2 · Related: FC-0006

FC-0010 (concept card · OUT-11.6.1)

  • Front: Is it misconduct to claim influence with an official that the lawyer does not actually have?
  • Definition: Yes. Under MR 8.4(e) a lawyer may not claim, openly or by suggestion, that she can sway a government agency or official through improper channels, or that she can get results by methods that break the Rules or other law. The claim is the violation, whether or not the influence exists.
  • Explanation: Truthful statements about experience or legitimate professional relationships are not within the rule; the word is improperly.
  • Example: "I play golf with the commissioner — your permit is as good as issued."
  • Exam trap: Thinking the lawyer must actually have the influence.
  • Cite: MR 8.4(e) · Outline: OUT-11.6.1 · Related: FC-0006

Multiple choice

MC-0001 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 11.1 · OUT-11.1.1)

Attorney Adler, a partner at a large firm, has performed no pro bono work in six years and has made no financial contribution to any legal-services organization. Her state has adopted the Model Rules without modification.

Is Adler subject to discipline?

  • A. No, because the pro bono responsibility applies only to sole practitioners and small firms.
  • B. Yes, because a lawyer must render at least fifty hours of pro bono service each year.
  • C. Yes, because a lawyer who does not perform pro bono service must make a financial contribution instead.
  • D. No, because the pro bono rule is aspirational, and a shortfall is not a disciplinary matter.
  • A is wrong: the responsibility applies to every lawyer; firms may aggregate but no lawyer is exempt. (cmt. [9])
  • B is wrong: the fifty-hour figure is an aspiration, not a requirement.
  • C is wrong: financial support is encouraged in addition to, not as a mandatory substitute for, service; neither is enforceable. (cmt. [9])
  • Answer: D. MR 6.1 is phrased as "should," and its comment makes plain that bar discipline is not the tool for policing it. Adler has fallen short of a professional responsibility but not of an enforceable rule. (MR 6.1; cmt. [12])
  • Tags: 11.1 · pro bono aspirational · cites MR 6.1

MC-0002 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 11.2 · OUT-11.2.1)

A court appoints Attorney Baek to represent an indigent defendant charged with sexually abusing a child. Baek finds the charge deeply distasteful and would prefer not to be associated with the case, but she is a competent criminal defense lawyer with no connection to the parties and could represent him diligently. She moves to withdraw from the appointment.

Should the court grant the motion?

  • A. No, because a lawyer may avoid an appointment only for good cause, and distaste that would not impair the representation is not that.
  • B. Yes, because a lawyer may not be compelled to represent a client whose conduct she finds morally offensive, and Baek finds the alleged abuse offensive.
  • C. Yes, because a lawyer may decline an appointment when she finds the client or his cause repugnant, and Baek finds this charge deeply distasteful.
  • D. No, because a lawyer may never seek to avoid a court appointment in a criminal case, and this is a criminal prosecution.
  • Answer: A. Under MR 6.2(c), revulsion counts as good cause only when it runs deep enough to probably damage the lawyer's working bond with the client or the quality of her advocacy. Baek can represent him diligently; her distaste does not meet the standard. (MR 6.2(c); cmt. [2])
  • B is wrong: representing a client is not an endorsement of the client's conduct, and moral offense alone is not good cause. (MR 1.2(b); MR 6.2 cmt. [1])
  • C is wrong: omits the impairment element that the Rule attaches to repugnance.
  • D is wrong: overstates the rule; good cause exists in three situations. (MR 6.2(a)–(c))
  • Tags: 11.2 · repugnance standard · cites MR 6.2(c)

MC-0003 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 11.2 · OUT-11.2.1)

A court appoints Attorney Cruz to represent a defendant in a complex fraud prosecution. Cruz's firm has represented the alleged victim, a bank, for years in matters closely related to the transactions at issue, and the bank refuses to consent to any conflict.

May Cruz seek to avoid the appointment?

