1. Regulation of the Legal Profession
1.0 The Framework: Who Regulates Lawyers, and How
This section answers four questions the exam keeps asking:
- Who has power over a lawyer? The courts and the disciplinary system of every jurisdiction where the lawyer is admitted or practices, plus each federal court whose bar the lawyer has joined.
- What conduct can be disciplined? Rule violations, plus some conduct outside law practice.
- Who may practice where? The limits on unauthorized and multijurisdictional practice.
- Who is responsible for whom? Lawyers inside a firm, their supervisors, and the nonlawyers who help them.
1.1 How the Profession Is Regulated
1.1.1 The courts and the rules
Rule: Each jurisdiction's highest court regulates the practice of law there, usually by adopting rules of professional conduct and running a disciplinary system; the ABA Model Rules are a model that binds lawyers only when a jurisdiction adopts them.
Explanation:
- Most states adopt rules based on the ABA Model Rules, sometimes with changes. The MPRE tests the Model Rules and Comments, not any one state's version.
- Amendment lag: NCBE does not test an ABA amendment until at least about one year after the ABA adopts it. For a time, the current ABA text and the text eligible for the exam can differ. This packet states the current text.
- Federal courts regulate their own bars. Each federal court decides who may practice before it and may discipline lawyers admitted there under its own rules, which often borrow the local state's rules. Admission to a state bar does not by itself admit a lawyer to a federal court, and federal discipline is separate from state discipline. (In re Snyder (1985))
- The rules are rules of reason. Some are mandatory ("shall", "shall not"), and a violation can lead to discipline. Others are permissive ("may"), leaving the choice to the lawyer's professional judgment. (MR Preamble & Scope [14])
- A rule violation does not by itself give anyone a civil claim against the lawyer, and it does not create a presumption that a legal duty was breached. The rules are designed for discipline, not as a basis for civil liability. (Scope [20])
- Sanctions range from private or public reprimand, through probation and suspension, to disbarment. The disciplinary process is separate from any civil lawsuit or criminal case over the same conduct.
⚠ Exam trap: "The client may sue the lawyer for violating Model Rule X." A rule violation is not itself a cause of action. The client needs a civil theory such as malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty (Section 5), though the rules may be evidence of the standard of care.
Cite: MR Preamble & Scope [14], [20]; In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634 (1985)
1.1.2 Key definitions used everywhere
Rule: A lawyer "knows" a fact when the lawyer has actual knowledge of it, which may be inferred from the circumstances; a lawyer "reasonably believes" something when the lawyer actually believes it and that belief is one a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer would hold.
Explanation:
- Knows (knowingly): actual knowledge. A lawyer can't avoid knowledge by closing their eyes to the obvious, because knowledge may be inferred from circumstances. Suspicion alone is not knowledge. (MR 1.0(f))
- Reasonably believes: the belief has two parts. The lawyer must actually believe it (subjective), and the belief must be reasonable (objective). (MR 1.0(i))
- "Reasonable" and "reasonably" describe the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer. (MR 1.0(h))
- Reasonably should know: a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would find out the fact in question. It is an objective standard, used for example in MR 8.4(g) and in deciding whether a client-lawyer relationship formed (S02 OUT-2.1.1). (MR 1.0(j))
- Two more defined terms appear throughout the later sections. Informed consent means the person agrees after the lawyer has explained the material risks of, and reasonably available alternatives to, the proposed course of conduct. (MR 1.0(e)) Confirmed in writing means informed consent given in writing, or given orally and then confirmed by a writing the lawyer promptly sends; the client doesn't have to sign it. If getting or sending the writing at the time of consent isn't feasible, the lawyer must get or send it within a reasonable time afterward. (MR 1.0(b)) Section 4 (OUT-4.0) covers both in depth, including the few rules that require a writing signed by the client.
⚠ Exam trap: Many rules turn on "knows". A lawyer who only suspects something (e.g., that a colleague misbehaved) usually has no duty that depends on knowledge, such as the duty to report. But suspicion can still trigger duties that don't depend on knowledge, such as the duty to inquire into a matter before taking or continuing it (MR 1.16(a); S02 OUT-2.1.2).
Cite: MR 1.0(b), (e), (f), (h), (i), (j)
1.2 Admission to the Bar
1.2.1 Duties of applicants and of lawyers in admission matters
Rule: Bar applicants, and lawyers dealing with an admissions or disciplinary matter (their own or someone else's), must be candid with the authority in three ways: no knowingly false statements of material fact; correct a misunderstanding they know has arisen; and not knowingly fail to answer the authority's lawful requests for information. The confidentiality rule still protects client information.
Elements: two duties apply to both applicants and lawyers.
- No knowing false statement of material fact.
- No failure to correct and no knowing failure to respond: disclose facts needed to correct a known misunderstanding, and don't knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information. (MR 8.1(b))
Exceptions and limits:
- The rule does not require disclosure of information protected by MR 1.6 (client confidentiality). (MR 8.1)
- A person may rely on constitutional rights, such as the privilege against self-incrimination, but must say so openly rather than use it as a cover for silence. (MR 8.1 cmt. [2])
Explanation:
- Character and fitness review is how admissions authorities decide whether an applicant can be trusted with clients' affairs. Honesty in the application is itself a test of character.
- The rule reaches the applicant and also any lawyer who takes part: for example, a lawyer who writes a recommendation letter for an applicant, or a lawyer answering questions about their own conduct. (MR 8.1)
- A knowingly false statement of material fact discovered after admission can lead to discipline, including disbarment, because the lawyer violated the rule while seeking admission. An innocent or immaterial error does not violate MR 8.1(a). (cmt. [1])
- Constitutional limits on admission rules. A state may require competence and good moral character. But it may not exclude lawfully resident aliens for lack of citizenship (In re Griffiths (1973), Equal Protection). Nor may it require applicants to be state residents (Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper (1985), Privileges and Immunities Clause).
Example: Applicant Ruiz leaves a college cheating suspension off her bar application because she thinks it is "old news." The omission of a material fact the application asks about can bar admission. If it surfaces after she is admitted, she can be disciplined.
⚠ Exam trap: The recommending lawyer is covered too. A lawyer who writes a glowing letter while knowingly hiding a material fact about the applicant is subject to discipline.
⚠ Exam trap: The duty is not limited to the applicant's own statements. A lawyer who is asked by the admissions authority about an applicant must answer truthfully and must not knowingly mislead.
Cite: MR 8.1; cmts. [1]–[3]; In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985)
1.3 Lawyer Discipline: Misconduct and Jurisdiction
1.3.1 What counts as misconduct
Rule: Professional misconduct covers seven kinds of conduct: (1) breaking the Rules, including trying to, helping or inducing someone else to, or using someone else to do it; (2) a crime that reflects badly on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness to practice; (3) dishonest, fraudulent, deceitful or misrepresenting conduct; (4) conduct that harms the administration of justice; (5) claiming or hinting at an ability to improperly influence a government agency or official; (6) knowingly helping a judge break the judicial-conduct rules; and (7) harassment or discrimination in conduct related to law practice.
Professional misconduct has seven branches. There are seven parts of MR 8.4.
- (a) Rule violations, including attempts, knowingly assisting or inducing another to violate, and violating through the acts of another (for example, sending an investigator to do what the lawyer can't).
- (b) Criminal acts that reflect adversely on honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer.
- (c) Dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, whether or not in law practice and whether or not a crime.
- (d) Conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
- (e) Stating or implying an ability to improperly influence a government agency or official, or to achieve results by means that violate the Rules or other law.
- (f) Knowingly assisting a judge or judicial officer in violating the rules of judicial conduct or other law.
- (g) Harassment or discrimination in conduct related to the practice of law, on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status or socioeconomic status, when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know it is harassment or discrimination.
Exceptions and limits:
- Not every crime counts. Paragraph (b) reaches offenses involving violence, dishonesty, breach of trust, or serious interference with the administration of justice, and a pattern of repeated minor offenses. Private conduct such as adultery is not covered. (cmt. [2])
- No conviction is required. Discipline can rest on the conduct itself, even if the lawyer was never charged or was acquitted. Typical disciplinary procedure (state enforcement rules, not a Model Rule of Professional Conduct element): disciplinary counsel bears the burden of proving misconduct by clear and convincing evidence, not "beyond a reasonable doubt." The lawyer is entitled to due process: notice of the charges and an opportunity to be heard and to present a defense. (ABA Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement R. 18)
- Paragraph (g) limits: it does not limit a lawyer's ability to accept, decline or withdraw from a representation under MR 1.16, and legitimate advice or advocacy consistent with the Rules does not violate it. (MR 8.4(g))
- More paragraph (g) limits: it is not violated by initiatives that promote diversity and inclusion, such as recruiting diverse lawyers or sponsoring diverse student groups, or by limiting one's practice to underserved populations as the Rules and other law allow. A trial judge's finding that peremptory challenges were used in a discriminatory way does not alone establish a violation. (cmts. [4]–[5])
- Good-faith challenge: a lawyer who refuses to comply with an obligation because she believes in good faith that no valid obligation exists does not commit misconduct. The MR 1.2(d) principle for good-faith challenges to the law applies. (cmt. [6])
Explanation: Discipline protects the public and the courts, not just clients. That is why dishonesty outside law practice, such as lying on a personal loan application, can lead to discipline: it shows the lawyer can't be trusted.
Example: Attorney Bishop, in her personal life, files a false insurance claim for a stolen bicycle. She was never charged. She is subject to discipline under MR 8.4(b) and (c): the conduct is dishonest, and no conviction is needed.
⚠ Exam trap: "The lawyer can't be disciplined because the conduct had nothing to do with practicing law." Wrong when the conduct is dishonest or criminal in a way that reflects on fitness. Right for purely private conduct with no bearing on honesty or fitness.
⚠ Exam trap: Getting around a rule "through the acts of another" is itself misconduct. A lawyer who has an investigator contact a represented party is treated as if the lawyer did it.
Cite: MR 8.4(a)–(g); cmts. [1]–[6]; ABA Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement R. 18
1.3.2 Which jurisdiction disciplines, and which rules apply
Rule: Two questions, two answers. Who can discipline? The jurisdiction where the lawyer is admitted, wherever the conduct happened, and also any jurisdiction where the lawyer provides or offers legal services. Which rules apply? For work in a case before a tribunal, the rules where the tribunal sits (unless the tribunal's rules say otherwise); for everything else, the rules where the conduct happened, unless its main effect was felt elsewhere, in which case that jurisdiction's rules.
Two questions, answered in order:
- Who may discipline? Every jurisdiction where the lawyer is admitted, plus any jurisdiction where the lawyer provides or offers legal services. A lawyer may be disciplined by more than one jurisdiction for the same conduct. (MR 8.5(a))
- Which rules apply? (MR 8.5(b)) - Matter pending before a tribunal: the rules of the jurisdiction where the tribunal sits, unless the tribunal's rules say otherwise. - Any other conduct: the rules of the jurisdiction where the conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, that jurisdiction's rules.
Safe harbor (other conduct only, not tribunal matters): a lawyer is not subject to discipline if the conduct conforms to the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect will occur. (MR 8.5(b)(2))
Explanation: Lawyers now practice across state lines constantly. MR 8.5 makes sure a lawyer answers to one set of rules for each piece of conduct, so the lawyer isn't caught between conflicting rules.
Example: Attorney Osei, admitted only in State A, represents a client in a trial in State B's courts under a pro hac vice order. Her trial conduct is judged under State B's rules, and both State A and State B may discipline her.
⚠ Exam trap: "Only the state where the lawyer is licensed can discipline the lawyer." Wrong: a jurisdiction where the lawyer provides or offers services can discipline too.
Cite: MR 8.5(a), (b); cmts. [1]–[7]
1.4 Reporting Professional Misconduct
1.4.1 The duty to report lawyers and judges
Rule: A lawyer must report to the proper authority when she knows that another lawyer broke a rule in a way that raises a substantial question about that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness, and must likewise report a judge whose known violation raises a substantial question about fitness for judicial office. The duty does not require revealing information protected by MR 1.6 or learned in an approved lawyers or judges assistance program.
Duty to report misconduct: there are three requirements before the duty arises.
- The lawyer knows (actual knowledge, not suspicion) of the violation.
- The violation raises a substantial question about honesty, trustworthiness or fitness. "Substantial" refers to how serious the possible offense is, not how much evidence the lawyer has. (cmt. [3])
- The report goes to the appropriate professional authority, such as the state disciplinary agency, not to the client, the press or the police.
Exceptions and limits:
- The rule does not require disclosure of information protected by MR 1.6 (confidentiality). The lawyer should encourage the client to consent to disclosure where it would not substantially prejudice the client. (MR 8.3(c); cmt. [2])
- The rule does not require disclosure of information gained while participating in an approved lawyers or judges assistance program (e.g., a substance-abuse program). (MR 8.3(c))
- Minor violations need not be reported; the duty is limited to offenses a self-regulating profession must pursue. (cmt. [3])
- Lawyer representing the lawyer in question. A lawyer hired to represent another lawyer about that lawyer's professional conduct, such as disciplinary defense counsel, has no duty to report the client. The ordinary client-lawyer rules, including MR 1.6, govern. (cmt. [4])
Explanation: Self-regulation only works if lawyers report the serious wrongdoing they learn about. The limits keep the duty from overriding client confidences and from discouraging lawyers from seeking help.
No duty is not the same as a ban. A lawyer may choose to report conduct the rule doesn't require her to report, such as a minor violation or misconduct she only suspects. Before reporting voluntarily, she must check her other duties. If the information relates to a representation, MR 1.6 bars disclosure without client consent or an MR 1.6(b) exception. The assistance-program exception only removes the duty to report; it does not itself make the information confidential, though the program's rules or other law may. (MR 8.3(c); cmt. [5])
Example: Attorney Lin serves on a bar committee with Attorney Pratt and sees Pratt forge another member's signature on a committee filing. Lin knows of a dishonest violation. The information does not relate to any representation of Lin's, so MR 1.6 does not limit a report. Lin must report it to the disciplinary authority.
⚠ Exam trap: Suppose Lin had learned of a forgery while representing a client, whether from the client, from opposing counsel or from anyone else. The information would relate to that representation, and MR 1.6 would protect it. Lin would not be required to report without the client's consent, and would not be permitted to unless an MR 1.6(b) exception applied. The test is whether the information relates to a representation and whether disclosure is authorized, not where the information came from.
⚠ Exam trap: Threatening to report misconduct to gain an advantage in a civil matter (e.g., "settle or I'll file a grievance") is not what the rule contemplates, and it can itself be misconduct. A lawyer who must report can't bargain the duty away for money.
Compare: The duty to report a judge (MR 8.3(b)) uses a different test: a substantial question as to the judge's fitness for office.
Cite: MR 8.3(a)–(c); cmts. [1]–[5]; MR 1.6(a); cmt. [3]
1.5 Unauthorized Practice of Law
1.5.1 Practicing where you are not admitted, and helping others do so
Rule: Two bans. A lawyer may not practice law anywhere in a way that breaks that place's rules on who may practice, or help someone else do so. And a lawyer not admitted in a jurisdiction may not set up an office or a regular, ongoing presence there to practice law, or tell the public she is admitted there, unless the Rules or other law allow it.
Unauthorized practice of law (UPL): practicing law where one is not authorized, whether by a nonlawyer or by a lawyer not admitted in that jurisdiction. The definition of the "practice of law" varies by jurisdiction. (MR 5.5 cmt. [2])
Two prohibitions:
- Own UPL and assisting UPL. A lawyer may not practice where not authorized, and may not help a nonlawyer (or an unadmitted lawyer) practice law. (MR 5.5(a))
- No local base or local "holding out." A lawyer not admitted in a jurisdiction may not set up an office or a systematic and continuous presence there to practice law, and may not hold out as admitted there, unless a rule or law authorizes it. (MR 5.5(b))
What lawyers may do (not assisting UPL): (cmts. [2]–[3])
- Delegate tasks to paralegals and other nonlawyers, as long as the lawyer supervises the work and remains responsible for it.
- Counsel nonlawyers who want to represent themselves, and advise nonlawyers whose work requires knowledge of law, such as claims adjusters, accountants and government employees.
- Train nonlawyers.
- Assist independently authorized paraprofessionals. Nonlawyers whom a jurisdiction's law authorizes to provide particular law-related services act under their own authorization, and a lawyer may help them. (cmt. [3])
Explanation: UPL rules protect the public from legal help by people without the training or the ethical duties that licensed lawyers have.
Example: Paralegal Doyle, supervised by Attorney Grant, drafts a will from Grant's notes and Grant reviews and signs off. That is proper delegation. If Grant let Doyle meet clients alone, give legal advice and set fees, Grant would be assisting UPL.
⚠ Exam trap: A nonlawyer who has no independent legal authorization may not give legal advice, set legal fees, or appear in court for clients, even under a lawyer's name. Supervision permits delegation of tasks, not the lawyer's professional judgment. Authorization, not nonlawyer status alone, controls: a paraprofessional licensed by the jurisdiction may provide the services the license covers.
⚠ Exam trap: "Holding out" includes letterhead, websites and business cards. A firm listing an out-of-state lawyer must show the jurisdictional limitation. (Compare MR 7.1, Section 10)
Cite: MR 5.5(a), (b); cmts. [1]–[4]
1.6 Multijurisdictional Practice
1.6.1 Temporary practice by a lawyer admitted elsewhere
Rule: A lawyer admitted and currently authorized to practice in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended anywhere, may provide legal services on a temporary basis in a jurisdiction where the lawyer is not admitted if the services fall within one of four safe harbors.
Multijurisdictional practice: a lawyer's legal work in a jurisdiction other than the one where the lawyer is licensed. MR 5.5(c) lists four safe harbors for temporary practice:
- Association: the work is done in association with a lawyer admitted in the jurisdiction who actively participates in the matter.
- Litigation: the work is in or reasonably related to a pending or potential proceeding before a tribunal, and the lawyer (or someone the lawyer assists) is authorized, or reasonably expects to be, to appear in it. The court's permission to appear is called pro hac vice admission.
- ADR: the work is in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration, mediation or other alternative dispute resolution proceeding, and it arises out of or is reasonably related to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction where the lawyer is admitted, and pro hac vice admission is not required.
- Home-practice link: other work, outside the litigation and ADR categories in (c)(2) and (c)(3), that arises out of or is reasonably related to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction where the lawyer is admitted. This catch-all can't be used to get around the conditions of those two safe harbors. (cmt. [13])
Explanation:
- "Temporary" has no fixed time limit. Services can be temporary even if they continue for an extended period, such as a long negotiation or litigation. (cmt. [6])
- Pre-trial work, such as interviewing witnesses in the host state for a case the lawyer expects to be admitted in, falls under the litigation safe harbor. (cmt. [10])
- A lawyer disbarred or suspended in any jurisdiction can't use these safe harbors. Neither can a lawyer who is admitted elsewhere but not authorized to practice there, for example on inactive status. (cmt. [7])
Example: Attorney Chandra, admitted only in State A, represents a longtime State A corporate client. She flies to State B for three days to negotiate the client's contract with a State B supplier. The work is temporary and reasonably related to her State A practice, so it fits safe harbor 4.
⚠ Exam trap: The safe harbors are for temporary work. Opening an office in the host state, or advertising there as available for local work, is a systematic and continuous presence that the safe harbors do not cover.
Cite: MR 5.5(c); cmts. [5]–[14]
1.6.2 Permanent presence without local admission
Rule: A lawyer admitted and authorized to practice elsewhere in the U.S. (or a qualifying foreign lawyer), and not disbarred or suspended anywhere, may have an office or ongoing presence in a jurisdiction without local admission in two cases: working for her employer or its affiliates, in work that doesn't require court admission pro hac vice; and providing services that federal law or other law expressly authorizes.
Two permanent-presence exceptions: (MR 5.5(d))
- In-house counsel: services to the lawyer's employer (or its affiliates), other than appearing before a tribunal where pro hac vice is required. A foreign in-house lawyer who advises on the law of a U.S. jurisdiction or on U.S. federal law must base that advice on the advice of a lawyer licensed and authorized to give it.
- Federal or other authorized practice: services the lawyer is authorized to provide by federal law or other law or rule, such as practice before a federal agency that admits nonlocal lawyers.
Eligibility: under either exception, the lawyer must be actively authorized to practice where admitted (inactive status isn't enough) and not disbarred or suspended in any jurisdiction. A qualifying foreign lawyer is either (1) a member in good standing of a recognized legal profession in a foreign jurisdiction, whose members are admitted as lawyers or the equivalent and are subject to effective regulation and discipline by a professional body or public authority; or (2) a person lawfully practicing as in-house counsel under foreign law whom the local highest court, in its discretion, authorizes. (MR 5.5(d), (e); cmts. [7], [15])
Explanation: Many jurisdictions require in-house lawyers to register with the local court. The Model Rule permits the presence but not the representation of outside clients from that office.
Remote work: ABA Formal Opinion 495 (2020) (advisory) says a lawyer may practice the law of a jurisdiction where the lawyer is licensed while physically working in a jurisdiction where the lawyer isn't admitted. The conditions: the local jurisdiction hasn't said this is UPL, and the lawyer doesn't hold out as admitted there, advertise or otherwise hold out a local office or address, or offer or provide legal services in the local jurisdiction. Local services, or matters subject to the local jurisdiction, need independent authorization there (for example, under MR 5.5(c) or (d)); where the client lives is not the test. Working privately from a home or other remote space, without holding out, does not by itself create a local office or a systematic and continuous presence. This is an ABA ethics opinion, not rule text: it explains how MR 5.5 applies, and the exam tests the rule itself. (Reviewer check, Sept 2026: the opinion has not been withdrawn.)
Example: Attorney Park, admitted in State A, moves to State B to work as in-house counsel for a manufacturer headquartered there. Park may advise the company from a State B office. Park may not take on outside State B clients from that office.
⚠ Exam trap: In-house counsel status covers the employer. It does not let the lawyer represent the employer's employees in their personal matters, or outside clients.
Cite: MR 5.5(d), (e); cmts. [15]–[21]
1.7 Professional Independence: Fee Sharing and Nonlawyer Ownership
1.7.1 No sharing legal fees with nonlawyers
Rule: A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except in four listed situations.
Fee sharing with a nonlawyer: giving a nonlawyer a part of a particular legal fee. It is prohibited because a nonlawyer with a stake in a fee might interfere with the lawyer's judgment. There are four exceptions:
- Death benefits: an agreement by the lawyer's firm, partner or associate to pay money to the lawyer's estate or to one or more specified persons after the lawyer's death, over a reasonable period. (MR 5.4(a)(1))
- Buying a practice: a lawyer who buys the practice of a deceased, disabled or disappeared lawyer may pay the purchase price to that lawyer's estate or representative, under MR 1.17. (MR 5.4(a)(2))
- Employee compensation and retirement plans: nonlawyer employees may be included in a compensation or retirement plan, even if it is based wholly or partly on a profit-sharing arrangement. (MR 5.4(a)(3))
- Court-awarded fees to a nonprofit: a lawyer may share court-awarded legal fees with a nonprofit organization that employed, retained or recommended employment of the lawyer in the matter. (MR 5.4(a)(4))
Explanation: Paying a paralegal a salary or a year-end bonus from firm profits is fine. Paying the paralegal a percentage of the fee in a particular case the paralegal brought in is not.
Example: Attorney Walsh promises her investigator 10% of the fee in any case the investigator refers. That is fee sharing with a nonlawyer and also a payment for recommending the lawyer. It is prohibited.
⚠ Exam trap: Profit-sharing retirement or compensation plans for nonlawyer staff are expressly allowed, even though they are tied to the firm's profits. A per-case cut of a fee is not.
⚠ Exam trap: The four fee-sharing exceptions don't let a nonlawyer become a partner, owner or manager of a law practice. That is a separate ban (see 1.7.2, MR 5.4(b), (d)).
Cite: MR 5.4(a); cmt. [1]
1.7.2 No nonlawyer partners, owners or control
Rule: Nonlawyers may not own, run or steer a law practice. A lawyer may not be partners with a nonlawyer in a business that includes practicing law; may not practice in a for-profit firm where a nonlawyer is an owner, a director or officer, (apart from a fiduciary holding a deceased lawyer's interest for a reasonable time during estate administration), or has the power to control the lawyer's professional judgment; and may not let someone who refers, hires or pays her for another person's case control her professional judgment.
Professional independence: the lawyer's professional judgment must stay free from control by nonlawyers. There are three protections:
- No partnership with nonlawyers if any partnership activity is the practice of law. (MR 5.4(b))
- No nonlawyer ownership or management of a for-profit organization that practices law. The one exception: a fiduciary representative of a lawyer's estate (such as the executor) may hold the lawyer's stock or interest for a reasonable time during administration. (MR 5.4(d))
- No third-party control. A person who recommends, employs or pays the lawyer to serve someone else may not direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment. (MR 5.4(c); compare MR 1.8(f), Section 4)
Explanation: Some jurisdictions now allow nonlawyer ownership under special programs, but the Model Rule does not. On the MPRE, apply the Model Rule.
Example: Accountant Stone offers to form "Stone & Vega, Tax Advisers & Attorneys" with Attorney Vega, splitting all profits, with Vega doing the legal work. Vega may not form the partnership because part of its business is the practice of law.
⚠ Exam trap: A lawyer may work for a nonlawyer-owned business as in-house counsel representing that business. MR 5.4(d) addresses organizations that practice law for others for profit.
Cite: MR 5.4(b)–(d); cmt. [2]
1.8 Responsibilities Within a Law Firm
1.8.1 Partners and supervising lawyers
Rule: Managers and supervisors carry responsibility for other lawyers. Partners and lawyers with similar management authority must make reasonable efforts to put firm-wide measures in place that reasonably assure every lawyer follows the Rules. A lawyer who directly supervises another lawyer must make reasonable efforts to see that lawyer complies. And a lawyer answers for another lawyer's violation if she ordered it, approved it knowing the specific conduct, or, as a partner, comparable manager or direct supervisor, knew of it in time to prevent or limit the harm and failed to take reasonable remedial action.
Three levels of duty:
- Firm-wide measures (managers). Partners and lawyers with comparable managerial authority must make reasonable efforts to set up policies and procedures, such as conflict checks, calendar systems and trust-account controls. (MR 5.1(a))
- Direct supervision. A lawyer with direct supervisory authority over another lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that lawyer complies. (MR 5.1(b))
- Responsibility for another's violation. A lawyer is responsible if the lawyer either: (MR 5.1(c)) - orders the conduct, or ratifies it knowing the specific conduct; or - is a partner, a lawyer with comparable managerial authority, or a direct supervisor who knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated, and fails to take reasonable remedial action.
Explanation:
- Paragraphs (a) and (b) are independent duties. A supervisor who never set up any system can be disciplined under MR 5.1(b) even if no one is ever harmed.
- "Firm" is broad. It covers lawyers in a partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law. It also covers lawyers in a legal services organization or in the legal department of a corporation or other organization. So the MR 5.1(a) duty reaches lawyers with comparable managerial authority in those settings, such as a general counsel. (MR 1.0(c); MR 5.1 cmt. [1])
- Paragraph (c) is about the other lawyer's violation. The supervisor is not automatically responsible for everything a subordinate does; responsibility requires ordering, ratifying, or knowing and failing to act.
Example: Partner Adler learns that Associate Kim has just filed a brief that misstates a key holding. The judge has not ruled yet. Adler must take reasonable remedial action (for example, ensure a correction is filed). If Adler does nothing, Adler is responsible for the violation.
⚠ Exam trap: "The partner is automatically responsible for the associate's misconduct." Wrong. Vicarious disciplinary liability requires ordering, ratifying, or knowledge plus failure to remediate. (The partner may still have violated MR 5.1(a) or (b) independently.)
Cite: MR 5.1(a)–(c); cmts. [1]–[6]; MR 1.0(c)
1.8.2 Subordinate lawyers
Rule: Instructions from a superior never excuse a clear ethics breach. The one shelter is narrow: when a professional-duty question is genuinely debatable and the supervisor settles it reasonably, the junior lawyer who follows that call is not disciplined.
Two points:
- "Just following orders" is no defense to a clear violation. (MR 5.2(a))
- Arguable questions: when the ethics question is genuinely arguable and the supervisor resolves it reasonably, the subordinate who follows that resolution is protected. (MR 5.2(b))
Example: A supervising partner decides that a new matter is not substantially related to a former client's matter and tells the associate to proceed. If the question was arguable and the partner's answer reasonable, the associate is not subject to discipline even if the answer later proves wrong.
⚠ Exam trap: The safe harbor covers only an arguable question with a reasonable answer. If the supervisor orders the associate to destroy evidence or lie to the court, the associate who complies is subject to discipline.
Cite: MR 5.2(a), (b); cmt. [2]
1.8.3 Nonlawyer assistance
Rule: Lawyers must make reasonable efforts to see that the nonlawyers who work with them (employees, contractors or others) act consistently with the lawyer's own professional duties. A lawyer answers for a nonlawyer's conduct that would be a violation if a lawyer did it when the lawyer ordered it or, knowing the specific conduct, approved it, or, as a partner, comparable manager or direct supervisor, knew of it in time to prevent or limit the harm and failed to take reasonable remedial action.
Nonlawyer assistance: work done for the lawyer by nonlawyers inside the firm (paralegals, secretaries, investigators, interns) and outside it (document vendors, cloud-storage providers, outside investigators, court reporters). MR 5.3 mirrors MR 5.1 for nonlawyers:
- Managers must make reasonable efforts to have measures giving reasonable assurance that nonlawyers' conduct is compatible with the lawyer's obligations. (MR 5.3(a))
- Direct supervisors must make reasonable efforts to ensure it. (MR 5.3(b))
- Responsibility follows the same test: ordering the conduct, ratifying it with knowledge of the specific conduct, or (for a partner, comparable manager or direct supervisor only) knowing of it in time and failing to take reasonable remedial action. (MR 5.3(c))
Explanation: Nonlawyers aren't bound by the Rules, so the lawyer must instruct and supervise them, especially on confidentiality. With outside vendors, reasonable efforts include checking the vendor's reliability and giving appropriate instructions. (cmts. [2]–[4])
Example: A firm hires a cloud-storage company for client files without checking its security. The managers may have failed to make reasonable efforts under MR 5.3(a), along with the duty to protect client information (MR 1.6(c), Section 3).
⚠ Exam trap: "The nonlawyer isn't subject to the Rules, so no one is responsible." Wrong: the lawyer answers for failing to supervise, and for ordering or ratifying the nonlawyer's conduct.
Cite: MR 5.3(a)–(c); cmts. [1]–[4]
1.9 Selling a Practice and Law-Related Services
1.9.1 Sale of a law practice
Rule: A law practice, or one practice area, may be sold, goodwill (the value of the practice's reputation and client relationships) included, if four conditions are met: the seller leaves that practice (or that area) in the geographic area or jurisdiction where it was conducted; the whole practice or whole area goes to one or more buyers; each client receives written notice; and no client's fees go up because of the sale.
Sale of a law practice: there are four conditions under MR 1.17.
- Seller exits: the seller ceases to engage in the private practice of law, or in the area of practice sold, in the geographic area or jurisdiction (as the jurisdiction decides) where the practice was conducted.
- Whole practice or whole area: the entire practice, or the entire area of practice, is sold to one or more lawyers or firms. A seller can't keep the lucrative matters and sell the rest.
- Written notice to each client of three things: - the proposed sale; - the client's right to hire other counsel or take possession of the file; - that the client's consent to the transfer of the file will be presumed if the client does not act or object within 90 days after receiving the notice.
- No fee increase because of the sale.