  • A. No, because a court appointment overrides the conflict rules, and the court appointed Cruz despite her firm's work for the bank.
  • B. Yes, because a lawyer may decline any appointment that would be inconvenient for her firm, and defending the bank's adversary would be.
  • C. Yes, because representing the defendant would likely require Cruz to violate the Rules, and a likely violation is good cause to decline.
  • D. No, because a lawyer may decline an appointment only for financial hardship or repugnance, and Cruz claims neither of those grounds.
  • A is wrong: appointment does not suspend the conflict rules; the conflict is what supplies good cause.
  • B is wrong: inconvenience is not good cause; the Rule requires a likely violation, an unreasonable burden, or impairing repugnance.
  • Answer: C. MR 6.2(a): good cause exists where taking the case would probably put the lawyer in breach of the Rules or other law. An unconsentable, or unconsented, MR 1.7 conflict with the firm's client is exactly that. (MR 6.2(a); cmt. [2]; MR 1.7)
  • D is wrong: omits the first of the three grounds. (MR 6.2(a))
  • Tags: 11.2 · conflict as good cause · cites MR 6.2(a)

MC-0004 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 11.3 · OUT-11.3.1)

Attorney Dunn, whose firm represents the region's largest apartment landlord, serves on the board of the county legal-aid society. The board is about to vote on whether the society should file a habitability class action against that landlord.

What must Dunn do?

  • A. Resign from the board, because a lawyer may not serve a legal services organization whose clients are adverse to her firm's clients, as here.
  • B. Abstain from the vote, because a board member may not take part in a decision that could materially harm an organization client adverse to her own.
  • C. Vote, because board service is not representation of the organization's clients and creates no conflict, and the landlord is not the society's client.
  • D. Vote against the action, because a lawyer must protect the interests of her firm's client in every forum in which she has a voice.
  • Answer: B. MR 6.3(b): board service is allowed even when the organization's clients are opponents of the lawyer's clients, but she may not knowingly join a decision that could significantly damage the organization's work for a person on the other side from one of her own clients. Abstention, not resignation, is the remedy. (MR 6.3(b); cmt. [2])
  • A is wrong: 6.3 expressly permits board service in these circumstances. (MR 6.3)
  • C is wrong: correct that board service is not representation, but the Rule still bars participation in the specific decision.
  • D is wrong: using the board seat to protect the firm's client is the conflict the Rule prevents, not a duty it imposes. (MR 6.3(a); MR 1.7)
  • Tags: 11.3 · board abstention · cites MR 6.3(b)

MC-0005 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 11.3 · OUT-11.3.2)

Attorney Enright serves on a bar-association committee drafting proposed amendments to the state's consumer-lending statute. One proposed amendment would substantially benefit a lender she represents in pending litigation. Enright supports the amendment on the merits.

What does MR 6.4 require of Enright?

  • A. She must disclose the identity of the client and obtain the client's consent before participating.
  • B. She must withdraw from the committee, because a lawyer may not participate in law reform that affects a client's interests.
  • C. She must tell the committee a client of hers may be materially benefited by the amendment, but may withhold the client's name.
  • D. Nothing, because a lawyer's law-reform activities are separate from her representation of clients.
  • A is wrong: the client's identity is protected; neither identification nor client consent is required.
  • B is wrong: the Rule permits participation; withdrawal is not required.
  • Answer: C. MR 6.4: a lawyer may work in law-reform groups even when clients may be affected, and once she knows a client stands to gain materially from a decision she helps make, she must say so — and the Rule expressly lets her keep the client's name confidential. (MR 6.4; cmt. [1])
  • D is wrong: the disclosure duty applies precisely because the activities can affect clients. (MR 6.4)
  • Tags: 11.3 · law-reform disclosure · cites MR 6.4

MC-0006 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 11.4 · OUT-11.4)

Attorney Fox volunteers at a court-sponsored self-help desk, giving brief advice to unrepresented litigants without expectation of further representation. She advises a woman about responding to a debt-collection suit. Unknown to Fox, her firm represents the creditor in unrelated commercial matters. A colleague at Fox's firm later learns of the encounter.

Which statement is most accurate?

  • A. Fox violated MR 1.7, because her firm's representation of the creditor created a concurrent conflict and she advised the creditor's adversary.
  • B. Fox violated MR 1.10, because her participation imputed the debtor's matter to the firm, which represents the creditor in its other commercial matters.
  • C. Fox did not violate the conflict rules, because in short-term services through a court program the concurrent-conflict rule applies only on knowledge.
  • D. Fox did not violate the conflict rules, because brief advice at a court self-help desk is not the practice of law and creates no client relationship.
  • A is wrong: imputation and the concurrent-conflict rule are both relaxed in this setting absent knowledge. (MR 6.5(a)(2))
  • B is wrong: apart from the knowledge trigger in 6.5(a)(2), MR 6.5(b) switches off MR 1.10 imputation for this kind of clinic work; the encounter is not imputed to the firm. (MR 6.5(b); cmt. [4])
  • Answer: C. MR 6.5(a)(1): when a lawyer gives brief, limited help through a court-run program, MR 1.7 and 1.9(a) reach her only if she actually knows of a conflict. Fox did not know. (MR 6.5(a); cmts. [1]–[3])
  • D is wrong: the advice is the practice of law; the relaxation is a specific rule, not an exemption from the profession.
  • Tags: 11.4 · short-term limited services · cites MR 6.5

MC-0007 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 11.5 · OUT-11.5.1)

After losing a summary-judgment motion, Attorney Gates tells a newspaper reporter: "Judge Horn ruled against us because the other side's firm hosts her fundraisers — she's bought and paid for." Gates has no information about any fundraisers or any relationship between the judge and the firm.

Is Gates subject to discipline?

  • A. No, because a lawyer may criticize a judge's rulings and reasoning, and Gates was explaining to the press why she believes the ruling was wrong.
  • B. Yes, because a lawyer may not make a statement about a judge's integrity with reckless disregard for its truth, and Gates had no basis for it.
  • C. No, because statements to the press about judges are protected political speech, and Gates spoke to a reporter about a public official.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer may not make any public statement about a judge while a matter before that judge is pending, and Gates's case is still pending.
  • A is wrong: criticism of rulings is protected; a groundless factual accusation of corruption is not criticism of a ruling.
  • Answer: B. MR 8.2(a). The statement asserts as fact that the judge is corrupt; Gates had no basis for it, which is reckless disregard for its truth. (MR 8.2(a); cmt. [1])
  • C is wrong: the Rule is drawn from defamation law's public-figure standard precisely to accommodate protected speech; knowing or reckless falsehood is outside that protection.
  • D is wrong: no such blanket rule exists; MR 3.6 limits prejudicial trial publicity, and MR 8.2 limits false statements, but honest comment is permitted. (MR 3.6; MR 8.2 cmt. [1])
  • Tags: 11.5 · reckless accusation · cites MR 8.2(a)

MC-0008 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 11.5 · OUT-11.5.1)

Attorney Ito writes a bar-journal article arguing that a sitting appellate judge's opinions in employment cases reflect a consistent misreading of the governing statute and a lack of understanding of workplace realities. Ito's analysis is careful and cites the opinions. The judge is offended.

Is Ito subject to discipline?

  • A. No, because honest and reasoned criticism of a judge's opinions is not a false statement made with knowledge or reckless disregard.
  • B. Yes, because a lawyer may not question a judge's qualifications in a public forum, and Ito questioned the judge's understanding in a journal.
  • C. Yes, because a lawyer may criticize a judge only in a pleading or brief filed in the case, and Ito published her criticism in a bar journal.
  • D. No, because MR 8.2 applies only to statements about judicial candidates, not sitting judges, and the judge Ito criticized is a sitting appellate judge.
  • Answer: A. MR 8.2(a) prohibits only statements the lawyer knows are false or makes with reckless disregard. A reasoned critique of published opinions, however unwelcome, is honest opinion of the kind the comment expressly encourages. (MR 8.2(a); cmt. [1])
  • B is wrong: qualifications may be discussed; the Rule bars false statements about them, not honest assessment.
  • C is wrong: no such forum limitation exists.
  • D is wrong: the Rule covers judges, adjudicatory officers, public legal officers and candidates. (MR 8.2(a))
  • Tags: 11.5 · protected criticism · cites MR 8.2 cmt. [1]

MC-0009 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 11.6 · OUT-11.6.1)

Attorney Juno tells a prospective client seeking a liquor license: "The licensing board chair and I go way back — hire me and I'll make sure this gets approved, whatever the inspectors say." In fact Juno has met the chair once at a bar function.

Is Juno subject to discipline?