Exceptions and limits:
- If a client can't be given notice, the client's representation may be transferred only by court order. In seeking it, the seller may disclose information relating to the representation only to the court in camera (privately, for the judge alone), and only as much as is necessary to obtain the order. (MR 1.17(c); cmt. [8])
- An unforeseen change in circumstances may justify a later return to practice, depending on the facts: for example, the unexpected loss of the job for which the lawyer sold the practice does not necessarily mean the sale violated the rule. (cmt. [2])
- Exit means leaving private practice. The seller may still work as a lawyer for a public agency, for a legal-services organization serving the poor, or as a business's in-house counsel. (cmts. [2]–[3])
- Whole-practice requirement, qualified. Each client remains free to choose other counsel. The requirement is still met if a buyer can't take a particular matter because of a conflict of interest. (cmt. [6])
Implementation safeguards: (cmts. [7], [11]–[12])
- Preliminary negotiations that reveal nothing about a specific, identifiable client are like merger talks and don't breach MR 1.6.
- The buyer may not see detailed client information, such as the file, until the client has received the written notice (which identifies the buyer) and has consented or let the 90 days run.
- Seller and buyer must address competence and conflicts before the buyer takes on a matter.
- If a tribunal must approve a substitution of counsel in a pending matter, that approval must come before the matter is included in the sale.
Example: Attorney Moreno, retiring, sells her estate-planning practice to Attorney Hale for a price that includes goodwill. She sends each client a letter describing the sale, their right to go elsewhere or take their file, and the 90-day presumption. Hale may not raise fees because of the purchase. The sale is proper.
⚠ Exam trap: Selling only some clients' files (the most profitable ones) is not allowed. The rule requires the entire practice or entire area of practice.
Cite: MR 1.17(a)–(d); cmts. [1]–[15]
1.9.2 Law-related services
Rule: The Rules' full client-lawyer protections follow a lawyer into law-related services (such as title insurance or financial planning) in two situations: when those services aren't clearly separate from her legal services, or when they are distinct (whether offered inside her firm or through a business she controls) and she doesn't take reasonable steps to make sure customers know they aren't getting legal services or the protections of a client-lawyer relationship.
Law-related services: services that might reasonably be performed together with legal services, and are related to them, but would not be unauthorized practice if performed by a nonlawyer. Examples: title insurance, financial planning, accounting, trust services, real-estate counseling, lobbying, tax preparation, and patent, medical or environmental consulting. (MR 5.7(b); cmt. [9])
When the full Rules, including client-lawyer protections, apply to the ancillary business: (MR 5.7(a))
- Not distinct: the services are provided by the lawyer in circumstances not distinct from the lawyer's legal services (for example, same office, same file, no separation); or
- Distinct, no warning: the services are distinct, whether provided within the law firm or by an entity the lawyer controls (alone or with others), and the lawyer fails to take reasonable measures to ensure the customer knows the services are not legal services and the client-lawyer protections (confidentiality, conflicts rules) do not apply.
Explanation:
- A signed notice and a separate office help but don't settle the question. The lawyer must take reasonable measures, suited to the customer's sophistication, so that the customer understands, before entering the agreement or receiving the services, whichever comes first, that the services aren't legal services and client-lawyer protections don't apply. (cmts. [6]–[7])
- Even when MR 5.7(a) doesn't apply, rules that govern all lawyer conduct, such as MR 8.4's ban on dishonesty, still govern the lawyer. (cmts. [2], [11])
Example: Attorney Brandt owns a title-insurance agency in a separate office with its own staff. Before any customer signs an agreement or receives services, the agency gives each customer a plain written notice, and takes reasonable steps to make sure the customer understands it. The notice says the agency is not a law firm, its services are not legal services, and client-lawyer protections such as confidentiality and conflict rules don't apply. The client-lawyer protections don't attach to the agency's work. But Brandt is still bound by rules that govern all lawyer conduct, such as MR 8.4. She must also follow the Rules with her own law clients, such as MR 1.8(a) if she sells them agency services.
⚠ Exam trap: Running the side business from the law office, with the same staff and files, makes it "not distinct," and the full Rules apply, including conflicts and confidentiality.
Cite: MR 5.7(a), (b); cmts. [1]–[11]
1.10 Restrictions on the Right to Practice
1.10.1 Agreements limiting a lawyer's future practice
Rule: A lawyer may not help make any agreement (partnership, shareholder, operating, employment or other) that limits a lawyer's right to practice after the relationship ends, except one tied to retirement benefits. (A restriction that comes with the sale of a practice under MR 1.17 is also permitted; MR 5.6 cmt. [3].) A lawyer also may not agree to limit her own right to practice as part of settling a client's case.
Restriction on the right to practice: a covenant not to compete or similar term that limits where or for whom a lawyer may practice. There are two prohibitions.
- Employment and partnership agreements: no post-departure restrictions on practice. (MR 5.6(a))
- Settlement agreements: no restrictions on a lawyer's future practice as a condition of settling a client's case, such as "plaintiff's counsel agrees never to sue the defendant again." (MR 5.6(b))
Exceptions and limits:
- Retirement benefits: an agreement may condition retirement benefits on the retiring lawyer not practicing. (MR 5.6(a))
- Sale of a practice: restrictions that are part of a sale under MR 1.17 are permitted. (MR 5.6 cmt.; MR 1.17)
Explanation: Clients have a right to choose their lawyer, and restrictions like these limit clients' future choices. In settlement, such a term also pits the lawyer's interest against the client's.
Example: Defense counsel offers a generous settlement on the condition that plaintiff's lawyer, Attorney Farah, agree not to represent any other claimant against the defendant. Defense counsel is subject to discipline for offering the term. If Farah agrees to it, she is subject to discipline too. Merely receiving the offer is not a violation.
⚠ Exam trap: The rule reaches the lawyer who offers the restriction as well as the lawyer who accepts it.
Cite: MR 5.6(a), (b) and cmts.
Section 1: Must-Know Checklist
- Rule violations are grounds for discipline, not civil claims. The Rules may be evidence of the standard of care, but they are not a cause of action. (Scope [20])
- Applicants and lawyers must be truthful in admission and discipline matters: no knowing false statements of material fact, no failure to correct a known misunderstanding, and no knowing failure to answer lawful demands, except for confidential client information. (MR 8.1)
- Misconduct includes dishonesty and some crimes even outside law practice. No conviction is required. (MR 8.4(b), (c))
- A jurisdiction may discipline any lawyer who practices or offers services there. Before a tribunal, the tribunal's jurisdiction's rules apply unless the tribunal's rules say otherwise. For other conduct, the rules where the conduct or its predominant effect occurred, with a safe harbor for a reasonable belief about predominant effect. (MR 8.5)
- Report known, serious misconduct by lawyers and judges to the proper authority, unless the information is protected by MR 1.6 (whatever its source) or came from an approved assistance program, or you represent the lawyer in question. (MR 8.3)
- No UPL and no assisting UPL. Delegating supervised tasks is fine; letting nonlawyers without their own legal authorization advise clients is not. (MR 5.5(a))
- Temporary out-of-state practice fits four safe harbors: local co-counsel, litigation, ADR, or a link to home practice, for a lawyer authorized to practice at home and not disbarred or suspended anywhere. In-house and federally authorized practice may be permanent. (MR 5.5(c), (d))
- No partnership with nonlawyers, and no nonlawyer ownership or control of a for-profit law practice (except an estate's fiduciary briefly holding a deceased lawyer's interest). Separately, no sharing fees with nonlawyers, with four fee-sharing-only exceptions: death-benefit payments to the lawyer's estate or specified persons; the price paid for a deceased, disabled or disappeared lawyer's practice under MR 1.17; profit-sharing compensation or retirement plans for staff; and court-awarded fees shared with a nonprofit that employed, retained or recommended the lawyer in the matter. (MR 5.4)
- Supervisors are responsible for others' violations only if they order, ratify, or know and fail to remediate, but managers and supervisors can separately violate their own reasonable-efforts duties. Subordinates may rely on a reasonable answer to an arguable question. (MR 5.1–5.3)
- No practice restrictions in employment or settlement agreements, except retirement benefits and the sale of a practice. (MR 5.6, 1.17)
Section 1: Common Traps
- "Only the licensing state can discipline." A state where the lawyer provides or offers services can too.
- "Suspicion triggers the duty to report." Only knowledge of a serious violation does, and not if the information is confidential.
- "Profit-sharing with nonlawyer staff is fee splitting." Plans for all staff are allowed; per-case cuts are not.
- "The partner is always responsible for the associate." Responsibility for the associate's violation requires ordering, ratifying, or knowing and failing to act. Separately, the partner can violate her own duty to make reasonable management or supervision efforts.
- "A settlement can include plaintiff's counsel agreeing not to sue again." Offering or agreeing to that restriction violates MR 5.6(b). If one lawyer offers it and the other agrees, both violate the rule; merely receiving the offer does not.
- "A seller may keep the best clients." A sale must include the entire practice or area.
Part B: Items
Flashcards
FC-0001 (term card · OUT-1.1.2)
- Front: Knows (knowingly)
- Definition: The lawyer has actual knowledge. A factfinder may infer that knowledge from what the lawyer saw, heard or had in hand.
- Explanation: Many duties turn on what a lawyer knows. Suspicion is not knowledge, but a lawyer can't avoid knowledge by ignoring the obvious, because a factfinder may infer it from what the lawyer saw and heard.
- Example: A lawyer who reads a bank statement showing a colleague moved client funds into a personal account knows of the misuse, even if the colleague never admits it.
- Exam trap: Don't treat "should have known" as "knows." The reporting duty and many other duties need actual knowledge.
- Cite: MR 1.0(f)
- Related terms: Reasonably believes · Duty to report misconduct
FC-0002 (term card · OUT-1.1.2)
- Front: Reasonably believes
- Definition: A two-part test: the lawyer in fact holds the belief (subjective), and a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer would hold it on the same facts (objective).
- Explanation: The test has a subjective half (the lawyer's actual belief) and an objective half (a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer would share it). Both must be met.
- Example: A lawyer who honestly but unreasonably believes a conflict is harmless does not "reasonably believe" it for purposes of the conflicts rules.
- Exam trap: Sincerity alone is not enough. An honest belief that no competent lawyer would hold fails the test.
- Cite: MR 1.0(i), (h)
- Related terms: Knows (knowingly)
FC-0003 (term card · OUT-1.2.1)
- Front: Character and fitness
- Definition: The admissions authority's review of whether an applicant can be trusted with clients' affairs, including the honesty of the application itself.
- Explanation: Applicants must not knowingly make false statements of material fact and must correct misunderstandings they know have arisen. A knowingly false application can bar admission, and if discovered later it can lead to discipline after admission.
- Example: An applicant who hides a prior academic-dishonesty finding the form asks about can be denied admission, or disciplined if it surfaces after admission.
- Exam trap: The duty isn't limited to the applicant. A lawyer who writes a recommendation or answers the authority's questions is also bound by MR 8.1.
- Cite: MR 8.1
- Related terms: Professional misconduct
FC-0004 (term card · OUT-1.3.1)
- Front: Professional misconduct
- Definition: Conduct listed in MR 8.4: violating the Rules, criminal acts reflecting on fitness, dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to justice, implying improper influence, assisting judicial misconduct, and harassment or discrimination related to practice.
- Explanation: The list reaches conduct outside law practice when it shows the lawyer is dishonest or unfit. It also reaches attempts, knowingly helping or inducing others to violate the Rules, and violations carried out through someone else.
- Example: A lawyer who lies on a personal mortgage application engages in misrepresentation and is subject to discipline, even though no client was involved.
- Exam trap: A conviction is not required. Discipline can rest on the conduct itself.
- Cite: MR 8.4(a)–(g)
- Related terms: Character and fitness · Duty to report misconduct
FC-0005 (term card · OUT-1.3.2)
- Front: Predominant effect
- Definition: For conduct not connected with a matter before a tribunal, the jurisdiction where the conduct has its main impact; its rules apply instead of the rules where the conduct occurred.
- Explanation: MR 8.5(b)(2) applies the rules of the place of conduct, unless the predominant effect is elsewhere. A lawyer isn't subject to discipline if the conduct conforms to the rules of the jurisdiction where the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect will occur.
- Example: A State A lawyer drafts, in State A, a contract for a client's State B business. If the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect is in State B and follows State B's rules, the lawyer is protected.
- Exam trap: For conduct in a pending court case, don't use predominant effect or its safe harbor. The rules of the jurisdiction where the tribunal sits apply, unless the tribunal's rules provide otherwise.
- Cite: MR 8.5(b)(2)
- Related terms: Professional misconduct
FC-0006 (term card · OUT-1.4.1)
- Front: Duty to report misconduct
- Definition: A lawyer who knows another lawyer committed a violation raising a substantial question about honesty, trustworthiness or fitness must inform the appropriate professional authority.
- Explanation: The duty needs actual knowledge and a serious violation. It doesn't require revealing information protected by MR 1.6, or information learned in an approved lawyers or judges assistance program. A parallel duty covers judges whose violations raise a substantial question about fitness for office.
- Example: A lawyer who sees opposing counsel forge a signature, and whose client consents to a report, must report it to the disciplinary authority.
- Exam trap: "Substantial" measures how serious the violation is, not how much evidence the lawyer has.
- Cite: MR 8.3(a)–(c)
- Related terms: Knows (knowingly) · Professional misconduct
FC-0007 (term card · OUT-1.5.1)
- Front: Unauthorized practice of law
- Definition: Practicing law in a jurisdiction without authorization there, whether by a nonlawyer or by a lawyer not admitted in that jurisdiction. A lawyer must not do it or assist it.
- Explanation: Each jurisdiction defines the practice of law. Lawyers may delegate tasks to supervised nonlawyers, counsel people who represent themselves, and advise nonlawyers whose work involves the law, but may not let nonlawyers exercise the lawyer's professional judgment.
- Example: A lawyer who lets a paralegal meet clients alone, give legal advice and set fees is assisting the unauthorized practice of law.
- Exam trap: Supervision allows delegation of tasks, not of legal advice, fee-setting or court appearances. A paraprofessional independently authorized by the jurisdiction's law is different: that authorization, not the lawyer's supervision, permits the services it covers.
- Cite: MR 5.5(a); cmts. [2]–[3]
- Related terms: Systematic and continuous presence · Multijurisdictional practice
FC-0008 (term card · OUT-1.5.1)
- Front: Systematic and continuous presence
- Definition: An office or other ongoing base for practicing law in a jurisdiction. A lawyer not admitted there may not establish one unless a rule or law allows it.
- Explanation: MR 5.5(b) also bars holding out to the public as admitted in the jurisdiction. The temporary-practice safe harbors don't cover a permanent local practice.
- Example: A State A lawyer who rents an office in State B and advertises there for local clients is violating MR 5.5(b).
- Exam trap: Presence can be systematic and continuous without a physical office, for example through regular solicitation of local clients.
- Cite: MR 5.5(b); cmt. [4]
- Related terms: Unauthorized practice of law · Multijurisdictional practice
FC-0009 (term card · OUT-1.6.1)
- Front: Multijurisdictional practice
- Definition: A lawyer's legal work in a jurisdiction where the lawyer is not admitted. Temporary work is allowed within four safe harbors, and some permanent work is allowed for in-house and federally authorized practice.
- Explanation: The four temporary safe harbors are association with local counsel who actively participates, litigation-related work, ADR work linked to home practice, and other work reasonably related to home practice. A lawyer who is disbarred or suspended anywhere, or not authorized to practice at home (such as on inactive status), can't use them.
- Example: A State A lawyer spends a week in State B negotiating a deal for a longtime State A client. The work is temporary and related to her home practice.
- Exam trap: "Temporary" has no fixed day limit. The question is whether the work is temporary, not how many days it takes.
- Cite: MR 5.5(c), (d)
- Related terms: Pro hac vice admission · Systematic and continuous presence
FC-0010 (term card · OUT-1.6.1)
- Front: Pro hac vice admission
- Definition: A tribunal's permission for a lawyer not admitted in the jurisdiction to appear in a particular case.
- Explanation: A lawyer who is, or reasonably expects to be, admitted pro hac vice may do temporary work in or reasonably related to that proceeding, including pre-trial work such as witness interviews.
- Example: A lawyer who expects to be admitted pro hac vice in a State B trial may interview witnesses in State B before the motion is granted.
- Exam trap: Pro hac vice admission covers one case before one tribunal. It isn't a general license to practice in that state.
- Cite: MR 5.5(c)(2); cmt. [10]
- Related terms: Multijurisdictional practice
FC-0011 (term card · OUT-1.7.1)
- Front: Fee sharing with a nonlawyer
- Definition: Giving a nonlawyer part of a legal fee. Prohibited except in four situations listed in MR 5.4(a).
- Explanation: The four exceptions are death-benefit payments, under an agreement with the lawyer's firm, partner or associate, to the lawyer's estate or specified persons over a reasonable period; the purchase price for a deceased, disabled or disappeared lawyer's practice under MR 1.17; compensation or retirement plans for nonlawyer staff (even profit-sharing); and court-awarded fees shared with a nonprofit that employed, retained or recommended the lawyer in the matter.
- Example: Paying a paralegal a bonus from overall firm profits is allowed. Paying the paralegal 10% of the fee in each case the paralegal refers is not.
- Exam trap: Profit-sharing plans for staff are expressly allowed. Per-case fee splits and referral cuts are not.
- Cite: MR 5.4(a)
- Related terms: Professional independence
FC-0012 (term card · OUT-1.7.2)
- Front: Professional independence
- Definition: A lawyer's professional judgment must stay free of nonlawyer control. So there can be no partnership with nonlawyers in law practice, no practicing in a professional corporation or other for-profit organization that practices law if a nonlawyer owns an interest (except that an estate's fiduciary may hold a deceased lawyer's interest for a reasonable time during administration), serves as a director or officer, or can control the lawyer's judgment, and no direction by a third-party payer.
- Explanation: MR 5.4 protects clients from having business or payer interests steer their lawyer. The Model Rule doesn't allow nonlawyer ownership of law firms, even though some jurisdictions have experimented with it.
- Example: A lawyer may not form a partnership with an accountant if part of the business is providing legal services.
- Exam trap: In-house lawyers working for a nonlawyer-owned business are fine; MR 5.4(d) is about organizations that practice law for others for profit.
- Cite: MR 5.4(b)–(d)
- Related terms: Fee sharing with a nonlawyer
FC-0013 (term card · OUT-1.8.1)
- Front: Direct supervisory authority
- Definition: Authority to supervise another lawyer's work. A lawyer who has it must make reasonable efforts to ensure that lawyer follows the Rules.
- Explanation: This duty is separate from the managers' duty to set up firm-wide measures. A supervisor can violate MR 5.1(b) by failing to supervise even if the subordinate never commits a violation.
- Example: A senior associate running a trial team must make reasonable efforts to ensure the junior associates follow the discovery rules.
- Exam trap: Supervisory authority depends on the actual relationship on the matter, not on job title.
- Cite: MR 5.1(b)
- Related terms: Nonlawyer assistance
FC-0014 (term card · OUT-1.8.3)
- Front: Nonlawyer assistance
- Definition: Work done for a lawyer by nonlawyers inside or outside the firm, such as paralegals, investigators and vendors. Lawyers must make reasonable efforts to keep that work compatible with their professional duties.
- Explanation: MR 5.3 mirrors MR 5.1: managers need firm-wide measures, direct supervisors need reasonable efforts, and a lawyer is responsible for a nonlawyer's conduct that the lawyer orders, or ratifies knowing the specific conduct. A partner, comparable manager or direct supervisor is also responsible if she knows of the conduct in time to avoid or mitigate its consequences and fails to take reasonable remedial action.
- Example: Before storing client files with an outside cloud vendor, a firm should check the vendor's security and give instructions on confidentiality.
- Exam trap: Nonlawyers aren't bound by the Rules, so the supervising lawyer answers for failing to supervise them.
- Cite: MR 5.3(a)–(c)
- Related terms: Direct supervisory authority · Unauthorized practice of law
FC-0015 (term card · OUT-1.9.1)
- Front: Sale of a law practice
- Definition: A lawyer may sell or buy a practice or an area of practice, including goodwill, if the seller stops private practice (or that area) in the geographic area or jurisdiction where it was conducted, the entire practice or area is sold, each client gets written notice, and fees don't rise because of the sale.
- Explanation: The notice must describe the sale, the client's right to hire other counsel or take the file, and that consent to the file transfer is presumed if the client doesn't object within 90 days after receiving the notice. If a client can't be notified, a court order is needed, sought in camera with only the necessary information. The seller may still work as a government, legal-services or in-house lawyer.
- Example: A retiring lawyer sells her entire estate-planning practice, sends each client the required notice, and the buyer keeps the existing fee rates. The sale is proper.
- Exam trap: Selling only the profitable clients isn't allowed. It must be the entire practice or the entire area of practice.
- Cite: MR 1.17(a)–(d)
- Related terms: Restriction on the right to practice · Fee sharing with a nonlawyer
FC-0016 (term card · OUT-1.9.2)
- Front: Law-related services
- Definition: Services connected with legal services that a nonlawyer could lawfully provide, such as title insurance, financial planning or lobbying. The Rules' full client-lawyer protections govern them when they aren't distinct from the lawyer's legal services.
- Explanation: If the services are distinct, whether provided within the firm or by a lawyer-controlled business, the full Rules apply unless the lawyer takes reasonable measures, before the customer enters the agreement or receives services (whichever is first), to ensure customers understand the services aren't legal services and that client-lawyer protections don't apply. Rules that govern all lawyer conduct, such as MR 8.4, apply either way.
- Example: A lawyer's title agency has a separate office and staff. Before any agreement is signed or work begins, it tells each customer that it offers no legal services or client-lawyer protections, and it makes sure the customer understands. The agency's work isn't subject to the client-lawyer rules, but the lawyer still may not, for example, act dishonestly (MR 8.4).
- Exam trap: Running the side business from the law office with the same staff and files makes it "not distinct," so the full Rules apply.
- Cite: MR 5.7(a), (b)
- Related terms: Professional independence
FC-0017 (term card · OUT-1.10.1)
- Front: Restriction on the right to practice
- Definition: A term in an employment, partnership or settlement agreement that limits a lawyer's future practice. Such terms are prohibited except for retirement benefits and the sale of a practice.
- Explanation: Restrictions limit clients' freedom to choose a lawyer. In settlements they also set the lawyer's interest against the client's. Both the lawyer who offers the term and the lawyer who accepts it violate MR 5.6.
- Example: Defense counsel offers to settle only if plaintiff's lawyer agrees never to sue the defendant again, and plaintiff's lawyer agrees. Both violate MR 5.6(b): one by offering, the other by agreeing.
- Exam trap: Conditioning retirement benefits on not competing is the one permitted post-employment restriction.
- Cite: MR 5.6(a), (b)
- Related terms: Sale of a law practice
FC-0018 (concept card · OUT-1.1.1)
- Front: Does a rule violation give the client a civil claim?
- Definition: No. The Model Rules are designed for discipline. A violation doesn't create a cause of action or a presumption that a legal duty was breached, though it may be offered as evidence of the standard of care.
- Explanation: A client harmed by a lawyer needs a civil theory such as malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty. Courts may still look to the Rules as evidence of the standard of care.
- Example: A client whose lawyer missed a deadline sues for malpractice, not "for violating Model Rule 1.3," though the rule may inform the standard.
- Exam trap: Don't confuse "subject to discipline" with "liable for damages." They're different questions.
- Cite: MR Scope [20]
- Related terms: Professional misconduct
FC-0019 (concept card · OUT-1.2.1)
- Front: Two duties in admission and discipline matters
- Definition: Don't knowingly make a false statement of material fact. Don't fail to correct a known misunderstanding or knowingly ignore a lawful demand for information.
- Explanation: MR 8.1 applies to applicants and to lawyers involved in admission or disciplinary matters. It doesn't require disclosing information protected by MR 1.6, and a person may assert a constitutional privilege openly.
- Example: A lawyer under investigation who ignores the disciplinary counsel's letter asking for records violates MR 8.1(b), separately from the underlying charge.
- Exam trap: Silence can violate the rule. Failing to respond or to correct a known misunderstanding is covered, not just lying.
- Cite: MR 8.1(a), (b)
- Related terms: Character and fitness
FC-0020 (concept card · OUT-1.3.1)
- Front: Which crimes support discipline under MR 8.4(b)?
- Definition: Crimes that reflect adversely on honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer: those involving violence, dishonesty, breach of trust or serious interference with justice, and a pattern of repeated minor offenses.
- Explanation: Lawyers answer to the whole criminal law, but professionally only for offenses showing a lack of traits relevant to practice. Private moral conduct such as adultery isn't enough.
- Example: A lawyer convicted of assault or of tax fraud is subject to discipline. A lawyer with a single speeding ticket is not.
- Exam trap: Dishonest conduct can be misconduct under MR 8.4(c) even if it isn't a crime at all.
- Cite: MR 8.4(b); cmt. [2]
- Related terms: Professional misconduct
FC-0021 (concept card · OUT-1.3.2)
- Front: Which jurisdiction's rules govern the lawyer's conduct?
- Definition: For a matter before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction where the tribunal sits, unless the tribunal's rules provide otherwise. For other conduct, the rules where the conduct occurred, or where its predominant effect is.
- Explanation: This choice-of-law rule gives the lawyer one set of rules for each piece of conduct. For conduct outside a tribunal matter only, a lawyer who reasonably believes the predominant effect will be in a certain jurisdiction and follows its rules is protected.
- Example: A State A lawyer trying a case in a State B court follows State B's rules for her trial conduct.
- Exam trap: Disciplinary authority and choice of law are different questions. Several states may discipline, all applying the same chosen rules.
- Cite: MR 8.5(b)
- Related terms: Predominant effect
FC-0022 (concept card · OUT-1.4.1)
- Front: Exceptions to the duty to report misconduct
- Definition: Two express exceptions: no duty to reveal information protected by MR 1.6, or information learned while participating in an approved lawyers or judges assistance program. Also, a lawyer hired to represent the lawyer whose conduct is in question has no duty to report; the ordinary client-lawyer rules govern.
- Explanation: Confidentiality to clients outranks the reporting duty, though the lawyer should encourage the client to consent when that wouldn't hurt the client. The assistance-program exception encourages impaired lawyers and judges to get help.
- Example: A lawyer who learns of another lawyer's fraud only from her own client in confidence is not required to report it without the client's consent.
- Exam trap: The test is not the source. MR 1.6 protects all information relating to a representation, whoever supplied it, so hearing about the same fraud again at a bar event doesn't free the lawyer to report without consent. Ask whether the information relates to a representation and whether disclosure is authorized (client consent or an MR 1.6(b) exception).
- Cite: MR 8.3(c); cmts. [2], [4]; MR 1.6(a); cmt. [3]
- Related terms: Duty to report misconduct
FC-0023 (concept card · OUT-1.5.1)
- Front: What may lawyers do without assisting UPL?
- Definition: Four things. Delegate tasks to supervised nonlawyers, counsel nonlawyers who represent themselves, advise nonlawyers whose jobs require knowledge of the law, and assist paraprofessionals whom a jurisdiction's law independently authorizes to provide particular law-related services.
- Explanation: The lawyer remains responsible for delegated work and must supervise it. Nonlawyers without independent legal authorization may not give legal advice, set fees or appear for clients.
- Example: A lawyer may coach a small-business owner who is handling her own small-claims case.
- Exam trap: Training and advising nonlawyers is not assisting UPL. Letting them exercise legal judgment for clients is.
- Cite: MR 5.5 cmts. [2]–[3]
- Related terms: Unauthorized practice of law
FC-0024 (concept card · OUT-1.6.1)
- Front: Four safe harbors for temporary out-of-state practice
- Definition: Association with active local counsel; litigation-related work (pro hac vice); ADR work linked to home practice, where the forum doesn't require pro hac vice admission; other work, outside the litigation and ADR categories, reasonably related to home practice.
- Explanation: Each safe harbor requires a lawyer admitted, and actively authorized to practice, in another U.S. jurisdiction who is not disbarred or suspended anywhere, doing temporary work. None of them allows a permanent local office.
- Example: A State A lawyer representing a State A client in a State B arbitration that doesn't require pro hac vice admission fits the ADR safe harbor.
- Exam trap: Active participation by local counsel is required for the first safe harbor. A local lawyer who merely lends a name doesn't qualify.
- Cite: MR 5.5(c)(1)–(4)
- Related terms: Multijurisdictional practice · Pro hac vice admission
FC-0025 (concept card · OUT-1.7.1)
- Front: Four exceptions to the ban on sharing fees with nonlawyers
- Definition: Death-benefit payments, under an agreement with the lawyer's firm, partner or associate, to the lawyer's estate or specified persons over a reasonable period; paying for a deceased, disabled or disappeared lawyer's practice; staff compensation or retirement plans (even profit-sharing); court-awarded fees shared with a nonprofit that employed, retained or recommended the lawyer in the matter.
- Explanation: Each exception poses little risk that a nonlawyer will control legal work on a particular case.
- Example: A firm may put all its staff in a retirement plan funded from firm profits.
- Exam trap: The nonprofit exception is limited to court-awarded fees. A lawyer may not split an ordinary contingent fee with a nonprofit referral source.
- Cite: MR 5.4(a)(1)–(4)
- Related terms: Fee sharing with a nonlawyer
FC-0026 (concept card · OUT-1.8.1)
- Front: When is a lawyer responsible for another lawyer's violation?
- Definition: When the lawyer orders it, or ratifies it knowing the conduct; or is a partner, a lawyer with comparable managerial authority, or a direct supervisor who knows of it in time to avoid or mitigate the consequences and fails to take reasonable remedial action.
- Explanation: This is responsibility for someone else's violation. Separately, managers and supervisors can violate their own duties to make reasonable efforts, even if no one else commits a violation.
- Example: A partner who learns an associate just lied in a pending discovery response, and does nothing while it can still be corrected, is responsible for the violation.
- Exam trap: There's no automatic vicarious liability. Knowledge plus failure to act, or ordering or ratifying, is required.
- Cite: MR 5.1(c)
- Related terms: Direct supervisory authority
FC-0027 (concept card · OUT-1.8.2)
- Front: The subordinate lawyer's defense
- Definition: A junior lawyer who follows a supervisor's reasonable call on a genuinely debatable ethics question is not disciplined.
- Explanation: A lawyer is bound by the Rules even when following orders. The defense protects subordinates only on genuinely debatable questions with a reasonable answer from the supervisor.
- Example: An associate who follows a partner's reasonable judgment that two matters aren't substantially related is protected if the partner turns out to be wrong.
- Exam trap: An order to do something clearly improper, like destroying evidence, isn't protected. The subordinate who complies is subject to discipline.
- Cite: MR 5.2(a), (b)
- Related terms: Direct supervisory authority
Multiple choice
MC-0001 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 1.1 · OUT-1.1.1)
Attorney Lindqvist missed a filing deadline in Client Adeyemi's case because of a calendaring error, and the case was dismissed. Adeyemi, angry, files a lawsuit asserting a single claim: "violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct." Lindqvist's state has adopted the ABA Model Rules.
Which is the most accurate statement about Adeyemi's claim?
- A. The claim fails as pleaded, because a Rules violation is not itself a cause of action, and Adeyemi's sole claim is a Rules violation.
- B. The claim may proceed, because MR 1.3 requires reasonable diligence and promptness, and Lindqvist missed Adeyemi's filing deadline.
- C. The claim fails, because a malpractice plaintiff must prove the underlying case would have succeeded, and Adeyemi's case was dismissed.
- D. The claim may proceed, because courts have inherent power to regulate lawyers who practice before them, and Lindqvist's error cost Adeyemi his case.
- Answer: A. The Rules are designed for discipline, not as a basis for civil liability, and a violation creates no presumption that a legal duty was breached. Adeyemi needs a civil theory such as malpractice.
- B is wrong: MR 1.3 does require diligence, and missing a deadline may breach it, but a breach is grounds for discipline, not a civil claim (Scope [20]).
- C is wrong: The case-within-a-case element is real, but Adeyemi hasn't pleaded malpractice. The defect is the theory itself, not a failure of proof.
- D is wrong: Courts do regulate lawyers through inherent power, but that power supports discipline and sanctions, not a damages claim built on the Rules.