  • A. No, because Juno has no actual influence over the board and so cannot exert any improperly.
  • B. Yes, because a lawyer may not claim or hint that she can sway an agency or official by improper means.
  • C. No, because statements made to attract a client are puffery and are not statements of material fact.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer may not represent a client before an agency with whose members she is personally acquainted.
  • A is wrong: the Rule addresses the statement, not the reality behind it.
  • Answer: B. MR 8.4(e): the misconduct is the claim or hint that the lawyer can bend an agency's decision through improper channels. Whether the influence exists is irrelevant; the claim is the violation. (MR 8.4(e))
  • C is wrong: the puffery concept concerns statements of negotiating position under MR 4.1; a claim of improper influence is a specific misconduct under 8.4(e), and it is also a false statement under MR 7.1 and 8.4(c). (MR 7.1; MR 8.4(c))
  • D is wrong: acquaintance with an official is not a bar to practice before the agency; claiming to exploit it improperly is the violation.
  • Tags: 11.6 · claimed improper influence · cites MR 8.4(e)

MC-0010 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 11.6 · OUT-11.6.2)

Judge Kane, a friend of Attorney Lowe, asks Lowe to arrange for the judge's spouse to be hired by Lowe's client, a company with a case pending before the judge, without the hiring being disclosed to the other party. Lowe knows the arrangement would violate the Code of Judicial Conduct and does as the judge asks.

Is Lowe subject to discipline?

  • A. No, because the Code of Judicial Conduct governs judges, not lawyers, and only the judge can be disciplined for violating it.
  • B. No, because Lowe did not himself communicate with the judge about the merits of the pending case.
  • C. Yes, because a lawyer may not have a personal friendship with a judge before whom she appears.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer who knowingly helps a judge breach the Code of Judicial Conduct commits professional misconduct.
  • A is wrong: the CJC governs the judge, but MR 8.4(f) makes knowingly assisting the judge's violation a lawyer's violation.
  • B is wrong: the violation is assisting the judge's misconduct, not ex parte contact; MR 3.5 is a separate rule. (MR 3.5(b))
  • C is wrong: friendship with a judge is not misconduct; assisting the judge's violation is.
  • Answer: D. MR 8.4(f): a lawyer who, with knowledge, helps a judge or other judicial officer breach the judicial-conduct rules or other law commits misconduct. Lowe knew and assisted. (MR 8.4(f))
  • Tags: 11.6 · assisting judicial misconduct · cites MR 8.4(f)

MC-0011 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 11.2 · OUT-11.2.1)

A court appoints Attorney Mora, a sole practitioner whose practice is limited to residential real-estate closings, to defend a capital murder case expected to last four months. Mora has never tried a criminal case. She moves for leave to decline, explaining that she is not competent to handle the matter and that four months away from her practice would likely cause it to fail.

Which statement is most accurate?

  • A. The court may grant the motion, because likely inability to represent competently and an unreasonable financial burden are each good cause.
  • B. The court should deny the motion, because a lawyer may not seek to avoid a court appointment, and Mora was duly appointed by the court.
  • C. The court should deny the motion, because uncompensated appointments are always a burden and the Rule presumes lawyers will bear them regardless.
  • D. The court may grant the motion only if Mora finds the client's cause repugnant, and she has said nothing about the accused or his cause.
  • Answer: A. MR 6.2(a) (representation likely to result in a violation of the Rules — here MR 1.1 competence) and 6.2(b) (unreasonable financial burden) are each good cause; Mora has both. (MR 6.2(a)–(b); cmt. [2]; MR 1.1)
  • B is wrong: the Rule bars seeking to avoid an appointment except for good cause.
  • C is wrong: the Rule does presume ordinary uncompensated work is bearable, but an unreasonable burden — one threatening the practice's survival — is good cause. (cmt. [2])
  • D is wrong: repugnance is one of three grounds, not the only one.
  • Tags: 11.2 · competence and burden as good cause · cites MR 6.2(a)–(b)

True / False

TF-0001 (OUT-11.5.1)

  • Statement: A lawyer may not publicly criticize a judge's rulings while a matter is pending before that judge.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: MR 8.2(a) prohibits only statements about a judge's qualifications or integrity that the lawyer knows are false or makes with reckless disregard; honest criticism of rulings is permitted and encouraged by the comment. Trial-publicity limits under MR 3.6 are a separate question of prejudice.
  • Corrected statement: A lawyer may criticize a judge's rulings and reasoning, but may not make a statement about the judge's qualifications or integrity that the lawyer knows is false or makes with reckless disregard as to its truth.
  • Cite: MR 8.2(a); cmt. [1]