- Cite: MR Scope [20] · Key terms: Professional misconduct
MC-0002 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 1.1 · OUT-1.1.2)
Attorney Hollis, a partner, reviews a colleague's client-trust records for a year-end audit. The records show that over three months the colleague moved $40,000 from the trust account into the colleague's personal account, with notes saying "loan to self." The colleague has not admitted anything, and Hollis has not asked the colleague about it.
Does Hollis "know" of the colleague's misconduct for purposes of the duty to report?
- A. No, because MR 8.3(a) requires reporting violations raising a substantial question about honesty, and the colleague openly labeled each transfer a "loan to self."
- B. No, because suspicion alone does not trigger the duty to report, and Hollis never asked the colleague to explain the transfers.
- C. Yes, because actual knowledge may be inferred from circumstances, and Hollis's records show $40,000 moved to the colleague's personal account.
- D. Yes, because MR 1.0(j) defines "reasonably should know" by what a prudent lawyer would learn, and Hollis reviewed the colleague's trust records.
- Answer: C. Knowledge under MR 1.0(f) means actual knowledge, and it may be inferred from circumstances. The records leave little doubt, and Hollis cannot avoid knowledge by declining to ask the obvious question. This item answers only the knowledge question. Whether Hollis must then report also depends on MR 8.3(c): trust records relate to client representations, and MR 1.6 may bar disclosure without consent.
- A is wrong: The substantial-question limit is real, but it concerns which violations are reported, not knowledge. Labeling a transfer a loan doesn't make taking client trust money honest.
- B is wrong: Suspicion alone isn't enough, but these records give actual knowledge, not suspicion. No confrontation is required.
- D is wrong: MR 1.0(j) is a real standard, but MR 8.3(a) uses "knows," which means actual knowledge. The result is right for the wrong reason.
- Cite: MR 1.0(f), (j); MR 8.3(a) · Key terms: Knows (knowingly), Duty to report misconduct
MC-0003 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 1.2 · OUT-1.2.1)
Bar applicant Okonkwo was placed on academic probation in law school for submitting a classmate's outline as his own work. The bar application asks applicants to list "any academic discipline." Okonkwo leaves the question blank because he believes the incident was minor and the probation has ended. He is admitted two years later, and the incident then comes to light.
Is Okonkwo subject to discipline?
- A. No, because MR 8.1(a) prohibits knowingly false statements of material fact, and Okonkwo wrote nothing false; he left the question blank.
- B. No, because MR 8.1 concerns facts that are material, and Okonkwo believed his ended probation was minor.
- C. Yes, because MR 8.4(c) prohibits conduct involving dishonesty, and Okonkwo submitted a classmate's outline as his own work.
- D. Yes, because MR 8.1(b) bars knowingly failing to respond to a lawful demand for information, and Okonkwo left the question blank.
- Answer: D. MR 8.1 bars knowingly making a false statement of material fact and failing to disclose facts needed to correct a misunderstanding. A false application discovered after admission is a basis for discipline.
- A is wrong: MR 8.1(a) does address false statements, but MR 8.1(b) separately reaches a knowing failure to respond. A blank answer to an express question is that failure.
- B is wrong: Materiality is a real element, but a fact the application expressly asks for, bearing on honesty, is material. His own view that it was minor doesn't control.
- C is wrong: MR 8.4(c) governs a lawyer's dishonesty, but the plagiarism happened in law school, before he was a lawyer. The disciplinable act is the knowing omission (MR 8.1).
- Cite: MR 8.1(a), (b); cmt. [1] · Key terms: Character and fitness
MC-0004 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 1.2 · OUT-1.2.1)
Attorney Castellano agrees to write a character reference for Mateo, a former intern now applying for admission. Castellano knows that Mateo was fired from a prior job for falsifying time records. Castellano's letter praises Mateo's "unblemished record of honesty in every job he has held." The admissions board relies on the letter.
Is Castellano subject to discipline?
- A. Yes, because MR 8.1(a) covers a lawyer's knowing false statement about another's bar application, and Castellano called Mateo's record unblemished.
- B. No, because statements of opinion are not false statements of fact, and Castellano's letter vouched for Mateo's character.
- C. No, because MR 8.1 does not require disclosure of information protected by MR 1.6, and Mateo was Castellano's former intern.
- D. Yes, because MR 8.4(a) bars knowingly assisting another's violation of the Rules, and Mateo's application relied on Castellano's letter of support.
- Answer: A. MR 8.1 covers a lawyer's statements in connection with another person's admission application, not just the applicant's own. Castellano knowingly made a material false statement.
- B is wrong: Opinion isn't a statement of fact, but "an unblemished record of honesty in every job" is a factual assertion Castellano knew was false.
- C is wrong: The MR 1.6 carve-out is real, but an intern is not a client, and the carve-out permits silence, not a false statement.
- D is wrong: MR 8.4(a) is real, but nothing shows Mateo made any false statement. The violation is Castellano's own statement under MR 8.1(a).
- Cite: MR 8.1(a) · Key terms: Character and fitness
MC-0005 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 1.2 · OUT-1.2.1)
Attorney Ferreira represents Client Dunn in a pending civil matter. Dunn, who is also applying for bar admission, told Ferreira in confidence about a prior shoplifting arrest. The admissions board sends Ferreira a questionnaire asking whether she has "any information bearing on Dunn's honesty." Dunn has not consented to disclosure.
What is Ferreira's proper course?
- A. She may decline to reveal Dunn's arrest, because MR 8.1 does not require disclosing MR 1.6 information, but her answer may not be false.
- B. She must disclose Dunn's arrest, because MR 8.1(b) requires a lawyer to respond to an admissions authority's lawful demand for information.
- C. She may say she knows nothing bearing on Dunn's honesty, because MR 1.6 protects information relating to her representation of Dunn.
- D. She may reveal Dunn's arrest, because MR 1.6(b) permits disclosure to comply with other law or a court order, and the board sent a questionnaire.
- Answer: A. MR 8.1 does not require disclosure of information protected by MR 1.6, but it still forbids knowingly false statements. She may say that she has information she can't disclose because of her duty of confidentiality. Asserting MR 1.6 this way isn't a failure to respond under MR 8.1(b).
- B is wrong: MR 8.1(b) does require a response to a lawful demand, but the rule expressly does not require disclosure of information protected by MR 1.6.
- C is wrong: MR 1.6 does protect the arrest, but it permits her to decline, not to make a statement she knows is false.
- D is wrong: The MR 1.6(b)(6) exception is real, but a board questionnaire is neither a court order nor other law requiring disclosure.
- Cite: MR 8.1; MR 1.6(a), (b)(6) · Key terms: Character and fitness
MC-0006 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 1.3 · OUT-1.3.1)
Four lawyers in the same firm are each the subject of a complaint to the state disciplinary authority. None of the conduct described below occurred in the course of representing a client.
Which lawyer is most likely subject to discipline?
- A. A lawyer who knowingly overstated her income on a mortgage application, since MR 8.4(c) prohibits conduct involving misrepresentation.
- B. A lawyer who pleaded guilty to driving with an expired registration, since MR 8.4(b) addresses criminal acts reflecting adversely on fitness.
- C. A lawyer who did no pro bono work this year, since MR 6.1 states that every lawyer has a professional responsibility to provide it.
- D. A lawyer who had a publicly known affair, since MR 8.4(d) prohibits conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
- Answer: A. Knowingly misrepresenting facts to a lender is dishonest conduct under MR 8.4(c), and it may be a crime reflecting on honesty under MR 8.4(b), even outside law practice.
- B is wrong: MR 8.4(b) is real, but a minor registration offense doesn't reflect adversely on honesty, trustworthiness or fitness.
- C is wrong: MR 6.1 is real, but it is aspirational ("should"), and falling short is not a basis for discipline.
- D is wrong: MR 8.4(d) is real, but it concerns interference with the justice system, and a private affair touches no case or client.
- Cite: MR 8.4(b)–(d); cmt. [2]; MR 6.1 · Key terms: Professional misconduct
MC-0007 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 1.3 · OUT-1.3.1)
Attorney Vance represents a plaintiff in a personal-injury case. The defendant is represented by counsel, and Vance knows it. Vance instructs his investigator to phone the defendant, pose as a friendly neighbor, and ask how the accident happened. The investigator does so and reports the defendant's admissions to Vance.
Is Vance subject to discipline?
- A. No, because represented parties may communicate directly with each other, and Vance's investigator, not a lawyer, placed the call.
- B. No, because MR 4.2 permits contacts that are authorized by law, and Vance's investigator may lawfully interview witnesses.
- C. Yes, because MR 4.3 bars a lawyer from implying disinterest to an unrepresented person, and Vance's investigator posed as a neighbor.
- D. Yes, because MR 8.4(a) bars violating the Rules through another's acts, and Vance had his investigator contact a represented defendant.
- Answer: D. MR 8.4(a) makes it misconduct to violate the Rules through another's acts. The contact would violate MR 4.2 if Vance made it himself, and the deception adds MR 8.4(c) concerns.
- A is wrong: Parties may talk directly (MR 4.2 cmt. [4]), but the investigator isn't a party. He is Vance's agent, and MR 8.4(a) bars acting through another.
- B is wrong: The authorized-by-law exception covers contacts permitted by statute or court order. An investigator's general freedom to interview witnesses doesn't reach a represented party.
- C is wrong: MR 4.3 is real, but it governs unrepresented persons, and the defendant is represented. MR 4.2 controls.
- Cite: MR 8.4(a), (c); MR 4.2; MR 5.3(c) · Key terms: Professional misconduct
MC-0008 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 1.3 · OUT-1.3.1)
At a bar-association continuing legal education dinner, Attorney Pruitt repeatedly mocks the accent and national origin of another lawyer seated at her table, loudly enough for others to hear. The other lawyer asks her to stop, and Pruitt continues. No client or case is involved.
Is Pruitt subject to discipline under the Model Rules?
- A. No, because MR 8.4(g) does not preclude legitimate advice or advocacy, and Pruitt's remarks were aimed at a fellow lawyer.
- B. Yes, because MR 8.4(g) covers harassment at bar-association events, and Pruitt mocked a lawyer's national origin at a CLE dinner.
- C. No, because MR 8.4(g) applies when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know the conduct is harassment, and no one told Pruitt it was.
- D. Yes, because MR 8.4(b) reaches criminal acts reflecting adversely on fitness, and Pruitt continued after being asked to stop.
- Answer: B. MR 8.4(g) covers harassment and discrimination in conduct related to the practice of law, and the comments include bar-association, business and social activities connected with law practice.
- A is wrong: The advocacy carve-out is real, but mocking a colleague's accent at dinner is not advice or advocacy for anyone.
- C is wrong: The knowledge standard is real and is met: once the other lawyer asked her to stop, Pruitt at least reasonably should have known.
- D is wrong: MR 8.4(b) is real, but it requires a criminal act, and nothing here is a crime. Paragraph (g) applies.
- Cite: MR 8.4(g); cmts. [3]–[4] · Key terms: Professional misconduct
MC-0009 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 1.3 · OUT-1.3.1)
Client Ibarra needs a zoning variance. Attorney Sorensen tells Ibarra, "I play golf with the zoning board chair every Saturday. Hire me and I'll make sure the variance goes through, regardless of the merits." Sorensen has never discussed a pending matter with the chair and does not intend to.
Is Sorensen subject to discipline?
- A. Yes, because MR 8.4(e) bars implying an ability to influence an official improperly, and Sorensen promised success "regardless of the merits."
- B. No, because MR 8.4(f) bars knowingly assisting a judge or judicial officer in violating the law, and the zoning board chair has done nothing improper.
- C. No, because MR 7.1 bars false or misleading statements about a lawyer's services, and Sorensen really does golf with the chair.
- D. Yes, because MR 3.5(b) bars improper ex parte communications with officials, and Sorensen sees the zoning board chair every Saturday.
- Answer: A. MR 8.4(e) prohibits stating or implying the ability to influence an official improperly. Whether Sorensen could or would do it is irrelevant; the implication is the misconduct.
- B is wrong: MR 8.4(f) is real but reaches only knowing assistance to a judge or judicial officer; the stem shows neither that status nor any assistance with misconduct. MR 8.4(e) governs, and it reaches the statement or implication alone.
- C is wrong: The friendship is true, but promising a result "regardless of the merits" implies improper influence, which MR 8.4(e) forbids.
- D is wrong: MR 3.5(b) is real, but Sorensen has had no communication about a matter and intends none. The misconduct is the implied influence.
- Cite: MR 8.4(e) · Key terms: Professional misconduct
MC-0010 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 1.3 · OUT-1.3.2)
Attorney Brennan is admitted only in State A. While on vacation in State B, he agrees to advise a State B resident about a State B landlord dispute and charges a fee. State B later investigates his conduct during that representation.
May State B discipline Brennan?
- A. No, because MR 8.5(b) chooses which state's rules govern conduct, and Brennan is licensed only in State A.
- B. Yes, because MR 8.5(a) reaches lawyers who provide services in a jurisdiction, and Brennan advised a State B client there.
- C. No, because MR 5.5(c) permits temporary practice by lawyers admitted elsewhere in defined situations, and Brennan was in State B on vacation.
- D. Yes, because a jurisdiction may impose reciprocal discipline based on another's, and State A is where Brennan is licensed.
- Answer: B. MR 8.5(a) extends a jurisdiction's disciplinary authority to lawyers who provide or offer services there, whether or not they're admitted.
- A is wrong: MR 8.5(b) chooses the rules; it doesn't limit who may discipline. And the predominant effect of advice on a State B dispute is in State B.
- C is wrong: MR 5.5(c) is real, but none of its situations fits a State B dispute taken on during a vacation. Even an eligible lawyer remains subject to State B's authority.
- D is wrong: Reciprocal discipline is real, but nothing shows State A has acted, and MR 8.5(a) lets State B act directly.
- Cite: MR 8.5(a), (b); MR 5.5(c) · Key terms: Predominant effect
MC-0011 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 1.3 · OUT-1.3.2)
Attorney Mbeki is admitted in State A and State B. From her office in State A, she drafts an agreement under which her client, a State B company, will buy land in State B from a State B seller. No matter is pending before any tribunal. The two states' rules differ on a disclosure the agreement's structure raises. Mbeki reasonably believes the predominant effect of her work will be in State B, and she complies with State B's rule but not State A's.
Is Mbeki subject to discipline?
- A. Yes, because MR 8.5(b)(2) looks first to where the lawyer acts, and Mbeki drafted the agreement in her State A office.
- B. Yes, because MR 8.5(a) lets each state where a lawyer is admitted discipline her, and Mbeki is admitted in both states.
- C. No, because MR 8.5(b)(2) protects a reasonable belief about where the predominant effect lies, and Mbeki reasonably believed it was State B.
- D. No, because MR 8.5(b)(1) applies the rules of the jurisdiction where a tribunal sits, and a State B court would hear any dispute over the land.
- Answer: C. For conduct not connected with a tribunal, MR 8.5(b)(2) applies the rules of the place of the predominant effect and provides a safe harbor when the lawyer's conduct conforms to the rules of the place she reasonably believes that is.
- A is wrong: The place of conduct yields to the place of predominant effect, and Mbeki reasonably believed that was State B.
- B is wrong: Both states may discipline her (MR 8.5(a)), but MR 8.5(b) picks one set of rules for each piece of conduct.
- D is wrong: MR 8.5(b)(1) applies only to a matter pending before a tribunal, and none is pending. It gives the right result for the wrong reason.
- Cite: MR 8.5(a), (b) · Key terms: Predominant effect
MC-0012 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 1.4 · OUT-1.4.1)
Attorney Szabo is defending a contract case. At a deposition, she personally sees opposing counsel, Attorney Holt, hand the court reporter an exhibit on which Szabo recognizes a signature Holt had forged; Holt had shown the original unsigned version to Szabo a week earlier. Szabo explains the situation to her client, who consents to her reporting it.
What must Szabo do about Holt's conduct?
- A. Nothing, because MR 8.3(c) does not require disclosure of MR 1.6 information, and Szabo learned of the forgery while representing her client.
- B. Refuse to use the exhibit, because MR 3.3(a)(3) bars offering evidence a lawyer knows is false, and Szabo knows Holt's signature is forged.
- C. Nothing, because reporting violations that raise no substantial question about fitness is permitted but not required, and Holt's forgery involved one exhibit.
- D. Inform the appropriate professional authority, because MR 8.3(a) requires reporting such violations, and Szabo saw Holt use a forged signature.
- Answer: D. MR 8.3(a) requires a report when a lawyer knows of a serious violation involving honesty. Forgery plainly qualifies. Because Szabo learned it while representing her client, it is information relating to the representation under MR 1.6, whatever its source; MR 8.3(c) would not require a report without consent, but her client has consented.
- A is wrong: The MR 8.3(c) carve-out is real, but it falls away with client consent, which Szabo has.
- B is wrong: MR 3.3(a)(3) is real, but Szabo isn't offering the exhibit; Holt is. Her duty about Holt's conduct is the MR 8.3(a) report.
- C is wrong: Permissive reporting covers lesser violations. Forgery raises a substantial question about honesty, however few exhibits are involved.
- Cite: MR 8.3(a), (c); MR 1.6(a); MR 3.3(a)(3) · Key terms: Duty to report misconduct
MC-0013 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 1.4 · OUT-1.4.1)
Client Pham retains Attorney Greer to sue Pham's former lawyer, Attorney Lomax, for malpractice. In a confidential meeting, Pham tells Greer that Lomax also stole $15,000 from Pham's settlement and shows Greer bank records confirming the withdrawal. Pham does not want the theft reported, fearing it will delay the malpractice case. Greer has no other source for the information.
Must Greer report Lomax to the disciplinary authority?
- A. No, because MR 8.3(c) does not require revealing MR 1.6 information, and Pham told Greer of the theft in confidence and has never consented to disclosure.
- B. Yes, because MR 1.6(b)(3) permits disclosure to mitigate substantial financial injury from a client's crime using the lawyer's services, and Lomax took $15,000.
- C. Yes, because MR 8.3(a) requires reporting a known violation raising a substantial question about honesty, and Pham's bank records show the theft.
- D. No, because the reporting duty does not reach a lawyer retained to represent the lawyer in question, and Greer was retained in a case against Lomax.
- Answer: A. MR 8.3(c) excludes information protected by MR 1.6. Greer should encourage Pham to consent to a report if it wouldn't substantially prejudice Pham, but may not report without consent.
- B is wrong: The MR 1.6(b)(2)–(3) exceptions apply to the lawyer's own client's crime using the lawyer's services. Lomax is not Greer's client, and Greer's services weren't used.
- C is wrong: Theft would otherwise be reportable, but MR 8.3(c) removes the duty when the information is protected by MR 1.6 and Pham won't consent.
- D is wrong: That exception (MR 8.3 cmt. [4]) is real, but Greer represents Pham, the accuser, not Lomax.
- Cite: MR 8.3(a), (c); MR 1.6(a), (b); MR 8.3 cmt. [2] · Key terms: Duty to report misconduct
MC-0014 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 1.4 · OUT-1.4.1)
Attorney Okafor volunteers as a peer counselor in the state bar's approved lawyers assistance program. During a counseling session, a participant, Attorney Vale, admits to having repeatedly lied to clients about the status of their cases while struggling with alcohol use.
Must Okafor report Vale to the disciplinary authority?
- A. Yes, because MR 8.3(a) requires reporting known violations raising a substantial question about honesty, and Vale admitted lying to clients.
- B. Yes, because MR 1.6 protects information relating to the representation of a client, and Vale was never Okafor's client.
- C. No, because MR 8.3(c) exempts information gained in an approved lawyers assistance program, and Okafor learned it as a peer counselor.
- D. No, because the attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications made to get legal advice, and Vale confided privately in Okafor, a lawyer.
- Answer: C. MR 8.3(c) exempts such information so that lawyers will seek help without fear of being reported by those helping them.
- A is wrong: That is the MR 8.3(a) duty, and Vale's lies would otherwise qualify, but MR 8.3(c) exempts information gained in an approved program.
- B is wrong: MR 1.6 likely doesn't cover the session, but the assistance-program exemption is separate from MR 1.6 and applies on its own.
- D is wrong: The privilege is real, but Vale sought peer counseling, not legal advice. The exemption, not privilege, removes the duty.
- Cite: MR 8.3(a), (c); cmt. [5] · Key terms: Duty to report misconduct
MC-0015 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 1.4 · OUT-1.4.1)
Over several months, Attorney Salazar has seen Judge Petrov hold private meetings with one side's lawyer about pending motions, without notice to the other side, and then rule for that side. Salazar's clients were not involved. Salazar mentions it to the judge, who says, "That's how I run my courtroom." Salazar has actual knowledge of the meetings.
What must Salazar do?
- A. Move to disqualify Judge Petrov, because a judge must disqualify when impartiality might reasonably be questioned, and Petrov met privately with one side.
- B. Nothing, because a judge may hold a nonsubstantive scheduling communication ex parte if no party gains an advantage and the others are promptly told, and Petrov's meetings concerned motions.
- C. Inform the appropriate authority, because MR 8.3(b) requires reporting a judge's known serious violation, and Salazar saw Petrov's repeated private meetings with one side.
- D. Nothing more, because a lawyer may raise concerns directly with a judge, and Salazar already raised the meetings with Petrov.
- Answer: C. MR 8.3(b) requires a lawyer who knows of such a violation by a judge to report it to the appropriate authority, typically the judicial conduct commission.
- A is wrong: CJC Rule 2.11 is real, but Salazar's clients weren't involved, and a motion wouldn't satisfy the MR 8.3(b) duty to report.
- B is wrong: The scheduling exception (CJC Rule 2.9(A)(1)) is real, but it covers only necessary scheduling or administrative contacts that address no substantive matter, where the judge reasonably believes no party will gain a procedural, substantive or tactical advantage, and the judge promptly notifies the other parties and gives them a chance to respond. Petrov's meetings addressed pending motions (substantive), and the other side got no notice, so the exception doesn't apply.
- D is wrong: Speaking with the judge is permitted, but it doesn't discharge the MR 8.3(b) duty to inform the appropriate authority.
- Cite: MR 8.3(b); MR 8.4(f); CJC Rules 2.9(A), 2.11 · Key terms: Duty to report misconduct
MC-0016 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 1.5 · OUT-1.5.1)
Attorney Marchetti runs a busy immigration practice. To save time, he lets his paralegal, Rosa, meet new clients alone, tell them which visa category they qualify for, and quote the firm's fee. Rosa holds no license or other authorization to provide legal services. Marchetti reviews the files later and signs the forms.
Is Marchetti subject to discipline?
- A. Yes, because MR 5.5(a) bars assisting a nonlawyer's unauthorized practice, and Rosa tells clients which visa category they qualify for.
- B. No, because a lawyer may delegate work to a paralegal the lawyer supervises, and Marchetti reviews Rosa's files and signs the forms.
- C. No, because a jurisdiction may authorize nonlawyers to provide limited legal services, and Rosa handles standardized immigration forms.
- D. Yes, because MR 1.5(b) requires the basis of the fee to be communicated to a new client, and Rosa quotes Marchetti's fees.
- Answer: A. A lawyer may delegate tasks to a supervised nonlawyer but must not let the nonlawyer exercise professional judgment. Telling clients which visa category they qualify for is legal advice, so Marchetti is assisting UPL. Quoting a fee Marchetti has already set is a task that may be delegated; the problem is the advice.
- B is wrong: Supervised delegation is permitted (MR 5.5 cmt. [2]), but giving legal advice is not delegable, and later review doesn't cure it.
- C is wrong: Jurisdictions may authorize paraprofessionals (cmt. [3]), but the facts say Rosa has no such authorization.
- D is wrong: MR 1.5(b) requires the fee basis be communicated, and it was. Staff may relay a fee the lawyer set.
- Cite: MR 5.5(a); cmts. [2]–[3]; MR 5.3; MR 1.5(b) · Key terms: Unauthorized practice of law
MC-0017 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 1.5 · OUT-1.5.1)
Carver, a nonlawyer small-business owner, has decided to represent himself in a small-claims case against a supplier. He hires Attorney Moy for one hour to explain the court's procedures and help him organize his evidence, and, after Moy explains the limitation's material risks and the reasonably available alternatives, he agrees to that limited scope. Moy does not appear in court.
Is Moy's assistance proper?
- A. No, because MR 5.5(a) bars assisting the unauthorized practice of law, and Carver, a nonlawyer, is handling a legal matter.
- B. Yes, because a lawyer may counsel nonlawyers who wish to proceed on their own, and Carver chose to represent himself.
- C. No, because MR 1.2(c) permits a limited scope only if reasonable and with informed consent, and Moy's help lasts one hour.
- D. Yes, because some small-claims courts restrict lawyer appearances, and Carver's case is in small-claims court.
- Answer: B. MR 5.5's comments expressly permit lawyers to counsel people who represent themselves. This is not assisting the unauthorized practice of law.
- A is wrong: MR 5.5(a) is real, but representing oneself is not unauthorized practice, so there is nothing to assist.
- C is wrong: MR 1.2(c) is real and satisfied: an hour of procedural coaching is reasonable for a small-claims case, and Carver gave informed consent after Moy explained the limitation's material risks and alternatives.
- D is wrong: Some courts do limit lawyer appearances, but the facts don't say so, and counseling a self-represented person is proper in any court.
- Cite: MR 5.5 cmt. [3]; MR 1.2(c) · Key terms: Unauthorized practice of law
MC-0018 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 1.5 · OUT-1.5.1)
Attorney Keene is admitted only in State A. Because many of his State A clients have vacation homes in neighboring State B, Keene rents a small office in State B, puts his name on the door, and advertises in State B newspapers as available "for all your legal needs." No State B rule or law authorizes this.
Is Keene subject to discipline?
- A. No, because MR 5.5(c)(4) permits temporary services reasonably related to home-state practice, and Keene's State B work serves his State A clients.
- B. No, because ABA Formal Op. 495 (advisory) permits, in defined conditions, remote work for home-state clients, and Keene's clients are State A residents.
- C. Yes, because MR 5.5(b) bars an unadmitted lawyer from establishing an office or systematic presence, and Keene rented a State B office.
- D. Yes, because MR 7.3 restricts live person-to-person solicitation, and Keene sought State B clients through newspaper ads.
- Answer: C. MR 5.5(b)(1) prohibits this presence, and his advertising also holds him out as available for local practice.
- A is wrong: MR 5.5(c)(4) covers temporary work. A rented office with his name on the door is not temporary.
- B is wrong: Formal Op. 495 (advisory) applies only if the lawyer doesn't hold out a local office or availability for local practice. Keene does both.
- D is wrong: MR 7.3 is real, but newspaper ads are advertising, not live solicitation, and MR 7.2 permits them.
- Cite: MR 5.5(b), (c)(4); ABA Formal Op. 495 (advisory); MR 7.2, 7.3 · Key terms: Systematic and continuous presence
MC-0019 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 1.6 · OUT-1.6.1)
Attorney Delacroix is admitted only in State A. A State A client needs help closing a real-estate deal in State B. Delacroix associates with State B Attorney Kwan, who reviews all documents, attends the closing and discusses the strategy with the client. Delacroix spends a week in State B working on the matter.
May Delacroix do this work in State B?
- A. No, because MR 5.5(b) bars a systematic and continuous presence, and Delacroix worked in State B for a full week.
- B. Yes, because MR 5.5(c)(1) permits temporary work with an actively participating local lawyer, and Kwan attends the closing.
- C. No, because appearing before a State B tribunal requires pro hac vice or similar authorization, and Delacroix is handling a State B matter.
- D. Yes, because MR 5.5(d)(2) permits services that federal law authorizes, and Delacroix's client is closing a real-estate deal.
- Answer: B. This fits MR 5.5(c)(1): temporary services in association with a locally admitted lawyer who actively participates. Kwan's active participation, not merely lending a name, is what makes the safe harbor work.
- A is wrong: MR 5.5(b) is real, but one week on a single deal is temporary, not systematic and continuous.
- C is wrong: Pro hac vice applies to tribunal appearances (MR 5.5(c)(2)). A real-estate closing involves no tribunal.
- D is wrong: MR 5.5(d)(2) is real, but no federal law authorizes a real-estate closing. The (c)(1) safe harbor applies.
- Cite: MR 5.5(b), (c)(1)–(2), (d)(2) · Key terms: Multijurisdictional practice
MC-0020 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 1.6 · OUT-1.6.1)
Attorney Ahn, admitted only in State A, has for years represented Client Torres, a State A manufacturer. A dispute arises with a State C distributor, and the contract requires arbitration in State C. Ahn travels to State C for three weeks to represent Torres in the arbitration. State C does not require pro hac vice admission for arbitrations.
Is Ahn's work in State C permitted?
- A. No, because MR 5.5(b) bars a systematic and continuous presence, and Ahn spends three straight weeks working on site in State C.
- B. No, because MR 5.5(c)(1) covers work in association with an actively participating local lawyer, and Ahn has no State C co-counsel.
- C. Yes, because MR 5.5(c)(3) covers ADR related to home practice where pro hac vice isn't required, and Torres is Ahn's longtime client.
- D. Yes, because MR 5.5(d)(2) permits services federal law authorizes, and the Federal Arbitration Act governs Torres's contract.
- Answer: C. MR 5.5(c)(3) covers ADR proceedings reasonably related to the lawyer's home practice when pro hac vice admission isn't required. Three weeks can still be temporary.
- A is wrong: MR 5.5(b) is real, but three weeks on one matter is temporary; there is no fixed day limit (cmt. [6]).
- B is wrong: MR 5.5(c)(1) is one safe harbor, not a requirement for the others. The ADR safe harbor applies on its own.
- D is wrong: MR 5.5(d)(2) is real, but the Federal Arbitration Act governs enforceability of arbitration agreements. It doesn't authorize anyone to practice law.
- Cite: MR 5.5(b), (c)(1), (c)(3), (d)(2); cmt. [6] · Key terms: Multijurisdictional practice
MC-0021 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 1.6 · OUT-1.6.1)
Attorney Quill was suspended from practice for six months in State A for neglecting client matters. During the suspension, Quill, who is also admitted in State D, goes to State B for a week to help a State D client negotiate a contract. The work is reasonably related to Quill's State D practice.
May Quill provide the services in State B?
- A. No, because MR 5.5(c) is unavailable to a lawyer who is suspended in any jurisdiction, and Quill is currently suspended in State A.
- B. No, because MR 5.5(c)(4) requires a link to practice where the lawyer is admitted, and Quill's State A license is suspended.
- C. Yes, because MR 5.5(c)(4) permits temporary work reasonably related to home practice, and Quill's negotiation relates to his State D work.
- D. Yes, because MR 5.5(c)(1) permits temporary work with an actively participating local lawyer, and Quill could associate State B counsel.
- Answer: A. MR 5.5(c) is limited to lawyers "not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction." Quill's State A suspension disqualifies him.
- B is wrong: The work does relate to his State D practice. The right result rests on the suspension bar, not a missing home-practice link.
- C is wrong: MR 5.5(c)(4) would fit an eligible lawyer, but the suspension bar applies to every (c) safe harbor.
- D is wrong: The MR 5.5(c)(1) route is also closed by the suspension bar.
- Cite: MR 5.5(c) · Key terms: Multijurisdictional practice
MC-0022 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 1.6 · OUT-1.6.2)
Attorney Obi, admitted in State A, moves to State B to become in-house counsel at a manufacturer's headquarters there. He complies with State B's registration requirement for in-house lawyers. A company vice president asks Obi to represent her personally in her divorce, and several neighbors ask Obi to prepare their wills.
Which work may Obi properly do from his State B office?
- A. The company's work and the divorce, because MR 1.13(g) lets an organization's lawyer also represent its officers, and she is one of the company's officers.
- B. All of it, because MR 5.5(d)(2) permits services that federal or other law authorizes, and Obi registered under State B's in-house rule.
- C. The manufacturer's work alone, because MR 5.5(d)(1) permits services to the lawyer's employer and its affiliates, and Obi is its in-house counsel.