TF-0002 (OUT-11.3.2)

  • Statement: A lawyer active in a law-reform group who knows that a decision could materially benefit one of her clients must tell the group about that possible benefit, though she may keep the client's name confidential.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: MR 6.4 requires the lawyer to reveal the possible benefit and expressly lets her withhold the client's identity.
  • Cite: MR 6.4

TF-0003 (OUT-11.6.2)

  • Statement: A lawyer commits professional misconduct by knowingly helping a judge breach the Code of Judicial Conduct.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: MR 8.4(f) so provides.
  • Cite: MR 8.4(f)

TF-0004 (OUT-11.1.1)

  • Statement: A lawyer who performs no pro bono service in a year is subject to discipline under MR 6.1.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: MR 6.1 is aspirational, and its comment makes plain that bar discipline is not the tool for policing it.
  • Corrected statement: A lawyer should aspire to at least fifty hours of pro bono service a year, but MR 6.1 is not enforceable through discipline, so a lawyer who performs none is not subject to discipline for that reason.
  • Cite: MR 6.1; cmt. [12]

Scenario Walkthroughs

SW-0001 · The Appointment and the Board

Facts. Attorney Nkemelu is a partner at a mid-sized firm whose largest client is a payday lender. She serves on the board of the county legal-aid society and on a bar committee studying reform of the state's small-loan statute. Three things happen in one week. (1) A court appoints her to represent an indigent defendant charged with assaulting a police officer; she finds the charge distasteful and the fee inadequate, but she is an experienced litigator and the appointment would take about two weeks. (2) The legal-aid board takes up whether to sue the payday lender for statutory violations. (3) The bar committee votes on a proposal to raise the interest cap, which would substantially benefit the payday lender in litigation the firm is handling for it.

Issues.

  1. May Nkemelu seek to avoid the appointment?
  2. What must she do at the legal-aid board meeting?
  3. What must she do at the bar committee?

Analysis.

  • The appointment. MR 6.2 permits seeking to avoid an appointment only for good cause. Distaste for the charge is not repugnance so intense as to impair the representation (6.2(c)). An inadequate fee for a two-week matter is not an unreasonable financial burden (6.2(b)); the Rule assumes appointed work is often poorly paid. Nothing suggests a violation of law or the Rules (6.2(a)). She has no good cause and must accept the appointment. Representing the defendant is not an endorsement of his conduct (MR 1.2(b)).
  • The board. MR 6.3 permits her board service even though the society's clients are adverse to her firm's client. But the vote on suing the payday lender is a decision that could significantly damage the society's work for people on the other side from her firm's client — and participating in it would be incompatible with her own MR 1.7 duty of loyalty to the lender. She must abstain from that decision (6.3(a)–(b)). She need not resign, and the society's procedures should let her step aside without identifying the client.
  • The committee. MR 6.4 permits her law-reform work even though it may affect the lender. Because she knows the lender stands to gain materially from the interest-cap vote she will take part in, she must tell the committee that a client of hers may benefit. She may keep the lender's name confidential, need not abstain, and need not resign. Compare the board: 6.3 required abstention because the decision would harm an organization client and conflict with her loyalty; 6.4 requires disclosure because the decision would benefit her client and the concern is candor, not disloyalty.

Conclusion. Accept the appointment (no good cause); abstain from the board's vote (6.3); disclose a client's potential material benefit to the committee without naming it (6.4). Three rules, three different responses, all turning on whether the lawyer's duty to a client is engaged and how.

Rules. MR 6.2(a)–(c); cmts. [1]–[2] · MR 6.3(a)–(b); cmt. [2] · MR 6.4; cmt. [1] · MR 1.2(b) · MR 1.7


Key terms

Each term is marked once in Part A at its definition and has a term card above.

ID Term Outline Card
KT-0001 Pro bono publico service OUT-11.1.1 FC-0001
KT-0002 Appointment OUT-11.2.1 FC-0002
KT-0003 Good cause OUT-11.2.1 FC-0003
KT-0004 Legal services organization OUT-11.3.1 FC-0004
KT-0005 Law reform activity OUT-11.3.2 FC-0005
KT-0006 Reckless disregard OUT-11.5.1 FC-0006

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