- D. The company's work and the wills, because MR 6.1 encourages pro bono service, and Obi's neighbors asked for help with their wills.
- Answer: C. MR 5.5(d)(1) permits a systematic presence to provide services to the lawyer's employer or its organizational affiliates. It doesn't extend to employees' personal matters or outside clients.
- A is wrong: MR 1.13(g) is real, but it doesn't authorize practice in State B. An officer's personal divorce is not employer work under MR 5.5(d)(1).
- B is wrong: MR 5.5(d)(2) is real, but the in-house registration authorizes only employer work, not divorces or wills.
- D is wrong: MR 6.1 is real, but it doesn't authorize practice where a lawyer isn't admitted.
- Cite: MR 5.5(d)(1)–(2); MR 1.13(g); MR 6.1 · Key terms: Multijurisdictional practice, Systematic and continuous presence
MC-0023 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 1.7 · OUT-1.7.1)
The firm of Pendleton & Thackeray adopts a retirement plan covering all employees, including paralegals and secretaries. The firm's contributions each year are a percentage of the firm's net profits from legal fees.
Is the plan proper?
- A. No, because MR 5.4(a) bars sharing legal fees with nonlawyers, and Pendleton & Thackeray's contributions come from legal-fee profits.
- B. No, because MR 5.4(d) bars nonlawyer ownership of a for-profit law practice, and the plan gives paralegals a stake in firm profits.
- C. Yes, because MR 5.4(a)(4) permits sharing court-awarded fees with a nonprofit that employed or recommended the lawyer, and the plan benefits staff.
- D. Yes, because MR 5.4(a)(3) permits including nonlawyer employees in a profit-sharing retirement plan, and the plan covers paralegals and secretaries.
- Answer: D. MR 5.4(a)(3) expressly permits including nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan, even one based in whole or in part on profit sharing.
- A is wrong: That's the general MR 5.4(a) rule, but a retirement plan is an express exception to it.
- B is wrong: MR 5.4(d) is real, but a plan contribution gives employees no ownership interest in the firm.
- C is wrong: MR 5.4(a)(4) is real, but no nonprofit or court-awarded fee is involved. The plan is proper under (a)(3).
- Cite: MR 5.4(a)(3)–(4), (d) · Key terms: Fee sharing with a nonlawyer
MC-0024 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 1.7 · OUT-1.7.1)
Attorney Delgado agrees to pay her longtime investigator, Frost, 15% of the legal fee in every personal-injury case Frost refers to her. Frost is not a lawyer. Delgado's clients are not told about the arrangement.
Is Delgado subject to discipline?
- A. No, because MR 5.4(a)(3) permits including nonlawyer employees in a profit-sharing compensation plan, and Frost is Delgado's longtime investigator.
- B. No, because MR 7.2(b)(2) permits paying the usual charges of a not-for-profit or qualified lawyer referral service, and Frost refers cases to Delgado.
- C. Yes, because MR 1.5(e) requires the client's written agreement to a fee division between lawyers in different firms, and Delgado's clients never agreed.
- D. Yes, because MR 5.4(a) bars a lawyer from sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer, and Delgado pays Frost 15% of the fee on each referred case.
- Answer: D. A per-case percentage of a fee paid to a nonlawyer is prohibited by MR 5.4(a). It is also improper payment for a recommendation under MR 7.2(b).
- A is wrong: The MR 5.4(a)(3) exception is real, but a per-case cut of fees for referrals is not a compensation plan.
- B is wrong: MR 7.2(b)(2) is real, but Frost is an individual, not a not-for-profit or qualified lawyer referral service.
- C is wrong: MR 1.5(e) governs divisions between lawyers in different firms, and Frost is not a lawyer. The split is barred whatever the clients are told.
- Cite: MR 5.4(a); MR 7.2(b); MR 1.5(e) · Key terms: Fee sharing with a nonlawyer
MC-0025 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 1.7 · OUT-1.7.2)
Attorney Eklund and Priya Lang, a certified financial planner, want to open "Lang Eklund Family Wealth." Lang would handle investment and retirement planning. Eklund would draft wills and trusts and handle probate matters. They would split profits 60/40 in Lang's favor, and Lang would run the office.
May Eklund join the partnership?
- A. No, because MR 1.8(a) requires informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, to a business deal with a lawyer, and Eklund would be in business with Lang.
- B. No, because MR 5.4(b) bars a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of its activity is practicing law, and Eklund would draft wills and handle probate.
- C. Yes, because MR 5.7 lets a lawyer provide law-related services such as financial planning, and Lang would handle the investment planning.
- D. Yes, because MR 5.4(c) bars a nonlawyer from directing a lawyer's professional judgment, and Lang would run the office, not the legal work.
- Answer: B. MR 5.4(b) bars this partnership. Eklund's will, trust and probate work is the practice of law.
- A is wrong: MR 1.8(a) is real, but Lang is not Eklund's client. The bar here is structural (MR 5.4(b)).
- C is wrong: MR 5.7 is real, but it doesn't permit a partnership with a nonlawyer that practices law.
- D is wrong: MR 5.4(c) is real, but protecting judgment doesn't cure the partnership, which MR 5.4(b) prohibits.
- Cite: MR 5.4(b)–(d); MR 5.7; MR 1.8(a) · Key terms: Professional independence
MC-0026 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 1.8 · OUT-1.8.1)
Partner Ahmed supervises Associate Brooks on a commercial case. Ahmed learns that Brooks served discovery responses yesterday falsely stating that no internal emails on a key topic exist. Brooks, in fact, had found several and withheld them. Ahmed decides to "let it ride" because correcting the responses would embarrass the firm. The firm has sound supervisory procedures in place. The responses can still be corrected before any ruling.
Is Ahmed subject to discipline for Brooks's violation?
- A. No, because MR 5.1(c)(1) makes a lawyer responsible for conduct the lawyer orders, and Ahmed did not order Brooks's false responses.
- B. Yes, because under MR 5.1(c)(2) a supervisor who knows in time to act and fails to do so is responsible, and Ahmed let it ride.
- C. No, because MR 5.2(a) keeps a lawyer bound by the Rules when acting at another's direction, and Brooks served the responses himself.
- D. Yes, because MR 5.1(a) requires partners to make reasonable efforts to ensure compliance measures, and Ahmed is a partner at Brooks's firm.
- Answer: B. MR 5.1(c)(2) applies. Ahmed has direct supervisory authority, knows of the conduct at a time when it can still be corrected, and fails to take reasonable remedial action.
- A is wrong: Ordering is one route. Knowing in time and failing to act is a separate route under (c)(2).
- C is wrong: MR 5.2(a) keeps Brooks responsible, but it doesn't relieve Ahmed under MR 5.1(c).
- D is wrong: MR 5.1(a) is real, but the firm has sound supervisory procedures, so that duty is met. Ahmed's liability comes from knowing and failing to act.
- Cite: MR 5.1(a), (c); MR 5.2(a); MR 3.4(a) · Key terms: Direct supervisory authority
MC-0027 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 1.8 · OUT-1.8.2)
Associate Tran is told by her supervising partner, Diaz, to proceed with a new matter against a company the firm represented five years ago on a different contract. Tran thinks the matters might be substantially related. Diaz reviews the files and reasonably concludes they are not. Tran proceeds. A court later disqualifies the firm, finding the matters substantially related. The former client was never asked for, and did not give, consent.
Is Tran subject to discipline?
- A. Yes, because MR 5.2(a) keeps a lawyer bound by the Rules when acting at another's direction, and Tran proceeded on Diaz's instruction.
- B. No, because MR 5.2(b) protects a subordinate acting on a supervisor's reasonable resolution of an arguable question, and Diaz reasonably resolved it.
- C. Yes, because MR 1.9(a) bars a substantially related matter adverse to a former client absent informed consent, confirmed in writing, and none was obtained.
- D. No, because MR 1.10 imputes a lawyer's conflict to the whole firm, and the court disqualified Tran's firm, not Tran.
- Answer: B. Whether the matters were substantially related was arguable, and Diaz's answer was reasonable. MR 5.2(b) protects a subordinate who acts on a supervisor's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty.
- A is wrong: That's the general rule, but MR 5.2(b) protects a subordinate on an arguable question reasonably resolved by a supervisor.
- C is wrong: MR 1.9(a), with its informed-consent exception, is the underlying rule, and no consent was obtained, but MR 5.2(b) protects Tran from discipline.
- D is wrong: MR 1.10 imputes conflicts for disqualification, but discipline is individual. Tran is protected only by MR 5.2(b).
- Cite: MR 5.2(a), (b); MR 1.9(a); MR 1.10 · Key terms: Direct supervisory authority
MC-0028 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 1.8 · OUT-1.8.3)
The managing partners of a mid-sized firm hire an overseas company to scan and store all client files. They choose the cheapest bidder without asking about its security practices, and they give it no instructions about confidentiality. Months later, a breach exposes client records.
Are the managing partners subject to discipline?
- A. No, because MR 5.3(c) makes lawyers responsible for a nonlawyer's conduct they order or ratify, and the partners never approved the breach.
- B. No, because an unauthorized disclosure is not a violation if the lawyer made reasonable efforts to prevent it, and a third party caused the breach.
- C. Yes, because lawyers must tell current clients of a breach that compromises their material confidential information, and the vendor's breach exposed client records.
- D. Yes, because MR 5.3 requires reasonable efforts to ensure an outside vendor's conduct fits the lawyers' duties, and the partners never vetted the vendor.
- Answer: D. MR 5.3(a) and (b) cover nonlawyer assistance outside the firm. Reasonable efforts include checking the vendor and giving confidentiality instructions. MR 1.6(c) also requires reasonable efforts to protect client information.
- A is wrong: MR 5.3(c) is one route, but MR 5.3(a)–(b) separately require reasonable efforts regarding the vendor.
- B is wrong: The reasonable-efforts defense (MR 1.6 cmt. [18]) is real, but these partners made no efforts.
- C is wrong: Notice is owed when a breach compromises material client information (ABA Formal Op. 483 (advisory)), but nothing says they failed to give any notice owed. The violation is the failure to vet and instruct.
- Cite: MR 5.3(a)–(c); MR 1.6(c); cmt. [18]; MR 1.4 · Key terms: Nonlawyer assistance
MC-0029 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 1.9 · OUT-1.9.1)
Attorney Abernathy is leaving private practice to become a full-time administrative law judge. She agrees to sell her solo immigration practice, including goodwill (the value of its reputation and client relationships), to Attorney Whitfield. She sends each client a letter describing the sale, their right to hire other counsel or take their file, and that consent to the file transfer will be presumed if they do not object within 90 days. Whitfield plans to add a 15% "transition surcharge" to the flat fees of Abernathy's former clients to recover the purchase price.
Is the sale proper?
- A. Yes, because MR 1.17(c) requires written notice of the sale, other counsel and the 90-day presumption, and Abernathy's letter covered each.
- B. No, because MR 1.17(d) bars increasing fees by reason of the sale, and Whitfield plans a 15% surcharge to recover the price.
- C. No, because MR 1.17(a) requires the seller to cease private practice, and Abernathy will still decide legal questions as a judge.
- D. Yes, because MR 1.17 preserves each client's right to take the file to other counsel, and Abernathy's clients may object.
- Answer: B. MR 1.17(d) forbids raising fees by reason of the sale. The other conditions (exit, whole practice, and notice, with the 90 days running from each client's receipt) appear to be met.
- A is wrong: The notice meets MR 1.17(c), but notice is only one condition. The surcharge violates MR 1.17(d).
- C is wrong: MR 1.17(a) is real, but judging is not private practice, and a seller may take a judicial post.
- D is wrong: The client's right to other counsel is real, but it doesn't cure a fee increase caused by the sale.
- Cite: MR 1.17(a)–(d); cmt. [3] · Key terms: Sale of a law practice
MC-0030 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 1.9 · OUT-1.9.1)
Attorney Ng has a general practice in a mid-sized city: about half personal injury and half estate planning. She wants to focus only on estate planning. She sells her entire personal-injury practice to another firm and sends the required notice to each personal-injury client. She stops handling personal-injury matters in that jurisdiction but continues her estate-planning work there.
Is the sale permitted?
- A. No, because MR 1.17(b) requires sale of the entire practice or an entire area of practice, and Ng kept her estate-planning work.
- B. No, because MR 1.17(a) requires the seller to cease the practice sold in that geographic area, and Ng keeps practicing in the same city.
- C. Yes, because MR 1.17 permits selling an entire area of practice and ceasing that area, and Ng sold all her personal-injury work.
- D. Yes, because a buyer must address conflicts before taking the seller's matters, and Ng's buyer took each personal-injury matter.
- Answer: C. MR 1.17 allows the sale of an entire area of practice, with the seller ceasing only that area in the geographic area or jurisdiction where it was conducted, as long as the other conditions are met.
- A is wrong: MR 1.17(b) permits an entire area, and she sold the whole personal-injury area.
- B is wrong: The cessation requirement reaches only the area sold. Ng stopped personal-injury work; estate planning may continue.
- D is wrong: Buyers must address conflicts (cmt. [11]), but that alone doesn't make a sale proper.
- Cite: MR 1.17(a)–(c); cmt. [11] · Key terms: Sale of a law practice
MC-0031 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 1.9 · OUT-1.9.2)
Attorney Kowalczyk owns a title-insurance agency that operates from his law office, uses his law-firm staff, and keeps its files in the same system as his legal files. Kowalczyk is the agency's sole owner. Customers of the agency are not told that the agency is separate from the law practice. A customer later claims the agency disclosed her financial information to a competitor.
Do the Rules of Professional Conduct govern Kowalczyk's title-insurance work?
- A. No, because a nonlawyer may lawfully sell title insurance, and Kowalczyk's agency sells title insurance to customers.
- B. No, because a lawyer may provide law-related services through a separate business, and Kowalczyk owns the agency as its own business.
- C. Yes, because MR 5.4(b) bars a lawyer from forming a partnership with a nonlawyer that practices law, and the agency employs nonlawyer staff who sell title policies.
- D. Yes, because MR 5.7(a)(1) applies the Rules when law-related services aren't distinct, and the agency shares Kowalczyk's office, staff and files.
- Answer: D. Under MR 5.7(a)(1), the Rules, including client-lawyer protections, apply when law-related services are provided in circumstances not distinct from the lawyer's legal services. Same office, staff and files, with no notice to customers, meet that test.
- A is wrong: Title insurance isn't the practice of law, but it is a law-related service, and MR 5.7 decides when the Rules reach it.
- B is wrong: A lawyer may own such a business, but it escapes client-lawyer protections only if the services are distinct and customers are told. Neither is true.
- C is wrong: MR 5.4(b) is real, but Kowalczyk owns the agency alone, so there is no partnership with a nonlawyer. Employing nonlawyer staff is permitted. MR 5.7(a) governs.
- Cite: MR 5.7(a), (b); MR 5.4(b) · Key terms: Law-related services
MC-0032 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 1.10 · OUT-1.10.1)
Attorney Nakamura represents a warehouse worker in an overtime suit against a national retailer. The retailer's lawyer, Attorney Haverford, proposes a generous settlement if Nakamura agrees not to bring any other wage claim against the retailer for five years. Nakamura's client wants the money.
Is Haverford subject to discipline for offering the term?
- A. Yes, because MR 5.6(b) bars offering a settlement term restricting a lawyer's right to practice, and Haverford proposed barring Nakamura's future suits.
- B. No, because MR 5.6(b) concerns restrictions that become part of a client settlement agreement, and Nakamura has not yet agreed to Haverford's proposed term.
- C. No, because MR 1.2(a) gives the client the decision whether to settle, and Nakamura's client wants the money.
- D. Yes, because MR 1.2(a) requires a lawyer to abide by a client's decision whether to settle, and Haverford made the offer on the retailer's behalf.
- Answer: A. MR 5.6(b) prohibits both offering and making such an agreement. Haverford violated it by offering it; Nakamura would violate it by agreeing.
- B is wrong: MR 5.6(b) covers "participating in offering or making" the agreement, so the offer alone violates it.
- C is wrong: MR 1.2(a) is real, but it doesn't let a lawyer propose a term the Rules prohibit.
- D is wrong: MR 1.2(a) is real, but nothing settled, and nothing suggests Haverford lacked his client's authority.
- Cite: MR 5.6(b); MR 1.2(a) · Key terms: Restriction on the right to practice
MC-0033 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 1.10 · OUT-1.10.1)
Partner Moon drafts, and proposes to the other partners, a clause in the partnership agreement of Kessler & Moon. It provides that any partner who leaves the firm and then practices law within 50 miles during the next two years forfeits all unpaid profit distributions already earned. The clause does not relate to retirement benefits. The partners adopt it.
Is Moon subject to discipline for drafting and proposing the clause?
- A. No, because MR 5.6(a) addresses agreements restricting practice, and Moon's clause restricts only the payment of distributions.
- B. No, because MR 5.6(a) permits restrictions that are conditions of retirement benefits, and Moon's clause governs the payouts of departing partners.
- C. Yes, because a business noncompete must be reasonable in time and area to be enforced, and Moon's clause lasts two years.
- D. Yes, because MR 5.6(a) bars offering an agreement restricting a departing partner's practice, and Moon proposed a forfeiture for practicing nearby.
- Answer: D. MR 5.6(a) bars participating in offering or making post-departure restrictions. A financial penalty for competing, such as forfeiting earned distributions, is a restriction on the right to practice.
- A is wrong: Financial penalties that discourage practice restrict it just as a direct ban does.
- B is wrong: The retirement-benefits exception is real, but the facts say this clause does not relate to retirement benefits.
- C is wrong: Reasonableness is the business-noncompete test. MR 5.6(a) bars the restriction however reasonable, so this is the right result for the wrong reason.
- Cite: MR 5.6(a) · Key terms: Restriction on the right to practice
True / False
TF-0001 (OUT-1.1.1)
- Statement: A violation of the Model Rules does not by itself give a client a cause of action against the lawyer.
- Answer: True
- Why: The Rules are designed for discipline. A violation creates no cause of action and no presumption that a legal duty was breached, though it may be evidence of the standard of care.
- Exam trap: Students assume "violates a rule" means "liable in damages." They're separate questions.
- Cite: MR Scope [20]
TF-0002 (OUT-1.1.2)
- Statement: A lawyer "knows" a fact only if someone has told the lawyer it is true.
- Answer: False
- Why: Knowledge means actual knowledge, and it may be inferred from the circumstances. The lawyer need not be told directly.
- Corrected statement: A lawyer knows a fact when the lawyer has actual knowledge of it, which may be inferred from the circumstances.
- Exam trap: Don't require direct admission. Circumstantial evidence can prove knowledge.
- Cite: MR 1.0(f)
TF-0003 (OUT-1.2.1)
- Statement: A lawyer who writes a recommendation for a bar applicant and knowingly includes a false statement of material fact is subject to discipline.
- Answer: True
- Why: MR 8.1 applies to lawyers in connection with a bar admission application, not only to applicants.
- Exam trap: Students think MR 8.1 applies only to the applicant.
- Cite: MR 8.1(a)
TF-0004 (OUT-1.2.1)
- Statement: A false statement on a bar application cannot be the basis for discipline once the applicant has been admitted.
- Answer: False
- Why: A knowingly false statement of material fact on the application, discovered after admission, can lead to discipline, because the violation occurred in the admission process.
- Corrected statement: A knowingly false statement of material fact on a bar application can be the basis for discipline, even if it is discovered after the applicant is admitted.
- Exam trap: Admission doesn't wipe out earlier dishonesty in the application.
- Cite: MR 8.1; cmt. [1]
TF-0005 (OUT-1.3.1)
- Statement: A lawyer may be disciplined for dishonest conduct even if the lawyer was never convicted of a crime.
- Answer: True
- Why: MR 8.4(c) covers dishonesty, fraud, deceit and misrepresentation whether or not criminal, and discipline doesn't require a conviction.
- Exam trap: Students assume a criminal conviction must come first.
- Cite: MR 8.4(c)
TF-0006 (OUT-1.3.1)
- Statement: Any criminal conviction is a ground for professional discipline under MR 8.4(b).
- Answer: False
- Why: Only crimes that reflect adversely on honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer count, such as offenses involving violence, dishonesty or breach of trust, or a pattern of minor offenses.
- Corrected statement: A criminal act is a ground for discipline under MR 8.4(b) only if it reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer.
- Exam trap: A single minor offense, like a speeding ticket, is not enough.
- Cite: MR 8.4(b); cmt. [2]
TF-0007 (OUT-1.3.2)
- Statement: A lawyer who is not admitted in a jurisdiction may still be disciplined there if the lawyer provides legal services in that jurisdiction.
- Answer: True
- Why: MR 8.5(a) extends disciplinary authority to lawyers who provide or offer legal services in the jurisdiction.
- Exam trap: Admission is not the only source of disciplinary authority.
- Cite: MR 8.5(a)
TF-0008 (OUT-1.3.2)
- Statement: When a lawyer's conduct occurs in a case pending before a tribunal, the rules of the lawyer's home jurisdiction govern that conduct.
- Answer: False
- Why: For conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction where the tribunal sits apply, unless the tribunal's rules provide otherwise.
- Corrected statement: When a lawyer's conduct occurs in a case pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction where the tribunal sits generally govern that conduct.
- Exam trap: Don't default to the home state. The forum's rules govern litigation conduct.
- Cite: MR 8.5(b)(1)
TF-0009 (OUT-1.4.1)
- Statement: A lawyer must report another lawyer to the disciplinary authority whenever the lawyer suspects the other lawyer violated a rule.
- Answer: False
- Why: The duty requires actual knowledge of a violation that raises a substantial question about honesty, trustworthiness or fitness. Suspicion of a minor violation is not enough.
- Corrected statement: A lawyer must report another lawyer when the lawyer knows of a violation that raises a substantial question about that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness, unless the information is protected by MR 1.6 or came from an approved assistance program.
- Exam trap: Both "knows" and "substantial question" are required.
- Cite: MR 8.3(a), (c)
TF-0010 (OUT-1.4.1)
- Statement: The duty to report misconduct does not require a lawyer to reveal information protected by the duty of confidentiality.
- Answer: True
- Why: MR 8.3(c) excludes information protected by MR 1.6, though the lawyer should encourage the client to consent to a report when that wouldn't substantially prejudice the client.
- Exam trap: Students think the reporting duty overrides confidentiality. It doesn't.
- Cite: MR 8.3(c); cmt. [2]
TF-0011 (OUT-1.5.1)
- Statement: A lawyer may counsel a nonlawyer who wishes to represent himself in a legal matter.
- Answer: True
- Why: Advising self-represented people is expressly permitted and is not assisting the unauthorized practice of law.
- Exam trap: Helping a person represent himself is different from helping a nonlawyer represent others.
- Cite: MR 5.5 cmt. [3]
TF-0012 (OUT-1.5.1)
- Statement: A paralegal who is closely supervised by a lawyer may set fees and give legal advice to the lawyer's clients.
- Answer: False
- Why: Supervision allows delegation of tasks, but not of the lawyer's professional judgment. Setting fees and giving legal advice are for the lawyer.
- Corrected statement: A supervised paralegal may perform delegated tasks, but may not set fees or give legal advice to the lawyer's clients.
- Exam trap: "Supervised" doesn't turn legal advice into a delegable task.
- Cite: MR 5.5(a); cmt. [2]
TF-0013 (OUT-1.6.1)
- Statement: A lawyer admitted in another state may practice temporarily in a jurisdiction only if the lawyer associates with local counsel.
- Answer: False
- Why: Association with actively participating local counsel is one of four safe harbors. The others (litigation, ADR and work related to home practice) don't require local counsel.
- Corrected statement: A lawyer admitted in another state may practice temporarily in a jurisdiction under any of four safe harbors, only one of which requires association with local counsel.
- Exam trap: Don't collapse the four safe harbors into one.
- Cite: MR 5.5(c)(1)–(4)
TF-0014 (OUT-1.6.2)
- Statement: A lawyer admitted and authorized to practice in another state, and not disbarred or suspended anywhere, may establish an office in a jurisdiction to provide legal services only to the lawyer's employer, without local admission, if the services don't require pro hac vice admission.
- Answer: True
- Why: MR 5.5(d)(1) permits in-house counsel to have a systematic and continuous presence to serve the employer and its organizational affiliates. The lawyer must be authorized to practice where admitted (not merely on inactive status) and not disbarred or suspended in any jurisdiction.
- Exam trap: The in-house exception covers the employer, not its employees' personal matters or outside clients.
- Cite: MR 5.5(d)(1)
TF-0015 (OUT-1.7.1)
- Statement: A law firm may include its nonlawyer employees in a retirement plan funded by a share of the firm's profits.
- Answer: True
- Why: MR 5.4(a)(3) permits compensation or retirement plans for nonlawyer employees even if based on profit-sharing.
- Exam trap: Students think any link to profits is fee sharing. This exception is express.
- Cite: MR 5.4(a)(3)
TF-0016 (OUT-1.7.2)
- Statement: Under the Model Rules, a nonlawyer may own a minority interest in a for-profit law firm as long as the nonlawyer does not direct the lawyers' professional judgment.
- Answer: False
- Why: MR 5.4(d) bars practicing in a for-profit organization in which a nonlawyer owns any interest, apart from a fiduciary holding a deceased lawyer's interest for a reasonable time during administration.
- Corrected statement: Under the Model Rules, a lawyer may not practice in a for-profit law organization in which a nonlawyer owns any interest, apart from a fiduciary holding a deceased lawyer's interest for a reasonable time during administration.
- Exam trap: Some jurisdictions have experimented with nonlawyer ownership; the Model Rule doesn't allow it.
- Cite: MR 5.4(d)(1)
TF-0017 (OUT-1.8.1)
- Statement: A partner in a law firm is automatically subject to discipline for any rule violation committed by an associate in the firm.
- Answer: False
- Why: A partner is responsible for another lawyer's violation only if the partner ordered or ratified it, or knew of it in time to avoid or mitigate its consequences and failed to take reasonable remedial action. Separately, a partner can violate MR 5.1(a) or (b) by failing to make reasonable management or supervision efforts, even without any of those facts.
- Corrected statement: A partner is subject to discipline for an associate's violation only if the partner ordered or ratified it, or knew of it in time to avoid or mitigate its consequences and failed to take reasonable remedial action. The partner may also be disciplined for her own failure to make reasonable efforts under MR 5.1(a) or (b).
- Exam trap: There's no automatic vicarious discipline, but don't forget the partner's own reasonable-efforts duties, which apply without ordering, ratification or knowledge.
- Cite: MR 5.1(a)–(c)
TF-0018 (OUT-1.10.1)
- Statement: An agreement conditioning a departing partner's retirement benefits on not practicing law is permitted.
- Answer: True
- Why: MR 5.6(a) prohibits restrictions on a lawyer's practice after the relationship ends, except agreements concerning retirement benefits.
- Exam trap: This is the one post-departure restriction the rule allows, and the sale of a practice is a separate exception.
- Cite: MR 5.6(a)
Scenario Walkthroughs
SW-0001 · The Partner, the Ledger, and the Exit Clause
Issues.
- Did Voss have a duty to report Adler, and did MR 1.6 excuse her silence?
- Is Voss herself exposed for the trust-account shortfall?
- Can Voss enforce the forfeiture clause, and did she violate a Rule by drafting it?
Analysis.
- The reporting duty. Under MR 8.3(a), once a lawyer knows that another lawyer has broken a Rule in a way serious enough to put that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness substantially in question, she must report it to the appropriate authority. Taking client funds for payroll is conversion under MR 1.15 and dishonesty under MR 8.4(c); it is the paradigm reportable violation. Voss's knowledge is not suspicion — she saw the ledger entries, asked, and got an admission. MR 8.3(c) then matters. The reporting duty does not reach information MR 1.6 protects, and MR 1.6 covers all information relating to a client's representation, whatever its source. The ledger entries show what happened to three clients' settlement money, so they are protected even though Voss found them in the firm's own books. That limit shapes how she reports; it does not license silence. The three clients had to be told their money was taken (MR 1.4(a)(3)), and MR 8.3 cmt. [2] says the lawyer should urge the client to agree to disclosure unless reporting would substantially prejudice the client, which is hard to see for clients whose money was taken. With their consent, MR 8.3(a) requires the full report. Voss did none of this: she told neither the clients nor the authorities. A promise to "square it up" does not undo a completed conversion. (MR 8.3(a), (c), cmt. [2]; MR 1.6(a), cmt. [3]; MR 1.4(a)(3); MR 8.4(c); MR 1.15)
- Her own exposure. Two routes. First, MR 5.1(a): a partner must see that the firm has practical systems in place to keep its lawyers within the Rules. Whether the firm's trust-account controls were adequate turns on facts not given here, so this route is a question to ask, not a conclusion. Second, and more directly, MR 5.1(c)(2): once Voss knew of the conversion while its consequences could still be avoided or mitigated — the clients' money could have been restored and the clients told — she was responsible for Adler's violation if she failed to take reasonable remedial action. She took none. Add MR 1.15's own safekeeping duties, which bind every lawyer with access to the account, and Voss faces discipline independent of Adler's. (MR 5.1(a), (c)(2); MR 1.15)
- The forfeiture clause. MR 5.6(a) bars a lawyer from participating in offering or making a partnership agreement that restricts a lawyer's right to practice after the relationship ends, except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement. A clause that strips deferred compensation — money already earned — from a partner who practices nearby is a practice restriction in disguise; it is not a retirement-benefit condition because Adler is not retiring, he is competing. Voss violated 5.6(a) when she drafted and offered it, and violates it again by seeking to enforce it. Whether a court will enforce the clause is a separate contract question; the MPRE asks about discipline. (MR 5.6(a); cmt. [1])
Conclusion. Voss's silence was not excused. MR 8.3(c) and MR 1.6 limit what a report may reveal without the clients' consent, but she had to tell the three clients what happened, and should have urged them to consent to a report, since a report could hardly prejudice clients whose money was taken; with their consent, MR 8.3(a) required it. She is separately responsible under MR 5.1(c)(2) for the unremedied conversion, and the forfeiture clause violates MR 5.6(a) both as drafted and as enforced. Adler's misconduct does not make Voss's own conduct clean.
Rules. MR 8.3(a), (c), cmt. [2] · MR 1.6(a), cmt. [3] · MR 1.4(a)(3) · MR 8.4(c) · MR 1.15 · MR 5.1(a), (c)(2) · MR 5.6(a); cmt. [1]
Key terms
| ID | Term | Outline | Flashcard |
|---|---|---|---|
| KT-0001 | Character and fitness | OUT-1.2.1 | FC-0003 |
| KT-0002 | direct supervisory authority | OUT-1.8.1 | FC-0013 |
| KT-0003 | Duty to report misconduct | OUT-1.4.1 | FC-0006 |
| KT-0004 | Fee sharing with a nonlawyer | OUT-1.7.1 | FC-0011 |
| KT-0005 | Knows (knowingly) | OUT-1.1.2 | FC-0001 |
| KT-0006 | Law-related services | OUT-1.9.2 | FC-0016 |
| KT-0007 | Multijurisdictional practice | OUT-1.6.1 | FC-0009 |
| KT-0008 | Nonlawyer assistance | OUT-1.8.3 | FC-0014 |
| KT-0009 | predominant effect | OUT-1.3.2 | FC-0005 |
| KT-0010 | pro hac vice admission | OUT-1.6.1 | FC-0010 |
| KT-0011 | Professional independence | OUT-1.7.2 | FC-0012 |
| KT-0012 | Professional misconduct | OUT-1.3.1 | FC-0004 |
| KT-0013 | Reasonably believes | OUT-1.1.2 | FC-0002 |
| KT-0014 | Restriction on the right to practice | OUT-1.10.1 | FC-0017 |
| KT-0015 | Sale of a law practice | OUT-1.9.1 | FC-0015 |
| KT-0016 | systematic and continuous presence | OUT-1.5.1 | FC-0008 |
| KT-0017 | Unauthorized practice of law | OUT-1.5.1 | FC-0007 |